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Abstract 
Every year Australian heavy vehicle drivers are involved in a significant number of 
injuries and fatalities. A number of researchers have suggested safety culture could be used to 
improve safety within the heavy vehicle industry. To date, however, no major research 
project has explored safety culture within this industry. Further, standard safety culture 
perspectives are ill-suited to the strong combination of both autonomy and regulation within 
the industry. Thus, to explore safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry, there is a need 
to enhance the current understanding of safety culture. 
The purpose of this research was to enhance the current understanding of safety culture 
by providing a new theoretically grounded framework of safety culture; and to utilise this 
framework to explore safety within the heavy vehicle industry. An initial analysis of the 
safety culture literature revealed theoretical ties to organisational culture and traditional 
concepts of culture found in the anthropology and cultural psychology literature. Due to their 
unique strengths and weaknesses, and the complementary nature of these conceptualisations, 
they were synthesised and a new conceptualisation of safety culture created. This synthesised 
conceptualisation holds that shared beliefs, attitudes and values (culture) of organisation 
members interact with their surroundings (context) to produce safety-related behaviours and 
outcomes. 
In order to apply the developed framework to the heavy vehicle industry, the research 
adopted the following five aims: (a) examine the suitability of key components of the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture to the heavy vehicle industry; (b) identify 
factors previously identified within heavy vehicle industries which comprise the key 
components of the framework; (c) identify major factors within the heavy vehicle industry 
which have eluded previous research; (d) identify the best approach to investigating the effect 
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of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry; and (e) examine how cultural and 
contextual factors affect safety-related behaviours in the heavy vehicle industry. 
A three-part research program was developed.  
Study One consisted of a systematic review of the heavy vehicle health and safety 
literature. This literature was analysed using the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture, providing a preliminary framework of safety culture within the heavy vehicle 
industry. A number of safety-related behaviours and their associated outcomes were 
identified. Additionally, contextual factors, including those related to government, the 
organisation, customers, the workers union, and the road and work environment, and a 
selection of potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values, were identified which related to 
the identified behaviours and outcomes.  
Study Two consisted of semi-structured interviews with key industry stakeholders. 
These interviews were used to identify major factors absent in previous research and to 
determine the best approach to explore relationships between key components of the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture and associated behaviours and outcomes. 
Interview data was analysed using grounded theory coding techniques. Study Two provided 
additional depth to many of the factors identified in Study One. Additionally, this study 
uniquely identified the importance of a number of industrial groups and affiliations, the 
general public and sub-contractual arrangements. Further, it found a high degree of perceived 
heterogeneity within the industry. Thus, in order to explore the effect of contextual and 
cultural factors on behaviours and outcomes, the next phase of the research needed to target 
individual organisations. 
Study Three consisted of three case studies with specific transport organisations. Using 
a combination of ethnography and grounded theory research techniques, Study Three sought 
to both explore the culture of the industry and the impact of culture and context on 
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behaviours and outcomes. The case studies consisted of interviews with drivers and 
organisational personnel, participant observation of drivers, and document analysis. A 
detailed account of the context surrounding drivers from each organisation was provided. 
Further, a number of cultural traits, common across the organisations, were identified. 
Finally, the relationship between culture and context, and behaviour and outcomes was 
explored. 
The current research contributed to the existing knowledge of safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry. Evidence of an industry-wide culture was found. Further, the way in which 
contextual factors were seen to interact with this culture led to the identification of potential 
best practices for organisations and customers, as well as changes to existing contextual 
factors that are ill-suited to the prevailing culture. Hence, a number of potential guidelines for 
safety interventions within the industry were identified. Future studies could aim to 
statistically validate the findings of the current research. 
The current research also contributed to the field of safety culture through the 
developed model of safety culture. This synthesised conceptualisation was demonstrated to 
be suitable for the heavy vehicle industry, and may be applicable to other related industries. 
Further, none of the examined safety behaviours could be explained through solely contextual 
or cultural factors. The synthesised conceptualisation provided in this research offers unique 
insight into safety behaviours unable to be gained using existing approaches to safety culture. 
Future research could seek to explore the potential benefits of this framework within other 
industries. 
 
 
Key Words 
Safety Culture, Organisational Culture, Occupational Health and Safety, Heavy Vehicle, 
Truck Safety, Truck Crash. 
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Definitions of Terms and Abbreviations 
Culture and Safety Culture-Related Terms 
 
Both ‘culture’ and ‘safety culture’ are terms with many definitions and as such no single 
definition is provided here. However, the below terms are used to refer to distinct 
approaches or conceptualisations within the culture and safety culture literature. 
Anthropological conceptualisation  The anthropological conceptualisation of culture 
holds that culture is a series of shared factors 
typically consisting of attitudes, beliefs and values. 
Functionalist approach  The functionalist approach to safety culture holds that 
safety culture is a pattern of shared behaviour and 
emphasises organisational structures and systems 
which influence this behaviour. 
Interpretive approach  The interpretive approach to safety culture holds that 
safety culture is shared patterns of meaning, typically 
operationalised as shared beliefs, attitudes and values. 
Normative conceptualisation The normative conceptualisation of culture holds that 
culture is the knowledge of the best that has been said 
and thought. When transferred to safety culture this 
conceptualisation emphasises comparing 
organisational structures and systems to current ‘best 
practices’. 
Pragmatist conceptualisation The pragmatist conceptualisation of culture holds that 
culture is about routine behaviour (practices) which 
  xxii 
 
results from shared underlying beliefs, attitudes and 
values. 
Synthesised conceptualisation The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, 
proposed within the current research, holds that safety 
culture is the assembly of underlying assumptions, 
beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an 
organisation (anthropological culture), which interact 
with an organisation’s structures and systems and the 
broader contextual setting (normative culture) to 
result in those external, readily-visible, practices 
(pragmatic culture) that influence safety. 
 Contextual factors Within the synthesised conceptualisation, contextual 
factors are any factors which influence behaviour but 
are external to the members of a given population. 
 Cultural traits Within the synthesised conceptualisation, cultural 
traits consist of beliefs, attitudes and values shared by 
members of a given population. 
Study Specific Terms 
The following terms are used within the current research and may hold ambiguous 
meanings. As such, the terms refer to the following definitions within the research. 
Autonomy For the purpose of this research, autonomy refers 
to freedom from external supervision, such as in 
the context of truck drivers who are absent from 
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the presence of a supervisor. 
Driver  Unless otherwise qualified (e.g. car driver), 
driver refers to a heavy vehicle driver. 
Heavy vehicle For the purpose of the current research, a heavy 
vehicle specifically refers to an automobile used 
to transport freight. Though no explicit cut-off 
was applied, heavy vehicles are typically 
classified as weighing over 4.5 tonnes. 
Organisational staff For the current research, organisational staff 
refers to any employee of a transport organisation 
not employed to drive a heavy vehicle. 
Observation Within the current research, observation 
specifically refers to the participant-observation 
technique used within ethnography. This 
technique consists of the researcher participating 
in typical daily rituals and directly interacting 
with the observed individual to gain an insider 
perspective. 
Heavy Vehicle Industry Terms 
There are many terms used by members of the industry and within the current research 
which may alienate the reader. Whilst these terms have been defined (where possible) at 
their first introduction within the text, the following list of terms and abbreviations used 
within the current research is provided for reference. 
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AFM (Advanced Fatigue 
Management) 
Advanced Fatigue Management is one of three 
fatigue management schemes offering 
significant flexibility in driving hours, with 
higher requirements for organisations than 
other schemes. 
Articulated truck An articulated truck is a vehicle consisting of a 
towing engine (referred to as a prime mover) 
and one or more trailers. 
B-double A B-double is a two-trailer truck combination 
consisting of a prime mover attached to a 
shortened trailer fitted to allow a standard semi-
trailer to be attached from behind. 
Body truck A body truck is a small heavy vehicle in which 
the trailer and towing engine are a single entity. 
That is, the trailer cannot be removed from the 
truck. Typically a body truck is quite small and 
may only possess two axles.   
BFM (Basic Fatigue Management) Basic Fatigue Management is the second 
fatigue management scheme which allows a 
maximum of 14 hours’ work in a given 24-hour 
period. Additional requirements include 
maximum night-time hours, maximum intervals 
between rest periods, and minimum rest 
durations. 
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Bonneted truck (also conventional) A bonneted truck or conventional truck is a 
prime mover in which the driver cab is situated 
behind the axle and the engine is housed below 
a bonnet protruding in front of the driver. 
Cab The cab (cabin) of a truck is the enclosed space 
within which the driver is seated when driving. 
Cab-over A cab-over truck is a prime mover in which the 
cab is situated over the axle and has a vertical 
(flat) front rather than a bonnet. 
COR (chain of responsibility) Chain of responsibility legislation states that 
each member of the supply chain is responsible 
for the safety of goods transport. Thus, a 
customer or manager may be held accountable 
for failing to ensure safe transport. 
Crate (livestock crate) A crate or livestock crate is the specific form of 
trailer used to transport livestock. The crate is 
typically two levelled, has openings along the 
side to allow air movement, and contains sealed 
off pens to minimise cattle movement. 
Extendable trailer An extendable trailer is a trailer with a 
modifiable length allowing for longer loads to 
be safely carried, without impeding on the 
ability to use the trailer for shorter loads. 
FM (Fatigue management) Fatigue management refers to regulations 
relating to the management of fatigue. The 
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regulations revolve around legislated work and 
rest periods monitored through the use of work 
diaries. There are three fatigue management 
schemes (standard, basic and advanced) which 
incrementally allow increased maximum 
durations of work with additional required 
safety precautions. 
Gate A gate is a metal frame inserted into the side of 
a trailer, or behind a load, to provide a solid 
barrier to prevent goods from shifting during 
transport. 
General freight General freight is a broad category of freight 
types typically encompassing any form of 
freight that does not have specific legislating 
requirements. 
Heavy haulage Heavy haulage refers to the transport of goods 
which are above the legal weight range of 
goods, thus requiring permits and specialised 
equipment. 
Line-haul  Line-haul is the transport of goods between 
major cities. 
Local Local driving typically refers to goods being 
transported within 200km (the maximum 
distance that goods can be transported without 
a work diary) of the transport company depot. 
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Long-distance Long-distance driving typically refers to trip 
lengths over 200km from the transport 
company depot (thus requiring a work diary). 
This can include inter- and intra-state transport. 
Log books Log books are the common name used to refer 
to work diaries. The term used to be correct, 
however, the term was replaced with work 
diaries when the fatigue management 
legislation changed. 
NHVAS (National Heavy Vehicle 
Accreditation Scheme) 
The National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation 
Scheme is an accreditation body which 
provides accreditation that permits 
organisations to either use basic or advanced 
fatigue management, conduct their own 
maintenance or manage their own vehicles. 
NOD (normalisation of deviance) Normalisation of deviance is a process by 
which unsafe behaviour is conducted without 
consequence, and so the behaviour becomes 
acceptable. 
Non-conformance Non-conformance notifications/slips etc. refer 
to a report issued to a driver and kept on record 
when a driver acts in a manner contrary to 
organisational policies. A non-conformance 
typically states what the improper behaviour 
was, what should be done in future, and what 
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approach will be used to punish this behaviour 
or ensure it does not reoccur. 
Over-dimension Over-dimension freight is any type of transport 
which has a width, height, or length beyond 
that which can be legally carried without a 
permit. 
Prime mover A prime mover is the towing unit of an 
articulated truck, and thus is a truck which is 
not built with a trailer. 
Rigid truck A rigid truck is a heavy vehicle in which the 
trailer and towing engine are a single entity. 
That is, the trailer cannot be removed from the 
truck. Further, the trailer is not free-moving and 
is rigidly attached to the engine unit. 
Road train A road train is a category of vehicle 
combinations consisting of a prime mover and 
multiple trailers. This includes B-doubles and 
various three (triple) and four (quad) trailer 
configurations. 
Semi-trailer A semi-trailer can refer to a trailer attached to 
the prime mover, however, it typically refers to 
a specific articulated truck vehicle combination 
in which a prime-mover tows a single trailer. 
SFM (Standard Fatigue Standard Fatigue Management is the default 
fatigue management scheme which allows a 
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Management) maximum of 12 hours’ work in any given 24-
hour period. A number of additional 
requirements are also present which govern the 
maximum intervals between rest periods and 
minimum rest durations. 
SOR (serious occurrence report) Serious occurrence reports are reports of 
incidents that have occurred within other 
organisations, which are relayed to a transport 
company. These are typically used for 
educational purposes. 
Speed limiter A speed limiter is a device fitted in the engine 
of a truck which limits the maximum speed the 
vehicle can accelerate to.  
SSO (serious safety occurrence) Serious safety occurrence is another name for 
an SOR (see above). 
Taut-Liner A taut-liner is a form of trailer in which the 
side walls are comprised of curtains (typically 
canvas) pulled taut. There are often platforms 
within the trailer allowing multiple levels of 
freight. 
Work diary A work diary is a book used by heavy vehicle 
drivers to record work and rest hours for the 
purpose of demonstrating fatigue management 
compliance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – The effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
 
 
 
 
1.1. HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE HEAVY VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
Transport is a crucial component of the Australian economy, accounting for 
approximately 5% of gross domestic product (GDP), and directly contributing to almost all 
other sectors within Australia (Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government, 2009). Situated within the transport sector is the road 
freight, or heavy vehicle, industry, in which health and safety is a major concern. Heavy 
vehicle drivers face many health and safety issues which are common to other industries, but 
have the additional concern of road safety as a regular component of their work. Safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry can generally be broken into road safety and workplace health and 
safety.  
Over 18% of the Australian road toll in the 12 months to the end of December 2012 can 
be attributed to crashes involving heavy vehicles (Department of Infrastructure & Local 
Government, 2013; Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, & Local 
Government, 2013). These deaths included heavy vehicle operators and the general public, 
showing that heavy vehicle road safety is not solely a workplace safety issue, but is also a 
public health concern. As well as loss of human life and related injuries, crashes may also 
cause additional damage due to the nature of materials transported. A leading truck insurance 
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company found that during 2011, 461 national truck crash incidents accounted for 
AUD$54.7m in claims payments (Driscoll, 2013). 
Aside from road crashes there are a number of other occupational safety concerns in the 
industry. Injury compensation data from Queensland, released shortly prior to the onset of 
this research, revealed that between 2008 and 2009 the transport and storage sector received 
2718 accepted injury claims, at a rate of 21.7 per 1000 workers. This rate was second only to 
the manufacturing industry and approximately 50% higher than the all-industry average 
(Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Board, 2010). Over 60% of serious injuries within 
the transport and storage sector are musculoskeletal disorders (Workplace Health and Safety 
Queensland, 2009). Furthermore, there are a number of health concerns prominent in the 
Australian heavy vehicle industry, including poor mental health, obesity, arthritis and 
rheumatism, lung diseases, heart and intestinal problems (The Work Outcome Research Cost-
Benefit (WORC) Project, 2008).  
In recent years, the Australian heavy vehicle industry has been the target for a number 
of policy initiatives and strategies aimed at improving health and safety. Due to the number 
of incidents and injury claims per employee, the National Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) Commission (2002) identified the transport and storage sector as one of four primary 
targets for the 2002-2012 National OHS Strategy. Five years after the inception of the 
National OHS Strategy, the number of incidents and injury claims per employee in the 
transport and storage sector had decreased by 22%. Despite this sector-wide decline, the road 
freight transport sub-group (the heavy vehicle industry), which accounts for 29% of 
employees in this sector, only showed an 11% reduction (Australian Safety and 
Compensation Council, 2010). The heavy vehicle industry, therefore, appears to be more 
resistant to national safety initiatives than other related industries. Health education research 
has shown that ‘off the shelf’ or global intervention strategies, that are applied to audiences 
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they were not specifically designed for, can have differing levels of effectiveness due to the 
impact of cultural norms and values (McLeroy et al., 1994). These issues point to the need to 
explore the impact of culture on safety (commonly referred to as safety culture) in the heavy 
vehicle industry.  
1.2. SAFETY CULTURE 
Safety culture has seen significant attention within the literature in recent years (for 
detailed analysis see reviews by Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; and Guldenmund, 
2000). There is significant debate within the literature about the nature of safety culture and 
how it can be defined and measured. Whilst some researchers view safety culture in terms of 
shared beliefs and values, others perceive it in terms of organisational structures and systems. 
Naevestad (2009) referred to these researchers respectively as interpretive and functionalist 
scholars. Dependent on the view of safety culture held by a researcher there are also different 
approaches used to measure or explore it. Due to limited consensus over definitional or 
operational concepts, one group of researchers referred to safety culture as ‘a concept in 
chaos’ (H. Zhang, Wiegmann, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 4). 
1.3. SAFETY CULTURE AND THE HEAVY VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
A number of researchers have indicated that safety culture could provide a useful 
avenue for improving safety in the heavy vehicle industry (P. Gander et al., 2011; McCorry & 
Murray, 1993; Short, Boyle, Shackelford, Inderbitzen, & Bergoffen, 2007). However major 
research has yet to explore the effect of safety culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Thus, there is a lack of existing research demonstrating how the safety culture concept could 
be applied to this industry.  
There may be a number of barriers to the use of existing safety culture approaches 
within the heavy vehicle industry. Due to the high levels of autonomy heavy vehicle 
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operators have regarding safety issues (Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, & Shelley Ii, 2003), safety 
culture may be difficult to apply to this industry. In industrial and organisational settings with 
high levels of autonomy or de-centralisation, safety concerns may be overlooked due to 
varying margins for error within different sub-units, systematic censorship and distortion of 
information regarding negative events, and inadequate communication (Pitzer, 1999). In such 
settings, safety culture can be a powerful means by which a sufficient level of integration can 
occur within an organisation, thereby enabling autonomy to continue in such a way that all 
parties work towards the same ultimate goals (Grote, 2008). However, the heavy vehicle 
industry is a special case, in that the degree of freedom and autonomy means that in many 
ways drivers serve as their own boss, working with little or no supervision. Unlike many 
other industries, the degree of time spent away from the organisation (particularly line-haul 
drivers), may lead to drivers identifying themselves separately from their organisation (Sully, 
2001). Therefore, it is clear that functionalist approaches which emphasise organisational 
structures and systems are too limited to explain safety within the heavy vehicle industry. 
It could be argued that this lends support to utilising an interpretive approach 
(emphasising shared beliefs, attitudes and values), yet this may also be too limiting. As 
previously indicated, there have been a number of policy initiatives and strategies aimed at 
improving safety within the heavy vehicle industry. Heavy vehicle drivers are subject to a 
wide variety of regulations to which they must adhere or risk punishment. They may also be 
subject to a number of organisational and customer policies and requirements. A solely 
interpretive approach would fail to take these aspects into account.  
1.4. THE PERFECT COMBINATION: A CONCEPT IN CHAOS – AN INDUSTRY 
IN NEED 
The fractured state of the field of safety culture, combined with the uniqueness of the 
heavy vehicle industry, presents an interesting nexus within which to conduct research. 
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Firstly, there is a need to explore the effect that culture has on safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Secondly, there is a need to enhance the existing understanding of safety culture. 
Whilst past researchers have simply redefined safety culture to suit a target problem 
(Guldenmund, 2000), defining safety culture relative to the heavy vehicle industry would 
further contribute to confusion of the field. Additionally, it is difficult to theoretically justify 
defining the concept to suit a single research problem. Thus, it is impossible to accurately 
address the effect of safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry without first addressing the 
confusion of the field.  
The current research, therefore, seeks to return to the theoretical roots of safety culture 
and identify the core components of the concept to provide clarity to the concept of safety 
culture, and identify underlying factors that should be considered in the heavy vehicle 
industry. This further benefits the heavy vehicle industry by ensuring that the current research 
is theoretically grounded, rather than merely a blind application of concepts used within other 
industries. 
1.5. THE CURRENT RESEARCH  
Due to the nature of health and safety in the heavy vehicle industry, and barriers to 
using existing approaches to safety culture, there are two principal aims of the current 
research. The first objective is to enhance the current understanding of safety culture and 
provide a theoretically grounded framework of safety culture. The second objective is to use 
this framework to explore the effect of culture on safety within the heavy vehicle industry. 
This research thesis starts by reviewing literature that pertains to safety culture, and uses it to 
develop a theoretical framework of safety culture. This framework is referred to as a 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture.  
A three-part research program was developed to examine the efficacy of this 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, and use it to explore the effect of culture on 
Chapter 1: Introduction  6 
 
safety in the heavy vehicle industry. The first study was comprised of a systematic literature 
review pertaining to heavy vehicle health and safety. Whilst there has not been a lack of 
major research exploring safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry, by exploring the 
literature regarding health and safety in heavy vehicle industries worldwide it is possible to 
develop an understanding of the factors which have been seen to influence health and safety 
outcomes. These factors can be interpreted through the synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture. Results of this review were used to identify factors to be considered when 
exploring the effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry, and begin to develop 
an industry-specific theoretical framework of safety culture. 
The second study was comprised of a series of semi-structured interviews with 31 key 
industry stakeholders. This served to confirm the findings of the systematic literature review 
in Study One, and identify any major factors not found in the literature. Additionally, this 
study served to identify the best approach to directly examine the effect that culture has on 
safety in the industry. Findings from this study determined the best approach to investigate 
the effect of culture of safety was to conduct case studies with individual transport 
companies. 
The third study consisted of three case studies with specific transport companies 
situated in Queensland, Australia. The case studies were comprised of interviews with drivers 
and management staff and observations of drivers, along with analysis of safety documents to 
corroborate information provided by participants. These case studies provided in-depth 
information of contextual and cultural factors that were present for drivers in companies 
being investigated, and the manner in which they influence safety. 
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1.6. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS TO THE EXISTING BODY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
Whilst further research is required to confirm the findings of this thesis, this study 
contributes to the body of knowledge on both safety culture and health and safety within 
heavy vehicle industries. Many theses commonly apply existing models and frameworks to 
novel problems. Conversely, the requirement of this thesis to develop a new framework of 
safety culture means that both the initial literature review and framework, and the results of 
the current research, hold direct contributions to knowledge.  
This thesis provides a novel approach to safety culture, which was useful in interpreting 
existing literature and understanding safety within the heavy vehicle industry. The use of the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture to interpret literature demonstrates its efficacy 
in informing research. Similarly, the conceptualisation’s application to the heavy vehicle 
industry provides a unique understanding of behaviour not possible with existing approaches 
to safety culture. Further, the current research offers the first major research findings of safety 
culture in any heavy vehicle industry worldwide. Finally, the findings may serve to 
significantly improve safety within the industry, due to an increased understanding of the 
cultural and contextual setting within which interventions are applied.  
1.7. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the chapters in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 is comprised of a literature review of safety culture. The purpose of the review was 
to develop an understanding of the current standing of the field, and to develop a theoretical 
framework for application within the current research. Throughout the review it is recognised 
that safety culture has theoretical ties to more traditional concepts of culture found in 
anthropology and cultural psychology literature. These traditional concepts are then used to 
further understand the current safety culture literature. The different scope, strengths and 
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weaknesses of these concepts mean they can be viewed as separate aspects of a larger 
concept. The review concludes by presenting the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture which holds that safety culture is the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, 
values and attitudes shared by members of an organisation, which interact with an 
organisation’s structures and systems and the broader contextual setting to result in those 
external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety. 
Chapter 3 outlines the research and the methods used for data collection and analysis in 
this thesis. The research comprises three major studies. Study One is a systematic literature 
review examining peer-reviewed literature regarding heavy vehicle health and safety. The 
purpose of this review is to interpret the existing research in the light of the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture. Thus, the review provides a theoretical framework of 
safety culture specific to the heavy vehicle industry and demonstrates the applicability of the 
synthesised conceptualisation to this industry. Study Two consists of a series of semi-
structured interviews conducted with key industry stakeholders. The purpose of Study Two is 
to further inform the findings of Study One to enhance the theoretical framework, and 
identify the best approach to explore the effect of safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Study Three is comprised of three case studies with specific transport organisations. Study 
Three aims to identify the effect of contextual and cultural factors on safety in the industry. 
The case studies are comprised of interviews, observations and document analysis. 
Chapter 4 provides results of the systematic literature review that comprised Study One. 
The literature on heavy vehicle health and safety was classified according to the health and 
safety outcomes to which they related. The literature regarding these outcomes was analysed 
through the lens of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture to develop an industry-
specific theoretical framework of safety culture.  
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Chapter 5 contains results of the semi-structured interviews. From the interviews, 
factors identified in Study One were further developed, and additional factors identified, 
further developing the theoretical framework. Additionally, a number of differences between 
sections of the industry were identified, highlighting the need to avoid treating the industry as 
a homogenous entity. Study Two concludes that case studies are the most efficacious 
approach to use for Study Three to identify specific cultural factors present within 
organisations and the way they interact with contextual factors to influence behaviour. 
Chapter 6 presents a brief overview of the case studies and a summary of Chapters 7 to 
11. Chapter 7 discusses the organisational context for each studied organisation, providing 
specific details of the management strategies used within the organisation. Chapter 8 presents 
the broader contextual factors identified within the case studies which surround the 
organisation and their drivers. Chapter 9 reports on each of the cultural traits identified in the 
case studies. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes Study Three’s results by exploring the manner in 
which previously identified factors influence specific safety behaviours within the studied 
organisations. 
Chapter 11 provides a discussion of the overall research program, examining how it 
compares with existing research. This final chapter provides critical analysis of the current 
research limitations. Chapter 11 also discusses how the current research contributes to the 
existing field of knowledge on both safety culture and heavy vehicle driver health and safety. 
Lastly, future directions for research based upon the findings of the current research are 
discussed. 
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2.  
 
Chapter 2: Returning to the Roots of Culture – A Review and Reconceptualisation of 
Safety Culture 
 
A modified version of this chapter was published as: 
Edwards, J. R. D., Davey, J., & Armstrong, K. (2013). Returning to the roots of culture: A review 
and re-conceptualisation of safety culture. Safety Science, 55, 70-80. doi: 
10.1016/j.ssci.2013.01.004 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Safety culture’ is a term with many definitions in the academic and professional 
literature (see reviews by Choudhry et al., 2007; and Guldenmund, 2000). The phrase safety 
culture was first used by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) in a 
report following the 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Amongst other 
causal factors, it was reported that a lack of safety culture, both within the Chernobyl plant 
and at a national level, contributed to the incident (INSAG-1, 1986, as updated in INSAG-7, 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). Five years after the disaster INSAG 
gave the following definition of safety culture: 
Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations 
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” (INSAG-4, 
1991, p. 1). 
Safety culture research has been conducted by individuals from various disciplines, 
leading to different conceptualisations of safety culture. Despite much research, there is a 
lack of widely-accepted definitions of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Hopkins, 2006). 
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Guldenmund (2000) suggested that this has led many researchers to re-define safety culture 
in relation to their research topic. Due to the number of definitions of safety culture, and the 
nature of the issue under investigation, research has focussed on many factors, including 
organisational management systems, policies and procedures, job design, work pressures, 
training, employee involvement in decision making, and perceptions and attitudes regarding 
the work environment (Arboleda et al., 2003; Choudhry et al., 2007; Cox & Cheyne, 2000; 
Grote, 2008; Håvold, 2010; O’Toole, 2002; Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006).  
Disagreement regarding the nature and content of safety culture presents a barrier to the 
advancement of the field beyond a loose collection of safety research. Whilst the nature of 
safety, risks and hazards may differ between organisational settings, thereby permitting 
different focuses between researchers, it is questionable whether culture and, therefore, safety 
culture, is differentiated. Distinct from the broader field of safety science is the specific use 
of the word ‘culture’ in safety culture. Thus, exploration of the meaning of the term culture 
may provide insight for the development of safety culture. Despite the lack of consensus in 
the field, there is some agreement that a positive safety culture is an organisational culture 
that places a high priority on safety-related beliefs, values and attitudes (Cooper, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Short et al., 2007). Whilst the literature presents safety culture as a 
specific issue, it can be viewed as a sub-component or effect of organisational culture, and 
not a culture in itself (Antonsen, 2009; Choudhry et al., 2007; Guldenmund, 2000; Haukelid, 
2008; Hopkins, 2006). Organisational culture thus appears a useful avenue to explore the 
meaning of culture in safety culture. 
2.2. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND SAFETY CULTURE 
Fisher and Alford (2000) found over 164 definitions of organisational culture. Despite a 
broad variety of definitions Guldenmund (2000) identified seven common characteristics of 
organisational culture, these being that it is (1) an abstraction and so is difficult to define and 
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operationalise; (2) relatively stable over time; (3) multi-dimensional; (4) shared by groups of 
people; (5) may contain several coexisting aspects (e.g. a ‘service climate’ or a safety 
culture);  (6) leads to overt practices; and (7) serves a functional purpose (e.g. culture is “the 
way we do things around here”). One of the more commonly referenced definitions of 
organisational culture is:  
shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with 
a company’s people, organizational structures and control systems to produce 
behavioural norms (the way we do things around here) (Uttal, 1983, p. 66).   
Another definition is provided by Schein (1990) who argued that any group with a 
significant shared history may have developed a culture and as such, organisational culture is 
simply the culture held by members of a given organisation. This culture was defined as: 
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and 
therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1990, p. 111).  
If organisational culture is merely the culture held by members of an organisation, then 
it can be argued that safety culture also has theoretical ties to traditional concepts of culture. 
It is, therefore, somewhat peculiar that safety culture literature rarely ventures beyond brief 
discussions of organisational culture in establishing its own theoretical basis. Due to 
difficulties in conveying culture to the business world, culture is often translated into business 
concepts (Fisher & Alford, 2000). Whilst it is important to communicate organisational and 
safety culture effectively to the business community and thereby increase its application, this 
communication must ensure fidelity to the original concepts. Basing safety culture purely 
upon the organisational culture literature adds a risk of cumulative error, leading to a loss of 
original concepts of culture. In order to explore the meaning of culture in safety culture, it is 
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beneficial to briefly return to traditional conceptualisations of culture, found in the 
anthropological and cultural psychology literature.  
2.3. APPLYING TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF CULTURE TO SAFETY 
CULTURE 
According to Tharp (2007), efforts to define culture have invariably led to exasperation. 
Definitions of culture number in the hundreds and differ in specificity (Cohen, 2009; 
Triandis, 1996). Brinkmann (2007) identified three conceptualisations of culture, namely 
normative, anthropological and pragmatist conceptualisations, which can be viewed as broad 
categories encompassing much of the research regarding culture. These conceptualisations 
provide a useful starting point for discussions about the nature of culture in safety culture. 
Whilst there are many issues of contention within these conceptualisations, this chapter 
provides a general overview of these conceptualisations, exploring how they can be, or have 
been, applied to safety culture.  
The normative conception holds that culture is the knowledge of “the best that has been 
said and thought” (Arnold, 1993). In this conceptualisation, culture is seen as a substance 
which can and ought to be possessed by an individual, resulting in the person being ‘cultured’ 
(Brinkmann, 2007). When applied to a group setting this conceptualisation can similarly be 
used to describe a group as cultured or uncultured. Brinkmann (2007) argued that this 
conceptualisation can be used to describe the ‘normative differences’ between individuals 
and groups. 
The anthropological conceptualisation of culture holds that culture is possessed by all, 
being comprised of factors that ensure conduct is repeated (Brinkmann, 2007). This view of 
culture focuses on the shared factors, rather than the evaluation of characteristics which are 
present or absent. This conceptualisation is dominant within the anthropological and cultural 
psychology literature, and many definitions of culture utilise this conceptualisation. Whilst a 
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full analysis of the social anthropology literature is beyond the scope of this thesis, a few 
points warrant discussion. 
Due to the difficulties inherent in defining culture many authors rely on examples 
drawn from other fields to describe culture. For example, Triandis (1989) likened culture in a 
society to memory for an individual. Rohner (1984) explained culture as a set of rules such as 
those governing sports or the use of language. Triandis (1989) stated that culture pertains to a 
number of domains, including language, economic, political and religious systems, along 
with religious and aesthetic patterns, and social structures to name a few. Later, Triandis 
(1996) stated that, within many definitions, culture commonly consist of a number of “shared 
factors… (that) provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, 
and acting” (p. 408) among a group of individuals who share a common language, history 
and location.  
Psychology has traditionally focussed on predicting behaviour to a greater degree than 
has anthropology. Cross-cultural psychology has sought to understand differences in 
behaviour between cultures. Due to the need for safety culture to be linked to behavioural 
outcomes, cross-cultural psychology provides a useful starting point for discussing how the 
anthropological conceptualisation of culture relates to safety culture. Chiu and Hong (2006) 
stated that there are many aspects of a culture including: (1) a material culture relating to 
methods used to achieve goals; (2) a subjective culture consisting of shared knowledge and 
ideas; and (3) a social culture consisting of rules and norms. Cooper and Denner (1998) 
reviewed a number of psychological theories relating to culture. One theory was ‘culture as 
core societal values’, which strongly relates to the anthropological conceptualisation of 
culture. These theories define culture as a set of shared beliefs or values, reflected in the 
systems and practices of a group, and in the thoughts, emotions and motivations of 
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individuals (C. Cooper & Denner, 1998). Thus, the shared factors of the anthropological 
conceptualisation of culture are commonly beliefs, attitudes and values. 
The final conceptualisation provided by Brinkmann (2007) was the pragmatist 
conceptualisation. Based on practice theory the pragmatist conceptualisation holds that 
culture is essentially about practices. Social models have generally sought to understand 
behaviour in terms of cognitions regarding behavioural consequences or group norms. 
However, practice theory (Reckwitz, 2002) holds that social order is not mental qualities and 
interactions but about tangible practices, described as the routine handling of objects, 
treatment of individuals and approaches to understanding the world around us. Despite the 
emphasis on behaviour, the pragmatist conceptualisation posits that behaviour only classifies 
as cultural ‘practices’ when attributions can be made regarding underlying values and 
reasons. This conceptualisation is, therefore, inextricably linked to the anthropological 
conceptualisation, which focuses on these beliefs, attitudes and values.  
As can be seen by the above discussion, the concept of culture can be interpreted in a 
number of ways, resulting in different understandings of the purpose of investigating culture 
and the core components that form culture. The three conceptualisations presented above do 
not necessarily cover the entire array of possibilities of culture, yet they serve as fundamental 
building blocks that can be used to explore safety culture. The remainder of this chapter will 
focus on applying these conceptualisations to safety culture, providing specific examples, 
where relevant, of these conceptualisations as they have been applied to safety culture. 
Finally, due to the unique strengths and limitations of each conceptualisation, this chapter 
provide a synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture.  
2.3.1. The normative conceptualisation of safety culture 
When discussing safety culture, Pidgeon (1991) stated that “a normative element is 
implicit in the original use of the term” (p. 130). Similarly, Guldenmund (2000) noted that the 
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INSAG report “follows a normative approach” (p. 245). The definition implied that safety 
culture leads to safety as the overriding priority (a predetermined ‘best’), rather than 
determining commitment to safety. Hopkins (2006) stated that for some authors, “only an 
organisation which has an over-riding commitment to safety can be said to have a safety 
culture” (p. 876). Over time this conceptualisation of safety culture has evolved, with some 
acknowledging that safety culture can exist to differing extents within organisations. For 
example, Parker et al. (2006) provided a list of defining characteristics for five types of safety 
cultures: pathological, reactive, calculative, proactive and generative. Despite this shift, the 
core evaluative component of this conceptualisation remains in much literature.  
When using a normative-like conceptualisation of safety culture, safety professionals 
first evaluate the presence and strength of safety culture within an organisation. If it is 
determined that an organisation lacks safety culture, or has a weak safety culture, the 
professional then begins to create or strengthen safety culture. If, however, an organisation 
has a strong safety culture, the professional ensures processes are in place to maintain this 
culture. In both of these examples safety culture can be viewed as a tool or solution to be 
applied to an organisation to improve or maintain safety performance. Haukelid (2008) noted 
that this ‘instrumental’ approach is common within management literature regarding safety 
culture.  
This emphasis of safety culture as a solution has been present since the first uses of the 
term. INSAG reported that “safety culture had not been properly instilled... prior to the 
Chernobyl accident” and that “the need to create and maintain a ‘safety culture’ is a 
precondition” for safety (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992, p. 22 ). Despite 
emphasising the need to create and maintain a safety culture, the INSAG failed to adequately 
define or describe the content of safety culture. INSAG report 4 (International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group, 1991), which expressly sought to clarify the meaning of safety culture, 
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reinforced the emphasis on creation and maintenance of safety culture without a clear concept 
of what safety culture is. INSAG’s model of safety culture simply stated that ‘policy level’, 
‘managerial’ and ‘individual’ commitment leads to safety culture.  
At the extreme end of this outcome-orientated approach, Cooper (2000) suggested that: 
 the creation of a safety culture simply becomes a super-ordinate goal, that is 
achieved by dividing the task into a series of sub-goals that are intended to direct 
people's attention and actions towards the management of safety (p. 116).  
Cooper proposed a model, which has been adapted for use in specific settings (e.g. 
Choudhry et al., 2007), in which safety culture was the product of psychological, behavioural, 
and situational factors. Despite being labelled as a model of safety culture, each of these 
factors were recognised to be distinct from safety culture, in that safety culture was merely 
determined by the interaction between these factors (M. Cooper, D., 2000). Thus, Cooper 
again emphasised creating a safety culture without explaining what it is. 
Whilst many have argued that managers should have the goal to develop or create a 
‘positive’ or ‘good’ culture (e.g. Choudhry et al., 2007; M. Cooper, D., 2000; Crum & 
Morrow, 2002; International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1991, 1992; Sully, 2001), 
others argue that culture cannot be managed in a top-down approach, but emerges from even 
the lowest levels of an organisation (Haukelid, 2008). Naevestad (2009) stated that, as some 
deeper levels of culture may not be changeable, reversions to previous behaviour are likely. It 
is clear from this debate that some aspects of culture are not amenable to manipulation. As 
the normative conceptualisation holds that culture can and ought to be possessed by groups, 
researchers must focus on changeable aspects of an organisation. Thus, much research has 
focussed on organisational policies, procedures and structures, leading to blurring distinctions 
between safety culture and safety management research, and safety culture serving as a 
benchmark to measure organisational policies and procedures. 
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Focussing on management and organisational approaches is, however, not appropriate 
for all industries and settings. Much safety culture research has focussed on tightly controlled 
industries, yet, there are industries without such tight control. In such industries, the intrinsic 
motivation of workers may be of greater relevance than organisational structures and 
systems. Additionally, given the debate about the extent to which it is possible to change a 
culture, emphasising creation of safety culture may neglect other cultural factors. Due to the 
effect of cultural norms and values, health research has shown that ‘off the shelf’ intervention 
strategies, applied to audiences for which they were not designed, can have differing results 
(McLeroy et al., 1994). Similarly, it has been suggested that “without a positive safety culture 
and climate it could be said that there is already resistance in the environment into which 
safety schemes and programmes are being implemented” (Russell, 2000, p. 40). Thus, there 
are aspects of culture, separate from adaptable systems and procedures, which can counteract 
safety initiatives. As such, it is important to explore alternative conceptualisations of safety 
culture.  
2.3.2. The anthropological conceptualisation of safety culture 
The anthropological conceptualisation of culture, though dominant in social 
anthropology, cultural psychology and organisational culture, is often overlooked within 
safety culture research. Nonetheless, the conceptualisation is present within many definitions 
of safety culture. Antonsen (2009) stated that most literature reviews of safety culture 
conclude that it is “a set of safety related attitudes, values or assumptions that are shared 
between the members of an organisation” (p. 183). This definition epitomises an 
anthropological conceptualisation of safety culture. Nonetheless, the majority of safety 
culture research focuses on organisational structures and practices.  
In a review of safety culture, Naevestad (2009) discussed two common approaches in 
the field. One approach labelled the ‘interpretive approach’, understands safety culture as 
Chapter 2: Returning to the Roots of Culture  20 
 
shared patterns of meaning. Based in social anthropology, this approach advocates the use of 
ethnographic and qualitative research. There are however, few qualitative studies of safety 
culture (Glendon, 2008). Many authors who use an interpretive approach position their 
research as the effect of organisational culture on safety, rather than safety culture.  
Examples of the interpretive approach include the writings of Karl Weick, Andrew 
Hopkins and Nick Pidgeon. Weick published a number of articles focussed on the effect of 
organisational cultures on safety, viewing culture as shared beliefs and expectations utilised 
by organisational members to assist in the simplification of complex tasks, typically for the 
worse (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Similarly, Pidgeon 
(1997) discussed ‘institutional vulnerability’ arising from cultural patterns and assumptions. 
Finally, Hopkins (1999) discussed two shared values which contributed to an Australian coal 
mine disaster.  
Despite the presence of the anthropological conceptualisation in theoretical discussion 
of safety culture, it is often overlooked in research. This may occur because attitudes are 
typically placed in the realm of safety climate (the aggregate of employees’ perceptions and 
evaluations of the priority of safety in their organisation) rather than safety culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000). However, safety climate research typically focuses on employee 
attitudes and perceptions relating to the structures, processes and procedures used by an 
organisation which bear on safety, and the perceived priority the organisation’s leadership 
places on safety (Jiang, Yu, Li, & Li, 2010; Johnson, 2007; Neal & Griffin, 2002; Zohar, 
2010). Thus, though influenced by attitudes, safety climate is primarily a proxy measure of 
organisational structures and systems, and thus aligns with the normative conceptualisation. 
Conversely, within an anthropological conceptualisation of safety culture, any shared beliefs, 
attitudes and values that have a bearing on behaviours are relevant. For example, research has 
found cultural tendencies towards fatalism, denial, and knowledge gained from personal 
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experience over reported truths to have contributed to incidents (Håvold, 2010; Hopkins, 
1999).  
This approach may also have received less attention due to difficulties associated with 
conducting qualitative research in organisational settings. Fisher and Alford (2000) stated that 
it is difficult to convince managers that ethnographical organisational culture research is 
worth the investment of time and effort. Further, as the purpose of such research is to 
understand, rather than evaluate, an organisation’s culture (Reiman & Oedewald, 2007), 
managers may not perceive this as valuable. Similarly, Hopkins (2006) stated that “in the 
absence of an accident, the ethnographic method can only speculate or hypothesise about the 
impact of organisational culture on safety” (p. 886). Whilst the anthropological 
conceptualisation is not limited to ethnography, as findings may be quantitatively validated 
and correlated with behaviour, this approach has not seen significant application in the 
literature. 
The approaches of Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1996) provide a useful starting point 
for applying this conceptualisation to safety culture research and practice. Hofstede (1980) 
explored the differences in work-related behaviours between different cultures, identified by 
national borders. Differences between these cultures were explained using four cultural 
dimensions. These dimensions were individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and masculinity. Triandis (1996) later reconceptualised these dimensions as 
cultural syndromes, which he defined as “a pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, 
categorisations, self-definitions, norms, role definitions, and values that is organized around a 
theme” (p. 408). Whilst neither Hofstede nor Triandis claim to have encapsulated entire 
cultures in these dimensions, this approach could be useful in summarising key aspects of 
safety culture which impact upon behaviour. As these specific dimensions may not apply to 
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safety culture, further research is needed to identify syndromes or dimensions that influence 
safety, and whether they are common throughout different organisations and industries.  
The anthropological conceptualisation differs from the normative conceptualisation in 
that, rather than evaluating the presence and absence of organisational practices, it 
emphasises exploring shared beliefs, attitudes and values. Further, it seeks to understand the 
culture of an organisation rather than change the culture to meet a predetermined benchmark. 
Due to the anthropological conceptualisation’s emphasis on shared psychological factors, it 
can be applied to a broader range of organisations (whether tightly controlled or fairly 
autonomous) and can inform intervention design and implementation through understanding 
the effect safety culture may have. If an organisation identified dimensions which impact 
upon safety, these can be targeted through training or policies which bypass the problematic 
cultural dimension. Despite the benefits of the anthropological conceptualisation, however, 
Schein (1992) stated that behaviour is not solely influenced by culture but also by contextual 
variables. Thus, if safety culture is intended to provide improved safety performance, 
contextual variables must also be considered.  
2.3.3. A pragmatist conception of safety culture  
Safety is ultimately a collection of behaviours, or the results thereof. Thus, when 
applying the pragmatist conceptualisation of culture to safety culture, safe behaviour and 
safety culture are interchangeable. Thus the pragmatist conceptualisation has limited 
applicability to safety culture, in that it provides no insight into why behaviour occurs. 
However, as reported previously, identification of cultural practices requires knowledge of 
underlying reasons. Hopkins (2006) suggested that many organisational culture authors 
focussed on behaviours, yet that the concept of “the way we do things around here” suggests 
an evaluation of correctness and, therefore, underlying beliefs (p. 876). 
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Naevestad (2009) identified a second approach to safety culture – the functionalist 
approach that understands culture as a pattern of shared behaviour and was suggested to be 
the dominant approach within safety culture research. The functionalist approach, however, 
differs considerably from the pragmatist conceptualisation of culture. The pragmatist 
conceptualisation of culture holds that practices are based in underlying beliefs and values, 
whereas functionalist research often searches for shared behaviours and utilises theories from 
social and organisational psychology to identify causes of behaviour (Guldenmund, 2000; 
Nævestad, 2009). As stated by Naevestad (2009) and Guldenmund (2007), safety climate 
questionnaires are the primary measuring instrument utilised in this stream of research (for a 
detailed review of safety climate see Zohar, 2010). In the absence of accepted definitions and 
models of safety culture, research has typically been conducted relatively independent of the 
wider field of safety culture, leading to safety as the only common factor in this research. 
Thus, safety climate questionnaires have had little success in producing replicable findings in 
either the content of safety climate or its relationship to behaviour (Guldenmund, 2007). 
Whilst the functionalist approach to safety culture has struggled to prove its validity and 
relevance to outcomes, and departs from the pragmatist conceptualisation, the emphasis on 
behaviour is important. Safety culture can only be of practical benefit if it is directly related 
to behaviours and outcomes.  
2.3.4. Is there a need for a new conceptualisation? 
Each of the above conceptualisations has unique strengths and limitations. The 
normative conceptualisation is useful in measuring the strength of organisational systems and 
structures, and thus identifying weaknesses which can be changed. However, as cultural 
beliefs and values can, at times, be a barrier to health and safety initiatives, the sole use of 
this conceptualisation may limit the applicability of safety culture research. Without 
understanding the underlying beliefs and values of an organisation’s culture, safety initiatives 
Chapter 2: Returning to the Roots of Culture  24 
 
may be resisted within the organisation. The anthropological conceptualisation, however, 
encapsulates those aspects of safety culture that were unaccounted for within the normative 
conceptualisation. Thus this conceptualisation has the ability to develop an understanding of 
how safety initiatives can be effectively implemented. When utilised alone, however, this 
conceptualisation fails to account for contextual influences on behaviour. Finally, the 
pragmatist conceptualisation places a strong emphasis on outcomes and behaviour. However, 
related research typically fails to adhere to existing definitions and models of safety culture. 
Thus, this conceptualisation fails to take into account deeper cultural beliefs and values, and 
may fail to acknowledge the range of organisational systems and structures that may interact 
with new safety initiatives.  
Though the above strengths and weaknesses do not invalidate these conceptualisations, 
they are commonly viewed as competing ideas within the literature. For this reason, it is not 
surprising that demonstrating the predictive validity of safety culture has proved difficult. To 
increase the applicability of safety culture research and practice and improve its predictive 
validity, it is necessary to recognise the relevance of each conceptualisation as part of the 
larger picture of safety culture. By synthesising these conceptualisations, research can focus 
on one or more of these conceptualisations without excluding the others. Further, the existing 
safety culture research can be interpreted as different aspects of a broader concept. It is thus 
beneficial to briefly explore literature that has attempted to bridge the gaps between these 
conceptualisations. 
2.3.5. The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture 
A number of authors have suggested approaches to culture and organisational culture 
which combine the anthropological and pragmatic conceptualisations. Geertz (1973) posited 
that culture be treated as a hierarchy of meanings and symbols, which is separate from the 
social systems and interactions that these produce. In this way, Geertz highlights the 
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importance of identifying underlying meanings that produce practices. Similarly, Tharp 
(2007) stated that “it is emotional preference that maintains cultural activities and practices” 
(p. 229). In this sense, the culture an individual identifies with causes a preference towards 
behaviour, leading to behavioural practices. Thus, culture is typically viewed as a set of 
underlying beliefs and values (anthropological culture) which motivate behavioural practices 
(pragmatic culture). 
As the normative conceptualisation of culture has a uniquely individual focus, there has 
been little literature linking the normative conceptualisation with the anthropological and 
pragmatist conceptualisations. As previously discussed, the normative conceptualisation, by 
stating that culture can and ought to be possessed by a group, has led to an emphasis on 
changeable characteristics. Schein (1992) argued that behaviour is both the result of culture 
(anthropological culture) and specific situational factors. Similarly, Pidgeon (1997) argued 
that for culture to be a useful subject it must be considered in light of organisation systems. 
Thus, the focus of the normative conceptualisation can be combined with the anthropological 
conceptualisation, providing better predictability of pragmatic culture, or behaviour.  
Drawing on each of the aforementioned conceptualisations of culture, a synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture can be created (see Figure 2.1). Safety culture can be 
viewed as the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by 
members of an organisation (anthropological culture), which interact with an organisation’s 
structures and systems, and the broader contextual setting (normative culture), to result in 
those external, readily-visible practices (pragmatic culture) that influence safety. Thus, within 
this synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, safety outcomes can be viewed as the 
result of behaviour which is influenced by both cultural and contextual factors. 
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Figure 2.1. A synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture 
 
There are a number of practical benefits to using a synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture to organisational safety research. Organisational safety research has generally 
sought to achieve two goals: (1) understand the causes of incidents (particularly seen through 
accident models); and (2) identify how best to manage organisations to reduce the risk and 
severity of incidents. Whilst safety culture research has provided a useful focus on improving 
organisations in the hopes of reducing incidents, the field has struggled to prove a direct 
relationship between safety culture and incident occurrences. This may have been largely 
been due to the divide between research focussing on normative and pragmatic views of 
safety culture, and those utilising an anthropological conceptualisation, labelled as the 
functionalist and interpretive approaches by Naevestad (2009). As behaviour is not solely 
caused by shared beliefs and values but is also the result of the interaction of these shared 
factors with contextual factors, researchers have been unable to predict behaviour by solely 
focussing on one approach.  
Using a synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture will also present a number of 
benefits to safety culture practice and research. The benefits to safety culture practice come 
through better prediction of behaviour via a stronger understanding of the collective effects of 
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cultural and contextual factors. With this understanding, more effective safety initiatives can 
be designed and implemented. Further, by identifying interactions between existing cultural 
and contextual factors, structures and systems which produce undesirable effects can be 
modified.  
A synthesised framework also holds a number of benefits to research. Much research to 
date has positioned the existing conceptualisations of safety culture as competing ideas (e.g. 
Nævestad, 2009). This has limited growth of the field through separating research findings 
into two related but contrary groups. Functionalist research has identified a large number of 
systems, structures, policies and procedures, yet struggled to demonstrate that they can truly 
influence safety. Similarly, interpretive researchers have identified underlying beliefs, 
attitudes, values and assumptions, yet have not statistically validated the existence of these 
factors and their impact on safety. By utilising a synthesised approach researchers will be 
able to better demonstrate the relationships between these factors and safety, and combine the 
findings of research from each approach into a single framework, thus, better understanding 
the knowledge that has already been gained in this field. 
2.4. CONCLUSIONS AND MOVING FORWARD 
In recent years safety culture has received significant attention in the literature. Despite 
much research, there is little consensus regarding definitions and key components of safety 
culture. This disagreement has led many researchers to redefine safety culture prior to 
investigating a new topic, adding further diversity. Without understanding what is meant by 
‘culture’ in the phrase safety culture, there is a risk that safety culture may become simply a 
catchy title for safety management. Whilst safety culture is often tied to organisational 
culture, it is rare for discussions to venture into traditional conceptualisations of culture. This 
chapter has explored how three general conceptualisations of culture have been applied to 
safety culture. Due to the unique strengths and limitation of each conceptualisation, using a 
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single conceptualisation in safety culture research limits the applicability of any findings. A 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture reduces these limitations whilst providing the 
benefits of each conceptualisation. Future research and practice in the field of safety culture 
could benefit from utilising this synthesised conceptualisation to augment existing 
approaches to safety culture. 
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3.  
 
Chapter 3: The Current Research – Research Outline, Aims and Method 
 
 
 
 
3.1. THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
Apparent resistance of the heavy vehicle industry to national safety initiatives 
highlights safety culture as an avenue to understand and improve safety. To date, no major 
published research has explored safety culture in heavy vehicle industries worldwide. Due to 
the unique nature of heavy goods transport, specifically the high degree of driver autonomy 
coupled with significant regulations and policies, existing approaches to safety culture are 
insufficient for the industry.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, two principal research problems led to the current research. 
First, there is a need to explore the effect of safety culture on safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Second is the need to enhance existing understanding of safety culture. The 
interrelated nature of these problems means it is impossible to address the first issue without 
addressing the second. The current research has two objectives: (1) to enhance the current 
understanding of safety culture and provide a theoretically grounded framework of safety 
culture; and (2) to utilise this framework to explore the effect of culture on safety within the 
heavy vehicle industry.  
In order to develop the theoretical framework of safety culture, Chapter 2 consisted of 
an analysis of the literature regarding safety culture. Links were identified between safety 
Chapter 3: The Current Research  30 
 
 
culture, organisational culture and traditional views of culture found in anthropology and 
cultural psychology. Three traditional conceptualisations of culture were identified as having 
been applied to differing extents within safety culture literature. The conceptualisations 
broadly focus upon organisational structures and systems, shared beliefs and values or 
immediate causes of behaviour. It was argued that these conceptualisations could be 
synthesised into a single framework of safety culture, and safety culture was defined as the 
assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an 
organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader 
contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety. 
3.2. DESIGN AND METHODS 
Having developed a framework of safety culture, it can now be applied to the heavy 
vehicle industry. The rest of Chapter 3 describes the design and methods of this research 
study. Rather than provide separate method statements within the study results chapters 
(Chapters 4 to10), it was decided to present an aggregated methods chapter. The decision to 
provide an aggregated methods chapter was made to minimise disruption of flow between 
study results and was deemed beneficial to the reader. 
3.2.1. Aims 
In order to apply the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture to the heavy 
vehicle industry, the current research employs the following aims: 
a. Examine the suitability of the key components of the synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture (culture, context and behaviour) to the heavy vehicle industry 
b. Identify factors previously identified within heavy vehicle industries, which comprise 
the key components of the framework 
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c. Identify major factors within the heavy vehicle industry which have eluded previous 
research 
d. Identify the best methodological approach to investigating the effect of culture on 
safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
e. Examine how cultural and contextual factors affect safety-related behaviours in the 
heavy vehicle industry 
3.2.2. Methodology 
To address the aims of this research a combination of ethnography and grounded theory 
is used. Each of these research approaches are discussed below. 
3.2.2.1.   Ethnography 
Ethnography was initially developed for use in understanding distant cultures and has 
been widely used throughout the social sciences (Giampietro, 2008). Giampietro (2008) 
stated that ethnography is not simply a method, but a methodology or global cognitive 
standpoint akin to a paradigm. However, Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont (1999) suggested 
that ethnographic research has seen many different forms, predominantly influenced by the 
dominant paradigms of the time period (for example, modernism between 1950 and 1970). 
Regardless of the ontological and epistemological perspective of the researcher, ethnography 
is effectively the exploration and description of a culture or society (Murchison, 2010). As 
the current research focuses on safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry in an Australian 
context, ethnographic methods will be employed.  
Ethnography uses a number of methods, including participant observation, informal 
conversations, interviews and document analysis (Giampietro, 2008; Murchison, 2010). 
Observations are often conducted in a controlled environment with minimal interaction 
between researcher and participant. The participant-observer model used by ethnographers 
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relies on an interactive relationship between the observer and the observed, and is conducted 
in the naturalistic setting (Giampietro, 2008; Murchison, 2010). Whilst these methods can be 
used to describe safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry, alone they may be insufficient to 
identify the relationship between culture and safety. 
3.2.2.2.   Grounded theory 
In order to identify the relationship between culture and safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry, a second approach named grounded theory will also be utilised. Grounded theory, 
initially developed by Glaser and Strauss (1965, 1967), is a methodological approach in 
which theory is developed from data. Grounded theory uses a constant comparative process. 
First, data is obtained and coded, revealing patterns and themes. Then, through theoretical 
sampling (the selection of participants and questions on the basis of emerging concepts) 
further data is obtained and analysed, leading to the formation of an emerging theory, 
consisting of a series of themes and the relationships between these themes.  
Grounded theory has developed along two divergent paths, with the founding authors 
taking different standpoints. The main differences between these standpoints are the methods 
applied, and the extent to which preconceived ideas influence the emergent theory (Heath & 
Cowley, 2004). The need to ensure the findings of this current research are relevant to safety 
culture means some degree of prior theory is necessary. Whilst a theoretical framework of 
safety culture has been developed, the specific content of each component of this framework 
is unknown. Further, previous research has not demonstrated the combined effect of cultural 
and contextual factors on safety, leaving the current research to formulate relationships 
between factors.  
For the purposes of this study, the methods outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) will 
be used. Whilst grounded theory was originally drawn from specific epistemological 
standpoints, Corbin and Strauss (1990) stated that grounded theory is a method and as such 
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can be utilised by all researchers. Corbin and Strauss (1990) outlined three types of coding to 
use when analysing data, including open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Open 
coding is conducted first and aims to identify key concepts or categories for further 
evaluation. Axial coding is subsequently conducted as these categories begin to develop. 
Axial coding identifies sub-categories and the relationships between these sub-categories and 
with the broader category. Finally, selective coding occurs in the late stages of grounded 
theory, associating the identified categories around a key theme.  
3.2.3. Methods 
To address the five stated aims of the current research, ethnographic and grounded 
theory methods are combined in a three-part research program. The current research can thus 
be described as both: (1) an ethnographic endeavour, designed to identify and describe the 
culture, context and common practices related to safety within the heavy vehicle industry; 
and (2) a grounded theory exploration of how culture and context influence safety outcomes.  
Study One consisted of a systematic analysis of the literature regarding heavy vehicle 
safety, exploring previously identified behaviours and potential cultural and contextual 
factors which influence safety. Study Two consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews 
conducted with industry stakeholders to examine whether any key factors eluded previous 
research, and identify the best approach to examine relationships between culture, context 
and behaviours. Grounded theory relies on the use of theoretical sampling as a result of 
obtained data. As the findings of Study Two revealed high levels of variance across the 
industry, it was determined that Study Three should consist of a series of case studies of 
organisations within the industry. Due to the heterogeneity of the industry, the specific 
cultural and contextual factors present within a given organisation may differ. Thus, in order 
to explore the interactions between cultural and contextual factors and the manner in which 
they influence behaviour, it is necessary to examine these factors in specific organisations. 
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Each of these case studies is also detailed below. Prior to discussing the methods of each 
study, it is important to note the role of the researcher in the study and the potential influence 
they had on the data. 
3.2.3.1. The role of the researcher 
With the exception of some of the semi-structured interviews conducted in Study Two, 
all data collected for the current research was collected by the author of this doctoral thesis. 
The interpretive nature of grounded theory and ethnography means that raw data is analysed 
by the researcher who categorises this data around themes. Pre-existing assumptions and 
knowledge held by the researcher may shape themes which emerged. Additionally, it is 
important to note that due to the sensitivity of some safety issues, in that many behaviours 
within the industry may contain both legal and safety implications, the presence of the 
researcher may have shaped the behaviours that occurred and influenced responses of 
participants. It is important to reflect upon my role as the doctoral scholar within this 
research.  
Prior to beginning this research I had little knowledge of the heavy vehicle industry. I 
had seen trucks while on the road and had only a few interactions with truck drivers while 
working part-time at a furniture store as they delivered goods. I somehow remained sheltered 
from a number of commonly held ‘facts’ about the industry. It was only after starting this 
research that I found friends and acquaintances sharing with me about ‘issues’ within the 
industry, including stereotypical descriptions of truck drivers driving all day and night and 
taking drugs to stay awake. Even within the university, I regularly encountered pre-
conceptions about the industry, ranging from those highlighted above, to more intricately 
detailed descriptions of how truck drivers supposedly used multiple log books to bypass 
fatigue laws, and of the apparent complete and utter power held by customers. While hearing 
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these preconceptions I was simultaneously learning about the industry from the inside 
perspective of industry members.  
Being unaware of commonly held preconceptions regarding the industry, the data and 
my own interpretations of it may carry less bias than otherwise possible. Due to the high 
representation of industry members within the research, the data may be favourably skewed 
by industry members in an attempt to appear in a socially desirable manner.  Other members 
of the research team, however, had previously conducted research surrounding the industry 
and had a less favourable view of the industry. Thus, throughout the study I was regularly 
required to justify my interpretations of data to other team members. In this way, analysis of 
data presented in this thesis was open to the emergence of themes without preconceived bias, 
while also being critically analysed for authenticity.  
Whilst I have no relevant salient experiences in memory which would have influenced 
the data collection and interpretation process, it is important to recognise that the sum of 
experiences I have had may have influenced these processes. It is possible that, should 
another student have conducted this research, different themes and topics may have emerged. 
Being a largely qualitative thesis, the data collection requires follow up questions to be 
formulated in response to statements made by participants. During the research I was 
regularly required to formulate such questions as each interview was approached with a 
desired direction and a very small selection of pre-planned questions. A different researcher 
may have perceived different statements to hold more meaning or relevance and thus 
formulated different questions, leading to different data collected. Further, during the Study 
Two interviews and the observations in Study Three handwritten notes were used for data 
collection. As it is difficult to record every statement made when taking written notes, a 
different researcher may have focused their recording on different aspects of the discussion. 
Finally, even with the exact same data collected, a researcher with different values and life 
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experience to my own may have coded the data differently and there may have been 
differences in the themes that emerged. Thus, whilst I can think of no relevant salient 
experiences, the sum of my life experiences may have shaped the data collection and analysis 
in ways that cannot be predicted. 
It is worth noting, however, that in the latter stages of the research a manager from 
Workplace Health and Safety, Queensland, with a long connection to the industry, reviewed 
the findings of this research. This reviewer commented that the understanding of the industry 
presented in the findings resonated with his own understanding. Thus, even though my own 
life experiences may have shaped the data collection and analysis, it can be said that there is a 
significant degree of credibility in the findings of the research. 
It is also important to consider the degree to which my presence may have shaped 
behaviours and responses of industry members while taking part in the research. Whilst the 
extent to which my presence altered the behaviour and comments of individuals remains 
unknown, some important points can be made. Firstly, I was aware of the potential for 
censorship of information and changed behaviour in my role as researcher. Prior to collecting 
data I informed participants about confidentiality and emphasised that I was not ‘checking-
up’ or judging the industry, rather I was attempting to understand safety from their 
perspectives as a way to inform the industry through recommendations coming from the 
findings of this study. Participants appeared to trust me enough to share very personal aspects 
of their working lives. Participants often discussed negative behaviours openly and 
articulated well the reasons for behaving in certain ways. This may be reflective of the fact 
that drivers and industry members who engaged in risky behaviour believe that their 
behaviour was acceptable and felt no need for self-censorship. Contrasting this openness 
were occasions when participants were unwilling to discuss drug use during interviews. 
Typically, however, once audio recording or note taking had stopped participants were 
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willing to share stories about illegal activities. Given that the purpose of this research was to 
explain behaviour through culture and context, the detailed information shared by participants 
offered a rich source of data. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the methods used in 
each of the three studies. 
3.2.3.2.  Study One 
In the absence of previous safety culture research it is unclear what cultural beliefs, 
attitudes, expectations and values, contextual influences and behaviours may comprise the 
key aspects of safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry. Chapter 2 suggested that the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture could provide a means to combine a range of 
safety culture research into a single framework. It may be possible to similarly inform safety 
culture using general safety research. Thus, in order to focus the current research, Study One 
consists of a systematic literature review of heavy vehicle safety, targeted at profiling 
previously identified factors. The results of this review can be found in Chapter 4. 
3.2.3.2.1. Aims addressed 
a. Examine the suitability of the key components of the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture (culture, context and behaviour) to the heavy 
vehicle industry 
b. Identify factors previously identified within heavy vehicle industries, which 
comprise the key components of the framework 
3.2.3.2.2. Method 
To profile previously identified factors it was necessary to access existing literature on 
heavy vehicle safety. To this end, a thorough search was conducted using a number of 
databases including EBSCOhost (including separate searches of CINAHL and Medline), 
Emerald, INFORMIT, Proquest and Sciencedirect. The following search phrases were used 
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(or the equivalent depending on the search criteria of the relevant databases): (“heavy 
vehicle” OR “heavy goods vehicle” OR “large goods vehicle” OR “truck” OR “lorry”) 
AND (“health” OR “safety” OR “accident” OR “injury” OR “crash”). 
Due to the large number of results different approaches were used to limit the search. 
To exclude articles with only passing reference to the search terms, searches were, where 
possible, limited to the title, abstract and keywords. Additionally, to maximise the quality of 
research, only peer-reviewed journal articles were included. Whilst the searches were 
restricted to peer-reviewed articles, a selection of grey literature was also reviewed. Grey 
literature was drawn from reports conducted in Australia about the Australian heavy vehicle 
industry. These reports were used to supplement the limited available Australian research. 
Grey literature was obtained primarily from websites of Australian research centres and 
typically consisted of government reports. 
Each article was assessed for eligibility based upon the key components of safety 
culture. Results needed to show significant contextual, cultural or behavioural factors linked 
with safety outcomes (qualitative data was not assessed for significance). A small selection of 
papers which did not statistically explore a relationship between such factors and safety 
outcomes were still included due to face validity. For example, papers demonstrating links 
between cultural or contextual factors and behaviours already known to influence outcomes 
were included.  
Screening eliminated articles with a primary focus on other road users, the 
environmental impacts of truck traffic, and the effect of truck emissions on the general 
public. Other articles, typically from developing nations, focussed on HIV and sexual risk 
behaviours, and these were excluded due to insufficient evidence regarding HIV as a concern 
in the Australian heavy vehicle context. While important fields of study, these topics were 
eliminated as they were irrelevant to the aims of Study One. 
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3.2.3.3.   Study Two 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with key industry stakeholders. 
In the absence of previous safety culture research, there was insufficient data obtained on 
potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values. It was also unknown if the reviewed safety 
research provided sufficient detail on the context and behaviour related to safety culture in 
the Australian heavy vehicle industry. Thus, in addition to reviewing past safety research, it 
was necessary to gain more detailed information. An inside perspective of the key factors 
within the industry was warranted. Due to the specific barriers to standard safety culture 
conceptualisations within the industry, it was also necessary to determine the best way to 
examine the relationships between cultural, contextual and behavioural factors.  
3.2.3.3.1. Aims addressed 
c. Identify major factors within the heavy vehicle industry which have eluded 
previous research 
d. Identify the best methodological approach to investigating the effect of culture 
on safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
3.2.3.3.2. Method 
Study Two consisted of semi-structured interviews with industry stakeholders. Whilst 
the specific interview questions were unstructured, the key topics investigated were guided 
by the used framework of safety culture and by the data gained from previous interviews. 
Interviews were conducted by two researchers, the doctoral scholar and a project officer who 
was part of the broader research team. Typically, interviews were conducted face-to-face in 
the participant’s place of business. A small number of the interviews were conducted over the 
phone due to access difficulties. With the written consent of participants, comprehensive 
notes were taken during interviews, and telephone interviews were audio-recorded. 
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Interviews were transcribed verbatim by the interviewer, and the data analysed by both 
researchers, enabling a constant comparison to be made. After several analyses some degree 
of saturation in the number of concepts and the depth of information was achieved, and Study 
Two was concluded. 
3.2.3.3.3. Participants 
A total of 31 industry stakeholders were interviewed (response rate ~50%), consisting 
of 23 transport company managers, plus three government officials (two police officers, one 
transport branch representative), two industry association representatives and three heavy 
vehicle drivers. Due to the sensitive nature of safety and the number of regulations which 
surround safety within the industry, there is a need to ensure the confidentiality of 
participants. This is particularly important as the research is in part funded by a number of 
government departments who have a role in regulating safety. For this reason no further 
details will be provided about the age, gender or history of participants. 
Interviewees were accessed using a snowballing technique, whereby initial contacts 
identified potential participants and these participants referred the research team to future 
participants. Whilst the sample may have been biased due to a low response rate and referred 
participants, Study Two focused primarily on broader contextual and cultural issues and not 
the attitudes and values of participants, and thus this potential bias should not have adversely 
affected the results. After 31 interviews it was found that little additional information was 
being gained through additional interviews. Further, due to the findings of Study Two with 
regards to the best methodological approach to investigating the effect of culture on safety, it 
was determined that no further interviews would be required. 
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3.2.3.3.4. Analysis 
Data obtained during Study Two was subjected to a constant comparison method, 
allowing immediate findings to direct later stages of Study Two. Transcripts were analysed 
using the methods detailed by Corbin and Strauss (1990; see section 3.2.2.2). Throughout the 
interview process, open coding and later, axial coding, was utilised. As Study Two was 
concluded in order for Study Three to begin, selective coding was not used in Study Two.  
3.2.3.4.  Study Three 
A number of key findings regarding differences throughout the industry were identified 
by Study Two. First, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity within the industry, 
typically related to organisational factors including the type of goods carried, distance carried 
and size and location of the organisation. Thus, it was determined that in order to explore the 
relationships between culture, context and behaviour it was necessary to conduct case studies 
with specific transport organisations sampling these heterogeneity-related factors.  
3.2.3.4.1.   Aims addressed 
e. Examine how cultural and contextual factors effect safety-related behaviours 
in the heavy vehicle industry 
3.2.3.4.2.   Method 
Study Three used a series of three case studies undertaken with specific transport 
organisations. This approach enabled depth of information, whilst exploring the broader 
industry, through a purposive selection of cases sampling the industry’s diversity. Stake 
(2010) stated that a case study is not a methodological choice, but a decision regarding the 
target of investigation. Therefore, whilst the application of multiple case studies is unusual 
within either ethnography or grounded theory, in the present study this decision is a result of 
theoretical sampling in grounded theory.   
Chapter 3: The Current Research  42 
 
 
Stake (2010) delineates between three forms of case studies: (1) intrinsic case studies, 
in which a single case is selected due to intrinsic interest; (2) instrumental case studies, in 
which a single case is selected to inform upon a broader theme; and (3) multiple or collective 
case studies, in which a selection of cases are selected to provide knowledge of a broader 
collection of cases. In this study a collective case study approach was used where 
organisations were selected in order to develop understanding of safety culture in the broader 
heavy vehicle industry. As a case study is simply a target of investigation, the methods of 
investigation used for these cases were drawn from ethnography, specifically interviews, 
document analysis and observations, and the data was analysed using a grounded theory 
approach. 
In two of the three studied organisations, the researcher was required to complete 
inductions, enabling an understanding of the basic training received by all staff whilst 
ensuring researcher safety. In the third company the manager requested the researcher read 
the organisation’s terms and conditions document, serving the same purpose as the 
inductions. Interviews were then conducted with staff members. The interviews lasted 
between 30 minutes and two hours and covered a variety of topics. The first questions were 
typically aimed at eliciting information regarding the history of the individual and identifying 
major safety concerns in their work role. Later questions sought to identify contextual, 
cultural and behavioural factors which influence these safety concerns. For example, the 
researcher typically asked what a driver was required to do to manage safety concerns, and 
reasons why a driver may or may not complete these activities. Participants would be asked 
about specific behaviours and outcomes identified in Studies One and Two, which were not 
spontaneously discussed. Finally, it is worth noting that as the researcher developed a greater 
awareness of safety within the industry, participants were asked to confirm information (for 
example, “one driver told me that drivers can be fined for spelling errors on their log books, 
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is that true?”). Prompts were seldom required as participants appeared eager to share their 
perspectives on safety. For a series of sample prompts and questions see Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Typical prompts and questions used within interviews and observations 
Conceptualisation Component Sample Prompts/Question 
Safety Outcomes  What are the major hazards faced by drivers? / What are 
the major hazards you face?  
What are the biggest causes of crashes? 
What are the biggest causes of injuries? 
Are musculoskeletal injuries, like strains etc., common? 
Behaviour What should a driver / do you have to do to avoid these 
hazards? 
(later in an interview) Is there anything else a driver/you 
need/s to do to avoid crashes/injuries? 
Is speeding an issue when driving? 
Context/Culture Why do some drivers X (e.g. not wear seatbelts)? 
Why do you X (e.g. wear a seatbelt)? 
What are the main causes of X (e.g. fatigue)? 
 
Typically conducted after the interviews, observations of drivers occurred during their 
usual shifts. Most observations lasted the duration of the shift, although some lasted for a 
portion of the shift. Observations lasted between four and 15 hours, with the exception of two 
which lasted two hours as the researcher was taken to another depot at the end of the driver’s 
journey.  
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During observations the researcher conducted informal interviews similar in nature to 
the staff member interviews, with drivers asked to list major hazards they face, detail 
behaviours they engage in to avoid an incident related to hazards, and why they would or 
would not complete these activities. Additionally, questions were asked which specifically 
related to tasks witnessed. For example, drivers were commonly asked why they were or 
were not wearing a seatbelt.   
Finally, safety documents provided to new drivers within each company were perused 
to supplement interviews and observations and to cross-reference information. 
3.2.3.4.3. Case Study Participating Organisations 
A number of organisations were approached for participation in Study Three. The 
transport companies that were approached varied from large (over 100 trucks) to small (less 
than 10 trucks) and carried a range of goods including general freight, dangerous and liquid 
goods, livestock and mixed freight. The approached organisations were based in a number of 
locations including capital cities and regional areas, and carried goods either interstate, within 
state over long distances and locally. Many organisations refused to participate, some 
claiming busyness while others were going through safety investigations. One organisation 
withdrew due to a major contract loss which forced depot closure. Thus, selection bias may 
have occurred due to organisations with recent incidents refusing participation. Selection of 
cases was also partially influenced by availability alongside theoretical sampling. Three 
organisations were selected that were willing to participate in the research. The key 
differences between these organisations are displayed in Table 3.2. As with Study Two, the 
sensitive nature of safety, number of regulations surrounding heavy vehicle transport, and the 
funding sources of this research require a high degree of confidentiality for participants. 
Thus, no further details will be provided about the age, gender or history of participants. 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Recruited Case Study Organisations 
Characteristics Company A Company B Company C 
Size  Medium (~50 trucks) Medium (~50 Trucks) Small (<10 Trucks) 
Location  A capital city A capital city A regional centre 
Cargo General goods A range of specialised 
goods 
Livestock 
Distance Medium-long distance 
(intra and interstate) 
Predominantly local with 
some medium and long 
distance 
Short-medium 
distance (within 
region) 
Trucks Articulated 
(semis and B-doubles) 
Articulated and rigid 
(Heavy haulage, crane 
mounted rigid, rigid body 
trucks, semis, B-doubles) 
Articulated  
(semis, B-doubles 
and road trains) 
 
Company A is a medium-sized family-owned and operated transport company. The 
organisation employs approximately 100 staff and owns over 50 prime movers. Company A 
carries general goods locally and between capital cities. A large proportion of their freight 
comes from a single regular customer. 
Semi-structured interviews and observations were conducted with 10 staff members. 
Four managerial, administrative and operational staff (two managers, one health and safety 
officer and one operations manager), along with six heavy vehicle drivers, took part in 
interviews. Six observations were also conducted with heavy vehicle drivers. Whilst the 
organisation conducts a number of overnight journeys, many of the regular freight runs are 
designed to allow the drivers to return home overnight. Thus, typical observations included 
the driver leaving the depot, loading freight, driving to the target destination, unloading 
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freight and returning to the depot. After conducting interviews and observations a number of 
policy documents were acquired from the organisation including a driver’s manual containing 
all relevant policies, pre-trip vehicle inspection sheets, applications and non-conformance 
forms. 
Company B is a medium sized transport company, employing approximately 100 staff 
with over 50 trucks. This organisation has a number of branches transporting different goods. 
Goods carried by Company B range from heavy haulage and long loads, to the carriage of 
construction materials and smaller consumption goods and are transported over both intra and 
interstate long distances and locally. Due to the diversity within Company B, the organisation 
has a number of managers overseeing branches within the company. Company B has a 
number of major customers rather than a single customer. 
Ten interviews were conducted within Company B. Participants consisted of the 
compliance officer, and part owner, of the company, two regional managers who each 
oversee approximately half of the fleet, five branch or depot managers, two driver trainers, 
and an operational manager. Eight observations were conducted, typically covering a driver’s 
shift. Finally, a copy of the operations manual was acquired. This document is provided to all 
drivers, typically with information tailored to the branch the driver is to work in. 
Company C is a small-sized transport company based in a regional centre. Family 
owned and operated, the organisation consists of six prime movers and various trailers, and 
employs between six and 10 people at any point in time. Company C transports livestock 
within the region, generally travelling to a livestock grazier to collect cattle and transport 
them to another property or a livestock agent. Unlike Company A and B, Company C 
generally conducts work as it arises from local graziers and agents. While Company C has 
many regular customers, they are not bound to specific customers. 
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At the onset of the case study the company was undergoing an accreditation audit from 
Trucksafe. As such, rather than begin with interviews the initial phase of data collection 
consisted of observing the audit. Following this observation the researcher conducted a 
number of interviews and observations with members of Company C. Five interviews were 
conducted with the owner/manager, compliance officer, two drivers, and the 
owner/driver/head-mechanic. During the interview process, there was an overlap between 
two interviews during which the compliance officer and the owner/driver/head-mechanic 
were both interviewed simultaneously in addition to their separate interviews. In this instance 
the interview started with the owner/driver and was later joined by the compliance officer 
before the first interviewee departed. Three observations were conducted. A copy of the 
driver terms and conditions provided to all drivers which outlines safety policies and 
practices was acquired.  
Whilst the sample size was noticeably smaller in Company C, it is important to 
recognise that Company C was significantly smaller than the other companies and, thus, the 
observations and interviews were conducted with all but one driver and all of the relevant 
organisational staff. As the case studies utilise qualitative data, sample size is not a reflection 
of the quality of data collected. It was found that the information obtained aligned with that 
from companies A and B, with only differences specifically relating to livestock transport. A 
significant degree of overlap and saturation occurred between cases, thus, no further data was 
needed from Company C. 
3.2.3.4.4. Analysis 
Both the observation and interview data was analysed through the coding methods 
outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990). This consisted of open, axial and selective coding. 
Due to the importance of adhering to the theoretical underpinnings of culture identified in 
Chapter 2 and developed in Studies One and Two, the open coding categorised data 
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according to: (1) contextual; (2) cultural; and (3) behavioural categories. Axial coding then 
identified themes within these categories and further sub-themes. Finally, selective coding 
was conducted during which the relationship between cultural and contextual variables and 
behaviour was identified. The results of Study Three are discussed in Chapters 6 to10. As 
these case studies were aimed at identifying patterns within the broader industry, the 
identified themes are presented in aggregate form. Where data emerged from only a single 
company it has been noted within the relevant sections. 
3.3. ETHICS CLEARANCE 
Ethical clearance was approved by QUT’s Human Research Ethics Committee in 
September 2010, approval number 1000000907. An amendment to Ethics was approved in 
November 2011, approval number 1100001426. 
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4.  
 
Chapter 4: Study One - Safety Culture and the Heavy Vehicle Industry: Just because it 
hasn’t been studied doesn’t mean we know nothing 
 
 
 
 
4.1. STUDY ONE RESULTS OVERVIEW 
Study One consisted of a systematic review of literature about heavy vehicle health and 
safety. The purpose of conducting this review was to examine whether the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture was suitable for the heavy vehicle industry, and what 
factors might comprise this conceptualisation within the industry.  
4.1.1. Method 
Methods used to identify relevant literature were outlined in section 3.2.3.1.2. Five 
databases were searched for relevant articles using a combination of search terms requiring at 
least one common name for heavy vehicles (heavy vehicle, heavy goods vehicle, large goods 
vehicle, truck or lorry) and one health and safety related term (health, safety, accident, injury 
or crash). In order to maximise the quality of literature, searches were restricted to peer-
reviewed journal articles (though a selection of grey literature was also included in the 
findings for reasons outlined in section 3.2.3.1.2). After conducting searches, articles were 
selected using criteria based upon the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, which 
holds that safety outcomes are the result of behaviour which is influenced by cultural and 
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contextual factors (section 2.3.5). That is, each article was required to demonstrate 
contextual, cultural or behavioural factors relevant to safety outcomes. 
Findings from selected papers were analysed using the synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture. As stated in section 2.3.3, safety culture is only of practical benefit if directly 
linked to behaviours and outcomes, thus each factor identified in this review must be linked 
with a specific safety outcome. Due to the nature of the industry, there are a number of health 
and safety concerns including those that relate to crash, non-crash injury and health outcomes 
(see section 1.1). Prior to conducting further analysis, articles were classified according to the 
specific form of safety outcome to which they related (in some cases resulting in multiple 
classifications for a single article). Within this broader classification, specific findings were 
classified according to the key components of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture (behaviour, context and culture). For each category of safety outcomes, relevant 
behaviours which result in these outcomes are first discussed, followed by contextual and 
cultural factors which either directly influence these behaviours, or where seen to influence 
outcomes without specifying a given behaviour. A brief summary of selected papers is 
provided in section 1.1.2, followed by the specific findings of the review relative to each 
outcome category. 
4.1.2. Selected papers 
A total of 132 peer reviewed journal articles met the selection criteria for Study One. 
Articles covered a broad range of topics, which could be categorised by relevant health and 
safety outcome (see Table 4.1). First, 54 papers either directly attempted to predict crash 
likelihood or severity, or highlighted factors found to be common in crashes. An additional 
41 papers examined factors known to be related to crashes yet did not investigate 
relationships between these factors and crash outcomes. These 77 papers were collectively 
categorised under crash outcomes. Second, 11 papers explored the prevalence and severity of 
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non-crash injuries and factors related to injury occurrence, and an additional six papers 
explored factors related to injury outcomes without demonstrating the relationship to injuries. 
These 17 papers were categorised under non-crash injury outcomes. Third, 19 papers were 
identified which explored the likelihood of health outcomes, and two additional papers 
explored factors known to be related to health outcomes. These 20 papers were categorised 
under health outcomes. Finally, though not a category per se, nine papers categorised as 
miscellaneous papers were identified that contained potentially relevant information 
regarding cultural and contextual variables which influence safety (e.g. analysis of attitudes 
towards enforcement).  Each category is discussed below. 
Table 4.1: Breakdown of peer-reviewed articles according to category of investigation 
Category of papers Number of articles 
Crash outcomes 95 
Injury outcomes 17 
Health outcomes 21 
Miscellaneous papers 9 
Total 142* 
*Total number exceeds eligible articles due to articles which addressed multiple categories 
4.2. CRASH OUTCOMES 
A significant portion of the papers included in this review related to the occurrence and 
severity of crashes, or examined factors known to influence crash-related injuries and 
fatalities. As the synthesised conceptualisation requires contextual and cultural factors to 
influence outcomes via behaviours, it is necessary to identify behaviours which contribute to 
crashes. 
Driving whilst fatigued. Driving whilst fatigued has received significant attention 
within the literature. Hanowski et al. (2007) conducted a camera observation study of 24 
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single drivers and 24 two-up driver groups, over trips of a minimum of six days, recording 68 
critical incidents. Of the 21 incidents initiated by truck drivers, the main causes were poor 
driving technique (52%), aggressive driving (24%), heavy vehicle design and physics 
(14.3%), lack of driver capability (4.8%), and fatigue and/or falling asleep (4.8%). Thus, 
whilst fatigue is not necessarily the most important cause of critical incidents, fatigue can 
increase the chances of hazardous scenarios.  
Carter et al. (2003) surveyed 4000 male drivers from the general population and 1389 
bus and lorry (truck) drivers in Sweden regarding sleep debt, sleepiness and traffic incidents. 
Professional drivers reported higher levels of sleep debt, which was correlated with traffic 
incidents at leisure, commuting and during work. Thus, perceived sleep debt has a significant 
relationship to the likelihood of crashes. 
Brodie, Bugeja and Elias (2009) explored coroners’ reports from 61 heavy vehicle 
driver crash fatalities in Victoria, Australia. Amongst other contributing factors, it was argued 
that fatigue may have played a major role in a number of fatalities. Fatigue is difficult to 
assess after a fatal incident, however a number of drivers had worked in excess of 10 hours, 
and nine of the 61 cases were believed to have resulted from the driver falling asleep, largely 
due to a lack of evasive manoeuvres. In an earlier study, Haworth, Heffernan and Horne 
(1989) analysed coroners’ reports from fatal multiple vehicle crashes involving trucks within 
Victoria. Reports identified heavy vehicle driver fatigue as contributing to 3.7% of these 
crashes (car driver fatigue in 5.4%). However, through the use of a number of criteria for 
detecting fatigue involvement, including extended driving hours, evidence of falling asleep at 
the wheel, comments made regarding tiredness, incorrect lane use without evidence of 
intoxication, and night time driving, Haworth et al. (1989) estimated that 7.6% of these 
incidents resulted from heavy vehicle driver fatigue (car driver fatigue 12.4%). 
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Similarly, Hakkanen and Sunmola (2001) analysed crash data from 337 fatal two-
vehicle crashes involving trucks in Finland between 1991 and 1997, finding that 2% of 
drivers had fallen asleep, 4% were tired at the time of the incident and 13% had exceeded 
legal driving hours. Finally, Chen and Chen (2011) examined 10 years of crash data from 
Illinois, USA, to analyse injury severity in multi and single vehicle truck crashes. This article 
emphasised differences between crash types, yet a number of factors were correlated with 
injury severity in one or both crash types. Amongst other findings, fatigue and falling asleep 
increased the likelihood of truck driver fatalities within multi-vehicle crashes. Some of the 
above studies lacked sufficient controls to demonstrate that fatigue is over-represented in 
crashes, however, it appears that driving whilst fatigued influences crash likelihood and 
severity. 
Drug and alcohol use. Drugs and alcohol are well known to reduce cognitive ability 
and so increase risk of crashes, but only two studies identified this effect in truck drivers. 
Brodie, Bugeja and Elias’ (2009) previously discussed analysis of coroners’ reports found 
that 10 of the 61 fatalities involved illicit drugs, and one alcohol intoxication, representing 
18% of analysed fatalities. Given that 17% of Australian truck drivers are likely to have used 
illicit drugs within the past 12 months (WORC 2008), and it is unlikely that these drivers are 
constantly influenced by substances, drug use is over represented in the fatal crashes. In one 
older study, Golob, Recker and Leonard (1987) found that alcohol was the principal cause of 
353 of 9508 truck collisions in California, further implicating the effect of alcohol on crashes 
in heavy vehicles. Additionally, however, Zhu and Srinivasan’s (2011) analysis of the US 
large truck crash causation study found an increase in severity of truck occupant injuries 
resulting from crashes in which the truck driver was influenced by illicit substances.  
Although few studies demonstrated an effect from alcohol and illicit drugs, a number of 
studies have explored the prevalence of drug use in heavy vehicle drivers worldwide (Gjerde 
Chapter 4: Study One  54 
 
et al., 2012; Labat et al., 2008; Leyton et al., 2012; Mir, Khan, Ahmed, & Abdul Razzak, 
2012; Silva, Greve, Yonamine, & Leyton, 2003). In Brazil, prevalence of illicit drugs at time 
of testing ranged from 5.63% to 9.3% (Leyton et al., 2012; Silva et al., 2003). In France, 
Labat et al. (2008) tested urine samples of 1000 truck drivers, finding cannabinoids in 8.5% 
of drivers, opiates in 4.1%, alcohol in 5.1%, buprenorphine in 1.8%, and a number of other 
drugs at lower prevalence rates, indicated to be much higher than the general population. Two 
studies compared drug use in truck drivers to other road users. In Pakistan, truck drivers 
utilised higher levels of illicit drugs than other commercial drivers (Mir et al., 2012). 
However, in Norway truck drivers had lower levels of drug use than car and van drivers. 
Thus, patterns of drug use vary significantly between countries. One Australian study 
investigated rates of stimulant use in Australian truck drivers. Mabbott and Hartley (1999) 
interviewed 236 western Australian truck drivers regarding the use of stimulant pills and 
found 27% of drivers used either licit or illicit stimulants to manage fatigue. 
Speeding. Driving above the posted speed limit and/or too fast for the conditions is a 
well-known risk for traffic incidents. Golob et al’s (1987) analysis of Californian collisions 
identified speeding as the primary causal factor in 2786 of 9508 crashes. McKnight and 
Bahouth’s  (2009) analysis of 231 truck rollover crashes drawn from the USA large truck 
crash causation study found failure to adjust speed to suit various conditions accounted for 
46% of rollovers. Surprisingly, no other studies were identified linking speeding and crash 
likelihood, although this may be due to a general acceptance of speed as a contributor to 
crashes. This acceptance is supported by crash statistics so lowers the perceived need to 
directly study this effect. Chen and Chen’s (2011) crash severity analysis, however, indicated 
that speed influences the severity of outcomes in single-vehicle truck crashes, yet not 
multiple vehicle crashes. Lack of an increase in severity in multi-vehicle crashes may be 
associated with the size of the truck and relatively limited impact of other vehicles regardless 
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of speed. Finally, Brodie, Bugeja and Elias’s (2009) coroners’ report analysis found that 
excessive and/or inappropriate speed was involved in 43.1% of fatalities in which speed was 
documented. Without available reports on the prevalence of excessive and inappropriate 
speeds of Australian trucks, it is unclear whether this proportion is a reflection of typical 
speeds; however, it is clear that speeding can lead to serious crash consequences.  
Seatbelt usage. Similarly to speeding, non-use of seatbelts received little direct 
attention in the truck safety literature. Seatbelt use would be related to injury severity but not 
crash occurrence. The lack of substantial research is concerning given anecdotal evidence 
that Australian truck drivers are resistant to seatbelt use. Further, low levels of seatbelt use 
have been identified in USA truck drivers generally, and specifically in Hawaii (Cook, 
Hoggins, & Olson, 2008; Kim & Yamashita, 2007). Bunn, Slavova and Robertson (2012) 
analysed crashes involving two-up drivers where one driver was in a sleeper berth. Whilst a 
number of other contributing factors were identified, lack of restraint led to a 2.25 times 
higher likelihood of injury. Brodie, Bugeja and Elias’s (2009) analysis of coroners’ reports 
found seatbelt use was only recorded in 25 of 61 fatalities, thus may suffer reporting bias, and 
it is difficult to draw conclusions due to the lack of prevalence data for Australia. However, 
of the 25 cases in which seatbelt use was reported, 68% of fatalities occurred during non-use 
of seatbelts. Further research is needed to understand seatbelt use and its effects in truck 
safety. 
Driving errors and violations. Research has implicated other driving errors and 
violations in crash severity and likelihood. Representing a varied group of behaviours, they 
essentially relate to the driven path of the vehicle and adherence to vehicle placement-related 
road rules. Golob et al’s (1987) analysis of Californian collisions found that 5433 of the 9508 
(57.1%) analysed crashes were primarily caused by improper turns, failure to yield, 
‘improper driving’ and other violations. Sullman, Meadows and Pajo (2002) utilised the 
Chapter 4: Study One  56 
 
driver behaviour questionnaire to survey 382 New Zealand truck drivers, finding that driving 
violations, but not errors or lapses, increased crash likelihood. Given that lapses were 
typically operationalised as safe but incorrect behaviours, and errors as narrowly avoiding an 
incident, it is not surprising that these behaviours were not correlated with crashes. McKnight 
and Bahouth’s (2009) analysis of descriptions of truck rollovers also found that 29% of the 
rollovers resulted from inattention and 20% from control errors. Finally, Hanowski, Perez 
and Dingus (2005) conducted camera observations of 41 drivers during 2737 crashes, near-
misses and crash-related conflicts, collectively labelled as critical incidents. It was found that 
driver distraction, a common cause for errors, accounted for 178 (6.5%) of critical incidents.  
In terms of severity of crashes, Hakkanen and Sunmola’s (2001) analysis of fatal two 
vehicle crashes in Finland revealed that, of 57 fatal crashes in which truck drivers were 
deemed principally responsible, 50.8% were primarily attributed to a cognitive error and 
26.3% to an operating error. These errors were the primary cause of truck-driver-at-fault fatal 
crashes. Despite a 14-year gap and different sample populations between this study and crash 
prevalence reported by Golob et al. (1987), the higher proportions of fatalities versus crashes 
provide a tentative link between severity and errors and violations. Chen and Chen’s (2011) 
crash severity analysis, however, directly demonstrated this impact, in some cases, finding 
that improper lane usage was correlated with crash severity in single-vehicle truck crashes, 
and both failing to give right of way and driving on the wrong side of the road in multi-
vehicle crashes. Thus, general driving errors and violations significantly raise crash 
likelihood and potentially severity. 
4.2.1. Cultural and contextual causes of crashes 
A number of articles identified cultural and contextual factors related to crash 
likelihood and severity, or risky behaviours. Prior to exploring the identified factors, two 
articles providing information on a number of factors should be discussed.  
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Chen and Chen’s (2011) analysis of injury severity in multi and single-vehicle truck 
crashes identified a number of contextual and individual factors as playing a role in the 
severity of injuries. Identified contextual factors included vehicle and load-related factors 
such as: cargo type and defects, truck configuration and tyre defects; road factors such as 
traffic signals, sharp turns, steep grade, and lane and median width and design; environmental 
conditions such as rain or wet roads, fog/smoke/haze, icy roads, wind, time of day and light 
level; and other vehicle factors such as traffic level and relative number of trucks. 
Additionally, individual factors such as age and gender were identified. 
Brodie, Bugeja and Ibrahim (2010) analysed 45 recommendations from 21 coroners’ 
reports on fatal truck crashes in Victoria, Australia. As these reports came from public 
inquests due to non-truck-driver involvement, only multi-vehicle crashes were included. 
Coroners made recommendations where the inquest found the related factors to be relevant to 
safety. The 45 recommendations targeted heavy vehicle safety (40%), another vehicle or 
party (18%), and general road safety (42%). The most common recommendations related to 
environmental factors such as road signage, speed limits, barriers, lighting and visibility, and 
lighting on trucks. The second most common recommendations related to human factors, 
such as truck driver reporting of health issues. Additionally, vehicle factors, education 
campaigns, driving hours reviews, heavy vehicle tracking, and fatigue detection in trucks 
were the target of recommendations.  
These two articles reveal that there are a broad number of factors which influence crash 
outcomes, that individual articles can inform multiple factors and that, in addition to cultural 
and contextual factors, individual factors may influence crash outcomes. Given the sheer 
number of factors identified within many articles, examining the findings of each article 
individually would result in significant overlap and duplication of findings. Thus, it is 
beneficial to aggregate the factors identified from multiple articles. Further, as the purpose of 
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this review was the identification of factors which form the key components of the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in the industry (context, culture, behaviour 
and outcomes), it is beneficial to describe individual factors in depth rather than emphasise 
every finding from specific articles. Finally, though individual factors are highly relevant to 
safety, safety culture is by nature a group level concept. Nonetheless, future research should 
investigate whether individual factors influence the relationships between culture, context 
and behaviour. As this research is the first major research project to examine safety culture 
within the heavy vehicle industry, the key components of safety culture form the focus of the 
current review and the findings related to individual factors are discussed in Appendix A. 
4.2.1.1. Contextual factors associated with crash outcomes 
A number of articles identified contextual factors which influenced either the 
occurrence or severity of crashes. The contextual factors identified can be broadly separated 
into five categories – government, organisation, customer, road environment and work 
environment. Each of these are discussed below. 
4.2.1.1.1. Government and crash outcomes  
The ability government bodies have to influence safety largely stems from 
enforcement. Whilst some examples of enforcement have obvious effects, others are less 
clear. Chen (2008) assessed crash rates in American trucking firms, comparing firms which 
were subjected to a compliance review with those never reviewed. In the USA, compliance 
reviews are conducted by an external body, assessing the policies and practices of companies 
with high crash rates, and may result in companies being banned from operating. Companies 
subjected to review showed significant steady declines in crash rates a number of years 
following their review. When compared with non-reviewed companies, crash rates were still 
higher. However, non-reviewed companies showed significantly smaller reductions in crash 
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rates over the same period. Thus, the mere threat of penalties on companies translates to 
changes in crash rates. 
Specific policies have also been shown to be related to crash rates. Neeley and 
Richardson (2009) compared speed limit and truck length regulations and crash fatalities 
between a number of US states. Lower speed limits for both cars and trucks reduced 
fatalities, whereas truck-only lower speed limits did not reduce fatalities. Further, truck 
length laws were related to fatalities per crash, but not the number of crashes. Similarly, 
Garber et al. (2006) analysed crash data gathered between 1991 and 2000 within six US states 
to examine the impact of differential truck speed regulations, again finding no consistent 
safety effect of these policies. Another specific form of policy which has received attention 
within the literature is truck lane restrictions. Fontaine (2008) examined crash data from 
Virginia, USA, after the introduction of lane restrictions and found that overall crash rates 
were not affected but there was a reduction in the number of fatal and injury crashes. 
Conversely, Korkut, Ishak and Wolshon (2010) analysed crash data from Louisiana, USA, 
after the introduction of both lane restrictions and differential speed limits, and found a 
reduction in total crash rates. 
Sullivan and Flannagan (2012) examined rates of US crashes where night time 
visibility could have been a causal factor both before and after the introduction of conspicuity 
measures, finding a reduction of 58%. In another example of enforcement, Sweena and 
Gaines (1999) found that the introduction of random drug testing in the USA significantly 
reduced crash fatalities for two years following their introduction. This reduction, however, 
disappeared after two years. Thus, consistent legislation and enforcement may be insufficient 
for prolonged safety.  
Government enforcement regarding fatigue has received significant attention. This 
enforcement generally centres on legislated maximum driving or work hours and the use of 
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log books. McCartt et al. (2000) interviewed 593 US long haul truck drivers regarding falling 
asleep at the wheel, finding that the number of hours working and resting influenced their risk 
of falling asleep whilst driving. Three studies specifically examined safety benefits associated 
with changes in ‘hours of service’ (HOS) legislations that occurred in 2004 in the USA. 
Hanowski, Hickman, Olson and Bocanegra (2009) specifically examined whether the one-
hour increase in maximum daily driving had a negative impact on safety. They found no 
increased risk during this additional hour. In a later study, however, Park and Jovanis (2010) 
analysed the likelihood of crashes occurring during subsequent hours of driving, finding that 
the relative likelihood of crashing in the eleventh hour of driving was 3.6 times that as in the 
first hour of driving, yet that the likelihood of crashing in the tenth hour was only 2.5 times 
higher. Finally, McCartt, Hellinga and Solomon (2008) compared sleep and rest time, driving 
hours, falling asleep at the wheel and driving hours violations before and after these changes, 
finding that despite an increase in rest and sleep time, and similar violation levels, falling 
asleep at the wheel was increased. In Australia, a review of driving hours legislation has been 
recommended by coroners (Brodie et al., 2010), indicating that driving hours enforcement 
have had insufficient effectiveness. However, given the adverse impacts of HOS changes in 
the USA identified above, it may be difficult to ensure an improvement to safety with driving 
hours changes. 
Hall and Mukherjee (2008) analysed US heavy vehicle fatalities and crashes, finding 
that a maximum three to five percent further reduction in fatigue-related crashes could be 
achieved by further reductions in maximum driving hours, but that this reduction would 
require 100% enforcement. Enforcement of driving hours can be problematic. One survey of 
100 New Zealand truck drivers regarding demographics, experience of fatigue, and 
compliance, found 33% of drivers exceeded regulated hours and only 69% exceeded nine 
hours rest between shifts (Baas, Charlton, & Bastin, 2000). Given that only 349 fines were 
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issued in New Zealand for fatigue breaches in 1994, it was argued that there was a clear lack 
of enforcement, due in part to falsification of log books. Snyder (2012) conducted an 
ethnographic study of US truck drivers, providing the story of one observed driver. Due to a 
number of pressures and delays, the driver labelled depot delays as ‘rest’ in order to drive 
through the night whilst fatigued. Thus, the driver was able to reach a location at which to 
rest sufficiently long to ‘reset’ the log book, and so reach the final destination by deadline. 
This example was given to show skilful use of log book regulations to meet a strict schedule. 
However, such behaviour reduces the effectiveness of such legislation.  
4.2.1.1.2. The organisation and crash outcomes 
Throughout the literature a number of organisational factors were identified which 
influence safety. These factors can be broadly categorised as general organisational factors, 
employee management, and management practices.  
General company factors. Cantor, Corsi and Grimm (2009) surveyed 415 US large 
trucking firm representatives, attempting to predict driver hours of service (HOS) and 
crashes, and examine the effect of electronic work diaries. Despite emphasising HOS, a 
number of general organisational factors were identified. HOS and crashes were correlated 
with the type of goods and distance carried, firm size, whether the firm was private, and past 
safety record.  
Other studies also noted the role that firm size had on crashes (Monaco & Redmon, 
2012; Moses & Savage, 1994). Generally, as firm size increases crash outcome risk 
decreases, although this trend reverses slightly in the largest of companies (Monaco & 
Redmon, 2012; Moses & Savage, 1994). Also noted was the effect of cargo type on crash 
outcomes (F. Chen & Chen, 2011; Monaco & Redmon, 2012; Moses & Savage, 1994; Stein 
& Jones, 1988). Stein and Jones’ (1988) found that driving empty trailers, typical in many 
organisations prior to loading, increases crash risk. Moses and Savage (1994) examined the 
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cause of crashes in a US safety review database, finding that firms carrying general freight, 
rather than specialised freight, had higher crash rates, yet hazardous materials transport also 
exhibited higher crash rates. Monaco and Redmon (2012) also found that hazardous material 
transport exhibited higher crash rates, yet indicated that this may be due to higher reporting 
rates of minor incidents. Further, Chen and Chen (2011) found that hazardous materials 
correlated with higher severity injuries in both single and multiple-vehicle crashes. Thus, 
both temporary cargo states, such as empty and defective cargo, and typical freight task have 
an effect on crash rate and severity. 
 Monaco and Redmon (2012) and Moses and Savage (1994) also demonstrated links 
between the distance goods were carried and crash rate. They found higher crash rates in 
interstate transport (Monaco & Redmon, 2012), yet decreased crash rates with increased total 
organisational miles travelled (Moses & Savage, 1994). These results are difficult to compare 
although it may be that total miles travelled better measures the size of the organisation than 
the length of trips. Nonetheless, the distance goods are carried appears related to crash 
outcomes. Friswell and Williamson (2013) surveyed 270 Australian truck drivers and found 
links between vehicle types and distance travelled and the experience of fatigue. The 
frequency of experienced fatigue was similar between drivers from all vehicle types,  
however  short distance light truck drivers experienced fatigue due to insufficient rest breaks 
and higher levels of urban traffic, while long distance heavy vehicle drivers experienced 
fatigue related to long hours, particularly overnight, and specifically during dawn. 
Employee management. The main employee management factor emphasised in the 
literature was the difference between owner operators and fleet drivers. Birdsey et al. (2010) 
found that owner operators had higher crash morbidities in US trade union morbidity data. 
Similarly, Mayhew and Quinlan (2006) interviewed 300 Australian truck drivers, finding that 
owner operators had higher injury and crash rates than fleet drivers. Conversely, Monaco and 
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Redmon (2012) found that owner operators and subcontractors reduced crash rates for 
contracting firms. Thus, despite higher crash rates, owner operators may under-report minor 
crashes, opting to conduct repairs privately. In Brazil, Lemos et al. (2009) also revealed that 
obstructive sleep apnoea was correlated with informal employment. Whilst the existence of 
informal trucking is not known in Australia, owner-operators may be the closest correlate. 
The above research indicates that owner-operators are a high-risk group within the industry. 
Driver payment was also identified as influencing crash outcomes. Rodriguez et al. 
(2006) observed demographic, operations, compensation and crash data from 2368 drivers 
from a single firm following a pay rise. Drivers employed prior to the pay rise and retained 
exhibited lower crash incidence and were more likely to remain with the firm. It is unclear 
whether consecutive pay rises would be required to maintain lower crash incidence. Staplin 
and Gish (2005) found that high turnover rates increase crash rates, and so the safety 
performance of drivers maintained after the pay rise may be an artefact of retainment. 
Snyder’s (2012) ethnographic study of US truck drivers also highlighted payment of drivers, 
finding that payment by distance, rather than time, lead to distance being viewed as money 
and, therefore, creates pressure to drive further than safely possible. This research has shown 
that pay rates and levels are related to crash outcomes. 
Management practices. Within the literature a number of management practices were 
identified as relating to crash outcomes. These included training, supportive versus 
demanding management styles, scheduling, company policies, and monitoring and 
enforcement of these policies. After initial recruitment, drivers are typically exposed to 
training. Despite training being common, only two peer-reviewed articles linked training to 
crash outcomes. Hanowski et al’s (2007) critical incident camera observation study argued 
that training could reduce technique errors, which were responsible for 32% and 52% of 
critical incidents initiated by single and two-up drivers respectively. Crum and Morrow 
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(2002) found that voluntary attendance at safety and training sessions reduced perceived 
fatigue. Thus, whilst training could reduce crashes, mandatory attendance may increase 
pressure and, therefore, perceived fatigue in drivers. In an earlier non-peer reviewed study,  
Haworth et al. (1991) surveyed 286 articulated truck drivers in Melbourne, Australia, 
regarding their behaviours and attitudes. Of those, 121 had experienced an injury crash. 
Among other findings, drivers who had experienced an injury-crash reported lower levels of 
training. 
Management style, supportive or demanding, can also influence safety. Swartz and 
Douglas (2009) found that supportive management styles decreased owneroperator’s 
intentions to commit unsafe acts. Using the job demands-control model to explore fatigue and 
job satisfaction in 1181 truck drivers, de Croon et al. (2002) found that the level of job 
control, work load and supervisor demands all predicted fatigue. Similarly, Morrow and 
Crum (2004) found that pressure to drive increased perceived fatigue. Regarding the extent of 
such pressures, Sabbagh-Ehrlich, Friedman and Richter (2005) interviewed 160 Israeli port 
truck drivers, of which 41.9% stated that their employee forced them to exceed legislated 
hours. In addition to explicit pressures, work stress has been correlated with drug and alcohol 
use in Pakistani truck drivers (Mir et al., 2012), and constant time pressure and disrespectful 
treatment linked with increased drug use in US long distance truck drivers (Shattell, 
Apostolopoulos, Sönmez, & Griffin, 2010). 
Scheduling can be a major source of pressure in truck driving and is responsible for the 
amount of driving completed by drivers, and thus fatigue (de Croon et al., 2002; de Pinho et 
al., 2006; Maldonado, Mitchell, Taylor, & Driver, 2002; Soccolich et al., 2013; Stein & 
Jones, 1988). McCartt et al. (2000) found falling asleep at the wheel to be associated with 
arduous schedules, higher ratios of work to off-duty hours, and driving while fatigued at night 
time. Crum and Morrow (2002) surveyed 116 managers and 279 drivers regarding fatigue 
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and close calls, finding that size of delivery window and levels of night time driving were 
associated with perceived fatigue. Further, of 683 Finnish truck drivers interviewed by 
Pertula, Ojala and Kuosma (2011), 27.8% often felt fatigued while driving and 46.8% 
attributed nodding off to work factors, including both long shifts and shorter sleeps, and 
inability to choose break times. Similarly, Charlton and Baas (2001) conducted surveys and 
psychomotor tests with 606 New Zealand truck drivers regarding fatigue. It was found that 
shift length and the number of days worked in a week were associated with decreased 
psychomotor performance. 
As previously stated, Sabbagh-Ehrlich et al. (2005) found that 41.9% of drivers report 
that their organisation forces them to work beyond their legal driving hours. It is unlikely that 
this occurs formally through written schedules, however scheduling combined with 
management pressures may contribute to this problem. Similarly, Beilock (1995) examined 
the schedules of 500 US truck drivers in the Florida peninsula, estimating that 14 to 26% of 
schedules required the driver to exceed legal HOS, and an additional 17 to 33% were 
suspected of requiring breaches. Thus, drivers may be less influenced by government 
legislation as a result of direct pressure from their organisation.  
Heavy work schedules have been associated with poorer levels of sleep. Braekman et 
al. (2011) surveyed 476 Belgian truck drivers. Perceived unrealistic work schedules were 
correlated with poor sleep. This effect may be influenced by the restriction of possible sleep 
locations. Baulk and Fletcher (2011) examined work and sleep diaries in order to compare 
sleep on the road with that at home, finding that sleeping at home significantly reduced 
perceived fatigue. 
To explore the causes of poor scheduling, Braver, Preusser and Ulmer (1999) 
interviewed 270 schedulers from Wyoming and Tennessee, USA, regarding the acceptance of 
jobs and scheduling of drivers. Schedulers reported considering revenue (75%) deadlines to 
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meet (24%) and hours of service (9%) in the acceptance of jobs. When scheduling, 
participants reported considering trip mileage (58%), speed limits (27%) and past route 
experience (13%). Two-thirds of schedulers reportedly used rule of thumb travel time 
estimates, with 14% expecting an average speed over 60mph. Combined, these findings 
demonstrate that organisations may become overloaded due to failure to account for 
deadlines and hours of service in the acceptance of jobs. This may lead to heavier scheduling 
of individual drivers, allowing little room for delays, and often require drivers to maintain 
high speeds. Thus, scheduling is a major factor to consider when examining the role of 
organisations in safety. 
Specific organisational policies can also influence crash outcomes, a few major 
examples of which appeared in the literature. Many researchers highlighted the influence of 
involvement in unloading and loading on fatigue and related incidents (Crum & Morrow, 
2002; Maldonado et al., 2002; Soccolich et al., 2013). Whilst unloading and loading 
involvement is partially dictated by customer policies, the organisation is also responsible for 
these practices. Similarly, the decision to utilise two-up or single driving impacts driver sleep 
quality (Maldonado et al., 2002). Finally, Sullivan and Flannagan’s (2012) conspicuity 
measures study, highlighted in section 4.2.1.1.1, indicated that some organisations choose to 
exceed legislation, so specific policies and practices should be considered. Regardless of 
policies used, without organisational monitoring and enforcement, they will have little 
impact. Only one study tied organisational monitoring to crash outcomes. Moses and Savage 
(1994) found that firms which under-report crash involvement reported higher crash rates 
than those with accurate reports. Thus, inaccurate monitoring is either caused by other factors 
which influence crashes, or directly leads to increases in incidents due to reduced detection, 
enforcement and self-assessment. 
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4.2.1.1.3. Customers and crash outcomes 
Customers play a significant role in heavy vehicle crash outcomes. Despite little 
reference in the literature, it is important to note that customers may influence organisational 
policies. Three studies were identified that directly linked customers with crash outcomes, all 
of which related to fatigue. As previously noted, Braver et al. (1999) found that 75% of 
schedulers consider revenue, and only 25% consider deadlines when accepting jobs. Thus, 
customers may be free to insist upon unreasonable deadlines when offering sufficient money. 
As the size of the delivery window influences perceived fatigue (2002), customers can be 
seen to heavily influence safety. Additionally, Kemp, Kopp and Kemp (2013) collected 
qualitative and quantitative data from 435 truck drivers in the USA and found that many 
drivers experienced time pressures, which typically stemmed from customer delays. These 
time pressures were associated with physical fatigue and emotion exhaustion. Finally, 
Snyder’s (2012) ethnographic study, and the associated example driver, demonstrated these 
effects as customer delays led the driver to drive when fatigued in order to reach a deadline. 
Whilst in other industries customers may have a less significant role in safety, reducing the 
degree of attention customers have received in safety culture literature, it can be seen that 
customers are an important contextual influence on safety within heavy vehicle industries. 
4.2.1.1.4. Road environment and crash outcomes 
Drivers spend the majority of their time on the road, so contextual factors related to 
road environment are important for heavy vehicle safety. The literature identified a number of 
road environment factors that influence safety, including other vehicles, environmental 
conditions and road design and condition. Whilst the organisation can limit night-time 
driving, these factors are generally beyond the control of the industry. 
Other vehicles. Bjornstig et al. (2008) examined 293 north Swedish passenger car 
fatalities resulting from multiple vehicle crashes from 1995 to 2004. Though half of these 
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fatalities occurred from crashes with heavy vehicles, the car driver was at fault in 81% of the 
fatalities. Thus, cars present a hazard to truck drivers. Further, 8% of the crashes involving a 
car and a truck showed signs of car-driver suicide through intentionally crashing. Similarly, 
Hakkanen and Sunmola (2001) analysed 337 fatal two-vehicle trailer-truck crashes in Finland 
from 1991 to 1997. Only 16% of trailer-truck drivers in these crashes were principally 
responsible. Thus, in 84% of crashes, the truck driver was considered a second participant in 
the crash.  
The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture relates to safety outcomes which are 
caused by behaviours influenced by contextual and cultural factors (section 2.3.5). Regardless 
of the culture of drivers, if another vehicle causes the incident there is little that a truck driver 
can do to avoid crashing. Whilst other vehicles influence crash outcomes, they may not 
always do so in a way amenable to interpretation with safety culture. Nonetheless, it is 
important to recognise the impact of other vehicles to maintain realistic ideas regarding the 
industry’s ability to improve safety. Additionally, however, other vehicles can influence 
driver safety through stress and resultant fatigue. Cherry and Adelakun (2012) surveyed truck 
drivers in Knoxville, Tennessee, USA, regarding perceived traffic threats to productivity and 
safety. Principal threats identified were aggressive drivers, congestion, car lane changing 
behaviour and merging vehicles. Due to increased driving time, lost productivity and the 
additional cognitive load of avoiding erratic car drivers, truck drivers may experience greater 
fatigue. 
Environmental conditions. In addition to other vehicles, environmental conditions may 
influence crash outcomes. Blower et al. (1993) analysed Michigan heavy vehicle crashes, 
finding that crashes were 1.4 times more likely at night. Bunn et al. (2009) similarly found 
crash patterns were associated with time of day, with truck drivers more likely to be at fault 
during the day. When compared with higher crash rates at night, this pattern may reflect other 
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vehicle faults increased at night. Ranney et al. (2000), using driving simulator experiments 
demonstrated that glare from headlights increased the time taken to see pedestrians and to 
identify objects in mirrors, and led to lane position variability, slower speed on curves and 
steering variability. Thus night time crashes may be influenced by increased contrast of light 
and glare relative to background light levels. However, time of day can also play a significant 
role in fatigue (Crum & Morrow, 2002; Heaton, Browning, & Anderson, 2008) and falling 
asleep at the wheel when drowsy (McCartt et al., 2000). Time of day has been used as an 
indicator of fatigue involvement in crashes (Gander, Marshall, James, & Quesne, 2006). 
Additionally, it is worth noting one non-peer reviewed Australian study which conducted on-
road evaluations of the fatigue experiences of 22 day shift, 21 night shift and 11 rotating shift 
truck drivers (A Williamson, Friswell, & Feyer, 2004). It was found that fatigue ratings 
showed a greater increase across a work week for night time drivers, yet that performance 
was not differentially affected by shift times. 
Chen and Chen (2011) also identified a number of other environmental factors, largely 
relating to weather, which influence crash severity, including smog/fog/haze, cross winds, 
wet and icy road surfaces, and low light conditions. Similarly, Hakkanen and Sunmola (2001) 
revealed that truck drivers perceive weather to play a significant role in crash outcomes. 
Lastly, Young and Liesman (2007) compared 14,700 rollover truck crashes in Wyoming, 
USA, with wind speed and gust records from 21 weather stations, finding that wind readings 
showed a significant correlation with rollover crashes. 
Road design and condition. The environmental factors identified in the literature were 
road design and condition. Golob and Recker’s (1987) study exploring causal factors of 
crashes revealed distinct patterns of crashes on different highways and highway sections. 
Sharma and Landge (2012) conducted zero-inflated negative binomial regression on heavy 
vehicle crashes on a selected highway, correlating crashes to road design factors. They found 
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that the number of highway access points, and narrower lanes and shoulders, increase crash 
risk. Australian coroners’ recommendations also commonly targeted road signage, posted 
speed limits, safety barriers, and lighting and visibility in order to reduce crash fatalities 
(Brodie et al., 2010). Similarly, Bunn et al. (2009) found that posted speed limits were 
associated with rates of truck driver at-fault crashes. Thus, a number of road-related factors 
including road dimensions, access points, visibility and posted speed limit have been shown 
to influence crash rates. 
Archer and Young (2009) utilised simulated changes to traffic signals aimed at 
decreasing the risk of truck crashes resulting from traffic light violations. A number of 
changes to traffic signal operation were found to reduce risk. Whilst the details of these 
changes are irrelevant to this chapter, traffic signals can clearly influence crash outcomes. 
Finally, road design and condition may also influence fatigue due to availability of rest 
locations. Crum & Morrow (2002) and Morrow and Crum (2004) found that inability to find 
adequate rest locations increased fatigue-related near misses. Similarly, in Israel, Sabbagh-
Ehrlich et al. (2005) found that difficulty finding a park when tired was associated with 
crashes. This fits with Snyder’s (2012) account of the driver travelling additional hours into 
the night because no parking was available at the first location. Many of the above factors 
were also identified in two non-peer reviewed Australian studies examining the interactions 
between heavy vehicles and the road system. These studies highlighted the following issues 
as being relevant to heavy vehicle safety – height clearances, horizontal alignment, signage, 
lane size, length of on/off-ramps, road edge drop-off, clear zones, railway level crossings, 
clearance times for intersections, visibility distance, delineation markings, shoulder sealing, 
roadside hazards, safety barriers and pavement quality (Styles, Mabbott, Roberts, & Tziotis, 
2008; Tziotis, Pyta, & McLean, 2009). 
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4.2.1.1.5. Work environment and crash outcomes 
Work environment factors identified in the literature differed from road environmental 
factors in that the organisation has some control over these factors. These factors include 
vehicle design and maintenance, passengers and cargo-related factors. 
Vehicle design and maintenance. Chen and Chen (2011) found semi-trailer trucks and 
truck tyre defects were associated with more severe injuries in multiple-vehicle crashes, 
highlighting that both design and maintenance of vehicles are relevant to safety. In regards to 
maintenance issues, Hakkanen and Summala (2001) reported technological faults as a 
common cause of truck drivers’ at-fault crashes. Similarly, Jones and Stein (1989) compared 
the roadworthiness of 734 trucks involved in 676 crashes with a randomised control selection 
of trucks, revealing that crashes were 1.5 times more likely with brake defects and two times 
more likely with steering defects. Further, through examining data drawn from the US large 
truck crash causation study, Blower, Green and Matteson (2010) found that when a truck had 
one or more defects the truck driver was 1.7 times more likely to have contributed to the 
crash. This could be explained by Haworth et al’s (1991) survey of truck driver behaviours 
and attitudes, which found drivers involved in an injury crash were less likely to examine 
their vehicle for defects. With regards specifically to brake defects, however, one non-peer-
reviewed Australian report analysed a number of truck crashes involving brake failure on 
long and steep road sections. It found drivers were often provided with insufficient 
information about auxiliary braking systems and that failure of these systems was often not 
clearly signalled to the driver (Trevorrow & Eady, 2010). 
Regarding the design of trucks, a number of studies identified correlates of crash 
outcomes. Braver et al. (1998) analysed photos of fatal crashes between cars and trucks and 
found under-ride to be severely underreported by police, as it was reported in only 6% of 
fatal crashes but evident in 63% of the sample. Potential for under-run was also emphasised 
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by two non-peer-reviewed Australian studies which highlighted the role of truck design 
related to size, stiffness, wheel guards and trims in contributing to a number of fatalities to 
members of the public involved in crashes with trucks (Rechnitzer, 1993; Rechnitzer & 
Foong, 1993).  Hanowski et al’s (2007) camera observation of drivers also revealed that 
14.3% of critical incidents initiated by two-up drivers were caused by physical properties of 
vehicle design. Whilst details of these effects were not clarified it was suggested that vehicle 
design, in terms of weight, size and centre of gravity, was crucial to critical incidents. 
Regehr and colleagues (2009) compared Canadian collision rates of various vehicle 
configurations and found longer vehicles had lower collision rates per kilometre travelled 
than other articulated trucks. Conversely, in Washington, USA, Stein and Jones (1988) found 
double trailer trucks were between two and three times more likely to crash than single-trailer 
or non-trailer trucks. Different legislative requirements between the US and Canada may 
partially account for the different crash patterns, however, it may be that grouping multiple 
vehicle types as ‘long vehicles’ could mask some variability within the Canadian study. 
Lastly, Archer and Young (2009) also reported that truck mass influences required braking 
distance and, thus, risk of red light running.  
Lastly, a number of studies investigated the benefits of specific vehicle safety 
countermeasures. In these cases the potential benefits of countermeasures were investigated 
in controlled tests or computer modelling, and as such the actual benefits of these 
countermeasures cannot be ascertained. Nonetheless, rear-view video systems were 
demonstrated to improve stop rate in controlled reversing scenarios (Lee, Kourtellis, Lin, & 
Hsu, 2010), forward collision warning systems were suggested to be able to reduce rear-end 
truck crashes on US highways by 21% (Rakha, Fitch, Arafeh, Blanco, & Hanowski, 2010), 
and speed limiters set to 105km/h were suggested to be able to reduce crashes on non-
congested Canadian highways (Saccomanno, Cunto, Hellinga, Philp, & Thiffault, 2009). 
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Taken together, the above studies indicate that vehicle design and maintenance plays a 
significant role in crash outcomes. 
Passengers. Only one reference to passengers was identified in the literature. However, 
as they fall outside other identified factors, this finding forms a separate factor. Bunn and 
colleagues (2009) found that the presence of passengers was protective of crashes for drivers 
aged over 65 years. Whilst this raises questions as to why age effects were relevant, it is 
important to recognise passengers may influence safety. 
Cargo. The final work environment factor influencing crash outcomes was cargo 
carried. Whilst this was noted as an organisational factor, it is clear that the cargo itself may 
also influence crashes as referred to in section 4.2.1.1.2. 
4.2.1.1.6. Summary: Context and crash outcomes 
As behaviour is the result of both cultural and contextual influences, it was important to 
explore contextual factors identified in the literature which influence crash outcomes. The 
influence of specific factors was identified including government departments, the 
organisation, customers, road environment and work environment. Government bodies were 
seen to influence crash rates and severity through regulations and enforcement, utilising 
specific policies to improve heavy vehicle crash outcomes. Aside from directly influencing 
drivers, some policies exert influence via the organisation. The organisation a driver works 
for also has a major role in crash outcomes. General organisational factors seen to influence 
crash outcomes included the size of the company, the goods they carry, the distance over 
which these goods are carried, employee management practices like employment type, 
payment and retainment, and management practices such as training, management style, 
scheduling, policies and enforcement. Further, customers influence safety through financial 
power, specific policies and delivery windows which apply pressure on drivers. In addition to 
government organisations and customers, the road environment influences crash outcomes 
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through the presence of other vehicles, environmental conditions, and design and condition of 
roads. Finally, the work environment influences crashes through vehicle design and 
maintenance, presence of passengers and cargo type. Having developed an understanding of 
the contextual factors which influence crash outcomes it is important to examine potential 
cultural factors identified in the literature. 
4.2.1.2. Culture and crash 
With a lack of previous safety culture research in heavy vehicle industries, no cultural 
factors have been identified within the literature. However, a number of attitudes, beliefs or 
values have been identified in heavy vehicle driver samples, which serve as potential cultural 
traits for further investigation. Baas et al. (2000) found that most drivers perceived fatigue to 
be a greater problem for other truck drivers than for themself, potentially indicating a general 
tendency to view other drivers as worse than the self. Whilst Snyder (2012) identified cultural 
traits in US truck drivers, these traits may not be relevant to Australian truck drivers and no 
relationship to safety was established. Nonetheless, drivers were seen to hold negative views 
towards enforcement, took pleasure ‘working the system’, valued personal experience over 
rules and valued working hard and getting the job done. A number of the above findings were 
also evident within Haworth et al’s (1991) non-peer reviewed survey of Melbourne truck 
drivers, which found that truck drivers generally held ill-feeling towards some government 
interventions and viewed themselves generally positive whilst labelling a select minority of 
‘cowboys’ as being to blame for incidents. Additionally, it was also seen that drivers who had 
experienced an injury-crash rated themselves highly regarding their ability to manage fatigue, 
despite possessing what were deemed to be poor fatigue coping behaviours. Lastly, Davey et 
al. (2007) found that a desire to fit in with the ‘trucking image’ contributed to drug usage.  
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4.2.1.3. Summary: Crash outcomes 
Crashes are a major safety concern within heavy vehicle industries worldwide. A 
number of studies have explored the causes of crashes, identifying a number of risky 
behaviours and factors associated with these behaviours. Despite a lack of previous safety 
culture research, analysing these studies using the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture highlights that much is currently known. A number of contextual influences on crash 
outcomes are present within heavy vehicle industries, including those drawn from 
government, organisations, customers, and the road and work environment. Additionally, a 
number of potential cultural traits have been identified, including viewing others as more 
dangerous, negative views of enforcement, working the system, valuing personal experience 
over rules, working hard and getting the job done, and fitting in with the trucking image. 
Figure 4.1 shows identified factors which related to crash outcomes in the same structure 
used in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. Thus, the figure shows that each of the identified contextual 
(section 4.2.1.1) and potential cultural traits (section 4.2.1.2) influence the behaviours 
identified in section 4.2, to result in crashes, injuries and fatalities. 
4.2.1. Non-crash injury outcomes 
In addition to crashes, heavy vehicle drivers experience a range of other injuries, 
referred to here as non-crash injuries. Non-crash injuries thus serve as the second category of 
outcomes within the literature. As the synthesised conceptualisation holds that outcomes are 
the result of behaviour which is influenced by contextual and cultural factors (section 2.3.5), 
each of these components of the conceptualisation must be analysed with regards to non-
crash injuries. Jones et al. (2011) examined mortality data from coroners’ reports on 47 
Australian fatalities from non-crash injuries between 2000 and 2009. Of the recorded 16 
cases, six drivers had detectable levels of blood alcohol and illicit drugs. In regards to the 
events preceding the fatality, 47% occurred when tending to cargo, 66% of the drivers were 
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Figure 4.1: A preliminary synthesised conceptualisation of the safety culture in heavy vehicle 
crash outcomes 
 
working alone, 45% were caused by brake failure-related vehicle movement and 70% 
involved the driver being crushed by the vehicle or another object. Thus, behaviours 
occurring around or in the vehicle or trailer during non-driving tasks must be considered. 
Drivers may also suffer a range of less severe injuries during these tasks. Shibuya et al. 
(2010) sought to identify hazard scenarios from text descriptions of 136 Danish trucking firm 
incidents occurring during unloading and loading. Activities undertaken at time of an incident 
included ascending/descending from the cabin or trailer (57), moving at heights (60), 
operating the top panel of the trailer (15), or standing beside the vehicle (4). The mechanisms 
of injury were falls from heights (63), falls at the same level (19), slips or trips without falling 
(24), overexertion (7), being hit by an object (19) and being caught between objects (4). The 
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causes of the 63 falls from heights were errors in footing (31), slips and trips (13), defects or 
malfunctions (7), shoe catching (3), and loss of balance or control (10). Suggestions to 
improve truck driver safety in these situations included modifying procedures, stricter shoe 
requirements, better housekeeping, improved truck maintenance and raising awareness of 
non-crash injuries. 
Three studies directly explored entering and exiting the vehicle. Fathallah and Cotnam 
(2000) compared impact forces when exiting vehicles with and without the use of steps and 
hand rails, finding that non-use of aids resulted in impact forces up to six times greater than 
with the use of aids. Similarly, Fathallah et al. (2000) compared risk of slip and fall in icy 
conditions when exiting a vehicle with or without these same aids. The probability of falling 
was between 0.7 and 0.9 without aids, and 0.45 and 0.55 with aids. Lastly, Patenaude et al. 
(2001) compared impact forces from 10 truck drivers either facing away or toward the truck 
upon descent. Facing away from the truck greatly increased impact forces and spinal 
compression.  
Lincoln et al. (2004) explored text descriptions of incidents leading to back injury in 94 
US army truck drivers. Incidents occurred when being struck by or against an object during 
motor vehicle crashes, falls resulting from slips/trips or loss of balance, and overexertion 
from lifting activities. 
Jones and Switzer-McIntyre (2003) explored transport sector work claims related to 
falls from non-moving vehicles in Ontario during 1997. They identified 352 falls, typically 
from the back of the truck or trailer, truck steps, or cargo. Common injuries from these falls 
included sprain/strains, contusions and fractures, with 89.4% of drivers back at work within 
12 months. Thus, these injuries are common but have minimal long term impact. 
The final form of injuries identified in the literature were loco-motor disorders, 
typically resulting from prolonged strain. Jensen et al. (2008) compared these disorders 
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amongst bus drivers, long haul truck drivers, other truck drivers and the general public. 
Professional drivers had high risk of lesions of the ulnar nerve, intervertebral disc disorders 
were more prevalent amongst long haul truck drivers and bus drivers, and long haul truck 
drivers were at higher risk of carpal tunnel syndrome, synovitis and bursitis.  
From the above studies a number of scenarios and behaviours related to non-crash 
injuries can be identified, included entering and exiting the vehicle, loading and unloading, 
working within the trailer and working from heights. A number of contextual and potential 
cultural factors were identified which influenced non-crash injuries. Identified individual 
factors can be found in Appendix A. 
4.2.1.1. Contextual factors associated with non-crash injuries  
Identified contextual factors which influence non-crash injuries could be categorised 
under organisational factors, worker’s unions and environmental factors. These are discussed 
below. 
4.2.1.1.1. The organisation and non-crash injuries 
The organisation to which a driver belongs can influence non-crash safety through 
employment form, scheduling and pressures and specific policies. Mayhew and Quilan 
(2006) found that owner-operators had worse injury records than other drivers. Further, 
Williamson et al. (2009) surveyed 217 short haul truck drivers from Sydney, Australia, and 
found the number of injury claims in the past five years was associated with whether or not 
the driver had permanent work status. Thus, employment form can influence either the 
reporting of injuries or the number of injuries sustained. 
Friswell and Williamson (2010) compared injuries with risk perceptions, revealing that 
organisational pressure was responsible for a significant proportion of injuries. One of the 
most direct methods of pressure is the use of strict schedules. Williamson et al. (2009) found 
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that work-life conflict was correlated with worsening injuries over time. Whilst not 
definitively related to scheduling, schedules that interfere with a driver’s personal life appear 
to influence injury progression. 
 Shibuya et al. (2010) suggested that policies relating to the loading and unloading of 
vehicles and the use of personal protective equipment could significantly improve injury 
outcomes. Similarly, Williamson et al. (2009) revealed that time spent loading was related to 
worsening injuries. Given that companies often use policies regarding unloading and loading, 
at times banning driver participation, such policies may directly influence injury rates and 
severity. Given the link between level of manual handling and musculoskeletal injuries (Robb 
& Mansfield, 2007), it is evident that such policies should be explored. 
4.2.1.1.2. Workers union and non-crash injuries 
Literature is unavailable which identifies customer and government effects on non-
crash injuries, however one study has discussed the role of a workers union. Williamson et al. 
(2009) found that workers union membership was linked with worsening injuries over time, 
illnesses and injury claims over the past five years. The mechanism of influence and whether 
the relationship was causal is unknown, however, further research should explore the effect 
of unions and other similar bodies. 
4.2.1.1.3. Environmental factors and non-crash injuries 
Environmental factors have also been linked to non-crash injuries. Due to a relative 
lack of research compared with crash outcomes, distinguishing between environment types 
has little benefit. However, two factors were identified – vehicle design and maintenance, and 
road factors. 
Vehicle design and maintenance. Studies discussed above have demonstrated the 
importance of aids for exiting vehicles. Fathallah et al. (2000) found that ‘step van’ design 
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trucks produced low slip probabilities in icy conditions regardless of aid use. Additionally, 
Marshall and Wells (2011) tested the physical requirements of three trailer tarping systems  – 
manual tarping, sliders, and rack and tarp – finding that manual tarping increased the risk of 
injury due to falls and physical requirements. Conversely, sliders reduced the risk of fall and 
physical strain. Finally, the design of seats can also influence back pain and repetitive strain 
injuries (Robb & Mansfield, 2007). Thus, truck design significantly influences non-crash 
injuries. 
Road factors. In addition to crash outcomes, roadways can also influence non-crash 
injuries. Shibuya et al. (2010) found that road inclination at unloading and loading locations 
increased the risk of brake failure leading to crushing. Similarly, Friswell and Williamson 
(2010) found that roadways and access points contributed to many injuries in short haul truck 
drivers. Lastly, vibration experienced whilst driving, and within depots, can lead to back 
injuries and pain. As this type of injury does not result from crashes it has been included here. 
Bovenzi et al. (2006) assessed whole body vibration and duration in European professional 
drivers, finding that lower back pain could be best predicted through combination of both 
vibration intensity and duration. However, Robb and Mansfield (2007) examined back pain in 
192 United Kingdom truck drivers, revealing that lower levels of vibration were associated 
with back pain. Thus, at higher levels of vibration the driver may be more prepared and able 
to resist the effect of vibration, whereas at lower levels they may be more vulnerable to 
injury. Kumar (2004) placed accelerometers on truck seats and strategic spinal locations of 14 
heavy mining truck drivers during typical activities. It was found that international standards 
for vibration were exceeded 17 times for vertical seat vibration, 23 times for vertical lumbar 
vibration, once for vertical cervical vibration, and on many occasions in the sagittal and 
coronal planes. Thus road inclination during unloading and loading and road-related 
vibrations present a significant non-crash injury threat. 
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4.2.1.1.4. Summary: Context and non-crash injuries 
When compared to crash outcomes, significantly less literature regarding contextual 
factors and non-crash injuries was available. However, there was some similarity between the 
contextual factors identified for non-crash injury and crash outcomes. The organisation, again 
through employee management and management practices, significantly influences non-crash 
injury outcomes. Whilst neither government nor customers were seen to influence these 
injuries, they may still exert influence through organisations, or may simply have eluded 
previous research. The influence of workers unions was, however, unique to non-crash 
injuries. Environmental factors were relevant to non-crash injuries, although only vehicle 
design and maintenance and road factors were identified. Having developed an understanding 
of contextual factors related to non-crash injury outcomes, it is important to explore potential 
cultural factors. 
4.2.1.2. Cultural factors associated with non-crash injuries 
Again, in the absence of previous safety culture research in heavy vehicle industries, 
only potential cultural factors could be identified. Two studies were reviewed which 
identified potential cultural beliefs, attitudes or values related to non-crash injuries. Shibuya 
et al. (2010) indicated that despite non-crash injuries being more prevalent than crash 
injuries, Danish truck drivers considered crashes to be the most important safety concern. 
Friswell and Williamson (2010) also found that truck drivers viewed road issues as their 
major concern. Whilst these views may be related to the potentially more severe average 
crash outcome over non-crash injuries, the apparent lack of emphasis placed on non-crash 
incidents was suggested to reduce precautions made for non-crash incidents. Friswell and 
Williamson (2010) also found that truck drivers viewed other truck drivers as more 
dangerous, potentially leading drivers to take higher risks under a false sense of security.  
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4.2.1.3. Summary: Non-crash injuries 
Non-crash injuries typically result from unsafe practices occurring during unloading 
and loading and entering and exiting the vehicle or trailer. Incidents are often the result of 
slips, trips, falls, loss of balance and overexertion, but can also result from repetitive strain. 
The current safety culture framework views behaviour as resulting from contextual and 
cultural factors. Regarding contextual influences on non-crash injuries, the organisation for 
which a driver works for, membership in a union, and vehicle and road factors were seen to 
influence these injury outcomes. Though few potential cultural factors were identified, it was 
seen that drivers may place higher priority on road safety over non-crash safety, and view 
other drivers as more dangerous than the self. These factors have been incorporated into the 
same format as Figure 2.1. in Chapter 2 to produce Figure 4.2. This figure demonstrates that 
the contextual (section 4.2.2.1) and potential cultural (section 4.2.2.2) factors identified 
within this section influence the behaviours and outcomes (section 4.2.2) related to non-crash 
incidents.  
 
Figure 4.2: A preliminary synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in heavy vehicle 
driver non-crash injuries. 
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4.2.2. Health Outcomes 
A number of papers were identified which focussed on health outcomes for heavy 
vehicle drivers. As these papers addressed distinct issues and typically provided only a small 
selection of factors, each health concern is addressed separately rather than aggregating 
factors. Behaviours such as drug use and inadequate sleep can be considered health concerns 
but have already been discussed. 
Cancer and respiratory disorders. Both cancer and respiratory disorders are significant 
health issues which truck drivers can face. Balarajan and McDowall (1988) examined 
mortality data for 3392 professional drivers in London, revealing that lorry drivers had an 
increased risk of stomach and lung cancer, bronchitis, emphysema and asthma. Jarvholm and 
Silverman (2003) examined health records of Swedish construction workers from 1971 to 
1992 on a computerised register. A total of 6364 truck drivers and 14,364 drivers of heavy 
construction vehicles were compared to 119,984 carpenters and electricians. Whilst 
construction vehicle drivers did not differ from the control, truck drivers had higher rates of 
lung cancer and prostate cancer, although only mortality from lung cancer proved significant. 
Jakobsson et al. (1997) also examined the risk of lung cancer in Swedish professional 
drivers using census data from 1970 and cancer registry data for 1970 to 1971. Over 96,000 
professional drivers experienced lung cancer, with long and particularly short distance truck 
drivers experiencing the highest risk. Cancer risk was higher in urban than rural areas, 
potentially explaining the higher risk of lung cancer in short distance truck drivers. This risk 
was attributed to vehicle exhaust and traffic congestion, which is consistent with other 
research showing lung cancer increased with exposure to exhaust (Garshick et al., 2008). 
Lastly, Steenland et al. (1990) examined lung cancer mortality within a multiple occupation 
union in the US, finding that only long-term driving of diesel trucks increased the risk of lung 
cancer. Smoking is a well-known risk factor for lung cancer, however only Jarvholm and 
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Silverman (2003) and Jakobsson et al. (1997) controlled for smoking status.  Both studies 
found that additional variation was still attributable to truck driving. This was further verified 
by Robinson and Burnett (2005), who analysed mortality rates for US truck drivers between 
1979 and 1990 finding that, even when adjusting for estimated smoking rates, long distance 
truck drivers demonstrated high rates of lung cancer, ischaemic heart disease and acute 
myocardial infarction. From these studies it can be seen that driving trucks generally 
increases risk of lung cancer and potentially other forms of cancer, along with respiratory 
disorders, though little is known about reducing risks associated with heavy vehicle driving. 
Eating and exercise. Dahl et al. (2009) compared 2175 long haul truck drivers with 
15,060 other truck drivers and the general population of Denmark for lifestyle-related 
diseases. All lifestyle-related diseases, except those related to alcohol, were more prevalent in 
truck drivers. Particularly strong trends were seen for diseases relating to calorie intake and 
exercise. Buxton et al. (2009) surveyed 542 US truck drivers, assessing relationships between 
work environment, sleep adequacy and diet. Increased fruit and vegetable consumption and 
decreased consumption of sugary drinks and snacks were correlated with attaining levels of 
adequate sleep, which was in turn correlated with working more hours and job strain. Good 
sleep adequacy was associated with supervisor support, lower job strain and job satisfaction. 
Thus, management practices and pressure were predictive of dietary-related disorders. 
General health. General health outcomes were discussed in three studies. Jovanovich et 
al. (2008) examined stress and serum lipids in 417 Serbian professional drivers, 81 of which 
were truck drivers. Highest values of serum glucose, total cholesterol, LDL cholesterol and 
triacylglycerols and the lowest values of serum HDL cholesterol were found in truck drivers. 
These lipids were correlated with increased stress levels and are known to have adverse 
health effects including atherosclerotic lesions. Thus, stress levels in truck drivers are high 
and contribute to poor health. By exploring the relationship between job control, demands, 
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need for recovery and sick leave, de Croon (2003) revealed that the need for recovery after 
work predicted later sick leave, further implicating the effects of stress over time. 
Though few contextual and cultural influences on general health outcomes were 
identified, Stasko and Neale (2007) interviewed 30 US truck drivers regarding access to 
health care. Most drivers had a family doctor, however those who did not cited cost as a 
barrier. Additionally, over a third of drivers stated their health care utilisation was reduced 
due to lack of access on-road. This is a significant problem for long distance truck drivers, as 
without accessible health care on-road they may be prevented from regular health checks. 
4.2.2.1. Summary: Health outcomes 
A number of heavy vehicle driver health outcomes were evident in the literature. These 
included cancers and respiratory diseases, eating and exercise disorders, and general health 
concerns. The synthesised conceptualisation holds that outcomes are the result of behaviours 
which are influenced by cultural and contextual factors (section 2.3.5). Existing literature on 
health outcomes was difficult to analyse through the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture due to a lack of identified behaviours, except for healthy eating and exercising, and 
receiving health care, and the complete absence of potential cultural traits. Nonetheless, it 
was seen that the organisation, region they work, and distance travelled influenced cancers, 
whilst management pressures, scheduling, and supervisor support influenced eating and 
exercise patterns. Lastly, health care access due to insufficient money or availability on-road 
influenced general health. These factors are again presented in Figure 4.3, which 
demonstrates what little information was present in the literature regarding how outcomes are 
influenced by behaviour, context and culture. 
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Figure 4.3: Preliminary foundation of a synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in 
heavy vehicle health outcomes 
 
4.2.3. Miscellaneous articles 
The final category of research consisted of those which identified contextual and 
potential cultural factors, without specifying a behaviour or injury scenario. Whilst cultural 
and contextual factors are only relevant to safety culture where they influence behaviour, a 
lack of previous research does not indicate that these factors do not influence behaviours. 
Further research should examine the impact of the identified factors on behaviour. 
4.2.3.1. Miscellaneous contextual factors 
Government policies. Kuncyte et al. (2003) conducted a policy review on training for 
transporting dangerous goods in the USA, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands. In Sweden 
there was an emphasis on accreditation for all trainers, while in the Netherlands emphasis 
was placed on examining the results of training. Contrarily, in Canada and the USA training 
is considered the responsibility of the organisation. It was argued that these differences in 
policies led to lower quality of training in the USA and Canada. Additionally, although 
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accreditation is beneficial, only the Netherlands directly ensures effective training. Given the 
importance of training, government policies regarding training may influence safety. 
Management practices. Mejza et al. (2003) examined management practices of high 
compliance and safety performing companies through surveying managers from 48 passenger 
carriers and 181 freight carriers. It was found that high safety performing trucking firms 
apply screening criteria for new employees, emphasise pre and during employment training, 
conduct a wide variety of training and testing, and reward safe behaviour. Whilst the 
mechanisms through which better safety and compliance performance was achieved are 
unknown, the importance of training was further supported. Additionally, driver selection and 
positive rewarding of safe behaviour were unique findings of this study. 
4.2.3.2. Miscellaneous potential cultural factors  
Viewing other drivers as worse than the self. Walton (1999) surveyed 1006 New 
Zealand truck drivers for perceptions regarding speed, consideration when driving, relative 
safety and relative skill compared with other drivers. Drivers tended to view others as less 
safe, less considerate on the road and as driving at faster speeds, though did not rate 
themselves as more skilled. Thus, it was argued that truck drivers rated others more 
negatively than themselves, though not themselves as more highly skilled. 
Attitudes towards enforcement. Douglas and Swartz (2009) developed a scale for 
measuring attitudes to enforcement which was piloted with 135 US truck drivers. Factor 
analysis revealed that perceived effectiveness of enforcement (comprised of consistency and 
sufficiency), perceived effectiveness of regulations and general attitudes towards regulations 
were important factors. This pilot survey indicated that attitudes towards enforcement and 
regulations may serve as relevant cultural dimensions. 
Attitudes towards risk and safety. Helmkamp et al. (2004) surveyed 1197 logging 
drivers before training and retested 21% following training. Initially, approximately half the 
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drivers stated that accidents were part of the job and had experienced a close call. Most 
drivers felt that safety management and safety meetings were important and over 75% said 
they would not take a risk for profit. These perceptions were not re-examined, however, 
training was rated as relevant and the materials as useful.  
Despite the above study finding that drivers will not take risks for money, other costs 
may influence behavioural decisions. Summala and Pihlman (1993) assessed Finnish truck 
driving behaviour around road work sites following a government campaign targeting speed 
and safe distance from road workers. Whilst drivers did drive further away from road 
workers, speed was not influenced. It was argued that drivers were willing to take safety 
measures with little direct cost, yet small subjective costs may reduce compliance. 
Lastly, Spielholz et al. (2008) surveyed 359 company staff and 397 drivers regarding 
major safety concerns and perceptions regarding organisational safety climate. Whilst 
company staff and drivers identified similar hazards, they differed in views of safety climate, 
as drivers expected to be injured and believed risk is part of the job. Both company staff and 
drivers viewed drivers as having primary responsibility over safety.  
From the above studies a number of potential cultural traits can be seen. First, drivers 
may view risk and incidents as part of the job, and are therefore potentially unavoidable. 
Second, whilst drivers state that they would not take an increased risk for money, they may 
be unwilling to sacrifice money or other gains to improve safety and thus value safety if there 
is no cost. Lastly, drivers may be considered to hold the primary responsibility for safety.  
Attitudes towards feedback. The last series of attitudes identified relate to attitudes 
towards feedback. Roetting et al. (2003) conducted focus groups with 66 US truck drivers 
regarding feedback from technology. Despite wanting feedback, drivers wanted constructive, 
individualised and respectful feedback from people they respect and perceived as 
knowledgeable regarding truck driving. Huang et al. (2005) confirmed these findings in 198 
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US long haul truck drivers, and identified a willingness to accept feedback from technology 
sources on the proviso that the technology was adequately designed. Zhang et al. (2006) 
conducted similar focus groups with 36 drivers, six management staff and six police officers 
from China. Drivers wanted more feedback, but considered feedback to be generally 
negative. Chinese drivers accepted feedback from technology because it is perceived to be 
accurate and scientific. Huang et al. (2008) then surveyed 200 Chinese long haul truck 
drivers. Results were similar, however, Chinese drivers showed no concern regarding the 
accuracy and design of technology. Thus, similar attitudes towards feedback were found in 
both Chinese and US truck drivers, with drivers desiring more feedback, and having a strong 
desire for positive feedback. However, Chinese drivers placed greater trust in technological 
feedback. It is important to assess how drivers relate to positive and negative feedback and 
whether behaviour change occurs as a result of feedback. Thus, at a general level, attitudes 
towards feedback may serve as a relevant cultural dimension. 
Safety climate. The last paper that was identified in the literature is difficult to place 
into a single category. Huang et al. (2013) tested a safety climate survey for lone workers 
using truck drivers as an example. As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2), safety climate 
can be defined as the aggregate perception of workers regarding the priority placed on safety 
by the organisation (Zohar, 2010) and is sometimes viewed as a snapshot of safety culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Conversely, it can be argued that it is merely a perception based 
measure of contextual factors, though potentially influenced by cultural factors. Huang et al. 
(2013) sampled over 7000 US truck drivers, finding a strong relationship between the survey 
tools and safe behaviour of individuals and safety performance of organisations. The factors 
which comprised safety climate at a management level were perceived organisational pro-
activeness and priority placed on driver safety, and adequate supervision. Factors identified at 
the work-group level included safety promotion, delivery limits and disapproval of cell phone 
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use whilst working. From this study, it can be seen that certain safety climate factors may 
serve as relevant cultural dimensions within the current conceptualisation of safety culture. 
4.2.3.3. Summary: Miscellaneous articles 
When viewing these articles in terms of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture, the above findings can generally be viewed as contextual or cultural in nature. 
Identified contextual factors included government policies, organisational employee 
selection, and training and positive safety reinforcement. Potential cultural factors included 
viewing other drivers as more dangerous, attitudes towards enforcement and regulations, 
attitudes towards risk and safety, attitudes towards feedback, and potentially safety climate. 
The synthesised conceptualisation holds that outcomes are the result of behaviour that is 
influenced by context and culture (section 2.3.5). The papers presented within this section do 
not relate directly to specific safety outcomes. Further, these papers lacked specific 
behaviours which had been shown by other research to influence outcomes. Nonetheless, the 
identified contextual and cultural factors may hold relevance to behaviours and outcomes. 
Using the same format as Figure 2.1, these contextual and cultural factors have been 
presented in Figure 4.4. 
4.1. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the literature regarding heavy vehicle driver 
health and safety through the lens of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture. Due 
to the nature of the industry, there are a number of health and safety concerns including those 
that relate to crash, non-crash injury and health outcomes. Conducting a systematic review of 
the peer-reviewed literature regarding heavy vehicle health and safety has identified a number 
of specific safety-related behaviours, along with a contextual influences and potential cultural 
influences. 
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Figure 4.4: Additional factors which may be relevant to a synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry 
 
Regarding crash outcomes, behaviours identified included driving whilst fatigued, drug 
and alcohol use, speeding, seatbelt usage and general driving errors. Contextual factors which 
were seen to either influence these behaviours, or crash outcomes, included government 
departments, the organisation, customers, the road environment and the work environment. 
Potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values targeted at other truck drivers, enforcement, 
safety rules, hard work and the trucking image were also identified. 
Non-crash injuries received significantly less attention in the literature, however, safe 
practices when loading and unloading and entering and exiting trucks were seen as target 
behaviours. Contextual influences included the organisation and road and work environment, 
along with membership in a workers union. Two potential cultural traits were also identified, 
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which consisted of beliefs regarding the relative risk of non-crash injuries (when compared to 
crashes) and that other drivers pose a greater safety risk. 
Health outcomes revealed no potential cultural traits, yet the roles of the organisation, 
road and working environment were again found to be related to these outcomes. 
Additionally, a selection of miscellaneous factors were found that highlighted the role of 
government policies and organisational factors, along with potential cultural factors targeted 
at other truck drivers, enforcement, risk and safety, feedback and perceptions in the form of 
safety climate.  
The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture holds that outcomes are the result of 
behaviour which is influenced by context and culture. By analysing the literature through this 
conceptualisation, it is evident that, despite an absence of past safety culture research in 
heavy vehicle industries, much is already known. There has been significant research into 
behaviours related to safety outcomes, and a significant body of research has explored 
contextual influences contributing to this behaviour. Further, as culture has been defined as 
shared beliefs, attitudes and values (section 2.3.5), potential cultural factors could be 
identified in the literature. Findings from this current literature review provide a significant 
framework on which to base future research regarding safety culture in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Future research should identify additional contextual factors to be explored and 
further investigate the identified potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values. Additionally, 
it is important to examine how research could investigate the relationships between cultural, 
contextual and behavioural factors within heavy vehicle industries. Collective findings from 
the literature presented here can be found in Figure 4.5 which comprehensively demonstrates 
specific outcomes illustrated through the literature, the behaviour that directly causes these 
outcomes, and the contextual and potential cultural factors which influence these behaviours 
and outcomes. 
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Figure 4.5: A preliminary synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in the heavy vehicle 
industry 
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5.  
 
Chapter 5: Study Two – Scouting the Industry: Has the research missed anything? How 
can we investigate the effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry?  
 
 
 
 
5.1. STUDY TWO OVERVIEW 
The first purpose of Study Two was to identify major contextual, cultural and 
behaviour factors which have eluded past research in the heavy vehicle industry, in order to 
further develop the framework of safety culture from Study One. Further, as it is the 
interaction and combined effect of cultural and contextual factors which influence behaviour 
(see section 2.3.5), the second purpose of Study Two was to identify how best to investigate 
the relationships between culture, context and behaviour to lay the foundation for Study 
Three.  
Study Two consisted of 31 semi-structured industry stakeholder interviews. The current 
chapter presents results of the interviews. The reporting of results in this chapter starts with 
findings relevant to the first purpose of the current research. The current framework of safety 
culture emphasises safety outcomes that are the result of behaviour which is influenced by 
culture and context. Thus, similarly to the manner in which Chapter 4 presented the results of 
Study One, this chapter begins by identifying behaviours which influence safety outcomes 
within the industry. These behaviours then provide a target for cultural and contextual factors 
to influence. Thus, the chapter then reports the contextual and cultural influences identified in 
Study Two. Throughout the chapter, in text quotations are used to explain the identified 
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factors. Conversely, boxed quotes are provided purely for depth of understanding of the text 
and emersion into the industry’s perspective of safety. 
A number of individual factors were also identified within Study Two, such as 
interpersonal relationships and demographics. Whilst these factors are worth considering in 
future research, to better understand the relative impact of culture and context in the presence 
of other factors, safety culture is essentially a group level phenomenon. As this research is the 
first use of the synthesised conceptualisation, and the first investigation of safety culture in 
the heavy vehicle industry, individual factors are not discussed in the current chapter and can 
be found in appendix A. The second section of this chapter discusses the findings of Study 
Two which relate to the second purpose of this study. A number of key differences within the 
industry were identified by participants. These differences may have a significant impact 
upon attempts to explore the effect of culture and context on safety within the industry. From 
these findings the methods and sample selection for Study Three are developed.  
5.2. STUDY TWO RESULTS: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK OF SAFETY 
CULTURE 
Study Two identified a number of contextual factors and potential cultural beliefs, 
attitudes and values which influence safety within the heavy vehicle industry. A number of 
these factors were found in the literature reviewed in Study One; however, others were 
uniquely identified within Study Two. The following section begins by discussing the 
behaviours identified by participants as being linked with safety outcomes such as crashes 
and injuries. Following the identification of behaviours the contextual and cultural factors 
which were identified as influencing these behaviours or safety outcomes will be discussed. 
Whilst each of the identified factors will be discussed, those overlapping with findings in 
Study One will be given brief attention, whereas uniquely identified factors will be discussed 
in detail.  
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5.2.1. Safety outcomes and behaviours 
The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture emphasises the requirement for 
contextual and cultural factors to be linked with safety outcomes in order to be relevant to 
safety culture (section 2.3.5). Whilst contextual and cultural factors may hold intrinsic 
interest, if they do not influence safety outcomes they are irrelevant to the purposes of 
investigating safety culture. A number of specific health and safety outcomes and behaviours 
were identified by interview participants. As with Study One, these behaviours and outcomes 
can be broadly categorised as crash outcomes, non-crash injuries and health outcomes.  
5.2.1.1. Crash outcomes 
Throughout the interview process a number of crash-related behaviours were identified. 
These primarily included fatigue, speeding, and drug and alcohol use. Whilst drug and 
alcohol misuse can have long-term health impacts, substance use was discussed by 
participants in relation to driving and is here considered a crash-related behaviour. As each of 
these behaviours was given significant attention within Study One, only a brief summary of 
findings is presented below. 
Driving whilst fatigued. Fatigue was unanimously reported by interviewees to be the 
single largest safety issue. One manager suggested that fatigue is responsible for 
approximately 60% of single vehicle crashes. Fatigue was generally recognised to stem from 
stress, environmental factors, interpersonal factors and government legislation. However, 
drivers’ decisions regarding fatigue management were said to determine fatigue-related 
incidents. 
Inappropriate speed. The second most frequent safety concern raised by participants 
was speeding. Despite the use of speed limiters and satellite tracking, speeding is a regular 
occurrence within the industry. It was argued by managers that controlling speed reduces 
crashes. Whilst satellite tracking and organisational enforcement is used to reduce exceeding 
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the posted speed limit, managers indicated that correct speed for the conditions is a separate 
issue. Managers highlighted the importance of reminding drivers to drive to the conditions. 
Further, failure to reduce speed when cornering can result in rollovers, although one driver 
argued that this is caused by insecure loads and can occur when driving at a typically safe 
speed.  
Drug use. Popular opinion holds that illicit drug use is a significant issue within the 
industry. There was some debate, however, as to the prevalence of drug use. One manager 
argued that car drivers are detected driving under the influence of drugs more often than 
heavy vehicle drivers. According to one police officer, drug use in heavy vehicle drivers is 
hard to quantify, partly as drivers warn one another of on-road enforcement, but that police 
officers do not see a large connection between truck driving and drugs. Nonetheless, it was 
suggested that police still detect a number of truck drivers under the influence of drugs. Work 
pressure, fatigue and financial pressures were argued to contribute to drug use. Additionally, 
some drivers were argued by managers to use combinations of drugs to manage highs. 
 Alcohol use. Alcohol misuse was a severe issue in the industry’s past. Two managers 
recalled that drivers used to carry a carton of beer in their cab and would either be drinking or 
hung-over upon arrival at work. One manager even stated that the distance between towns 
used to be measured by the “number of stubbies” you could drink between them. This 
apparently “died out” with the introduction of zero tolerance for alcohol and drink driving 
reportedly no longer occurs. 
5.2.1.2. Non-crash injuries 
Despite identifying a number of behaviour scenarios associated with non-driving 
injuries in the literature, relatively little attention was given to these injuries during Study 
Two. This may reflect the potential cultural belief that road incidents are much more 
significant than non-driving injuries (section 4.2.2.2). When asked about these injuries, a 
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number of managers stated that they never hear about them. This lack of awareness may be 
related to a potential over-representation, within this study, of managers of line-haul drivers, 
who typically do not conduct loading and unloading. Nonetheless, some concerns regarding 
musculoskeletal injuries were raised. Participants stated that during entering and exiting the 
cab of a heavy vehicle there is a heightened risk of both falls and muscle strains. Muscle 
strain was also seen to be a concern in manual handling conducted by local ‘multi-drop’ 
drivers. Thus despite little attention, the identified behaviours align with those identified in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.2.2). 
5.2.1.3. Health outcomes  
Whilst heavy vehicle drivers have a reputation for being unhealthy, it was claimed by 
one manager that required medical checks have reduced this issue. Nonetheless, it was argued 
that truck drivers are over-represented in one cardiac rehabilitation unit in south east 
Queensland. Discussion surrounding health outcomes identified healthy eating, psychosocial 
concerns, and anxiety and stress. 
Healthy eating. Healthy eating and exercise were identified in Study One (section 
4.2.3). Whilst healthy eating was identified as an issue by interview participants, the long-
term nature of outcomes related to eating, made eliciting information regarding the causes of 
these behaviours difficult. Further, healthy eating may be more related to individual decisions 
than shared beliefs, attitudes and values. Thus Study Two found little information regarding 
eating choices. 
Psychosocial concerns. Psychosocial issues were raised as a concern by one 
government representative so questioning targeted this issue. One manager suggested these 
issues only become a problem when people label them so. However, it was noted that 
bullying may occur in some areas of the industry, and despite the pressure to “harden up” 
some individuals have lower tolerance for bullying. Further, it was suggested that some 
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drivers, particularly those who work nights, are accustomed to working alone and were said 
to be “gruff” and “weird”. Though it was unclear whether this may be the result of night 
work, or that night work attracts such individuals. 
Anxiety and stress. Participants stated that the industry is full of stress caused by 
customers and managers. Further, some aspects of truck driving, particularly for drivers of 
dangerous goods trucks, are naturally stressful. This stress can lead to health concerns, and 
fatigue. Specific attention was given to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After 
significant incidents many drivers can experience PTSD and it was argued that there is a lack 
of support for these drivers and that WorkCover only offers three counselling sessions.  Many 
drivers were suggested to be afraid to resume work after an incident, particularly fatality-
causing incidents, regardless of fault attributions.  
5.2.1.4. Other minor concerns.  
A number of other safety concerns were raised by interviewees, yet in insufficient 
detail to warrant discussion, including tail-gating, working alone and the associated risk of 
injury, seatbelt use, and working from heights. These issues may be significant;. However, as 
they were raised only briefly by few interviewees they will not be discussed further. 
5.2.1.5. Summary: Safety outcomes and behaviours 
Study Two confirmed a number of risk behaviours and outcomes from Study One, 
including driving whilst fatigued, inappropriate speed, drug and alcohol use, dietary 
disorders, musculoskeletal injuries resulting from falls and muscle strains acquired when 
entering and exiting a heavy vehicle and participating in manual lifting. While receiving less 
attention in the interviews, issues such as tailgating, seatbelt use and working from heights 
were also raised as safety concerns. Finally, the addition concerns of psychosocial issues, 
anxiety and stress, and working alone were found. The above factors, along with safety 
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outcomes and behaviours identified in Study One, are presented in Figure 5.1. In the figure, 
any component which received additional information from Study Two is shaded grey. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Safety-related behaviours and outcomes in the heavy vehicle industry – updated 
with results from Study Two 
 
5.2.2. Contextual Influences on safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
The synthesised conceptualisation emphasises safety outcomes that are the result of 
behaviour which is influenced by culture and context (section 2.3.5). As stated in section 
2.3.4, behaviour is not a product of culture alone, but also specific situational or contextual 
factors. Thus, the context surrounding the driver will interact with the culture of drivers to 
result in patterns of behaviour. Throughout Study Two a number of contextual factors were 
identified, categorised as: (1) government; (2) industrial groups and affiliations; (3) 
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customers; (4) the general public; (5) the temporal context of the industry; (6) the 
organisation; (7) the contracting organisation; and (8) environmental factors. A number of 
factors relating to the role of government, the organisation, customers and two separate forms 
of environmental factors were identified in Study One. As such, the following section will 
focus on information unique to Study Two. 
5.2.2.1.  Government 
A number of government departments influence heavy vehicle safety, including police 
and government branches such as the Road Transit Authority (RTA), Department of 
Transport and Main Roads (DTMR), Queensland Workplace Health and Safety (QWH&S) 
and WorkSafe Victoria. These departments were primarily indicated by participants to 
influence safety through law enforcement, and the provision of permits and licences. The 
findings of Study Two with regards to the influence of government departments on safety 
aligned with those in Study One, however, additional information was gained regarding 
fatigue management, the role of specific government personnel, and permits and licensing. 
Fatigue management. According to participants, fatigue management legislation 
significantly reduced fatigue in the industry. Whilst this was discussed to some degree in 
Study One, a number of key findings regarding the industry’s perspective should be noted. 
The specific introduction of Basic Fatigue Management (BFM; in which drivers are permitted 
to work longer than under standard fatigue management yet must adhere to additional 
requirements), and the associated requirement for training and accreditation, was suggested to 
have had major impacts. Additionally, the introduction of chain of responsibility (COR) 
legislation was suggested by participants to have increased industry efforts to reduce fatigue. 
Many drivers are reportedly now “well versed” in the impact and management of fatigue. 
However, the exemption of local drivers (working within 200kms of the depot) may limit the 
impact of fatigue management. 
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A number of criticisms of the fatigue management legislation were raised. First, fatigue 
management regulations were argued to be too difficult to understand given heavy vehicle 
drivers have a lower intelligence. Second, fatigue management legislation was also argued to 
be a contributor to fatigue. When combining the restrictions of fatigue management 
legislation with work pressures, it was suggested that there be a minimum number of hours to 
which a driver must adhere. One manager even stated that work diaries give an “incentive to 
drive when tired” due to their inflexibility. The time at which a driver finishes work on any 
given day influences the next day’s departure time, thus, drivers may drive when fatigued in 
order to minimise the impact on the remaining journey. Third, a lack of infrastructure and 
unforseen delays means drivers may become stranded between rest locations, thus choosing 
to either continue driving and risk punishment, or pull over on the side of the road. This may 
lead to poor sleep quality from road noises and potentially needing to skip dinner. Finally, 
punishment for clerical errors, and the ease with which some drivers may be able to falsify 
work diaries, present additional threats to the effectiveness of fatigue management 
legislation.  
 Government personnel. Attention was also given to the role of enforcement officers. 
Police officers were identified as implementing on-road enforcement; however, according to 
interviewed police this is restricted to the enforcement of traffic laws (due to their offence 
categories). It was claimed that police officers may struggle to detect the heavy vehicle 
drivers who operate outside of the law and may travel late at night. 
Managers discussed transport inspectors, also referred to by one manager as the 
Department of Transport and Main Road’s (DTMR) “own police”. Whilst these officers can 
enforce a greater number of heavy vehicle laws than police officers, they were argued to offer 
more lenient penalties. It was suggested by participants that while police give fines, transport 
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inspectors focus on prosecutions and give infringement notices, which did not require 
monetary payment. 
Permits and licences. Study Two uniquely identified provision of permits and licences 
as relevant to safety. Two interviewed police officers referred to a number of permits they 
provide for trucking companies, including those for movement of large machines and mining 
equipment, oversize loads, associated pilot vehicles, and certain special permits (such as 
drought relief restriction exemptions). Additionally, government departments influence safety 
through licensing drivers, although industry participants argued licensing to be insufficient 
and overly arduous. Further, it was suggested that through providing false references to 
licensing agencies it is possible to bypass certain requirements for licensing. 
5.2.2.2.  Industrial groups and affiliations 
A series of industrial groups and associations, along with groups external to the 
industry, were identified in Study Two. These groups included the Transport Workers Union 
(TWU), the Australian Trucking Association (ATA), accreditation schemes, external 
guidelines and workers’ compensation. Whilst the effect of union membership was seen in 
Study One, accreditation, external guidelines and workers’ compensation were not identified 
in the literature. 
Transport Workers Union. The TWU organises a number of rallies and protests, applies 
political pressure on government, and has the power to investigate companies to identify 
mistreatment of drivers or illegal organisational behaviour. However, a number of issues 
were raised by members of the industry. In recent years the TWU has argued that heavy 
vehicle driver payment is insufficient, resulting in a number of safety issues. Whilst the 
effects of money on behaviour were identified by participants, it was suggested that a lack of 
pay is no excuse for illegal behaviours and that this TWU focus may be contributing to 
blame-shifting within the industry, thus reducing driver responsibility. Additionally, it was 
Chapter 5: Study Two  105 
 
suggested that the TWU can be overzealous in pursuing their goals. For instance, one 
manager detailed campaigns mounted against their company, during which TWU members 
slandered the company (claiming the company “kills truck drivers” despite zero fatalities), 
and a TWU representative suggested that if the company joined the TWU they would cease 
their investigation. 
Accreditation schemes. A number of accreditation schemes exist within the industry, 
which eluded previous research. These schemes, though voluntary, may provide a 
competitive advantage to organisations. The benefits of accreditation may include permission 
to conduct certain activities, the ability to use accreditation as an excuse to increase 
compliance in staff and attracting business. Due to these benefits, the safety requirements 
these schemes place on organisations are positively rewarded. 
External guidelines. A number of guidelines produced by industry groups outlining 
‘best practices’ were identified. These voluntary guidelines can be ‘signed’ by companies 
concerned about safety. One such example was the Australian Steel Industry Logistics Safety 
Code (ASI LSC). 
 
Workers’ compensation. Workers’ compensation, or WorkCover, was also discussed. 
Whilst the benefits of workers’ compensation, particularly for injured drivers, are significant, 
compensation was suggested to have unintended negative outcomes. These outcomes 
included encouraging a lack of responsibility in workers. Positively, however, raised 
premiums resulting from incident levels encourage managers to actively improve safety to 
reduce costs.  
We have codes of practice which drivers are tested on and they’re continually retested on 
it. It’s basically a booklet that describes fatigue and there is a question and answer section 
in it. They go through the fatigue one every three months or so. (General Goods Transport 
Company Manager Four) 
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5.2.2.3.  Customers 
As one interviewee stated, the two biggest influences on safety are the manager and the 
customer. This view was evident in the number of interviewees who expressed a desire to see 
greater customer interest in safety. Industry members indicated that the customer holds all the 
power, due to the ability to financially reward or punish organisations. However, one 
manager argued that trucking companies need to inform their customers where they 
negatively impact safety. This dynamic interplay between customers and companies was 
highlighted by one manager who stated that “it is a power play whichever way you go” along 
the supply chain. 
The manner in which customers influence safety aligns with the findings of Study One. 
As previously stated, customers may significantly improve safety. One manager stated that 
many companies are “forced to be safe” by their customers. Whilst chain of responsibility 
(COR) legislation may help to improve customer-influenced safety, the logistics safety 
manager of one large customer company stated that they have a greater fear of injuring 
people than COR prosecution. Whilst some customers encourage safety, many overtly or 
covertly encourage unsafe behaviour. A number of industry members highlighted unsafe 
demands placed on transport companies and delays. Additionally, it was argued that 
customers often perceive themselves to be immune to COR.  
Customer-company transport-company fit. One unique theme which emerged from the 
interviews was cultural matching between customers and transport companies. It was 
suggested by some participants that larger transport and customer companies place a higher 
priority on safety and, thus, seek similar-minded business partners. Conversely, smaller 
customers who do not understand their obligations, or simply want their goods delivered 
quickly, were indicated to hire like-minded organisations. This matching between customers 
and organisations may be influenced by the size of the task demand and ability of 
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organisations, indicating a necessitated relationship. Regardless, there appears to be a cycle 
of reinforced safety amongst larger companies. Conversely, smaller transport companies 
struggling to gain employment may accept jobs safer companies will reject, with the only 
alternative being a sub-contractual arrangement with a larger transport company. 
5.2.2.4.  The general public of Australia 
Study Two again revealed the role of other vehicles on the road, yet additionally 
identified concern regarding the public image of the industry. Thus, the general public was 
identified as a category separate to the road environment. 
Other vehicles on the road. A number of participants indicated that many crashes are 
not the fault of heavy vehicle drivers. One manager suggested that in 50-60% of multi-
vehicle crashes with non-trucks the other driver is solely at fault. These crashes are 
concerning for the industry, as the other vehicle typically receives the greatest damage to 
property and passengers. Whilst these exact figures may not be correct, one police officer 
noted that, within their region, only one of 13 fatal crashes involving trucks in the year (to 
date at the time of the interview) was the fault of the heavy vehicle driver and none of the 20 
fatal crashes in the year prior. Thus, as stated by one manager, drivers are not as concerned 
by their own competency as they are by the “competency of the guy coming towards you”. 
The manager in question reported their organisation had only had one fatality which occurred 
when an elderly man cut across the path of a truck. It was stated that the driver was seriously 
impacted by this event because “he’s killed somebody, that’s a big deal!”. 
Safety issues regarding other vehicles were attributed mainly to the impatience of car 
drivers. Participants talked about members of the public going to great lengths to pass a truck, 
often resulting in multiple unsafe or illegal acts. One driver said that in those situations they 
would not risk their own life for the stupidity of other drivers and thus may simply allow a 
crash to happen. Lastly, a number of managers also spoke about car drivers committing 
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suicide by driving into trucks. The prevalence of this behaviour is difficult to quantify, as 
deceased drivers cannot be questioned, though managers suggested this behaviour is 
evidenced by the way a car may appear to target the heavy vehicle.  
The general public’s perception of the industry. Significant concern was raised 
regarding the general public’s perception of the industry, due to their influence on 
government decisions.  
 
Participants generally expressed that “public perception is built up against” heavy 
vehicle drivers. Interviewees referenced the stereotypes of drivers being addicted to drugs 
and dangerous, stating that the public believe they are “all drug-popping murderers”, or 
“drug-fucked scum who don’t care”. Simply put by one interviewee, the “heavy vehicle 
culture has been much maligned”. 
 
This image may be partly influenced by members of the industry commonly referred to 
as cowboys, rebels, rednecks or rogues. Participants argued that mass media, through 
selective news stories, contribute to this problem. 
 
Media make dramas out of accidents, even when they are not the truck driver’s fault, so 
they get good media coverage. Bad media is rammed down the public’s throat, so they 
believe everything bad about truck drivers. (Truck Driver Two) 
 
Public perception is that truck drivers are all cowboys and they drive unsafely and they are 
out to kill motorists... They are people who have families and aren’t listened to. (Transport 
Association Representative One) 
 
Truck driving is not high profile or dignified, it’s not high honour like a doctor or lawyer, 
people think truck drivers are drug-fucked scum who don’t care... Everyone wants it on rail 
but when was the last time you saw a train pull-up at Woolworths to unload meat?  
(General Goods Transport Company Manager Six) 
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Interviewees argued that stereotypes regarding heavy vehicle drivers serve to deter 
individuals from seeking a career in the industry, leading to a driver shortage requiring 
employment of less desirable individuals, and can result in additional government policies. 
Members of the industry were frustrated by the weight given to public opinion regarding the 
industry and did not understand why “people think they have the right to tell [drivers] what 
they can and can’t do”.  
5.2.2.5.  The temporal context of the industry 
Throughout the interviews the idea that the industry has significantly changed over 
recent years was as a common theme. The temporal context of the industry may be relevant 
to safety, as artefacts of the past influence the current industry. Many participants claimed 
there have been significant shifts in the culture of the industry, with managers referring to an 
“old culture” and a “new culture”. This new culture was described as “it’s smart to be safe” 
and includes the recognition that safety saves money. Whilst the accuracy of the claimed 
changes may be questionable, one police officer noted that over 20 years ago “it was easier 
to get someone for doing something wrong”. Other participants argued, however, that there 
has been minimal ‘real’ change in the industry. 
 
Despite recognising changes, many participants suggested there is still significant room 
for improvement. Change was typically attributed to the role of previously discussed 
contextual factors, such as government enforcement and customers. Further, interviewees 
revealed an expectation that the national heavy vehicle regulator (which was yet to be 
launched at the time of interviews) may lead to further changes. 
It’s not that different from 30 years ago... It’ll never change; it is what it is... The only real 
differences is log books and user friendly vehicles (General Goods Transport Company 
Manager Six) 
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5.2.2.6. The organisation 
Industry members indicated that managers have the largest influence on the culture of 
the industry. Beliefs, attitudes and values of managers were said to filter down to drivers. 
While the ability of managers to shape culture is a contentious issue in the literature (e.g. 
Haukelid, 2008; Nævestad, 2009), industry members perceive management to play a 
significant role in safety. As many organisational factors identified in Study Two align with 
the findings of Study One, the following discussion focuses on new information, giving 
emphasis to the good and bad safety management practices and employee management.  
Practices of good safety management. Participants described a number of good safety 
management practices including: (1) a commitment to safety; (2) adequate communication of 
safety concerns; (3) organisational monitoring of behaviours; (4) practical management 
strategies (e.g. prioritising safety over operational concerns, rewarding positive behaviour 
while punishing negative behaviours, and use of safe technologies); and (5) supportive 
management techniques (such as informing drivers that it is acceptable to run late). 
 
We have a process in place at the moment where we actually printed out some stickers to 
put on all our transit envelopes that just says if you’re tired pull up and ring the 1800 
number. And we sporadically do that just so we’re not doing it all the time so it keeps it in 
front of the driver’s faces that they know that they can pull up at any time, if they feel tired 
they need to stop. (General Goods Transport Company Manager Four) 
 
Things are getting better, but still a long way to go (Livestock Transport Company 
Manager) 
 
Opportunity for improvement is significant but the change is also significant (Private Fleet 
Logistics Manager)   
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Characteristics of poor safety management. Industry members also highlighted 
negative practices with one manager stating that “there are not a lot of bad drivers, just bad 
managers”. Negative practices included prioritisation of profit over safety, application of 
overt and covert pressures, and poor driver infraction management. It was suggested that 
pressures typically result from the financial gain resulting from high performance. It was 
suggested that whilst upper management typically value safety, lower management may 
pressure drivers for financial gain. Further, high levels of competition and undercutting 
within the industry can increase pressure to acquire contracts, leading to “cutting corners”, 
as “doing things legally costs more”. 
Employee management. Practices regarding employment, training and payment may 
also influence safety as previously demonstrated in Study One. Additional information was 
gleaned in the stakeholder interviews. First, it is important to note that most participants 
highlighted a perceived driver shortage within the industry, which may exert pressure on 
managers to employ sub-par individuals. Managers discussed the importance of good driver 
recruitment, noting that “transport is not all driving”. Attributes looked for in new 
employees include positive references and driving history, employment stability, the 
personality and demeanour of drivers, and their trainability. It was suggested that drivers will 
“find [companies] that suit them”, due to similar beliefs and values. Similarly, interviewees 
suggested that a “good driver wants to keep their job with a good company”. Thus, driver 
selection is also a matter of cultural matching between drivers and companies. 
Whilst the influence of training was identified within Study One, a number of 
participants also discussed the importance of inductions. One manager claimed that the 
primary goal of inductions was to determine the fit between the individual and branches of 
the company. Inductions are also used by employers to offer training regarding safety policies 
and procedures. Further to formal training sessions, some managers referred to informal 
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training occurring through driver-driver mentoring, and one manager indicated this to be the 
only training conducted within their company. Finally, Study Two confirmed the finding that 
payment by trip or distance increased unsafe behaviour. 
5.2.2.7. The contracting organisation 
Subcontractors, also referred to as contractors or subbies, form a significant portion of 
the transport industry. Subbies are typically individual drivers, though smaller companies 
may subcontract to larger organisations. The relationship between a subcontractor and the 
company they work for is similar to the organisation-customer relationship. It was suggested 
that in recent times customers have placed more emphasis on adequate safety management of 
subcontractors as a requirement for employment. Similarly to what was shown regarding 
owner-operators in Study One, subbies may pose a significant risk due to increased financial 
pressure. 
 
… it is the subcontractors they employ which I believe is probably one of our biggest risk 
areas. We don’t have a direct relationship with them, we don’t know what their standards 
and systems are. The head carrier is required to ensure they have processes to ensure they 
are compliant and legal. Not sure how robust that is. I have a personal feeling about the 
one man one truck subcontractor, I think if anyone is going to break the rules it will be 
those guys. Coz they are more interested in making a dollar than doing anything else. 
(Steel Transport Company Manager) 
 
It’s getting too hard economically for an owner driver to survive these days. He’s better off 
driving for an NQX or a Toll or somebody like that… than to be trying to get into the 
marketplace and do loads ad hoc wherever, he might work he might not then to make his 
truck payments. (General Goods Transport Company Manager Four) 
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Contracting company policies. It was argued that when contractors are motivated to 
improve safety they will, thus the contracting organisations can significantly influence subbie 
safety. Similarly, one government representative stated that “contracts drive change quicker 
than safety”, as “when safety is a personal issue, it can’t be done, but when it is a 
contractual issue, then they can do it”. In the below quote one manager detailed his approach 
to managing subcontractors: 
“If we employ a contractor or a fleet driver to do a task, we would ask him to be 
Trucksafe accredited, NHVAS (National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme) 
accredited, fatigue accredited, and we would be asking him to do exactly the same 
things we do. We then actually go out and do an audit on them. Like myself, I am a 
qualified auditor, so I would go into their business and frequently audit their business 
down the path of all those compliance issues to make sure that they are being 
compliant. So the fleet driver would have satellite tracking, he would have his drivers 
accredited in fatigue, he would have some NHVAS maintenance and mass so his 
equipment is going to be roadworthy and his drivers are going to have a medical, and 
all those sorts of issues would be checked by us so that they meet at a minimum our 
standards... What normally happens with a fleet driver is that we can either see his 
tracking, or we put the satellite devices in their prime movers.  So we get all the data 
regardless. So that way we can monitor speed and fatigue in all those fleet drivers. We 
only see the data if there is an issue or a compliance issue. So if he speeds we get an 
email and if he goes over his driving hours we receive an email.” (General Goods 
Transport Company Manager Four) 
5.2.2.8. Environmental factors 
Relatively little information regarding environmental factors was gained from Study 
Two. Whilst other vehicles were identified, they were re-categorised as the general public. 
Chapter 5: Study Two  114 
 
Only the influence of environmental factors on fatigue was further discussed in Study Two. 
Industry members highlighted that the need for constant concentration and the lack of 
comfort in the cab of the truck can contribute to fatigue.  Night-time driving may lead to 
drivers fighting their ‘body clock’ in order to stay awake. Whilst there are a number of 
available rest stops for drivers, many managers and drivers suggested that sleep at such 
locations was impossible. For example, it was stated that noise from members of the general 
public make sleeping in such locations impossible. Additionally, it was suggested that there is 
insufficient infrastructure for the current demand. These issues led one organisation to roster 
all drivers to be home by night-time through the use of changeover drivers at midway points. 
5.2.2.9.   Summary: Contextual influences on safety 
Study Two added significant depth to the developing framework of safety culture with 
regards to the role of government, customers, the organisation and environmental factors. 
Additionally, a number of new factors were identified relating to the role of the general 
public, industrial groups and affiliations, the contracting organisation and the temporal 
context of the industry.  The new information obtained in Study Two is summarised below. 
Regarding government departments, Study Two identified COR and fatigue 
management legislations, as well as permits and licences, and the differences between police 
and transport inspectors. Although Study One identified the role of a workers’ union, Study 
Two elaborated with a collection of similar external bodies, including the Australian 
Trucking Association (ATA), accreditation schemes, external guidelines and workers’ 
compensation bodies, which were collectively categorised as industrial groups and 
affiliations. Study Two confirmed the role of customers in safety and provided insight into 
the mechanisms through which customers influence safety. Although other vehicles were 
identified in Study One, the combination of these vehicles and public perception regarding 
the industry were categorised under the general public. The role of the organisation was also 
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confirmed, though additional detail on specific organisational practices were highlighted, 
including general positive and negative practices, inductions, training and payment. Adequate 
rest locations, cabin design and the time of day were again revealed as important 
environmental factors. Additionally, however, Study Two uniquely found that the temporal 
context of the industry and the subcontractual relationship may be important for safety. When 
these findings are combined with those from Study One, a more developed framework of 
contextual factors which influence safety outcomes can be provided. Figure 5.2 contains the 
contextual factors which have been identified in Studies One and Two. In the below figure, 
components that received additional information from Study Two are shaded grey. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Contextual influences on safety in the heavy vehicle industry – updated with 
results from Study Two 
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5.2.3. Potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values 
The above discussion highlighted safety outcomes and behaviours and contextual 
factors which influence behaviours and outcomes. The remaining component of the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture is cultural factors (see section 2.3.5) which are 
comprised of a series of shared assumptions, beliefs, attitudes and values. Study One 
highlighted a number of beliefs, attitudes and values shared by members of heavy vehicle 
industries which influence safety. These were labelled as potential cultural factors due to the 
lack of deliberate investigations of culture and shared nature of these factors. Study Two also 
identified a number of beliefs, attitudes and values which were suggested by participants to 
influence safety. Study Two’s findings were largely drawn from managers and non-industry 
personnel, so the cultural factors identified remain referred to as ‘potential’ factors. It is 
unclear whether these factors are shared by drivers. Potential cultural factors identified in 
Study Two included beliefs and attitudes towards enforcement and regulations, beliefs about 
the general public, the ‘old school’,  lifestyle and autonomy, money hunger, attitudes towards 
safety and risk, and attitudes towards family and friends. Each of these factors are discussed 
below, and where these findings overlap with similar findings in Study One this is noted.   
5.2.3.1. Beliefs and attitudes towards enforcement and regulations 
Many members of the industry supported the need for enforcement, yet there was a 
belief that enforcement is insufficiently applied. Further, when enforcement is applied, it is 
often perceived as unfair or misdirected. These beliefs align well with attitudes towards 
enforcement identified within the literature. 
5.2.3.2. Beliefs about customers 
As discussed, a number of managers and drivers stated that customers hold “all the 
power”. Despite the fact that power relationships between customers and the industry may be 
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relatively equal in reality, this perceived power may result in drivers complying with unsafe 
demands. A number of other factors also influence this perception, including levels of 
competitiveness within the industry. Further, this belief may reflect the motivation of drivers, 
particularly when linked to the value placed on money and the ability of customers to offer 
financial reward (see section 5.2.3.5). This belief was spoken about by many of the industry 
members and warrants further attention. 
5.2.3.3. Beliefs about the general public 
As noted in section 5.2.2.4, industry members believe that a negative image has built up 
around the industry. Participants found this image was unfair and inaccurate, and felt 
maligned. Whilst this may indicate overconfidence in the level of safety within the industry 
or, as shown in Study One, the view that other drivers are more dangerous (e.g. section 
4.2.2.1), there was also a significant emphasis on the general public ‘telling them what to do’. 
However, this may also reflect an assumption that the industry should regulate itself. Thus, 
further investigation is needed to determine whether these attitudes and statements reflect a 
specific attitude toward the general public or a broader set of cultural factors. 
5.2.3.4. ‘The old school’ 
Members of the industry commonly discussed a ‘new culture’ and an ‘old culture’. 
Whilst discussions of the ‘old culture’ centred upon past practices and attitudes, individuals 
who still prescribe to these practices were referred to as ‘old school’.  
 
Remember that a lot of these people, it’s an older workforce and some old habits are very 
difficult to change even though we try very hard to make sure those people don’t do the 
wrong thing, there is always a case or so of ‘I’ve been driving for 30 years and never had 
an accident’, ‘well you should go and by a lottery ticket because the way you are –  
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Old school individuals were commonly identified as being tough, taking greater risks, 
having unsafe habits, wearing injuries as a “badge of honour”, and holding a “loyalty to the 
culture rather than to the company”.  
 
Similarly, it was indicated that old school individuals were more likely to engage in 
drug use. It was also suggested that in previous times, there was a mindset to take drugs and 
that this mindset was not questioned. Whilst these negative aspects were considered to be 
being replaced by a newer, safer, culture, the values and beliefs associated with perceived 
affiliation to the ‘old school’ may remain within the industry and warrant further 
investigation. Additionally, it is important to determine whether being ‘old school’ influences 
behaviour or is simply a description of people. If it is simply a descriptor, the characteristics 
used to identify someone as old school may be more relevant to behaviour than actually being 
‘old school’. 
5.2.3.5. The lifestyle and autonomy 
It was often suggested that life on the road carries a certain “sense of freedom” and that 
truck driving “gets in your blood”. It was stated that, whilst truck drivers initially view it as 
just a job, it eventually “becomes part of them”. This lifestyle, particularly when spending a 
long time on the road, may negatively impact drivers’ families, however, drivers were 
indicated to become accustomed to the lifestyle and unwilling to work in a different 
occupation. 
– restraining your loads you’re going to have one in the near future’... they roll the dice too 
often. (Steel Transport Company Manager) 
 
They broke every rule in the book. It was the culture back in those days.  There was an 
expectation from management – the culture was promoted to move freight quickly. 
(Manager of a medium sized transport company in Queensland) 
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Closely associated with the lifestyle of trucking is the high degree of autonomy held by 
drivers. Whilst autonomy is a natural part of the industry, it may also be the reason some 
drivers are attracted to the industry. It was argued that some drivers simply want to “not 
answer to anyone”. This autonomy, or the desire thereof, was commonly suggested to 
influence driving whilst fatigued, as only the driver is capable of knowing when they should 
rest and must make that decision alone. Additionally, some drivers reportedly desire input on 
trip planning and may opt to drive outside of hours to meet non-work commitments.  
 
5.2.3.6. Money hunger 
A number of industry members suggested that there is an alarming level of ‘money 
hunger’ in the industry. Drivers, particularly under 40 years of age, were stated to “need to 
have all the toys”. Due to the desire for money, some drivers will exceed legal hours or drive 
with excessive speed in order to increase their pay. This was indicated to further contribute to 
drug use in order to stay awake. This directly contrasts the finding in the literature that 
drivers will not take risks for money. 
5.2.3.7. Attitudes towards safety and risk 
As stated by one manager, despite seeing enough incidents to realise truck driving can 
be dangerous, many drivers believe that they are skilled enough to avoid an accident. 
Additionally, it was suggested that ‘cowboys’ within the industry take higher risks on a 
regular basis, believing that outcomes associated with unsafe behaviour will not occur for 
Drivers choosing, a lot of it is. They’re funny... I’ve been around drivers for 40 years and 
they are a world of their own. They make some bad decisions at times and one of them 
would be to keep driving instead of stopping within their 5.5 hours and having a 15-minute 
rest, some of them will drive for seven to eight hours and then have a break. (Steel 
Transport Company Manager) 
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them. These beliefs align with the emphasis on personal experience over rules, identified in 
Study One, which may lead drivers to falsely believe that they can avoid crashes and the 
belief that other drivers are more dangerous. Conversely, however, a small number of drivers 
were indicated to hold fatalistic attitudes towards incidents. This aligns with the expectation 
of injury identified in Study One (Spielholz et al., 2008). Further investigation regarding the 
differences in these attitudes is required. 
5.2.3.8. Attitudes towards family and friends 
Heavy vehicle drivers place significant value on friends and family members. It was 
indicated that, in order to avoid letting down or delaying a changeover driver, or to ensure 
they are home early, drivers may take significant risks. Whilst these are normal desires, the 
risks associated with rushing when driving a truck are significant. Further investigation is 
required to determine whether this is truly a cultural factor or the influence of these friends 
and family. 
5.2.3.9.  Summary: Potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values 
Study Two identified a number of potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values which 
may form key components of safety culture within the industry. These included beliefs and 
attitudes towards enforcement and regulation, beliefs about customers, beliefs about the 
general public, the old school, the lifestyle and autonomy, money hunger, and attitudes 
towards safety, risk, family and friends. A number of these factors overlapped with findings 
of previous research. Beliefs and attitudes towards enforcement and regulation mirrored those 
found in Study One. Further, the findings regarding money hunger and the identified attitudes 
towards safety and risk added further depth to similar factors identified in Study One. The 
remaining factors were unique to Study Two. Factors identified in Study Two, along with 
those in Study One (but not within Study Two), have been combined in Figure 5.3. Specific 
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factors identified in both studies were thematically categorised for easier understanding, 
resulting in additional categories of work-related attitudes and beliefs and attitudes regarding 
the organisation. As many of these cultural factors gained additional information in Study 
Two, the entirety of this figure is shaded grey. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and values which influence safety in the heavy 
vehicle industry – updated with results from Study Two 
 
5.2.4. A general framework of safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry 
 Study Two added depth and detail to the contextual and cultural influences identified 
in Study One by identifying a number of additional factors. New factors identified in Study 
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Two included contextual influences (such as the role of public perception, specific 
government personnel who enforce safety policies, the temporal context of the industry, and 
the role of subcontractual agreements) along with a number of additional potential cultural 
traits (such as beliefs about customers and the general public, attitudes towards family and 
friends, the old school, and the lifestyle and autonomy).  
Combining the results of Studies One and Two allows a general framework of safety 
culture in the heavy vehicle industry to be provided (see Figure 5.4). As discussed in section 
2.3.5, the synthesised conceptualisation emphasises outcomes which result from behaviours 
which are influenced by contextual and cultural factors. Whilst the specific details of the 
identified factors may differ between organisations, the framework provides a useful starting 
point for investigating the relationships between cultural, contextual and behavioural factors 
within the industry. In order to understand the effect of culture on safety it is necessary to 
understand how both culture and context interact to shape behaviours and, therefore, 
outcomes. Prior to investigating relationships between these factors, there is a need to 
identify the best method of exploration. Thus, the second aim of Study Two was to ascertain 
the best technique to explore the relationships between these factors. 
5.3. PREPARING FOR STUDY THREE 
A number of differences within the industry were evident throughout Study Two. 
Regional variation in government departments, voluntary accreditations, and differences in 
organisational and customer policies and procedures highlight that many drivers operate 
under very different contexts. Additionally, though Sully (2001) suggested that there may be 
a shared road culture across the industry, the results of Studies One and Two only partially 
support this finding. There were a number of potential cultural traits which appeared to either 
compete or only be present in some drivers. This may indicate the presence of smaller sub-
cultures, multiple cultures within the industry, or that these factors are not part of the culture.  
Chapter 5: Study Two  123 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: A general framework of safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1), cultural beliefs, attitudes and values can be 
resistant to change. Thus, it was argued (section 2.3.5) that through understanding the 
existing culture, changes could be made in contextual factors that interact negatively with 
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culture. For Study Three to explore the positive and negative interactions between culture and 
context, it is important to find common cultural factors within the industry and examine their 
relationship to safety in the presence of contextual differences. Due to the difficulty in 
determining whether cultural factors are shared, there is a need to explore the culture of 
smaller subsections of the industry and then, through comparison, determine which factors 
are shared. Thus, Study Three must explore the relationship between contextual, cultural and 
behavioural factors in distinct subsections of the industry. 
5.3.1. The heterogeneity of the industry 
Study Two identified a number of differences within safety outcomes of transport 
organisations and drivers throughout the industry. These differences were commonly 
attributed to organisational factors, similar to the general organisational factors identified in 
Study One. This included the size of the transport company, the distance that goods are 
carried, type of goods carried, location of the depot, and size and type of trucks used. Each of 
these factors is discussed below. 
5.3.1.1. Size of transport company  
A number of industry members suggested that the size of the transport organisation led 
to significant differences between organisations. It was suggested that due to differences in 
financial pressures, existing business structures and risks of detection and prosecution, 
smaller companies pose a significantly greater safety risk. Participants reported that small 
organisations (below five or 10 vehicles) comprise the majority of the industry. Whilst the 
proportions of business sizes within the industry was unclear, one manager suggested that 
approximately 85% of businesses were either owner drivers or small companies, 10% were 
family owned businesses with between five and 100 trucks, and the final 5% were comprised 
of large, often publicly owned businesses (see Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5: Overview of the industry by size of company*  
*Reproduction of a sketch provided by a manager of a medium-sized business. 
 
Financial pressures were indicated to produce the majority of differences between large 
and small companies. Being an owner driver was suggested to be the “toughest job in the 
industry”, due to the large costs of owning a heavy vehicle (e.g. vehicle cost, registration, 
insurance, maintenance and fuel). Thus, owner operators must ensure a regular flow of 
income. For this reason, both owner drivers and small businesses were said to take greater 
risks. Additionally, new small company owners were indicated to have little understanding 
about the costs associated with operating a transport company. This places further financial 
pressures on these organisations, leading to greater risk-taking behaviours. Larger companies, 
however, were suggested to be more financially secure. Thus, one manager from a large 
transport company stated that their business “will do its own thing”, but always complies 
with the existing legislation and regulatory framework.  
 
I have a personal feeling about the one man one truck subcontractor, I think if anyone is 
going to break the rules it will be those guys. Coz they are more interested in making a 
dollar than doing anything else. (Steel Transport Company Manager) 
 
~ 5% - Large businesses with 
100+ vehicles (toll, Linfox, NQX 
etc), often publicly owned 
~ 10% - Family owned medium 
sized businesses with 5-100 
vehicles 
~ 85% - Owner 
drivers and 
small 
businesses with 
<5 vehicles 
Chapter 5: Study Two  126 
 
The characteristics of good and poor safety management, discussed in section 5.2.2.6, 
were also suggested to align with the size of the company. For instance, in smaller 
companies, managers were said to prioritise profit over safety and give tighter schedules to 
drivers. There was also a perception within the industry that government departments target 
larger companies when enforcing policies. Due to the increased risk of prosecution one 
manager stated that “the big guys play by the rules because they have more to lose”. 
Conversely, it was argued that ‘the 85%’ of the industry, which pose a greater risk, remain 
undetected.  
5.3.1.2. Distance of haul  
Another key characteristic differentiating between drivers and organisations was the 
distance over which goods are carried. Many participants strongly defended the character of 
line haul (or long-distance) drivers. For example, one manager stated that the “guys on 
articulated trucks doing the long drives” were “generally good blokes” who view their work 
as a “decent full-time job”. Local drivers, however, were indicated to be different. Despite 
insufficient detail as to how the drivers differed, a number of differences in the nature of line-
haul and local work were identified. As simply put by one manager, local driving is “shit 
work”. Local driving is often very physical work requiring little intelligence and, thus, it was 
argued that intelligent people are not attracted to this kind of work. Local work was typically 
viewed as a ‘starting level’ for new drivers, as a company can easily send assistance in the 
case of an incident. As such, local drivers may be less experienced. Despite using local work 
as a platform for beginning line-haul work, it was noted that some drivers “get stuck there” 
due to family commitments and lack of success in getting better-paying jobs. 
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5.3.1.3. Type of goods  
Participants also indicated differences in the risks associated with different goods. It 
was suggested by participants that these differences have led to different subcultures between 
transporters of differing types of goods. For example, it was claimed that refrigerated goods 
transporters along the ‘coast highway’ have a particular propensity to speed and that petrol 
tanker drivers experience different levels of stress due to the higher potential for harm 
associated with crashes. Finally, as previously noted, certain goods sectors may also have 
their own codes of practice.  
5.3.1.4. Location of depot and organisation  
The industry can be further differentiated through the location in which the company is 
operating. One large transport company manager argued that even within their own company 
there are regional variations between depots and, thus, there is a difficulty maintaining an 
organisation-wide culture. It was often noted by participants that sub-cultures between 
regions are common. For instance, one respondent highlighted differences between coastal 
and rural regions. These differences may be confounded, however, by the type of goods 
common to certain regions. One example of these variations was that Rockhampton is 
dominated by mining transport, whilst Cairns has a stronger farming influence.  
5.3.1.5. Size of trucks  
Finally, it was suggested that safety within the industry differs according to the size of 
trucks being used. A number of interviewees suggested that there were differences between 
the drivers of larger and smaller trucks. Additionally, it was suggested that larger vehicles 
may pose inherently higher risks simply due to the size of the vehicle.  
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5.3.1.6. Case studies as a way forward 
Given the need to examine sub-sections within the industry, and variations within the 
industry as highlighted above, Study Three aimed to sample a broad variety of the above 
factors. Based on the above findings, this would require examining separate organisations of 
different sizes, based in various locations, utilising diverse types of trucks, and carrying 
differing goods over different distances. Thus, Study Three uses case studies with specific 
transport organisations to explore the relationships between contextual, cultural and 
behavioural factors. 
5.4. STUDY TWO CONCLUSION 
Study Two aimed to identify factors within the heavy vehicle industry which have 
eluded previous research and to identify the best methodological approach to investigating 
the effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. As discussed in section 5.2.4, 
Study Two added significant depth of information to factors identified in Study One and 
identified a number of additional factors. By combining the findings of Study One and Two, 
a framework of safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry was presented.  
With regards to the best methodological approach to use for investigating the effect of 
culture on safety, it was noted that there was apparent variations with regards to contextual 
I think the accident rate (between road trains and B-doubles or semis) would be quite 
significantly higher within the road train network. 
Interviewer:  Is that simply because of the vehicle or...?  
Yeah I think so yeah, it’s just the swept path of the road train as opposed to a B-double, I 
don’t think the licensing process is good enough in Australia because they can get a B-
double licence and jump into a road train. I think there is too much of a gap there for them. 
(General Goods Transport Company Manager Four) 
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and cultural factors, requiring the investigation of sub-sections of the industry. Throughout 
Study Two, industry members highlighted a number of organisational factors which were 
suggested to result in significant variance within the industry. Thus, it was apparent that the 
subsections of the industry which should be investigated in Study Three, which is the focus of 
Chapters 6 to 10, are specific transport organisations. This indicates that case studies 
conducted with transport organisations would provide the best approach with which to 
investigate the effect of culture on safety.
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6.  
 
Chapter 6: Study Three Preface – Case Studies Summary and Chapter Breakdown  
 
 
 
 
6.1. STUDY THREE OVERVIEW 
The previous two studies identified a number of contextual influences and potential 
cultural traits that were demonstrated by previous research (Study One), or indicated by 
participants (Study Two), to influence safety-related behaviours. Thus these studies addressed 
the first three aims of the current research project (see section 3.2.1). That is: (1) Study One 
demonstrated that the key components of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture 
(culture, context and behaviour) were suitable for examining safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry (Aim A); (2) Study One identified a number factors previously identified within the 
industry which comprise the key components of the framework (Aim B); and (3) Study Two 
identified major factors which had eluded previous research (Aim C). From the findings of 
these studies, a general framework of safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry was 
developed. 
Study Two also sought to identify the best approach to investigating the effect of 
culture on safety within the industry (Aim D). At the conclusion of Study Two, it was found 
that there were perceived differences within the industry, related to the size and location of 
the organisation, type of trucks utilised, type of cargo carried and distance carried. Thus, the 
industry cannot be analysed as a homogenous unit, as the culture of specific organisations 
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may differ and specific contextual factors, such as regulations, accreditation, customers and 
organisational structures and systems, may vary. These variations within the industry 
preclude the possibility of exploring the influence of culture and context on behaviour at an 
industry-wide level. Therefore, in order to examine how cultural and contextual factors 
influence safety-related behaviours, it is necessary to conduct case studies with specific 
transport organisations.  
Study Three aimed to examine how cultural and contextual factors affect safety-related 
behaviours in the heavy vehicle industry (Aim E). Three case studies were used, forming 
what is known as a collective case study, where the cases are selected to inform the 
understanding of the effect of culture in the wider industry. Thus, the selection of cases 
required organisations which sample the diversity of the industry. By necessity, cases were 
partially selected out of availability, in addition to meeting the selection criteria. The three 
selected organisations possessed a number of differences, shown in Table 3.1 (see section 
3.2.3.4.3). As stated when discussing the participants for this study, it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of participants. Therefore, no further details will be provided about the 
age, gender or history of participants when discussing individuals within the case studies. In 
some cases, such information is provided, but only where deemed relevant to the aims of the 
research and where confidentiality can be maintained. 
Whilst a number of contextual and potential cultural factors have been identified in the 
previous two studies, Study Three explicitly aimed to examine the impact of such factors on 
behaviour. However, due to the lack of previous research on culture within the industry, and 
the lack of driver interviews in Study Two, the first two studies provided insufficient detail 
regarding the culture of the industry. In order to explore how cultural and contextual factors 
influence safety-related behaviours, there is a need to better explore cultural beliefs, attitudes 
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and values within the industry. Thus, Study Three also partially continues to address Aim C 
in identifying cultural factors that have eluded previous research.  
Based upon the findings of Studies One and Two, it could be seen that each of the 
highlighted safety-related behaviours, (e.g. speeding, driving over hours, jumping from the 
trailer etc.) are conducted by individual drivers. Whilst organisational staff member 
behaviour influences the context surrounding the driver, it is ultimately the driver’s behaviour 
that causes an incident (with exception to crashes caused by other vehicles). Thus, as the 
current safety culture framework seeks to explain these behaviours in terms of cultural and 
contextual factors, the current research must seek to explain the culture which is held by 
drivers and not by organisational staff. 
The current theoretical framework for safety culture holds that behaviour is not 
influenced by culture alone, but also by specific contextual factors (see section 2.3.5). Studies 
One and Two found a number of these contextual factors present within the broader industry. 
In order to explore the effect of culture on safety-related behaviours, Study Three must 
provide a detailed description of the specific context surrounding the culture of the study 
sample, and thus the context surrounding the driver. Therefore, whilst the principal aim of 
Study Three was to explain behaviour using cultural and contextual factors, it must first 
provide a detailed account of the specific context relevant to the case study organisations and 
identify shared cultural beliefs, attitudes and values. The remainder of this chapter provides a 
broad overview of the reporting of Study Three’s results in subsequent chapters. 
6.2. STUDY THREE CHAPTERS OVERVIEW 
Due to the degree of information obtained within the case studies the results have been 
presented over a number of chapters. Due to the overlap between cases, and the fact that the 
cases were selected to inform safety culture in the broader industry, the results of Study Three 
are presented in aggregate form according to the key framework components (context, culture 
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and behaviour). Thus Chapter 7 examines the role of the organisations, Chapter 8 explores 
other contextual influences, Chapter 9 examines cultural factors and Chapter 10 examines 
behaviour. On the first page of each chapter a small cut-out of the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture, labelled chapter focus, is presented with the component/s 
relevant to the chapter circled. 
Chapter 7 presents the results relevant to the influence of the organisation on safety. As 
the organisation is the foremost point of contact for heavy vehicle drivers, it is important to 
lay the organisational context as a foundation for other influences upon safety. While Studies 
One and Two sought to identify a range of possible influences to develop a preliminary 
framework which could apply to specific organisations and the industry as a whole, the 
purpose of this chapter is to detail the specific organisational structures and systems which 
are present for drivers within these companies. 
Chapter 8 outlines the additional contextual influences on safety identified within Study 
Three. Study Three identified a number of contextual influences common to the case study 
organisations, which aligned with the findings from Studies One and Two. Additionally, 
Study Three identified an effect of national and global climate, the broader industry, and a 
number of affiliations not previously identified. Chapter 8 discusses: (1) the influence of 
national and global climate; (2) government departments and enforcement; (3) the general 
public; (4) the customer; (5) accreditation schemes; (6) the broader industry; and (7) 
environmental and situational factors. Again, unlike Studies One and Two, which identified a 
range of possible influences throughout the industry, this chapter discusses specific 
contextual factors that are present for drivers within the specific organisations. 
Chapter 9 presents the cultural factors identified within the case studies. The case 
studies confirmed a number of potential cultural traits identified within Studies One and Two 
and identified a number of new traits. The identified cultural traits can be categorised as 
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underlying cultural traits, and second and third order traits which are formed from lower 
traits. The majority of cultural traits identified were common throughout the case studies, 
thus implicating a degree of commonality throughout the industry regarding culture.  
Whilst the ordering of Chapters 7, 8 and 9 was somewhat arbitrary, there are a number 
of benefits to the order used. The role of the organisation in influencing safety consists of a 
number of factors unique to each of the studied organisations. Further, as the selection of 
cases was based on organisational factors, Chapter 7 serves as a description of the 
participants. Other contextual factors, detailed in Chapter 8 showed a greater degree of 
commonality between organisations and many of the identified cultural factors discussed in 
Chapter 9 were shared by drivers from all companies. Thus, the ordering of these chapters 
permits the discussion to shift from organisation specific factors to shared factors. Further, if 
cultural factors were to be analysed first, subtle differences in the manifestation of cultural 
traits, which are explained by contextual variations, would be difficult to account for. Finally, 
the current framework makes a clear distinction between cultural and contextual factors. This 
is largely on the basis that culture is resistant to change, whereas context is more amenable to 
change. Thus it is necessary to avoid colouring the discussion of context with preconceived 
notions of culture which could prevent a more objective discussion of structures and systems. 
Whilst cultural and contextual factors may have inherent effects on safety, within the 
proposed framework, behaviour was argued to not necessarily be influenced by either culture 
or context alone, but by a combination of culture and specific contextual factors (see section 
2.3.5). The principal aim of Study Three was to explore how cultural and contextual factors 
affect safety-related behaviours. Chapter 10 discusses specific safety-related behaviours, 
emphasising the role of contextual and cultural factors in shaping these behaviours. Thus, 
Chapter 10 explores the impact of each of the factors discussed in Chapters 7 to 9 on 
behaviour.  
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Study Three also identified a number of individual factors which are important to 
consider in future research, yet do not align with the current framework. These factors have 
been discussed in Appendix A. 
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7.  
 
Chapter 7: Study Three Results Part I – The Organisation 
 
 
 
 
7.1. THE ORGANISATION
Study Three consisted of a series of three case studies with transport organisations. 
During these case studies, observations of drivers and interviews with organisational staff and 
drivers were conducted. Throughout the case studies a number of themes emerged regarding 
the manner in which the organisation influences safety. These included employee 
management strategies, such as recruitment, training, rostering and payment, and safety 
management strategies including communication, technological and material safety and 
policy monitoring and enforcement. As behaviour is not caused solely by culture but also by 
specific contextual factors (see section 2.3.5), it is necessary to be aware of the context 
surrounding the culture of drivers in order to understand how culture influences behaviour. 
Whilst the two broader themes of employee management and safety management were 
present in the results of Studies One and Two, as discussed in section 6.2, the purpose of the 
current chapter is not to merely identify potential organisational influences, but to give 
specific detail on the organisational structures and systems present within the case study 
organisations. Thus, while this chapter is essentially descriptive in nature and only takes into 
account structures and systems, without seeking to interpret meanings behind their use, this is 
necessary to provide the contextual framework with which culture interacts to produce 
Chapter Focus 
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behaviour. Therefore, the current chapter does not seek to explain organisational practices 
from a cultural perspective, nor does it seek to explain culture through organisational 
practices. Rather, it describes the specific context surrounding drivers that will later be shown 
to interact with the culture of drivers to influence behaviour (Chapter 10).  
In order to delineate between case study organisations, whilst avoiding duplication of 
data, these themes are presented in aggregate form, followed by details regarding individual 
organisations where relevant. These themes have been presented in the order above both to 
match the order used in Studies One and Two, and due to employee management strategies 
generally being the first influence of the organisation experienced by a new driver. Before 
exploring these themes, however, a brief discussion of the general limitations that 
organisations have in influencing safety are identified. 
7.2. ORGANISATIONAL LIMITATIONS IN INFLUENCING SAFETY 
Members of companies A and B discussed a number of limitations that an organisation 
has in influencing safety. First, drivers have significant autonomy from the organisation, due 
to time spent off-site and difficulties associated with direct monitoring. Thus, for many 
behaviours, the organisation can only take corrective measures after an incident, if they occur 
within the organisation’s depot, or when given feedback from external sources. 
 
Unfortunately though you can’t, as soon as someone is out the gate and round that corner, 
you can’t see the truck anymore, you can’t make them do anything. You can’t tell them not 
to... you know you could tell them all you want not to tail gate that doesn’t mean they’re 
going to do it. Same as seat belts. All trucks are fitted with seat belts doesn’t mean they’re 
going to wear them you know. (Company A Manager One) 
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Further, particularly within Company B, it was evident that new sites visited by drivers 
may not be able to be inspected by organisational staff. Thus, the driver must ensure their 
own safety. 
 
There are a number of additional risks which are beyond the control of the organisation. 
For example, driver behaviours occurring outside of work hours may influence fatigue. As 
noted by one organisational staff member, the company is unable to control or monitor driver 
rest during legislated breaks. 
 
Due to such limitations, the organisation’s primary role in safety is to prepare the driver 
to work safely. 
We don’t know what they do at home. I can control it if they’re here, like I can always, if I 
see them standing around outside I can always hunt them off to bed and you know shoo 
them off type thing but whilst they’re at home. Same as in Sydney I can’t basically pat them 
on the arse and put them into bed. And that is one of my main issues, I don’t know what 
they do at home. (Company A Operations Staff Member) 
 
I can’t physically always go out and check a particular site and make sure the site is safe, 
that’s sort of up to the driver when he gets there to make that judgment but I could 
certainly make sure that the piece that he’s going to pick up or the item he’s going to pick 
up, it’s safe to do so on the particular equipment that he’s going to take. (Company B 
Branch Manager One) 
 
...you know the worst thing about truck driving is we’re not sitting next to them so we can’t 
see what they do away from our load or with other people. So unless we get a complaint no 
one is going to say look you are continually jumping off your load, you’re going to jar your 
spine. We don't see it. If we see it here we can pull them aside and say hey you know, this, 
this and this. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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7.3. EMPLOYEE MANAGEMENT 
Whilst management strategies that relate directly to safety have the clearest relationship 
to outcomes, it is important to first discuss employee management strategies. Practices such 
as recruitment, training, rostering and payment form the basic foundations for safety 
management strategies. Thus, without understanding employee management strategies, it is 
impossible to truly understand the role of the organisation in safety. The following section 
outlines the specific approaches taken by the case study organisations with regards to 
recruitment, probationary employment periods, initial training and inductions, ongoing 
training, rostering and payment.  
7.3.1. Recruitment 
The recruitment process determines whom the organisation deem sufficiently skilled 
and qualified to work in transport. Thus, recruitment decides who is permitted to drive a 
At the end of the day it’s always that element you don’t have control over and I'm referring 
to maybe other motorists on the road. That’s why you have to have drivers that are always 
smart about what they’re doing, you know? We tend to refer to our drivers as professional 
drivers, not truck drivers. We want to have professional drivers. Ones that can foresee 
where an incident may happen and avoid it, you know? Don’t tailgate cars, don’t speed. 
Don’t drive beyond your hours. Just do everything in a timeframe where it’s a safe 
timeframe. That’s what we strive for. If someone says to me, ‘I’ve got a load that I want 
you to load this afternoon and it’s got to be at Sydney at seven o’clock tomorrow morning’ 
I’d say ‘ring someone else’, because I can’t do it and I won’t do it. All of a sudden you’re 
putting an element of risk by asking a driver to drive through the night. (Company B 
Operational Manager) 
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truck. Each case study organisation took a slightly different approach to recruitment. The 
following discussion outlines the recruitment approaches taken by each company. 
7.3.1.1. Company A recruitment 
Company A requires prospective employees to complete an application form and 
provide licence information and references. This information is then checked by the 
organisation. Company A previously used on-the-job assessment, however due to a driver 
shortage this assessment no longer occurs at this organisation.  
 
Due to the pressure this shortage has placed on Company A, the company feels forced 
to hire substandard drivers. Further, Company A has at times used recruiting agencies to meet 
increased demands. It was noted that recruitment agencies drivers are generally less safe, 
with one manager stating that “the temp agencies have the worst drivers; lots of accidents”. 
Though the reason for these drivers being less safe was unknown, it may be related to an 
inability to hold a term position, leading to employment through recruitment agencies. 
Our recruitment process is totally fallen down as a result of shortage of drivers. We’re 
losing all our drivers to mines...we still have our application which you’ve got which 
you’ve obviously seen and we do our reference checks. In the past we used to put drivers 
into trucks and go for drives...we don't do that anymore because we don't have the luxury. 
... even through reference checking we’re putting drivers on that we’re like iffy about 
because there aren’t any. And we just have conversations around you know this is a 
probationary period and it’s an opportunity for you to make sure you’re happy and that 
vice versa because yeah there’s just none out there. We sit trucks because there aren’t 
drivers. We’ve got the work out there and we’ve got the equipment but drivers....and we’re 
using more and more temp agencies too but we’re finding the temp agencies have the 
worse drivers. Yeah lots of accidents. (Company A Manager Two) 
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A specific concern raised about recruitment agency drivers was fatigue management. 
When hiring drivers on a temporary basis, the organisation needs to know whether the driver 
is legally permitted to drive. Whilst the company can audit the work diary of the driver, they 
cannot determine if it is accurate, as the driver may use multiple work diaries. Though the 
recruitment agency should be aware of recent employment, it was indicated that they do not 
keep track of hours of service. Despite these risks, Company A feels compelled to use 
recruitment agency drivers. 
Well I mean generally there’s drivers who like that environment where they can temp but 
from our experience I think it’s the drivers who can’t hold down jobs too who go to the 
temp agencies. And it’s very interesting because some of our, obviously I audit the 
recruitment agency’s driver’s paperwork and sheets and things and we, all our drivers 
including temp drivers have to sit through the induction that you’ve received, that online 
one where they have to do it before they go out. So they know what’s required. Anyway 
there’s been an incident in the past where I’ve phoned an agency to obtain work diary 
sheets because the driver didn’t hand any in to us and we didn’t pay the agency because we 
didn’t have all the paperwork. And the agency wasn’t collecting work diaries and they’re 
the employer... So how are they making sure in a chain of responsibility that the driver is 
doing the right thing and are they training them on how to fill them in? Because similarly 
again I'm getting recruitment agency drivers who aren’t completing them properly and our 
program doesn’t go in...it does go through how to fill them in properly but there’s only so 
much you can do in 10 minutes or however long, 20 minutes to do the induction... And the 
other thing that’s interesting too is that if as an agency they’re not collecting work diaries 
and they’re working for numerous employers how do they know what they’ve done in the 
previous 14 days or previous 28 days to know that they’re legal to drive? (Company A 
Manager Two) 
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7.3.1.2. Company B recruitment.  
Company B utilises a thorough recruitment process to ensure every driver is capable 
and willing to work safely. One Company B manager stated he’d “rather have the truck 
parked there with no driver in it than to put someone that I don’t think is up to standard in 
the vehicle”. Similarly to Company A, Company B requires prospective drivers to supply a 
full application, resume, copies of qualifications and medical examinations. Following initial 
acceptance, the new driver is subjected to an on-the-job assessment regarding pre-requisite 
driving ability and safety which is conducted by an organisational trainer and consists of an 
accompanied shift. During this time the trainer examines whether the driver can safely drive 
the vehicle and adhere to policies and regulations (further discussed in section 7.3.3.2). 
7.3.1.3. Company C recruitment 
Company C begins recruitment by interviewing prospective drivers and examining their 
previous work history. Similarly to Company A, at times Company C is unable to apply 
stringent criteria to potential employees. Further, even if a driver has a poor safety record, 
based on the references obtained from past employees, Company C may give them a ‘second 
chance’. 
...at one stage the general manager said he would refuse to use recruitment agencies 
anymore because we were just getting so many accidents that we were having to pay for. 
Like just scratches and running into gates and poles and stuff like that. And I mean if 
there’s less than a 2% profit margin basically we get no money for those trips or less 
because they’re just making silly mistakes. And it was all agency drivers but then it’s got to 
a point where there’s no option. (Company A Manager Two) 
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Despite taking this more lenient approach, due to the close nature of the livestock 
transport industry the managers of Company C can contact other transport companies that 
have had contact with the driver. Thus, they can typically determine whether or not a driver is 
suitable for employment based on the attitude and behaviour they have demonstrated in their 
previous employment. Thus, whilst Company C sometimes is pressured to hire less suitable 
staff, they take considerable effort to determine if a driver is sufficiently safe to employ. 
Like when they come here I have an interview with them and I’ve got, I think I have a fairly 
good grasp of people and we just have a bit of a chat. The first question I ask is can they 
take orders from a woman? If they go oh..oh..yes I know full well they can’t so they usually 
don't get to base two. Because I do all of that, if they can’t deal with me well this is not the 
job for them. And then we sort of more have a discussion than anything else. I look up what 
they’ve done in the past, I talk to past employers and see how they are and how they deal 
with umm with safety and whether they’re able to take to instruction, all those kinds of 
things that you ask an ex-employer of your umm supposed new one. (Company C Manager) 
 
It’s like every industry sometimes you can’t pick and choose. You don't particularly hire 
people that are downright drug-fucked, dangerous or bad records or whatever. Like we 
wouldn’t do that. But there’s got to be a middle ground somewhere. To give them a chance 
yeah. Like even though someone might have had a big bad drug record or something 
previous but he’s sworn to be good, well you can’t treat him as a criminal because you 
know I mean you’ve got to give them a go. We’ve always been prepared to give people a 
go.  (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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7.3.1.4. Summary of recruitment by Company A, B and C  
The above discussion outlined the recruitment approaches used by each of the case 
study organisations. Each of the studied companies takes a slightly different approach to 
recruitment. Whilst both Company A and C indicated an occasional inability to choose safe 
drivers and being forced to hire sub-standard drivers, Company B indicated they will only 
employ safe and competent staff regardless of demand and vehicle use. The primary 
difference between companies A and C lie in that Company C reliance on information from 
companies they have a relationship with, yet Company A relied on references. Finally, only 
Company A indicated a use of recruiting agencies, despite recognising an increased risk. 
7.3.2. Probationary period 
It is common practice within many industries for new employees to be subject to a 
probationary employment period, during which they may be dismissed if a manager does not 
feel the employee ‘fits in’. Whilst each company use a probationary period, Company B and 
C also incorporate on-the-job training during this period. The following discussion outlines 
these approaches taken by Company C and B. Again the purpose of this discussion is not to 
make inferences regarding the culture of the industry or organisations but to detail the 
specific practices used by the organisation. 
 
 
 
And the industry is quite, they all know each other. So if there’ somebody you can sort of 
put out your feelers to someone else, oh have you heard of so and so the driver for the job. 
And they go shit stay away from him he rolled four or whatever...  the livestock transport 
association is like a family. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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7.3.2.1. Company C probationary period 
After recruitment, a new Company C employee is required to accompany an existing 
driver on the road. The stated purpose of this trip was to ‘get a feel’ for the driver, and 
determine if they fit with the company. This is followed by a standard three-month 
probationary period. 
 
7.3.2.2. Company B probationary period  
Company B appeared to place higher emphasis on determining if a driver is safe during 
the probationary period. Following the inductions (see section 7.3.3) a new driver begins their 
probationary period with Company B. During this time, an experienced driver, or a trainer in 
one depot, will teach the new employee and assess their fitness for continued employment 
based upon their driving and working skills and knowledge, and the attitude they demonstrate 
during this work. During one observation, a driver discussed his experience accompanying a 
new driver, stating that the new employee “won’t last long because of his driving habits”, an 
opinion that was first given to the relevant manager. Whilst driving ability was assessed as 
part of the recruitment process, this probationary period was suggested to also assess the 
attitude of the driver. Thus, this assessment determines whether the new driver will act safely 
in the absence of a manager. 
Okay I guess training from us in the last 34 years is pretty well on the job... And basically 
just get a bit of a feel, send them with the boys, send them with (name) let him get a feel for 
who they are. Give them a three-months trial, if they’re no good in the first three months 
obviously they’re not here and you usually know within the first week or so whether they’re 
worth having or whether they’re not. Or whether they’re worth keeping to try, to try them 
out and see how they go. (Company C Manager) 
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After the driver has been assessed through this probationary period, if the driver is 
believed to be safe they will then be employed within the company. Whilst the new employee 
may be provided with continued on-the-job training in order to enable them to work alone, 
the driver is now treated similarly to older drivers and given a regular position within the 
company. As highlighted by one manager, this process is similarly applied to drivers 
transferred within the company. 
 
...no matter where he’s come from, how long he’s worked with the company, if he comes 
into my area, he’s my responsibility, it’s my responsibility to look after his safety, I don’t 
care if he’s worked for us for heavy haulage for 10 years, seven years, once he comes into 
my area, he’s into a different environment, he’s not familiar with it so we train him up in 
every area... So anybody I have... he’ll go with that area till he’s actually happy he's –   
I think if they’ve got a good attitude and they’re willing to learn, they’re willing to take 
advice not just from me but from all the experienced drivers we’ve got out there... we’ve 
got two experienced drivers out there, and if they say to me, ‘oh that guy is a bit of a 
dickhead, where did you get him from?’ or ‘Christ he’s going to need some training 
otherwise he’s not going to get through it.’ So you ask them, ‘alright what’s he not doing 
safely?’ ‘Well he doesn’t wear his hat, he doesn’t put his gloves on, he’s always getting out 
without his gloves.’ So you get him in and you say ‘you’ve got to be a bit more aware of 
what you’re doing because obviously I don’t want you going home hurt, make sure you 
keep your PPE, make sure you’ve got your gloves on. Don’t go handling things over twenty 
KG’s’ and that sort of thing. So you probably give him a week or two then you go back and 
ask the driver, or you go onsite yourself, you ask the driver who he is learning with, ‘has he 
improved?’ ‘No he’s not improved.’ ‘Well sorry we’ll have to move you out of the depot, 
you’ll have to find yourself another position.’ (Company B Branch Manager Two) 
Chapter 7: Study Three Results – The Organisation  148 
 
 
7.3.2.3. Summary of probationary periods  
The above discussion outlined the approaches taken by Company C and B to 
probationary periods of employment. Company B places a much higher emphasis on this 
probationary period than Company C. Where Company C required the driver to be 
accompanied for one trip to determine suitability, Company B requires an extensive period 
during which an existing driver teaches the new employee important aspects of the job and 
simultaneously reports back to the organisation as to whether or not the driver is suitable. 
7.3.3. Initial training and inductions 
Each organisation also offered some form of initial training and inductions. As the form 
and content of these inductions differed between companies, each company’s approach is 
discussed below. In both Company A and B the researcher was exposed to a shortened form 
of these inductions. The following discussion again seeks to detail the specific approaches 
used by each company to describe the context surrounding the driver culture. 
7.3.3.1. Company A initial training and inductions  
Company A provides drivers with a driver’s manual detailing the company’s policies 
and procedures, and requires drivers to undergo both training and inductions. The inductions 
cover the primary policies and procedures utilised by the company, including safety 
– 100% comfortable, he can do all the runs and knows all the tricks. Might take a week, 
sometimes it takes two weeks. They never get pushed, it’s always when they’re happy. It’s 
when the driver that they’ve gone with will sign off and say “yeah I'm happy with him, I 
can’t show him anymore, he’s good to go by himself”. Then I’ll bring the driver back in 
and say ‘are you comfortable enough to do this work by yourself? The driver is taking 
holidays, he’s going to take annual holidays, are you okay to cover this position?’ If he 
says ‘yeah I'm fine’ then that’s what I do... (Company B Branch Manager Two) 
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procedures within the company depot, the use of pre-trip driver declarations and vehicle 
inspections, and policies regarding issues such as fatigue management and the use of drugs 
and alcohol. In order to use extended BFM (basic fatigue management) work hours, the 
driver must also receive BFM training. 
 
7.3.3.2. Company B initial training and inductions. 
 Company B provides significant inductions, consisting of a number of presentations 
covering the basic policies and practices of Company B, alongside site maps containing 
important safety features (fire extinguishers, evacuation points etc.). Following the 
presentations, employees are given a questionnaire relating to the content covered, and a tour 
of the depot, in order to reinforce the content learned in its natural context. 
For a new driver, skill competency training and assessment is also required. Whilst the 
competencies required for each job within Company B vary, there are some generic 
competencies, such as load restraint, which every driver must complete. Additionally, every 
driver is provided with COR (chain of responsibility) training. Finally, Company B also 
conducts induction training which is required by customers for drivers who deliver their 
goods.  
 
And the inductions cover off all the safety requirements for our customer sites and if 
they’re you know having to use some particular type of equipment which can injure you 
well obviously then there’s a training procedure for that when they come into the business. 
(Company B Region Manager One) 
 
We put all of our blokes through basic fatigue management courses. If they don’t have that 
accreditation when they come here we put them through that and give them medicals all 
that sort of stuff. (Company A Manager One) 
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Following the inductions, new drivers are also supplied with an operations manual. The 
operations manual contains information regarding the policies and procedures used by 
Company B and safety information relevant to all drivers, along with specific information 
related to the company branch the driver will work in. This branch-specific section includes 
customer policies and practices and information regarding the handling of goods. It was noted 
by one manager that staff cannot be expected to always remember their training, and thus, the 
manual allows easy access to safety information and policy statements. 
 
7.3.3.3. Company C initial training and inductions 
 Whilst Companies A and B utilised a number of formal classroom-style inductions, 
Company C predominantly relied upon the provision of a driver’s manual. According to the 
Company C manager, this manual gives drivers “all that they need to know about who we 
are”. After reading the manual (or if illiterate, having the manual read to them), a driver has 
the option to discuss any questions they have with the manager. When asked about formal 
training, the manager stated that generally they aim to “identify issues early in the piece and 
...if I told them you know to go and do ... to learn the procedures and policies off the top of 
their head they probably, they wouldn’t know. So what we’ve done is we’ve actually done 
up a driver operation manuals so it’s referral back to it. So if the driver feels like that if 
something is unsafe, he’s got something to refer back to. Because we don't expect, we’re all 
human we’re not going to sit there and say you need to you know rule 101 or whatever it 
may be. We just try to refer back to it and the drivers have got it there for their reference. 
So it’s not a book that’s hidden away up in my office, it’s there with them and it’s 
something that they can, some drivers may not even open it. (Company B Branch Manager 
Five) 
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if things come up sort of later on we counsel them”. Thus, within Company C, training is 
conducted in an informal and relational manner. 
7.3.3.4. Summary of initial training and inductions  
The above discussion outlined the specific approaches taken by each company to initial 
training and inductions. Despite similarities between the inductions of Company A and B, 
Company B offered significantly more comprehensive training. Company C on the other 
hand, appeared to rely on a combination of their driver’s manual and an ‘honesty’ system 
where the drivers are expected to ask questions if unsure. Thus, whilst drivers in all 
companies are, in theory, adequately informed of rules, only Company B provided significant 
training and testing to ensure drivers are able to comply. 
7.3.4. Ongoing training.  
Each of the studied organisations also placed a different emphasis on ongoing training. 
The type of training utilised by each company and their attitudes towards training are 
discussed below. Whilst there is some discussion of attitudes regarding training the purpose 
of discussing these is to gain insight into the emphasis placed on training and the content 
which forms training. Again the primary purpose of this chapter is to detail the specific 
organisational context surrounding the driver culture. Whilst it is possible to make inferences 
about the culture of drivers or even managers from the below discussion, this is not the 
purpose of the current discussion. Further, without a deliberate treatment of the culture of 
drivers any inferences made at this stage could be misinterpreted. The type and content of 
ongoing training becomes particularly relevant to safety given the beliefs drivers hold about 
truth and reality. 
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7.3.4.1. Company A ongoing training.  
Within Company A, it was stated that getting drivers to attend training is arduous and 
takes significant time. Drivers are reportedly quick to attempt to avoid training and, while 
they will eventually be ‘forced’ into training, they can be unreceptive. This led one 
organisational staff member to suggest that they are happy so long as the minimal training 
and induction has been completed. Thus, at a minimum the initial training and inductions are 
conducted by all drivers, yet further training has not been effectively implemented in 
Company A. 
 
Right because their log books right, we can’t teach them seven hours before they go out 
and that’s when they’re most receptive. When we’re teaching them is when they come in 
and they’re tired, grumpy and shitty and they’re not receptive. Alright? But how else do 
you do it? Now unless these guys are making miles, they’re not making dollars, we will 
teach...we will pay them for being in here but then it interferes with their fatigue time so it 
interferes with their trips and that interferes with their big dollars. So when they first come 
in here we give them you know about I don't know, an hour and a half, two hours’ worth of 
training and I think that’s probably about as much as they can take on board on the first 
day. Then over a period of time we’ll get them in for more training but I'm actually going to 
change the way we do the training because I’ve found with that online thing you did. I 
found that to be easy and cost effective to do and I'm finding that you know because it’s 
easy and cost effective to do we can get everybody through it. But with all the other courses 
you know that we do here they all say oh no I'm too tired, oh I'm this or I’ve got bloody my 
wife out in the car. Oh it’s me bloody day off. So nobody wants to be trained. Eventually 
they [will be forced to do the training]... Yeah well at the moment since I’ve set up the 
online induction right, provided they’ve done that and the [major customers induction] I'm 
fairly happy with that. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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Regarding the attitudes of manager to training, it was evident that training often centred 
on behavioural consequences, ranging from legal repercussions to the likelihood of an 
incident. This form of training was evident through the inductions and reports of 
conversations with staff. Additionally, it was evident that managers perceived training was 
unnecessary for behaviours that could be reasonably expected. Thus, some aspects of safe 
behaviour were not given significant emphasis.  
 
7.3.4.2. Company B ongoing training.  
Company B offers significant training to both new and continuing staff throughout their 
employment. This ensures adequate skills and knowledge to safely perform the job and 
maintains high awareness and commitment to safety. As reported by one manager, Company 
B prefers to ensure its drivers are conscious of safety and risks rather than to condition 
behaviour through punishment. Thus the general attitude of Company B organisational staff 
members toward training was that it is necessary and beneficial. 
 
We don't like to sort of come across as the big brother slap you across the wrist. They work 
for us, we pay them. So what we do is we try to give them foundation. As you know you 
talked to (trainer’s name) this morning, (trainer’s name) basically preps the driver for the 
conditions that he works in. So they’re well aware that safety is a high priority for 
(Company B) and for us you know as individuals. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
I believe tailgating is in the induction stuff.  Seat belts, that’s a good question I mean I 
suppose, I could be wrong here, it may be in there, I don't recall it, but I suppose you 
probably wouldn’t have to, I mean you don't tell them to breathe when they get in the truck, 
why would you need to tell them to put a seat belt on although you know most blokes don't 
because they think it’s safer without it, and quite often it is in a truck. (Company A 
Manager One) 
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Whilst training within Company B consists primarily of formal training sessions and 
toolbox meetings, drivers may be subjected to either generic or targeted training. Training 
was said to be either organised on the basis of a driver’s individual need, or aimed at keeping 
all drivers’ skills up to date. When conducted on a needs basis, training is generally the result 
of either an incident, leading to retraining, or when a trend of unsafe behaviour is noticed. 
 
Whilst targeted training can occur to ensure a driver is up to standard, the aim is often 
to equip a driver for more advanced work. For example, one manager stated that they will 
train drivers for larger vehicles when transferring from driving a body truck to a semi-trailer. 
Similarly, training can be conducted to equip a driver for over-dimension work. 
 
When you employ people, you have to look at their skill sets and then from there it’s a case 
of training them up into more advanced skills like doing over-dimensional work and the 
likes of that. Because there’s a lot of things that when you’ve done it for a long time, it just 
becomes something natural to you. But if you haven’t done it before, you don’t think of the 
little things that make your job so much easier or prevent you from damaging the product 
or damaging the vehicles or whatever, and there are also a lot of rules and regulations –  
The moment the incident has happened then we all start talking about these procedures and 
policies that are in the manual, and if the driver doesn’t know about it we refresh them. 
And that’s why we go through a refreshing training every 12 months. And we’ll pick, even 
if we have an incident here on site where we see that there’s a bit of a trend, we try to put 
training or refresher courses around those incidents as such or those policies, those 
procedures. Whether that’s through a PowerPoint presentation, and it may only be two or 
three minutes of just slides, we try to do more visuals with the drivers and then less you 
know in a book type of deal because they, we get I’ve found in my time, is that you get more 
out of a driver from a visual sense. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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Group training sessions, however, typically serve a preventative role rather than a 
response to behaviour. One manager indicated that, due to the prevalence of manual handling 
throughout the company, they conduct regular manual handling refresher training courses.  
 
Each branch of Company B also conducts toolbox meetings on a monthly basis. 
Toolbox meetings typically occur prior to the beginning of a day’s shift. A number of 
managers indicated that they choose a safety issue to focus on during each toolbox meeting. 
The researcher attended one such toolbox meeting, during which general discussion was 
made regarding minor upcoming business changes, the manner in which speeding 
infringements are managed, and driving at a safe speed in the depot. Drivers were also able to 
discuss these issues and ask questions about the topics covered.  
– from the point of view of travel times with over-dimensional loads so you have to know 
all that sort of side of the business too. (Company B Operational Manager) 
You’ve got to make (safety) everybody’s problem. You know we’re drumming into the guys 
all the time about safety. We do training sessions. We’ve just gone through a week of it 
now, we’ve just put them all through a safety fork lifting training as well as safety at work. 
The B-double drivers, we put them through a rollover training course... it’s a DVD plus a 
questionnaire they were talking about, we got some engineers and explained how do 
rollover’s happen. But they should know how that happens or any things, but yes the 
training they’re always doing training of some sort. We do a manual handling training 
every six to 12 months. We bring in a guy from outside. He has a full training program that 
he’s put together. He is an occupational therapist so he’s actually come and done an actual 
site-specific training. He’s now done the training with us I think, this will be the fourth year 
now he’s been doing it. So every year he just takes it that little bit further and adjusts it to 
what we’re doing in the workplace and so yeah, he’s really good. (Company B Branch 
Manager Three) 
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Another common practice in these meetings is the discussion of serious occurrence 
reports (SORs), also sometimes called serious safety occurrences (SSOs). SORs detail 
incidents that have occurred in related industries, other branches of the company or at a 
customer site. The purpose of discussing these incidents is to raise awareness of safety issues 
and educate drivers about safety procedures. Drivers who participated in observations 
indicated that the use of SORs was effective in raising awareness and beneficial in helping 
them to learn about their job. One Company B driver stated that the use of these reports 
“makes you more aware” and that “you are always leaning, you can learn from incidents 
whether they happen at the workplace or elsewhere”. This driver indicated that it was 
because of SORs that “toolbox meetings are good, you hear of things and you think we’re 
lucky we follow the policies”. 
 
 
We have a toolbox meeting once a month religiously, it’s on all of our umm calendars at 
the end of the month and we go through those SSOs, if there’s none, there’s none, if there 
is, there is, and we try to incorporate it into our day-to-days. A lot of the SSOs that have 
come through may not be relevant to our type of business here on site. But we do try to give 
them examples of you know this is you know this is how you get off the truck properly, you 
know the right way and all that type of stuff. And so the drivers yeah they do take it on 
board because I do have a lot of drivers come into me and say you know like that guy was 
lucky and there’s a bit of talk about it amongst the ranks. So I do believe that it’s a good 
tool, especially when you hear the stuff from Melbourne, Sydney because (steel customer) 
are quite good, they filter the stuff through quite regularly. So because it’s happening all 
the time it’s always good just to talk about it and refresh it. And ... it all comes down to 
like, and I don't mean to harp on it, but all about influencing, I always said that. We’re 
trying to influence drivers to do the right thing. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
Chapter 7: Study Three Results – The Organisation  157 
 
7.3.4.3. Company C ongoing training.  
As noted in section 7.3.2.1, at Company C training is predominantly conducted on the 
job, rather than in a classroom-type setting. Due to shifts in accreditation and regulatory 
bodies, however, Company C is now required to take a more stringent approach to training. 
Training was, however, generally viewed as unnecessary and one staff member indicated a 
desire to avoid appearing overzealous or to repeat themselves. Thus, training borders on 
being apologetic in the way it is conveyed. This may be influenced by the inability to easily 
hire new staff and be an attempt to avoid offending current staff. 
 
The recent emphasis placed on training means that Company C is currently developing 
a new approach to training. Company C’s recently appointed compliance officer was, at the 
time of investigation, determining the best approaches to use in training. Additionally, the 
compliance officer was still learning the legal requirements of training. Due to the perceived 
difficulty of getting all employees together at any given point in time the compliance officer 
typically approached individuals one-on-one to inform them of new requirements.  
Yeah and you’ll never, you’ll never make it 100% safe although you’d be stupid to think 
you could. Because like even now we’ve got to say to our drivers you know don't do this, 
don't stand there, don't do that. Because you know if you don't, you know the story, if we 
don't tell them the risk we’re liable. But I'm not going to go there to the shed every morning 
and tell them the same old thing... (compared to construction industry) yeah every day, 
every day they’ve got to tell them. You know have a bloody toolbox meeting or whatever 
they talk about and you can’t do this and you can’t do that. Well I mean surely to Christ 
you’ve only got to tell them once. You can remind them every now and again but you don't 
have to tell them again.  And we’re not a big company like. The blokes that are here now 
are pretty...pretty good. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Similarly to Company B, some training was reported to be in response to inappropriate 
behaviour. Due to legal changes, some previously accepted behaviours, now against 
regulation, were the typical focus of training. Thus, training is conducted as problems arise. 
 
7.3.4.4. Summary of ongoing training.  
The above discussion outlined the approaches taken to ongoing training by each of the 
case study organisations. A number of differences between each of the companies and the 
way they handle ongoing training were identified. Company A appeared to view training as 
somewhat unnecessary. Due to a lack of interest in training held by drivers, the company 
generally was content with the initial inductions. Similarly, Company C has traditionally only 
trained drivers in response to problems, typically in the form of informal discussions at the 
Only because they’re bringing in new procedures with new paperwork and all that sort of 
stuff that we have to have. Sometimes I have to go and tell them they’re doing it wrong or 
tell them how to do it. But it’s all pretty simple stuff, but it’s just in the new system. 
(Company C Compliance Officer) 
 
And getting all the staff in the same place at the same time, all the same thing is like it 
hasn’t happened. I’ve been trying to get that to happen for months and it just hasn’t 
happened because it’s impossible, it’s virtually impossible... Getting everyone in the same 
place at the same time to tell them exactly how things need to be is difficult because then I 
lose track of what I’ve told one person because we’re still getting our heads around how 
the ..I’m still trying to get my head around how it’s going to work. So and then I’ll tell a 
driver one thing and then I’ll forget what I’ve, that that’s what I’ve said to him and tell a 
different driver something else and then they start squabbling, the drivers start squabbling 
with the maintenance guys and it’s just, it’s a pain in the arse to be honest. But it’s got to 
be done. (Company C Compliance Officer) 
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workplace. Conversely, Company B places a high priority on training and conducts regular 
toolbox meetings alongside periodical formal training sessions. 
7.3.5. Rostering 
Though considered an employee management strategy, rostering has a major impact 
upon fatigue and fatigue management. Despite some similarities, each company handled 
rostering differently. The following discussion details the specific rostering approaches used 
by each company. 
7.3.5.1. Company A rostering  
Company A has a fairly consistent workload with many regular trips. Generally, 
rostering is conducted to ensure that the roster meets the legal requirements for each driver. 
Thus, if a driver cannot legally complete a journey they are not rostered to take that load. 
 
Prior to departure, Company A assesses the driver’s fitness for duty. Fitness for duty 
checks add a layer of flexibility to rostering. Fitness-for-duty assessment is an ongoing 
process, starting with up-to-date medical examinations and a brief daily assessment, typically 
consisting of operation and management staff observing the behaviour and appearance of the 
driver to determine if the driver appears fatigued or influenced by substances. Drivers are 
What we've done in previous, we have looked back. A lot of, some of the guys, some of the 
older guys think oh yeah we’re back in the old school where you keep going.  And then we 
look back at what he’s done for the whole week and we say no you’re due for your 24-hour 
logbook break. We’ve got to look at that as well where the driver thinks he’s still right to 
go and I’ll say no if I send you out now you’re not going to have, you’re going to get half 
way down the road and you’re going to have to have a 24-hour break somewhere. And it’s 
no good. I’d rather give the load to someone else and then make sure that you’re right for 
the following day. (Company A Operations Staff Member) 
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also required to declare themselves fit to drive prior to departure. For drivers on long-distance 
journeys, this process is conducted over the phone. 
 
If deemed unfit for duty, a driver will be sent home or asked to rest until a later load 
becomes available. This is assisted by use of air-conditioned bedrooms, showers and kitchen 
facilities at the Company A depot, enabling adequate rest without losing commuting time.  
 
If they come in late and I see that they’re not fit to go out or we haven’t got a load to suit 
them to go out they get put at the end of the list and they don’t go out. Or we put them on a 
very late one... like say for instance a drive comes in at two o’clock in the afternoon you 
know darn well he doesn’t want to go out again. But I might have something for him that is 
not urgent to get into the other state til the following day and he can leave at midnight and 
he’s still getting time to go home, do whatever he wants to do and still get six or seven 
hours sleep before he actually has to go out again. (Company A Operations staff Member) 
 
So we train our schedulers, because they do their scheduler’s course on how to look for 
symptoms of fitness for duty. So are they tired? Do they look like they might be on 
something or whatever? So we go through slurring or red eyes and smells but we also train 
them you know to be careful that they’re not diabetic and you know all that sort of stuff too. 
And how to handle it because we don't want to be seen to be discriminatory or unfair or 
anything like that. And it’s got a lot, it is linked in with our drug and alcohol testing too 
because we test based on suspicion as well. So yeah so and that’s why we make our drivers 
phone in for their drivers’ dec, they don't just fill it out themselves. So that even if they’re 
not at the depot the schedulers can listen for the symptoms and the signs. But if they’re not 
fit then the options at that point are, you know, they don't do the trip. They need to stop and 
rest if they’re in the middle of a trip or whatever. If there is suspicion then we organise 
drug testing. (Company A Manager Two) 
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7.3.5.2. Company B rostering.  
Company B also rosters according to the needs of the job and the abilities of drivers. As 
put by one manager, it is important to determine “who’s the best truck and driver and trailer 
for each job”. Company B typically rosters their drivers for shorter shifts than the legal 
maximum. When discussing being stranded due to insufficient driving hours, one manager 
stated this problem was rare as “it’s load planned anyway, so you wouldn’t probably do more 
than 10 hours at the furthest part”. Echoing this, another manager indicated that the company 
ensures that, given fatigue management requirements, drivers always have extra days to 
spare, reducing the likelihood of problems arising from work pressures.  
 
As an added check, drivers are required to sign a fitness for duty declaration and are 
assessed for their fitness for duty. Thus, similar to Company A, the roster is flexible to the 
fitness of drivers. Further, drivers are required to undergo regular health checks and random 
drug and alcohol testing. 
Drivers on a 14-hour day, which is all basic fatigue management, they have to follow a 
logbook every day. They have to hand one page of that logbook in every day. So the 
company monitors, someone goes over that page every day and checks to make sure they’re 
not making mistakes, they’re not exceeding their driving hours and that’s all monitored and 
recorded through the office. And then when it comes to drivers being away for a long time, 
you’ve then got to talk to them and see how many hours they’ve worked each day to make 
sure they don’t exceed their 84 hours without a 24-hour break, and 145 hours in any 14-
day period. I try and have it so that every driver has either a Saturday or a Sunday off. 
That way if they have a day off every weekend, you don’t have any troubles extending 
fatigue management. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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7.3.5.3. Company C rostering  
Unlike companies A and B, rostering is very difficult at Company C. Whilst it will be 
further discussed in section 8.5, livestock transport is conducted on a needs basis, typically 
resulting from a sale. Thus, work can be gained at short notice and rostering is difficult or 
impossible. 
 
It’s impossible, it’s impossible. Even this morning we had a phone call this morning you 
know we’ve got eight decks in the (location name) sale, got to go to (location name)... you 
know this afternoon or tomorrow. So you can’t plan in advance (Company C Manager) 
 
Well yeah they do a...got to ensure that even before they start they have a fitness-for-duty to 
acknowledge. So if they come to work and they’ve had a bad night, they’re fatigued 
because they haven’t slept because they’ve had the flu, because they’re taking a medication 
that may affect their driving, their responsiveness, they have an undertaking to put their 
hand up and say I'm just not coming to work, I'm not well. We’ve had instances where 
we’ve had drivers come in and they’ve had some family issues at home, they’ve been visibly 
upset. We’ve said no, no not in a truck today mate, you call it quits and head off home, get 
on top of things and then come back. We’ve done that for guys that are sick for a day, 
we’ve done it for one or two, we’ve sent them off and given them extended leave for a 
couple of weeks because they’ve had issues, so that’s even before they start at work. 
They’ve got to be fit and able to do so and that follows on with our regular safety, our 
regular medical checks for them. We do random drug testing, drug and alcohol testing of a 
morning at a site. No one knows till they get to work and oh got a minute? Test.  So it’s 
ensuring, trying to ensure that even before the guys sort of like get in the truck, first of all 
they’re fit and healthy to drive and that’s along with our regular medicals. (Company B 
Region Manager One) 
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Whilst Company C tries to ensure drivers are available on sale days, it is difficult to 
predict driver demand. Despite trying to book in advance, agents and graziers may call at the 
last minute and change the number of trucks and trailers they need. 
 
Due to the size of the company, it is impossible to regularly have spare drivers ready 
for a last minute job. Whilst drivers typically get time off between loads, Company C does 
not truly have drivers to spare. 
 
 
 
... how many drivers we’ve got. Well when there’s not something happening, we’ve got two 
blokes working the shed. You would have seen that I suppose. So when they come home if 
they’re definitely not going anywhere for the next day or so they do much of their own 
greasing simply because if it’s not greased properly and they drop a tail shaft they’re the 
one going to get yelled at... But basically they can drive it in here and say this is my list of 
problems. The boys in the shed fix that and do brakes and all those kinds of things. So that 
gives them the time off to go and rest until something else comes up. And we can’t have 
spare drivers, no such thing as spare drivers in this industry. You’re flat out having enough 
to drive what we’ve got. (Company C Manager) 
 
With sale days even worse, Wednesday is sale day, you organise around having trucks 
waiting to see what comes out of the sales... then he rings up and says oh no I’ve only got 
three decks to go in and I go or he rings up and says you know those three trucks I booked? 
I now need five. So it’s really difficult. There’s no scheduling. You can’t actually schedule 
anything in advance. It’s difficult even to schedule around having the men have a day off a 
week because they can be away... The graziers are getting better in that they’ll book in 
advance. There are some times when you simply they can’t do that. (Company C Manager) 
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7.3.5.4. Summary of rostering  
The above discussion outlined the specific rostering approaches used by each company. 
Both Company A and B are able to utilise a full rostering system due to relatively consistent 
workloads. For this reason, these companies can plan when they will use each driver in order 
to ensure that they do not exceed their work hours. Company A uses its drivers more heavily 
than Company B, and has to be more aware of legal restrictions. Conversely, Company B 
rosters its drivers well below their legal limits, both for daily and weekly restrictions, thus 
ensuring availability of drivers for additional workloads. Company C, however, is unable to 
roster their drivers effectively due to the nature of livestock transport and the number of 
drivers employed. 
7.3.6. Payment of drivers  
The method of payment and, therefore, form of employment, can significantly 
influence safety. Members of Companies A and B discussed the way in which drivers are 
paid for their work, but members of Company C did not. Nonetheless, information regarding 
driver payment was gleaned from the driver’s manual. The following discussion outlined 
specific payment methods for each company. This information becomes particularly 
important when discussing attitudes towards money and time in Chapter 9. 
7.3.6.1. Company A payment of drivers  
Company A drivers are typically employed on a permanent basis. Unlike permanent 
employment in other industries, drivers of Company A are either paid a minimum salary, or 
in cents per kilometre. If the number of kilometres travelled does not result in a pay above the 
minimum salary, the driver will still be paid the minimum amount. It was suggested to be rare 
for drivers to work below the minimum number of kilometres. Additionally, however, due to 
the permanent status of drivers in Company A, they receive sick leave and vacation payment 
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(typically the minimum salary plus loadings). Thus, whilst drivers are employed on a 
permanent basis, they are typically paid by the kilometre travelled. This form of payment can 
serve as a significant motivation for unsafe driving, particularly through increased speed, 
which increases the average payment per time period. Local drivers within Company A are, 
however, payed an hourly rate. 
 
 
And umm when we are employing drivers yeah we put them on a permanent rate, which it 
obviously looks less because it’s not casual loading but we pay their sick days, annual 
leave days all that sort of stuff, which is great around Christmas time. We get an influx of 
drivers at Christmas time because you get all the public holidays and they get paid for that 
whereas when they’re casual working for someone else they don't get it. So we’re finding 
when the Christmas period is over they head off back to their casual rate of pay and so 
we’ve been talking about do we need to look at casual because all they care about is that 
rate of cents per kilometre or what they’re getting per hour. They don't care, seem to care 
about security of employment or yeah, you know getting their sick leave and annual leave 
pay loading. They just want more money now. And that would be the majority of feedback 
that we get, they just want that casual rate of pay... So we’ve been talking about do we do 
that? But isn’t job security and having a permanent employee more important? I know 
legislation has changed so that if casuals have been here more than 12 months we need to 
legally offer them a permanent position in writing and they have the option to choose.  But 
I mean you can deal with that as it happened. So yeah because really we’ve been looking at 
the calculations and it is slightly more expensive to use a casual rate of pay rather than 
permanent but if it’s going to help us to attract and retain more drivers. I mean do we do 
that when everyone else is saying permanent. It’s better to have permanent employees but 
that’s not what they’re wanting. (Company A Manager Two) 
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7.3.6.2. Company B payment of drivers  
A number of drivers indicated that Company B “look after you pretty well”, 
particularly because they pay drivers by the hour. Managers indicated that by paying drivers 
by the hour, there is no incentive to drive faster. Company B drivers shared this perspective, 
often making statements such as “why bother rushing when you are paid by the hour?” and 
“they pay you by the hour so you are not really rushed”. Contrary to distance-based 
payment, a number of drivers suggested that being paid by the hour may even contribute to a 
lazy, time-taking attitude in some drivers. Whilst this may be negative in itself, time-based 
payment clearly does not encourage speed-related risk taking. 
 
 
And the thing about (Company B) where the drivers don't have to push the limit is our 
drivers that go away are paid by the hour. Whereas a lot of companies pay by the trip or by 
the kilometre or others, whereas (Company B) it’s by the hour. So the driver doesn’t have 
to force himself to do the trip a little bit quicker so his pay packet looks a little bit better. 
And that’s a lot of the problem with our industry. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
 
Yeah I guess one of the advantages that (Company B) have from the point of view of not 
having the drivers want to exceed their hours is that our guys are paid an hourly rate 
regardless of whether they’re working around town or whether they’re going away on a 
trip. So they get paid, if they work 14 hours, they get paid for 14 hours. Not like the guys 
who are on a trip rate where they get paid $350 to drive to Sydney so they try and drive it 
there as fast as they can so they can turn around and come home again. We do nothing like 
that, its straight hourly rates. If a guy works fifteen hours a day, he gets paid for fourteen, 
so there’s no incentive for someone to go and work extra hours a day because he’s not 
going to get paid for it. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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7.3.6.3. Company C payment of drivers.  
No members of Company C spontaneously raised the manner in which drivers are paid. 
Further, whilst many prompts were used regarding the factors associated with behaviour, no 
specific attempt was made to elicit information regarding payment. Thus, the following 
information was drawn from the driver’s manual. Drivers employed by Company C are paid 
a daily rate, and do not accrue holiday or sick leave. Further, drivers are expected to be at the 
depot from 8am to 5pm unless otherwise discussed, and will not be paid additional hours if 
they could have completed their load within a typical work day. Thus, driver employment 
could be described as casual, yet full-time. Similarly to Company B, as drivers are not paid 
by the kilometre there is less incentive to speed or skip required rest breaks. However, the 
potential not to receive additional pay for longer days may encourage speeding to reduce 
unpaid work. 
7.3.6.4. Summary of payment of drivers  
The above discussion outlined the specific payment methods of each company. The 
form of payment used by each company was unique. Company A employs staff on a 
permanent basis, yet, the manner in which drivers are paid is based upon the number of 
kilometres travelled. Conversely, Company B pays their drivers by the hour, and Company C 
pays per day worked. Whilst the time period which companies B and C utilise is different, the 
fact that each pays based on the amount of time worked rather than by the kilometre means 
that these drivers are less likely to be motivated to drive in an unsafe manner to achieve a 
better pay. 
7.3.7. Promotion opportunity within Company B  
Unique to Company B is the ability to promote drivers within the company. Due to the 
wide range of vehicles used and work conducted within Company B, drivers can advance 
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through different types of transport. This was particularly discussed by one Company B 
driver, who indicated an excitement that “they are going to get [him his] B-double licence”. 
Whilst this was not evidently linked to any specific safety behaviours, it may be possible that 
this opportunity leads to a greater commitment to the organisation, and thus better 
compliance, in order to receive such promotion.  
 
7.4. SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
In addition to the employee management strategies used by each company, a number of 
safety management practices within the organisation were identified within Study Three. 
These practices included communication, technological and material safety and the 
monitoring and enforcement of safety policies. Finally, Company B participants also 
indicated that the company deliberately attempts to shape the culture of their organisation. 
Each of these safety management strategies are discussed below for the purpose of detailing 
the context surrounding the culture of drivers. Again, whilst inferences could be made 
regarding the culture of drivers or managers, this is not the purpose of the current chapter. 
Thus, this section is descriptive in nature, outlining the specific organisational context. 
If they’re a good driver and they want to change then we’ll try to move them to somewhere 
what they want to do. Or if they want to improve their skills, if they’ve only got a heavy 
rigid licence and they want to go to a semi licence then we’ll try and open some doors for 
them as long as they’ve been a good driver. So we’ll try and reward them that way to keep 
their skills up. I’ve moved two or three now from different departments to get their skill 
levels up which obviously passes on a more positive attitude. They don’t feel like they’re 
trapped and stuck in that one job and one position. They can say look there’s movements 
out there, whichever way they want to go. So that’s what I try and do. (Company B Branch 
Manager Two) 
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7.4.1. Communication  
Communication between the organisation and their drivers is crucial to managing the 
problem of driver autonomy. Whilst some forms of communication were common to each 
company, the following discussion highlights increases in communication between 
companies.  
Each company uses communication to monitor the location and progress of drivers. 
Starting with Company C, drivers reported a requirement to “ring in for every load so that 
(the manager) knows where we are”. Additionally, the manager will call drivers who have 
failed to check in at the expected time. As stated by one driver, “if we should have reached 
the next spot, she knows”, and it was stated that the manager will “wait a while and then try 
to call (the driver) to see where (they) are”.  
Company A utilises the same processes. However, they will also call a driver who is 
detected pulling up at an unexpected time, through satellite tracking, to check if the driver is 
in need of rest or experiencing mechanical problems. Further, if a Company A driver is 
fatigued and needs to nap, the driver will contact the company to request a wakeup call. 
 
Lastly, Company B utilises the approaches detailed above and additionally uses an 
internal two-way radio system that serves as the first point of call. This system is often used 
to remind drivers about specific hazards.  
And that’s, that’s about the only way you can actually combat anything like that and with 
the satellite yeah like you’ve got to constant, we’ve got a guy in there, well put it this way. 
The office is manned 24/7. We consistently watch that satellite, we make numerous phone 
calls during the night to the drivers to ensure that they’re okay. If they pull up for an 
unscheduled pit stop we want to know why. Is he okay? Has he got a problem? Has he got 
a mechanical problem, a fatigue problem, things like that.  And that’s our procedures 
inside...in the operations. (Company A Operations Staff Member) 
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Additionally, Company B also will regularly contact their drivers simply to check that 
they are well, providing a supportive environment where drivers feel respected and able to 
discuss issues. Similarly, when the driver is absent from a depot for a prolonged period of 
time they will either check on the driver or require them to regularly phone in. 
 
... if I can see the driver is out of the truck because he’s got his ignition turned off on the 
Navman and I need for some reason to contact him urgently I may try and ring his own 
personal mobile. But I find that can be a distraction to people when they’re doing their 
work onsite so I try and avoid that as much as I can but yes, there are times when you have 
to make phone calls. But generally we also have mobiles in the trucks so I prefer to ring the 
truck’s phone and leave a message on the mobile in the truck so when he gets back into his 
cab he sees it, sees the message there. But initially when they’re driving down the road, the 
two-way is the main source of contact. (Company B Operational Manager) 
 
We also have communication systems that people can use so we’ve got two way systems, 
we’ve got the mobile phones as well and we’ve got a Navman tracking system to be able to 
track where the drivers are so that we know if someone’s pulled over for a longer period of 
time than expected we can do a call and find out if everything is okay. But often those 
things won’t work so the Navman system won’t work in all areas of Australia so in more 
remote areas they drop off but for the most part they do. We have a plan in place when –  
 
I usually get a phone call from (The Director) saying ‘hey have you told the boys just to be 
careful?’ You know like it’s in there, the back of their mind, they lived through it like you 
know I suppose luckily enough I wasn’t here at that time... So yeah so as soon as it starts to 
rain or you know there’s that rush period, the company does, you know, you can tell it and 
you know even when we’re talking in that management meetings you know the conversation 
will come up. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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7.4.2. Technological and material safety.  
To provide a safe work environment, technological and material safety interventions 
are often required, ranging from PPE (personal protective equipment) to more advance 
technologies. Additionally, vehicle design and maintenance can play a pivotal role in safety. 
Though vehicle maintenance is discussed as a specific safety concern in section 10.2.6, a 
brief note will be made here regarding speed limiting technology. The following discussion 
outlines the specific technological and material safety interventions used within each 
company in order to provide adequate detail of the organisational context surrounding 
drivers. As each organisation makes use of different materials and technologies for safety 
they will be discussed separately. 
7.4.2.1. Company A technological and material safety.  
The forms of materials and technology utilised in Company A generally include PPE, 
sleeping facilities, and in-vehicle speed limiters. Additionally, the company tries to maintain 
a high quality of vehicle maintenance. 
Company A has a limited PPE policy for drivers, mainly consisting of enclosed 
footwear in large portions of their depot and steel-capped shoes in the workshop. Thus, very 
little reference was made to the use of PPE. Despite the lack of in-depth PPE policies at 
Company A, their major customer requires enclosed footwear and high visibility vests. 
Company A’s bedroom facilities have already been discussed. Additionally, however, 
each Company A truck is fitted with built-in bunks for sleeping on the road. Due to 
difficulties sleeping in a truck during the day, the trucks are also fitted with ‘bunk coolers’ 
– people are away, going on long trips. They either go in convoys or they will have a 
regular call-in point. (Company B Director) 
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(an air conditioning unit which operates when the vehicle is stopped). However, Company A 
drivers stated that bunk coolers are insufficient for the summer heat. 
 
One approach to reduce speeding in the industry is the mandatory use of speed limiters 
in trucks. Speed limiters prevent the truck from accelerating beyond a given speed (legally 
maximum = 100km/h). Members of Company A indicated that limited trucks can still exceed 
this speed when going down hills. 
 
Due to the ease with which speed limiters can be tampered, satellite tracking is an 
important tool within the organisation. One Company A driver stated that “tampering with 
speed limiters is easy, you just put a wire or a box over it, but you can’t do it without being 
caught”. Through notifying the company when a vehicle exceeds 100km/h, and the duration 
for which this has occurred, the company can detect speed limiter tampering. As noted by one 
driver, though a truck can briefly exceed 100km/h downhill, if the truck does so for an 
extended period of time it is clear that the speed limiter has been tampered with.  
 
And the workshop, that’s the workshop’s job as well and if we notice any abnormality we 
let senior management know that they may have a wire on it or some way to make it go 
quicker. And then it gets pulled into the workshop and the workshop goes right through it. –  
100km/h yeah. They’re...the road speed is gutted at 100km/h they will go faster than that 
off a hill because they’re not gear bound at 100km/h but I think they’ll top out at just over 
120 or something like that, 130.  Yeah. (Company A Manager One) 
 
The bunk coolers are shit, they just don’t work with the heat, they use water to cool the air, 
but the water itself isn’t cool... Always try to sleep when it’s still dark and cool... Even guys 
who have been doing it for a while struggle to sleep... Some suggest putting ice in the 
water, but it’s too much effort to make the ice fit. (Company A Driver Six) 
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7.4.2.2. Company B technological and material safety.  
Company B places priority on providing safe worksites and equipment for drivers. A 
number of managers and drivers indicated that the owners of Company B are seeking to set 
an equipment benchmark for other companies.  
 
This goal was evident in a number of ways. Company B provides mandatory high 
visibility clothing and other PPE for their drivers. This was particularly noted by the 
researcher who, prior to attending the first site visit, was informed of the PPE required for 
each site. Though such requirements are common to other industries, only Company B placed 
such requirements on the researcher (with exception to Company A stating that a high 
visibility vest would be required at one customer site). In addition to PPE, Company B also 
provides easily accessible first aid kits for every truck. 
 
– It gets sent around, gets put on the dyno, covers have a look at it and see if it’s been 
tampered with, so everything is above board. (Company A Operations Staff Member) 
We have first aid kits in the vehicles. We place them in the passenger side of the vehicle at 
the bottom of it, sort of at the foot well. So that way if someone needed to access the first 
aid kit, they don’t have to climb up into the truck to access it. They can open the door on 
the passenger side of the vehicle which is off the roadside and get to a first aid kit fairly 
quickly. So just a few things like that. And we’re moving in a way of our PPE at the 
moment is that we won’t issue any shorts anymore. We used to issue some shorts as a 
combination of a uniform but as we’re evolving as a company, moving in the direction of –  
The owners of the company have very high standards in their equipment and their people 
and obviously that comes at a cost and that’s how they want to run the business and that’s 
really good from that point of view. They want to have their company as a standout 
company compared to other people. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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A number of Company B drivers, however, criticised the lack of some technologies and 
materials. For instance, some drivers indicated that the lack of bunks in Company B trucks 
prevented napping when fatigued. Whilst Company B provides hotel accommodation for all 
overnight trips, drivers insisted that the ability to nap during a trip was important. Similarly, 
one driver indicated that, despite a goal for no drivers to have to climb the trailer, some jobs 
are impossible to complete without climbing. It was suggested that, due to this goal, 
Company B did not provide safe methods of climbing the trailer for those jobs where it was 
necessary. Thus, it was suggested that, until it is possible to complete all jobs without 
climbing the trailer, drivers are forced to climb the trailer in an unsafe manner. One manager 
from Company B, however, indicated that despite searching, the company has been unable to 
identify a safe means to climb the trailer. 
 
– no shorts will be issued, regardless of what you do. It’ll just be long policy all the way. 
Yeah so a few things like that. (Company B Director) 
We’ve tried to look at a way of having a ladder that you can make portable and move it 
around. Now there are some ladders that fit into the combing rail sockets but they’re very 
narrow and the drivers generally don’t like using them because they feel very narrow, they 
feel very flimsy and our drivers are quite big so they don’t like that feeling, they want 
something sturdier. But to find something that will universally fit all trailers and can be off 
the ground so it doesn’t need to be based on the ground, because we can work in all sort of 
ground heights. It can be uneven; it can be on a roadside. You want to be able to gain 
access to your truck or your trailer without needing a stable base. So you need to be able to 
create a stable base off the air, it needs the support from underneath the trailer to get a 
leverage point to keep it supported. I can’t do that. All the trailers are built differently 
underneath so they don’t work generically. So we investigate it, we investigated all of that 
and we ended up with a step we called a ‘Shaw step’ ... It’s very similar to the steps that –  
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Despite these complaints, Company B does provide a number of safe materials for 
drivers and actively investigates new approaches to reduce risks. In addition to the simple 
materials discussed above, Company B has also purchased electric pallet jacks to prevent 
drivers from strains during unloading, and banned the use of ‘lever dogs’ (a chain tightening 
device prone to causing injuries) as a means to restrain loads, opting for the safer ratchet-
mechanism ‘EV cams’. Additionally, one manager indicated that Company B had purchased 
a device designed to lift the top layers off pallets, thus, reducing physical injuries.  
 
Company B also places importance on the maintenance of vehicles. Whilst this includes 
general maintenance to ensure safety, Company B must also maintain and monitor speed 
limiters. Due to the age of many Company B trucks, however, some are unable to be speed 
– you get in an office environment to step up onto something just a little bit higher... But the 
difficulty with those steps is where do we place them? They become a lethal weapon 
themselves if you don’t restrain them properly. And if your space is taken up with paying 
load, what space do you allocate to a Shaw step? Where do you put that? So some vehicles, 
we’ve definitely got a way that we can do that and others don’t, just don’t. So it makes it 
difficult. (Company B Director) 
 
 
It’s been superseded by a number of other types of equipment fully in (steel customer), fully 
in (building supplies customer), we no longer buy the lever dogs. We buy a replacement 
piece of equipment so I suppose also involved in the type of equipment we use. The design 
of some trailers specific to our customer’s requirements, there’s an involvement in safety 
there… If there is a safety incident or injury we’ll review that incident, undertake an 
investigation of that incident, try and look at what the root causes are. Once again, if it’s a 
piece of equipment that’s been ill-used obviously we’ll review our training procedures. If 
the equipment is not suitable we’ll review the suitability and change the equipment. 
(Company B Region Manager One) 
 
Chapter 7: Study Three Results – The Organisation  176 
 
limited. For this reason, speed in Company B is typically controlled through policies, satellite 
tracking (see section 7.4.3.1.2) and enforcement, rather than technology. 
 
7.4.2.3. Company C technological and material safety  
Company C differs significantly from companies A and B in their use of technological 
and material safety. As indicated by the manager of Company C, cattle react poorly to high 
visibility clothing and, as drivers are required to climb crates (livestock carrying trailers), 
steel capped boots make this climbing dangerous. Thus, it was argued to be common practice 
for livestock transporters is to avoid using PPE. However, Company C do utilise speed 
limiters. 
The manager-driver of Company C stated that drivers “can’t speed because they’re 
limited”. Due to the potential for tampering with speed limiters, the manager-driver of 
Company C regular inspects each vehicle.  
 
7.4.2.4. Summary of technological and material safety. 
The above discussion highlighted specific technological and material safety items used 
within each company. The companies used different degrees of technological and material 
safety. The limited or non-existent PPE policies in Company A and C contrast with Company 
B’s extensive non-negotiable PPE policy. All three companies used speed limiters although 
...yeah and I look, not that I know what I'm looking for but....if I look at a truck and it looks 
like there might have been something done to it or whatever, you know. (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
 
We have a 95 K speed limit on our vehicles, that’s a policy limit. Some vehicles have been 
able to be speed limited because of the type of engine they have but some vehicles are older 
and their engines don’t have limiting functionality like that. So it’s a policy limit and we 
monitor to the policy based on our Navman. (Company B Director)  
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some Company B vehicles were unable to be limited, making Company B rely predominantly 
upon policy enforcement to manage speed. Company A provides sleeping facilities, while 
Company B does not have such facilities, but pays for accommodation for overnight drivers. 
Lastly, Company B also used a number of unique pieces of equipment, to avoid injuries 
likely to occur when restraining a load or loading goods. 
7.4.3. Policies and procedures  
While the effects that specific organisational policies on safety-related behaviours will 
be discussed in Chapter 10, the general policy enforcement approach is worth noting. Each 
company had a number of policies, typically enforced through some form of punishment. 
However, in order to use such punishment, it is important to first detect policy breaches. 
Thus, the following discussion outlines the specific monitoring and enforcement approaches 
used by each company. Again the purpose of this discussion is not to make inferences 
regarding the culture, but to detail the specific organisational context surrounding drivers 
which may interact with their culture. The information below becomes particularly relevant 
when considering driver attitudes towards rules and regulations in Chapter 9. 
7.4.3.1. Monitoring 
As previously noted (section 7.2) many policy breaches are difficult for companies to 
detect. Nonetheless, a number of monitoring techniques, common to each company, were 
identified, including feedback from external sources, satellite tracking, and paperwork 
auditing. The following discussion outlines specific monitoring approaches in each company. 
7.4.3.1.1. Feedback 
Transport companies can receive a significant amount of feedback from their customers 
regarding the behaviour of drivers, though typically only when the behaviour results in 
damage to non-organisational people and property, or sufficient risk to warrant a formal 
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complaint. Due to the post-event nature of such feedback, this serves to provide information 
for future prevention. Members of Company A, however, noted that occasionally car drivers 
will also phone the organisation to lodge a complaint about drivers. 
 
Company B also utilises an incident reporting system in which drivers are required to 
report on every incident, therefore providing self-feedback. Though drivers may provide false 
or misleading information, or fail to report minor incidents, Company B encourages drivers 
not to do so as the report is for information purposes, not to assign blame.  
 
You know we also try to talk to drivers one on one. Like if we do see something unsafe we 
try to umm encourage the drivers to report incidents, even if it’s their own fault because 
there’s learning in behind that. We don't come over with a big ruler and say “that’s it, 
you’re sacked, you’re fired, you’re gone”. What we try to do is that “tell us, we’d rather 
find out about it today than a customer ringing us up and saying ‘hey like did your driver 
tell you about this?’” So we try to work through that with the drivers, and put some, you 
know, procedures back in place... if it’s required and just try to help the driver through it. 
Because in some cases you know if it’s a driver error, in a lot of cases the incidents when 
they do occur, like if it’s driver related you know it is driver error. And we work through 
the drivers with that, so we try again to influence that safety aspect. You know like you 
know “why did you do it?”, “You shouldn’t have done it. You know these are the rules” 
and we just sort of, we keep on back and forth you know. We always try to revert back to 
what our procedures and policies are and try to influence them in that way mate. 
(Company B Branch Manager Five) 
If someone rings up and says your truck is tailgating me the first thing we do is work out 
which truck it is with satellite tracking and ring him up and say ‘pull your fucking head in 
we had someone make a complaint about you’.  (Company A Manager One) 
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7.4.3.1.2. Satellite tracking 
At noted above, satellite tracking is a common monitoring method used in the heavy 
vehicle industry. Tracking provides the companies with information regarding the current 
location, heading and speed of a vehicle. Satellite tracking was used by each company to 
monitor speed breaches in all vehicles detecting speeds higher than the speed limiter, thereby 
detecting speed limiter tampering and running off hills. 
 
As satellite tracking does not automatically provide information about the local speed 
limit, Company A primarily uses it to monitor truck location and breaches of speed limiters. 
Conversely, Company C uses satellite tracking to monitor speeds which exceed a safe level 
for the size and configuration of specific trucks and current weather conditions. 
 
Oh somebody has got a speeding issue here, not speeding as in over the limit but speeding 
in what you should be doing with the combination that you’re carrying and each one of 
them goes it’s not me. And when you print out their little and you put it in front of them, 
and they’re all...the ones that are doing the wrong thing go very quiet. It’s there, it’s there. 
I find it a really good tool that Navman, really good tool. (Company C Manager) 
 
I mean we destroyed a quad which is two B-doubles put together. One of my drivers 
destroyed the truck, the trailers everything, not because he was going too fast because my 
satellite tracking shows me he was only going 50km/h, but it was in the fog and in the dusk 
and there was another truck coming the other way. He should have been doing 30km/h. –  
And then like I said the trucks are road speed limited to a hundred but they’re gear bound 
at more than that so of course they run it off a hill. You can’t stop anyone from doing that, 
although we frown upon it and that’s one of the reasons we have satellite tracking to try 
and keep control of it a bit better. (Company A Manager One) 
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Company B also primarily uses satellite tracking to monitor maximum speed limits. 
However, the system used within the company can also be programmed with location-
specific speed limits. This approach is used near one depot to ensure that drivers do not 
exceed the local speed limit. 
 
Additionally, Company B uses satellite tracking to monitor driving hours and breaks, 
due to the short lengths between satellite ‘snap-shots’. Thus, it is possible to detect, within 
approximately five to 10 minutes of accuracy, how long a truck has travelled without a break. 
Whilst driving hours and breaks are not consistently watched, it was stated that satellite 
tracking serves to confirm log book data on a semi-regular basis.  
 
– So from a management point of view if I'm there and I see he’s going too fast for the 
conditions as soon as it comes back into the range it’s a slap on the wrist, and “I’ll be 
watching you” again. (Company C Manager) 
We’ve had instances in the past where we’ve gone back through the Navman and checked 
on what drivers have put on their timesheet and their log book. Just to make sure that 
they’re not cheating the hours, make sure they’re taking their half-hour breaks when – 
But if there’s a speed, it can only tell you from point A to point B. During that time, at some 
period, he went over a hundred K’s or you can set it to wherever you want, you can set it at 
50 K’s, you can set it at 60 K’s, it’s up to you what you set it up. So I just have mine at a 
hundred K’s so anything over a hundred K’s it gives me a blip on it. If you’re on like a, say 
you’re on a designated road in a rural area say for instance and your guys are speeding 
down this road and you had a customer complaint, then you could set that road to 
whatever, 50 or 60 then you get the same readout that down this road during some point at 
some time, the truck was speeding. (Company B Branch Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 7: Study Three Results – The Organisation  181 
 
 
7.4.3.1.3. Paperwork audit 
The final form of monitoring used in each company was paperwork auditing. Drivers in 
each company complete regular paperwork, including log books and pre-trip inspections. 
Short distance drivers within Company A, must also complete a daily run sheet. Similarly, 
Company B drivers have additional forms for certain customers, such as declarations of 
fitness for duty. Each company regularly audits driver paperwork, and one Company A 
manager specifically stated that “every week I go through 15% of work diaries, 100% of pre-
trip inspections and I go through mass as well”.  
 
So...umm you know with the drivers, do everything as far as like the driving hours and all 
that, all by the law, by the book and we audit that... When the drivers fill in their audit 
checklist, we’ve got (staff member name) down the front there, he’ll actually go through 
and make sure all the numbers are checked, the dates are correct, the driving hours 
correct. Breaks have been taken, is the fitness for duty checked? So there’s a process in 
place that we do the following morning. So whatever happens today all happens yeah 
tomorrow... So a lot of the stuff that if a driver is actually doing something unsafe it’s 
probably something that they’re going against a procedure or policy, not so much umm I 
think it’s probably more just to cut corners. You know like it’s five o’clock in the afternoon, 
I’ve still got two deliveries, you know the mindset gets onto home time. So that’s why I talk 
about the influencing of the behaviours because we tell them that we’re going to audit  –  
– they’re due them. Because they can only work a maximum of six hours and they have to 
have a half hour break, we can use that... If a guy has had his engine turned on for 10 
hours straight and he’s driving well you know he hasn’t had his half-hour break. 
(Company B Operational Manager) 
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Through checking paper work, it is possible to identify unintentional non-compliance. 
Thus this serves as a useful tool in identifying a lack of understanding held by a driver. 
However, due to the ability to falsify paperwork, audits cannot easily detect deliberate 
breaches.  
7.4.3.2. Enforcement 
When a driver is found to breach organisational policies and procedures, they may be 
subjected to penalties. Despite the severity of punishment depending on the breach, the same 
general process was followed by managers of each company. This section details the specific 
approach taken to enforcement within the studied companies for the purpose of detailing the 
organisational context surrounding drivers. 
Typically, if a minor breach of policy or moderately risky behaviour is detected, the 
driver will be counselled. This serves to alert the driver to the fact they have been detected, 
and reminds them about correct behaviour and how to behave differently in future. 
 
– them the next day. So we’ll find out what ...where they’ve gone wrong if they’ve gone 
away from the procedures through our auditing process. (Company B Branch Manager 
Five) 
I can think of one guy that we sat down with a couple of years ago and straightened him 
out and there hasn’t been an issue with him since then...That one came about from just 
watching the guy on Navman and realising that he was up to his five hours and then his five 
and a half and then six hours and he still hadn’t stopped for a break so I just kept watching 
him and he exceeded the amount of time he was allowed to work without having a break, 
you could see that on Navman. And that’s just simply what alerted me to him was watching 
him from that point of view. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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In Companies A and C, non-conformance slips are used to inform the driver of the 
correct behaviour. Essentially, a non-conformance slip is a warning stating the incorrect 
behaviour, the punishment to be received, and the organisation’s expectations for future 
behaviour.  
 
Non-conformance slips serve a number of purposes. First, non-conformance slips notify 
the driver that their behaviour has been detected. Second, it reminds the driver that this 
behaviour is not accepted by their organisation. Third, it offers a form of retraining simply by 
indicating what should be done in future. Additionally, however, receiving a non-
conformance slip provides the individual and the organisation a chance to discuss the issue in 
question, which may lead to retraining. 
 
Yeah not taking proper breaks is different again because that’s a little bit more serious. So 
the short-term fix for that would be they receive the non-conformance and ops will talk 
them through that and we ask them if they want further training around that area. The 
long-term fix is that if it happens again they don't have the option, we will retrain them, so 
yeah that’s an example of that. (Company A Manager Two) 
And the non-conformance itself has on it, similar thing again, is it maintenance, fatigue, 
what is the short-term fix, what is the long-term fix and the drivers have to sign off on the 
short-term and the long-term fix. And then there’s an area on there that if they don't agree 
with a non-conformance or if there was extenuating circumstances they can fill that in and 
then it gives either (OH&S officer), myself or the general manager the ability to withdraw 
the non-conformance from the system and that has happened. (Company A Manager Two) 
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Company C have only recently introduced a non-conformance system. It was noted that 
non-conformances serve as a reminder to the staff member of the behaviour they are required 
to complete and an indication that they have in some way failed to meet their requirements. 
Thus, their systems aligns with that of Company A and B. However, according to the 
company’s compliance officer, at the time of investigation they had yet to issue a non-
conformance to any drivers.  
In the event of a more serious offence, or a repeat offence, a driver may receive a 
written warning. This warning again will indicate the policy or procedure breached, the 
expected future behaviour, and that further breaches in the policy may result in termination of 
employment.  
 
Well before backing OH&S we just occasionally mention to them like watch your speed and 
then if the OH&S person or senior manager wants to take it further then they pass it on to 
me and you know formally warn them in the way of a written letter or a non-conformance. 
We’re pretty big on non-conformances just to let them know that they’ve done wrong and 
counsel them if need to be counselled. Like continuously running off of hills. You know 
they’ve got to be pulled back into line and say hey no, you can’t do that. (Company A 
Operations Staff Member) 
 
It’s the only way I'm going to be able to do it because then if it’s there in writing they initial 
the bottom of every page and sign the back, that’s my arse covered. And it means I can go 
down and say to them, you understand this, you signed this piece of paper that says you 
understand this, why aren’t you doing it? And give them a non-compliance. (Company C 
Compliance Officer) 
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Finally, if the behaviour is deemed to be extremely dangerous, or a written warning has 
already been issued, the individual may be recommended for immediate dismissal.  
 
Main thing would be if we get ...finding out about that. If a customer rings or severity there 
of it. So we’d certainly be, we would have a sit down chat with him, we’d always make sure 
that there’s at least two of the supervisors in the discussion. Then mainly the supervisor 
that they have, if it’s day shift or night shift. They’d be cautioned with it and we’d take a 
note of that, basically if we saw that happen again then they would be given a written letter 
or warning and depending on the severity of whatever that safety situation might be we 
may pursue that. You know we would go down the road of a termination. (Company B 
Branch Manager Three) 
 
 
Well it depends on what it was for right? Say for argument’s sake I saw you jumping off the 
truck incorrectly right. I’d say look explain to you why you didn’t have to do it right. But 
then if I saw you doing it another time I’d probably remind you and say for argument’s 
sake if I saw you doing it a third time I’d put it in writing and just say you know this is what 
I saw you do. This is what’s going to happen and then if I see you do it again we’ll escalate 
it to a first and final warning letter. So that’s like getting three warnings before you get 
fired. Now say for argument’s sake I saw a bloke standing on top of a truck right? He’d be 
told to get down straight away, he would get a first warning letter straight away because 
you know the situation is so much more dangerous and I’d say for argument’s sake  he’d 
have been you know really silly up there I’d go and see the boss and I’d recommend 
termination. Yeah. So that’s the... you know of course at the end of the day we’re serious 
about safety. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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7.4.3.2.1. Summary: Policy monitoring and enforcement 
The above discussion outlined the specific approaches taken towards policy monitoring 
and enforcement within each company. For company policies to influence behaviour it is 
necessary for breaches to be detected and punished. Not all breaches can easily be detected 
by transport organisations. Nonetheless, each studied company uses a number of monitoring 
approaches including feedback, satellite tracking, and paperwork auditing. Minor breaches in 
policies and procedures are typically used to train the individual. More serious incidents, 
however, may have employment consequences, thus deterring repeated behaviour. 
7.4.3.3. Company B specific: Culture shaping 
Uniquely, Company B managers regularly indicated that they deliberately attempt to 
shape the culture of the organisation and groups with whom the drivers of Company B 
interact. Whilst this discussion is inherently about culture, the relevance of this information to 
the current research relates to the specific actions taken by management and not the reasons 
or rationale behind these actions. The following discussion highlights specific practices used 
I suppose the worst or one of the most extreme situations is if we’ve had a driver that will 
not follow our safety procedures, they’ll be counselled, if their performance doesn’t 
improve the worse thing is they’ll be dismissed. We’ve done that on a couple of occasions 
where drivers have repeatedly broken our safety requirements, and it’s got to be a 
significant incident or incidents before we take those extreme measures but we will if we 
think ongoing, the guy has got you know...some drivers I suppose you know I’ve always 
done it this way, she’ll be right mate, that style of thing. We don't condone that you know if 
it’s...if they’re under.... involved in any issues that could involve safety of the public or 
themselves. Certainly discussion, counselling, if all else fails dismissal.  So yeah safety is 
probably at the forefront of what we do. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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by Company B managers which form an important component of the organisational context 
surrounding drivers. 
Managers often stated that they try to ‘shape the culture’, though typically this phrase 
was somewhat interchangeable with influencing a certain behaviour, as culture appeared to 
be described as patterns of behaviour. The primary means to shape culture used within 
Company B were ensuring a high level of homogeneity within the company, creating habitual 
behaviour patterns, setting examples of positive behaviour, raising awareness of safety, and 
reducing the sense of invulnerability to incidents. Managers appeared to believe that cultural 
shaping was dynamic and requires constant maintenance, as people will resort to old patterns 
of behaviour and thinking. Thus their concept of shaping culture aligned with the literature 
which suggests that culture can be difficult to change, or that true change may not be 
possible.  
 
 Managers of Company B highlighted homogeneity within the organisation as a key for 
maintaining a good culture, again typically meaning patterns of positive safety behaviour. In 
the past, some branches of Company B reportedly exhibited significant variance to the 
remainder of the company, leading to a higher risk of incidents and injury. Managers 
perceived that unless there is consistency across Company B, upper management cannot 
accurately assess safety and reduce incidents. In order to solve this problem, Company B 
Needs to be driven though still by the management. If you back off a bit the guys start to 
probably get back into the old routine. So you constantly need to be reviewing what they’re 
doing. If they’re not doing something right you know you broach that with them. We had a 
toolbox meeting with a group of them, pulling the guys aside off our driver trainer, might 
see someone they’re probably not doing it the best way. Well then (name) allocates them 
time and do refresher training with them. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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promoted a driver trainer from serving one depot to oversee the training needs of the entire 
company and examine safety across the company. 
 
Company B managers also often indicated the need to set positive examples. Thus, like 
the common phrase of safety culture as ‘the way we do things around here’, Company B 
seeks to show drivers the correct way to act through constant training and reminders. 
 
I think generally everyone that works in (Company B) is pretty intelligent and is all striving 
for the right thing. You know there’s the old guys that have been here for 20 to 30 years 
and who are taught how to do things for yourself because in those days there was no 
communication if you broke down in the middle of the highway somewhere, you didn’t  –  
He got promoted down to there and he’s now sort of implementing what we’ve got here into 
other centres. Whether or not we’re better or worse off than other sites really couldn’t 
answer it because I’ve never really gone to those sites, but I do feel that I know when I talk 
to the drivers now that that gap has closed up to where the standards are a bit more gelled 
I suppose. Like before it used to be like I used to get a driver to come up from here and 
mate it was sort of like eyes wide opened like “holy shit... I didn’t know I had to wear high 
viz” or “I didn’t know I had to do this”, you know. And it’s just because they’re used to 
being away from a site that’s so heavily focussed on safety. Now it’s not a problem... It took 
a while to implement and I think the link was (name), you know like they needed somebody 
like (name) in that role to bring it all together. It was all there on paper, it just needed 
somebody to be saying hey that doesn’t look right or it just needed that fine tuning... Like it 
wasn’t just somebody come in for two days and said this is now what we’ve got to make 
changes to. He understood the business as a driver, as a manager, he looked at it from, like 
similar to what you’re doing now, you know going through the managers, go through the 
drivers and getting that right balance I think mate. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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To further facilitate this approach, the company newsletter often provides stories of 
correct behaviour to be modelled. For example, one driver made a poor decision resulting in 
damage to company property, however, they then went to great lengths to rectify the problem 
and this behaviour was included in the organisation’s newsletter. 
 
– have a mobile phone. You couldn’t ring up someone and say come and fix me, you had to 
do it yourself. Whereas the newer breed of guys don’t have that training because they’re 
used to modern technology. Some guys don’t allow drivers to change a flat tyre. So that’s 
the sort of breed of person you’re getting coming through. But it’s always a case of just 
teaching them the (Company B) way and not the way they’ve come in with bad habits. And 
I think people come to realise from the way we run our business is that we don’t do things 
illegally and people appreciate that. (Company B Operational Manager) 
 
I think another hazard is the mentality of people, of the drivers when they’re out of the 
depot is they revert back to old ways. So they’ll take off all their high vis, they’ll walk 
around in thongs, they’ll put on their stubbies, they’ll smoke, they’ll eat and drive, do all of 
those things where we’ve got very clear procedures, but how do you monitor that? Really 
hard to monitor, because you’re not sitting out the back of woop woop watching them. So 
some of the ways that we reduce those risks is a lot in the culture. So a new focus is a 
cultural behavioural shift, is people just behaving in a way that is safety related so that it 
becomes a behaviour, that it will be done regardless of whether you’re being seen or not 
being seen. (Company B Director) 
 
I’ve got a driver recently, he parked his truck and went in for a break at a service station 
and he parked it just outside the service station on (road name). When he came back, he 
didn’t notice the damage but he noticed a car off to the side. He drove back to the yard and 
then when he got to the yard he noticed his vehicle had been damaged. And he came back –  
Chapter 7: Study Three Results – The Organisation  190 
 
 
Finally, Company B management seek to shape culture through constantly raising 
awareness of safety and increasing the perceived risks of incidents. As discussed in section 
7.3.4.2, Company B uses SORs to maintain safety consciousness. Though this was discussed 
as an aspect of toolbox training, at its core this is an attempt to maintain awareness and shape 
culture. 
 
SORs mightn’t have anything to do with the transport industry but we still bring that up at 
the meeting. You know there’s the man that fell off that building in Ipswich a couple of 
weeks ago, that will be brought up. It’s more to sort of try and keep them focussed on 
safety. As I keep telling them I want to go home the same way I come to work except dirtier. 
(Company B Region Manager Two) 
– up, he actually parked it and went “well this is wrong”, took photos of that and went 
back up to the scene and found the car and found that it’d been like, someone had stolen a 
car and careered off the road and hit our truck, they took it off then took the plates and 
ran... the police were called, he made sure he called the office and he got (the Director), he 
came and looked and took all the pictures... So a couple of good things about that which I 
asked the driver could he write a story about it so we could publish it in the newsletter... 
this is the sort of behaviour I would like other drivers to hear about... He went above and 
beyond by, fair enough he didn’t see the damage at the time but he made the effort to come 
back. He knew where it was, he knew where it happened and he came back. He took 
pictures and he called somebody... I guess the not so good thing about his behaviour was 
he didn’t need to stop there for a break... He stopped because apparently a mate was there 
and he was going to go and see him, so he went to see his mate. So he did that, rather than 
take the truck the 15 minutes back to the depot... So he’s put a $250,000 piece of machinery 
at risk because of convenience to meet a friend, and that mentality isn’t a good thing to 
publicise. So he’s halfway there, but he’s halfway... so I asked him to, you know I think it’s 
important to communicate good behaviours, not just punish bad ones. You can’t just go and 
reprimand people for bad behaviours but you have to go and, let’s highlight and celebrate 
the good things. While we’ve had damage to our vehicle, the behaviour of this person and 
how they’ve gone and taken ownership and really been committed to trying to get the best 
outcome for the company at that point in time, applaud. Thank you very much. (Company B 
Director) 
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Additionally, one Company B depot uses trailer placards aimed at raising awareness of 
safety in drivers, customers and members of the general public. These placards included 
simple messages reminding unloaders to be aware of the location of the driver and broader 
statements such as that the driver is also a father. Whilst it was recognised that the placards 
could seem ‘silly’, it was argued that even the act of reading and criticising the placard can 
result in discussion which may be effective in shaping attitudes. 
 
It’s all about how people perceive the truck driver. What we’re trying to get out of it, 
especially on the road, that everyone sees a truck driver as a maniac, you know, he’s going 
to cut me off and all that. In some cases drivers are saying they cut somebody off because 
they wanted to cut somebody off, they’ve got a family as well is what we’re trying to 
promote. We’ve also got over there is ‘where is the driver standing?’ so can you see the 
driver? We’ve had quite a few near misses across the business, not saying directly through 
(Company B) but through (steel customer) when forklift unloading and, you know, the 
packs have fallen off. So we try to put magnets up on the side of the truck without us 
standing beside them and saying you know can you see the driver, we’ve got these – 
I think we’ve been able to develop a culture in a couple of those sites where the guys 
actually now think all the time about safety because we’ve been able to show them what 
happens if they don't through our customer sends us anything that they get nationally, any 
significant safety occurrences. We’ll then feed it back to our guys, look what happened in 
Victoria, look what happened in NSW, beware of this when you’re doing it. So I suppose 
it’s constant communication, referring back to the safety. The drivers see us working on 
our load restraint or umm trailer design or vehicle design and training safety training.  
With that event you know you start to develop that safety consciousness because you’re 
always talking about it. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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The belief that incidents ‘won’t happen to me’ poses a significant safety risk and 
managers indicated that they also try to change this belief. This is particularly relevant for 
drivers who have worked for a long time without having an incident. Drivers were argued to 
need to believe that the job they are doing can lead to injury (see also section 9.3.1).  
 
Company B seeks to develop a sense of vulnerability to injury and incidents through 
training and general conversations. Thus, they aim to produce a culture which is constantly 
seeking to reduce the risk of injury. 
But no, no I suppose it’s just a matter of talking to the drivers to get, you know, their beliefs 
in safety. That’s, I think, that’s the underlying fact that the driver has got to have a sincere 
belief that whatever they do when they’re at work can result in them hurting themselves. So 
consequently they need to have that safety focus at all times. But also at the same time 
they’ve got to balance that with getting the product delivered and ensuring the customer is 
happy and ensuring our customer is also satisfied they’ve done their job properly. 
(Company B Region Manager One) 
 
– magnets up so they can read it. And it sort of, and some customers take it as a bit of a 
joke, but even while they’re taking it as a joke they’re still reading it and they’re still 
talking about it. So that interaction is still happening. So we’re influencing that type of 
behaviour. I think I talked to you before about you know what we try to do as far as safety, 
ear plugs and all that. We try to get all our guys, super, advisors, managers, whoever 
comes here on site, to be dressed ready to, you know, we don't try to cut any corners with 
safety. So if I'm seen to be wearing the right gear, like don't necessarily need to be wearing 
high vis all the time but I do because I want my drivers to see that well if he’s wearing it 
then I should wear it. So they’re the type of things that we really try to influence with the 
behaviour. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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7.5. SUMMARY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE ORGANISATION ON SAFETY 
The purpose of this chapter was to detail the organisational context within which 
drivers operate. There were a number of similarities between each of the studied 
organisations. Each organisation used a number of employee management strategies which 
provide the foundation for the work which is conducted by drivers. These strategies included 
recruitment, probationary periods, initial training and inductions, ongoing training, rostering, 
and payment. Whilst the companies differed in the exact use of these strategies, these 
strategies essentially determine who is permitted to drive a heavy vehicle, how much 
education they receive, when they are permitted to drive and what monetary incentive they 
receive. Similarly, each organisation used specific safety management strategies including 
regular communication with drivers, providing a safe working environment with 
technological or material safety, and the monitoring and enforcement of policies and 
procedure. 
In terms of the current safety culture framework, these organisational strategies serve as 
significant contextual factors which, together with broader contextual factors (see Chapter 8) 
and cultural factors (see Chapter 9), shape safety-related behaviours (see Chapter 10) and 
therefore outcomes. It is worth noting, however, that this information could also be 
It’s an aging industry too … and I’ve found in my time is that the older ones, and we 
touched on it before, is I’ve been doing it for 30 years. That umm is something that I try to 
change very quickly whenever I’ve become a manager in a certain contract or whatever it 
may be. Because those type of guys, they’re the risks to me, you know, those ones have 
never had the incidents and never done this and do everything right, they’re still a risk... So 
that’s where I suppose my involvement is as we try and give that feedback to the drivers or 
influence those behaviours to keep them focussed on the point mate, which is come home 
safe. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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interpreted through the normative conceptualisation of safety culture. The normative 
conceptualisation typically examines organisational structures and systems, comparing them 
to a predetermined set of best practices. Given the lack of previous safety culture research on 
the heavy vehicle industry, it is unclear what these best practices may be. Nonetheless, 
Company B appeared to have a stronger safety standard than companies A and C. Thus, it 
would appear that Company B could serve as an exemplar organisation for other transport 
companies to model. The next chapter details the broader contextual factors identified in 
Study Three.
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Chapter 8: Study Three Results Part II – Contextual Influences on Safety  
 
 
 
 
8.1. CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON SAFETY 
Study Three consisted of a series of three case studies with transport organisations. 
During these case studies, observations of drivers and interviews with organisational staff and 
drivers were conducted. In addition to the factors related to the organisation (see Chapter 7), 
a number of other contextual factors on safety were identified throughout the case studies. 
These factors were categorised according to their source, ranging from abstract concepts such 
as the influence of national and global climate, to more concrete concepts such as 
government enforcement. Whilst the effects of each factor at times differed for drivers from 
each company, the factors were fairly consistent across organisations. The following chapter 
discusses the following contextual influences which were identified in the case studies: (1) 
the influence of national and global climate; (2) government departments and enforcement; 
(3) the general public; (4) the customer; (5) accreditation schemes; (6) the broader industry; 
and (7) environmental and situational factors.
As with Chapter 7, the purpose of this chapter is to detail specific contextual factors 
surrounding drivers. As stated in section 2.3.5, the synthesised conceptualisation holds that 
safety outcomes are the result of behaviours which are influenced by both culture and specific 
contextual factors. Thus, in order to address the aim of explaining how culture and context 
influence behaviour, it is necessary to provide a detailed account of the context surrounding 
Chapter Focus 
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the driver and organisation. This context interacts with the culture of drivers (described in 
Chapter 9) to influence safety-related behaviours (see Chapter 10 for a discussion of how 
these factors influence behaviour). Whilst many of the themes regarding contextual factors 
are naturally influenced by the culture and individual attitudes of respondents, this chapter 
seeks to outline the specific structures and systems present within and around the industry. 
Thus, though inferences regarding the culture of drivers or managers could be made from 
many participant comments seen in this chapter, this is not the purpose of the current chapter. 
8.2. THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 
The majority of factors identified within the case studies have a specific and direct 
effect on safety, through either the drivers or organisation. There were, however, a number of 
broader influences on safety, originating at a national or global level, which had a more 
indirect impact on safety. These included the effect of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
(GFC), the heavy vehicle industry driver shortage, and the effect of national cultural 
influences. Due to the abstract manner in which these factors were said to influence safety, 
they were more likely to be identified by upper management. Thus, there was a deficit in the 
depth and quantity of information obtained. Nonetheless, it is important to be aware of the 
effect of these factors on safety. Each of these contextual factors is outlined below. 
8.2.1. The Global Financial Crisis  
The GFC received significant public attention and had widespread impacts. The heavy 
vehicle industry was significantly affected by the GFC, through increased financial pressure 
on trucking companies, due to decreased spending by the general population, fewer goods to 
transport and increased competition. This financial pressure resulted in an increased 
motivation to cut corners regarding the implementation of safety. Similarly, Company A and 
B were required to make financial decisions to reduce this pressure. 
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When combined with other catalysts, such as the Queensland floods between December 
2010 and January 2011, this increased financial pressure led many transport companies to 
close. Whilst this increased the available workload, many organisations still face difficulties 
with the additional driver shortage. 
 
8.2.2. The driver shortage 
It is common place within the industry to hear of the “driver shortage” that has been 
experienced in recent years. As stated in section 7.3.1.1, the additional workload and shortage 
of drivers has led Company A to loosen previous recruitment standards. One influence said to 
contribute to the driver shortage is the mining boom. One Company A manager indicated that 
Oh yeah, with the GFC there’s less and less transport companies out there so the work is 
out there and continually we don't even have to look for work, we’re getting phone calls all 
the time can you do this? Can you do this? And we’ve got the equipment sitting here and 
we can’t get drivers. So it’s hard yeah. (Company A Manager Two) 
Because of the global downturn the work has dropped a lot... it’s the same amount of work 
but smaller loads... so they are cutting down with the business and a lot of drivers are 
scared that when it gets busy again we won’t be able to make it. Just recently they got rid 
of two prime movers, two trailers and a body truck... they got rid of them on the Friday and 
needed them on the Tuesday. (Company B Driver One) 
 
And we are looking at an idea of giving drivers say a thousand dollar bonus every year but 
it works backwards. Every time they get a non-conformance they lose $10 or something off 
that bonus… but again yeah with the GFC and everything it’s been tough so that hasn’t 
been implemented but that’s where we want to head. So hopefully things will pick up soon. 
(Company A Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 198 
 
even with the loss of many transport companies, the mining industry, through offering better 
pay, hires many of the transport workers who have lost their past employment.  
 
Additionally, the lack of formal recognition and training for heavy vehicle driving as a 
skilled labour was argued to contribute to the driver shortage. In the past, drivers would often 
have children or offsiders present with them as they worked, which served as an informal 
introduction to the industry. However, due to the effects of insurance agencies and workplace 
legislations, this practice no longer occurs. Additionally, many insurance companies either 
refuse to insure heavy vehicle drivers under 25 years of age, or require significantly increased 
premiums. Given the low profit margin of the industry, many transport companies are 
unwilling to employ younger drivers and by the time a potential driver reaches an age at 
which they will receive work they may have pursued a different career. Whilst this is an 
industry concern, it was suggested that, if external bodies could provide recognised training, 
the number of people entering the industry could increase and ultimately increase competence 
and safety. 
 
...if we start at the schools I think programs that the government has need to be tweaked a 
little bit more to have the task of driving be considered a trade. Not an occupation, it’s a 
trade like a mechanic. To get to the class of heavy vehicle operator, you start at high 
school where people can do a trade or an apprenticeship on it, not a traineeship but an 
apprenticeship where they’re being an offsider, they’re getting their licences out of –  
No the mines have made that so bad. So bad because I mean we’ve had some of our long-
term drivers leave... one of them as an example, he earned probably take home about 
$1200 a week for his work and he chose to not do five days but he’s taking home over 
$2000 a week and you just can’t compete with that. And I think he said he’s two weeks on 
two weeks off so he’s only working six months of the year...  (Company A Manager Two) 
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8.2.3. The effect of national culture  
In addition to the specific pressures exerted upon the industry, the national culture can 
influence safety. Though only discussed by a small selection of participants, it was indicated 
that safety beliefs and values originate long before entering the workforce. The primary 
sources of these values were alleged to be public media and early life experiences. Even 
seemingly harmless activities were argued to build a dangerous culture – for example, 
watching television entertainment programs portraying a lack of compliance to safety 
principles. Whilst the previous example may be extreme, it was suggested by members of 
Company A that teaching safety is not solely the responsibility of the organisation. 
 
 
 
The other thing that I think is very valid right? Have you ever watched ... renovation 
programs and so forth on TV? ... have you ever noticed that they all run through the 
warehouse? Right? Have you ever noticed that some of the times... they were working off 
ladders without three points of contact? … sometimes their scaffolding isn’t erected 
correctly? ... Why don't we talk to these people you know and with regards to attitude and 
mind set and everything else. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
 
– school, as long as they’re competent and driving the right class and insurances support 
that and all those things come into place that you’ll have a 24 or 23-year-old that is going 
to be a competent HR, HC driver and we’ve got more people in the industry but we’re 
going to get more people, the bigger the pool which means the higher the competence 
rates. If we’ve only got a very small pool, we’ve got, we’re digging the dregs of the barrel 
and we’re going to fight a losing battle to ever get a smarter operator out there that can 
replicate these behaviours. (Company B Director) 
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8.2.4. Summary: The influence of national and global climate 
The above discussion outlined a number of contextual influences originating from a 
national or global level. The global and national climate can have a direct and indirect effect 
on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. Recent economic conditions have placed considerable 
financial pressure on organisations. Additionally, the shortage of workers available for the 
industry increases pressure to hire drivers who would otherwise be deemed unsafe. Finally, 
national cultural variables may shape the culture of the workforce. Despite being seemingly 
removed from the daily activities of truck drivers, these factors highlight that the heavy 
vehicle industry does not operate in isolation from this broader climate.  
8.3. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT 
There are a number of government bodies which have an influence on safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry. Though the manner in which safety is influenced differs between 
departments, they primarily exert influence through policy enforcement. Thus these bodies 
largely serve to deter unsafe behaviour. The specific bodies identified in Study Three were 
the Fair Work Ombudsman, workplace health and safety branches, WorkCover, transport 
departments, police, animal welfare and the RSPCA. Prior to discussing the role of each 
department, two general factors will be discussed. First, though specific policies and 
enforcement are discussed in relation to behaviour in Chapter 10, chain of responsibility 
legislation will be discussed here due to its influence over many types of behaviour. Second, 
it is worth noting that enforcement on organisations may lead to an effort to appear safe, 
rather than actually reduce safety outcomes. The discussion below outlines the specific 
factors which form the government context surrounding drivers and organisations. 
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8.3.1. Chain of responsibility legislation 
In 2005, the New South Wales and Victorian governments implemented chain of 
responsibility (COR) legislation, followed closely by the remainder of Australia. COR 
legislation states that any member of the supply chain (schedulers, packers, loaders, drivers, 
operators, receivers and employers or managers) can be held accountable for any action, 
inaction or demand they make which contributes to breaches in road safety. COR legislation 
is widely thought to have significantly impacted the industry, due to greater potential for 
punishment. 
 
The effect of COR legislation has been predominantly seen through transport 
organisations. One Company A driver stated that “if a driver says no, they can’t make you do 
it under COR” as “if they make them the company goes down big time”. Additionally, one 
Company A manager stated that, due to COR, the company now ensures drivers take the 
required rest breaks. Similarly, within Company B, one manager suggested COR has meant 
that he must make every effort to ensure that the correct processes and procedures are in 
place prior to sending a driver out on a job.  
Oh just everybody realises what the repercussions could be. I think there’s a lot more of a 
chase of it in the court system and you know a lot of the smaller transports and the way 
they went a lot of those have gone now because of that you know. There’s nowhere near as 
many, I don't know I suppose you’d call them backyarders in the game these days you 
know... Just you know I suppose the repercussions are now that there is jail time too I 
suppose, whereas everybody got a slap on the wrist for it many years ago. I suppose now 
there’s a bit more of a repercussion to it. (Company B Branch Manager Three) 
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COR was perceived to have had mixed results on customers. One Company A manager 
indicated that their major customer now require safety, as they are equally responsible under 
the law.  
 
Despite the positive impact of COR on some customers, it was often suggested that 
COR has failed to influence some customer behaviours, particularly delays which can 
contribute to fatigue and driving over hours. One Company B manager argued that the reason 
customers have been insufficiently effected by COR was a lack of education, although others 
suggested that some customers simply “look the other way”. Similarly, the manager of 
Company C noted that many livestock agents do not understand their obligations and in the 
past has contacted the local transport department who sent a representative to explain COR to 
an agent. 
We do a lot of work for them, we’re very closely monitored and essentially they even do 
their own audit on us every... every six or 12 months they audit us themselves. To make 
sure we’re not breaking the law because under chain of responsibility these days they’re in 
as much shit as we are because as the customer they’re seen to push us to do the job. So 
you know they watch us just as closely as anyone else watching us. (Company A Manager 
One) 
 
We enforce everybody take their legally required breaks, if you don’t you’re fired... and 
like I said, force blokes to have required breaks. Once upon a time all companies never 
used to do stuff like that but we now dismiss people if they don't because it’s just too much 
of a risk if something goes wrong. Yeah it’s a lot of trouble coming. (Company A Manager 
One) 
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Whilst COR has significantly influenced safety within the industry, this influence has 
yet to extend throughout the supply chain. This may be due to the number of customers and 
stakeholders within the industry. Thus, the industry is often required to educate their 
customers about COR.  
8.3.2. The paperwork trail 
A number of case study participants indicated that enforcement targeted at 
organisations typically lead to a paperwork trail, rather than organisational changes. Whilst 
this theme is inherently influenced by the culture and individual attitudes of respondents, as 
Yeah so basically that’s the story for us.  Agents, to be honest with you agents are the 
biggest problem. They expect more and think they’re exempt from lots of things. Like chain 
of responsibility etc you know we need you to be, or they’ll ring at eight o’clock  tonight 
and want you somewhere that’s quite impossible at six o’clock in the morning and not get 
their head around the fact that there are other issues. We’ve had boys working in the shed 
here all day. They can’t just get in the truck and be there tomorrow morning, that’s just not 
how it works. So convincing them of their responsibilities is very difficult. Some of them are 
fine and some of them have respect for who we are and what we do because they’re, when 
we started they were in nappies. So there’s that oh okay well we expect that some of them 
are not...some of them will never be... Yeah so we did get them in... my understanding is 
that they... and this is quite some time ago, had a bit of a talk to the agents and the 
graziers. But I think at the end of the day there’s got to be more education of those people 
and it’s not all about the truck driver. You can’t just put them on and say to the driver you 
need to be somewhere, they’ve got to take responsibility. And until somebody gets 
prosecuted and umm and convicted nothing is going to change because why would it? 
(Company C Manager) 
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the current research focuses on the culture of drivers, rather than organisational staff, it is 
important to recognise the manner in which government policies influence the organisation 
and are presented to drivers. Drivers often noted that organisational policies are put in place 
primarily to “cover their arses”. Whilst organisational staff at Company A did not use this 
wording, they did indicate that some policies were aimed at reducing the risk of punishment 
despite no perceived safety benefit. For example, it was stated that whilst the methods of 
training and policies have not changed an additional paperwork trail is needed as evidence in 
case an incident occurs. 
 
As stated by the compliance officer of Company C, whilst the company complies with 
the laws to the best of their ability, his role was “just proving that we’re doing the right thing, 
and that the men are doing the right thing and that’s all, all the Is are dotted and the Ts are 
crossed”. It was argued that the sole purpose of this was to ensure that “when that auditor 
comes in, or when the department comes in and has a look at the paperwork it’s all there, 
[the drivers] don't get fined, nobody loses points”. Thus, rather than organisations using 
policies to improve safety, they are often simply an effort to provide evidence of already 
occurring behaviour. 
 
 
And one bloke climbed up and fell and because we didn’t give him a letter to say hey don't 
climb up the fucking trailer it cost us a lot of money and a lot of trouble... we had gone 
through the whole don't do it, don't do it, don't do it. So we got in the least amount of 
trouble but we still got in a lot of fucking trouble for it. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Yeah when it goes wrong that’s when you’ve got to have a bit of paper. You know I just 
don't get it; I don't get the whole shooting match. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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8.3.3. The Fair Work Ombudsman.  
The Fair Work Ombudsman is a regulatory body put in place to ensure that 
organisations comply with commonwealth workplace laws, investigating issues such as 
payment of employees, unfair dismissal and mistreatment of employees. Thus the 
ombudsman acts as a check to ensure that individuals are not forced to comply with 
unreasonable demands by the organisation. As this body was only discussed by members of 
Company A it is unlikely that they play a major role in safety within the industry. 
Nonetheless, due to the existence of pressures within the industry, the Fair Work 
Ombudsman gives truck drivers an option if they feel pressured into unsafe working 
conditions. Thus, it is important to recognise the Fair Work Ombudsman as another 
contextual influence surrounding the industry. Organisational staff members from Company 
A indicated that the Fair Work Ombudsman has investigated their organisation on a number 
of occasions. 
 
Additionally, one Company A driver indicated previous experience with unfair 
dismissals, stating that a previous employer had tried to force them to drive a vehicle with 
bald tyres. After refusing to drive the truck the driver was fired. The driver then stated that “if 
they sack you for not doing something you can’t do you can get them for unfair dismissal”. 
 
 
It’s a really interesting thing because we put, and even when we were audited, we got 
audited by the workplace ombudsman and we do on a regular basis, as people leave and 
they’re not happy or whatever. And they’ve never found anything but they cannot believe 
that we put our drivers on permanently because they said the majority of transport 
companies have their drivers as casuals not permanents. (Company A Manager Two) 
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8.3.4. Workplace Health and Safety and WorkCover 
Workplace Health and Safety branches play a major role in policy making and 
enforcement within the industry. Members of the case study organisations did not discuss the 
role of workplace health and safety branches directly, however, they did emphasise the role 
of workers compensation, or WorkCover. Given the close relationship between WorkCover 
and workplace health and safety branches, and that compensation claims may lead to 
workplace health and safety department involvement, the influence of these two bodies 
overlap. The majority of information regarding these departments was drawn from a select 
few organisational staff members. However, this information source bias may reflect the role 
of these individuals, rather than discredit the information obtained. As the enforcement 
aspects of these bodies are exerted at an organisational level, managers and health and safety 
personnel are more likely to see them as relevant to safety within the industry. Additionally, a 
number of the provided quotes were drawn from a single manager who was very passionate 
and vocal about the issue. However, the same sentiments were expressed, albeit to a lesser 
extent, by many managers. Whilst the attitudes of respondents can be clearly seen to 
influence the themes identified, it is important to recognise that the purpose of this section is 
to detail the influence of WorkCover. This discussion does not seek to explain the culture of 
drivers, nor the attitudes of specific respondents. 
Similarly to insurance bodies, WorkCover requires organisations to pay a premium 
based upon a number of general factors, such as the size of the organisation and the average 
claim rate of the industry, in addition to an organisational safety record loading. 
 
Well when I first came here I thought we had heaps of accidents. When I looked at our 
insurance you know like annual reports and things it was like oh my God. Like seriously 
there are so many accidents. But then over time as I sit in on the meetings every time they 
come around to renew our insurances and stuff, this company is doing so well in –  
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In addition to regular premiums, in the event of an incident claim, the organisation is 
required to pay an excess, calculated upon factors including the usual salary the individual 
receives and the duration of lost work time. Further, if the organisation is found negligent, 
they may be at risk of fines or further payments. Thus, WorkCover serves to deter 
organisations from failing to provide a safe workplace, leading to changes in perceptions of 
acceptable behaviours. 
 
In addition to fines and punishments, an injured employee may choose to make a 
common law claim against the organisation. These claims provide further incentive to 
manage safety in the workplace. 
 
– comparison to most. And our premiums should actually be a lot lower but you know how 
they use industry premiums? (Company A Manager Two) 
 
And we had one WorkCover common law claim, like common law, which was just 
ridiculous and it cost this company, we paid $45,000 in our policy premiums though to this 
individual in lost salaries and things, well continuing their wages and that. When we in our 
minds thought this is not a genuine common law claim but what do you do? And yeah they 
threw it out and said you shouldn’t have even got $45,000 at common law yet WorkCover 
continued paying. And that was one incident and we’ve got another and it’s ongoing at the 
moment where yeah this guy again is claiming he’s like claiming a million dollars. 
(Company A Manager Two) 
 
And not only is it less safe than it was, it’s not less safe or anything it’s just the amount of 
trouble you get into stuff like that now closes your business down. You know just to take 
someone to hospital and give them some worker’s comp for a few weeks you know get tens 
or hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of fines and shit. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 208 
 
Due to these significant costs, Company A members indicated that they work closely 
with WorkCover to encourage rehabilitation of injured employees. Thus, whilst WorkCover 
primarily serves to deter injuries from occurring, they also assist in reducing the severity and 
duration of injuries. 
 
Despite the benefits of WorkCover and workplace health and safety branches, there 
were concerns raised by case study participants. First, it was often indicated that some 
individuals abuse the compensation system for monetary payouts.  
 
Depends on the person. You can generally pick them. I had one person who fell off the 
truck, the trailer and fractured his hip. Fifty per cent overall permanent impairment, can’t 
drive a truck today, has never gone common law. Could have gone to state claim and 
common law no worries, never gone common law because he felt supported through the 
process. He has a job that he still works around the heavy vehicle injury but he just said, 
I'm not that type of person. I don’t believe in that sort of system. I’ve got a payout that has 
been sufficient for me to do what I need to do for ongoing surgery because he needed a hip 
replacement in the end and that came out of a stat payment. He did all that, he’s happy. 
I’ve got somebody who has a small tear that was based on a pre-existing tear but they did 
it, the straw that broke the camel’s back was here. It’ll be in common law, no worries. 
They’ve already got their lawyers involved. That’s the first person they call after their 
injury is a lawyer and it’s flagged all over WorkCover. You see it coming a mile away 
because they just know they can get some money and they’re only after the money. I’ve got 
some people who we go through the whole process, they’re all wanting to get back to  –  
We try and work really closely with WorkCover to rehabilitate as quickly as possible not 
only for our financial gain… but paying some dude to do nothing for three weeks while 
we’re paying another dude to do his job. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 209 
 
 
Specific examples of working this system included claiming injuries which occurred at 
home as work injuries, and trying to achieve maximum payouts from minor injuries. 
 
– work and everything like that, all happy to then they know the system well enough to go 
can you give me a permanent impairment assessment and offer me a payout? And they’ll 
take that as well, they’ll go oh I’ll just take an extra fifteen, sixteen grand from this. That’s 
going to help me pay off my next car. I’ve got some people that use the system because they 
know they’ve got money and they’re not really going to need it going forward but they 
know they can get it. Got other people who don’t believe that they should milk the system 
like that then we have other injuries where people haven’t even, they don’t even think about 
it... They’ve focussed on the job rather than the injury. (Company B Director) 
 
You know we had a bloke the other day went to the doctor and got I’ve got a pain in my 
groin. Oh it’s a hernia.  Is it a work injury? ‘Yeah I done it at work’ (tone of voice used to 
indicate otherwise). All that dude has ever done since he’s worked here he gets in his truck 
goes to [customer depot], hooks up his trailers goes to Sydney unhooks them and goes to 
bed... All of a sudden you know we’ve caused his hernia. Turns out, we sent him to our 
doctor yesterday he doesn’t have a hernia he’s got a strained stomach muscle. That could 
happen from taking a crap mate; you know how does he put that down to being a work 
injury? The hardest thing he does is climb in his truck which is probably no taller than his 
front steps at home anyway. Unfortunately everyone knows now that you can get lots for a 
work injury... You know we had a bloke here who couldn’t come to work for a week and 
was having time off because he hurt his shoulder lifting a gate. That was awesome except 
the week before that he fell off a chair changing a light globe at home. Same injury. So he 
was just told to go to work or fuck off and work somewhere else. I'm not going to say 
people don't hurt themselves and then they deserve time off work. But if a bloke falls off a –  
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Whilst this may not directly influence safety within the industry, it may inflate injury 
statistics and results in increased premiums. 
 
Second, it was argued the organisation for which an individual works at a given point in 
time may receive increased payments for injuries which result from cumulative strain over a 
number of years. 
 
Finally, it was suggested that, due to the no fault system utilised by WorkCover, 
workers are encouraged to take little or no responsibility for their actions. This was suggested 
– chair changing a light globe at home and then comes to work the next day or the next 
week oh I hurt my shoulder lifting the gate. You know you want to belt their fucking head in 
because number one they’re lying straight to your face. You’re good enough to give them a 
job in the beginning. He’s lying to your face and he expects to get money for it that he 
doesn’t deserve. That’s fraud mate. But these blokes, you know, if I went to the bank and 
said my name’s [researcher’s name] I want to withdraw a thousand bucks I’d go to fucking 
jail for that.  But yet these blokes can make a false claim for injury and receive money for it 
and it’s just like yeah go back to work you’re not getting any more so they go back to work. 
What’s the difference? (Company A Manager One) 
 
We had a bloke working here for a few months, he only had one arm, he was diagnosed 
with carpel tunnel and had to have an operation so that goes on our WorkCover. You know 
that’s a lifetime of using one arm to do everything but he was working here when it 
happened and it cost us tens of thousands of dollars. (Company A Manager One) 
 
It’s another bloke that’s probably going to try and settle for a shitload of money because 
he’s just a fucking liar. Essentially he’s a liar but WorkCover’s no fault claim system 
means they just keep paying him anyway. And it just jacks up all of our policies in the long 
run. (Company A Manager One) 
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to lead to financial punishment on organisations even when an individual has shown blatant 
disregard for safety. 
 
Despite much of the information regarding WorkCover being presented negatively by 
members of Company A, it was noted that WorkCover can positively impact attitudes 
regarding safety. Due to the current level of premiums paid by Company A, improvements in 
safety can lead to a reduction in costs. Given safety is often seen as a cost, typically borne for 
moral reasons, the financial penalty for incidents can lead to viewing safety as having 
financial benefit. 
 
 
So there’s been a big shift in that focus and since we’ve done that even WorkCover have 
commented on you know how well things are travelling in terms of the way we’re 
managing our WorkCover so it’s been really good. And it’s also worked to influence 
management because our director can now see it is worth sending someone to the doctor 
for five hundred bucks to get specialist reports and whatever. In comparison to having you 
know hundreds of thousands of dollars of WorkCover premiums and stuff. So he can really 
see the benefit already and I think that’s pretty good for a, you know, maybe we’ve been 
doing it for about 12 months. (Company A Manager Two) 
 
It’s a no fault injury system right, so no one is ever at fault so therefore everyone is going to 
pay. And I think that’s widely spread throughout the whole issue. We’re in right across the 
board it doesn’t matter what industry you’re talking about is that there’s no blame placed 
on the individual. So it doesn’t matter if I train you today right and you are ...I train you 
tomorrow and on the third day you had an injury and I wasn’t there physically holding your 
hand, we are at fault. You need to place fault with the individual... people need to be 
accountable for their own actions (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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8.3.5. Police and transport departments 
Due to the vast amount of time heavy vehicle drivers spend on the road, enforcement of 
road laws by police and transport inspectors play a significant role in safety. There are a 
number of Australian government departments responsible for the enforcement of road laws, 
including police, the Department of Transport and Main Roads Queensland and the Roads 
and Traffic Authority in New South Wales. On road enforcement was seen by members of 
the case study organisations as strict. One Company A driver stated that “the authorities are 
pretty tight these days so you can’t do much”. Similarly, the manager-driver of Company C 
stated that “everything we do is done legitimately, as close as you can to being perfect 
because you’ve got to be” as “if you don't get in the shit today you’ll get in the shit 
tomorrow”. However, it was often noted that there is insufficient police enforcement on the 
roads. As stated by one Company C driver, “there’s not enough police on the roads, when I 
was a young fellow you couldn’t do anything without being pulled over”. Specific reference 
was made by case study participants regarding licensing, and fixed and mobile enforcement. 
Whilst the impact of specific laws and enforcement strategies is discussed in Chapter 10, a 
brief discussion of these common factors is provided below for the purpose of outlining the 
specific structures and systems related to police and transport inspectors, and the manner in 
which they influence the industry. Again the purpose of this section is not to interpret cultural 
factors or individual attitudes.  
8.3.5.1. Licensing  
Government departments responsible for the provision of licences are the first influence 
on road safety. Similarly to organisational recruitment, the licensing process determines who 
is allowed to become a heavy vehicle driver. Despite the benefits of licensing, a number of 
concerns were raised by members of Company B and C. Members of Company B indicated 
that the level of skill required for different heavy vehicle licences were insufficient. First, it 
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was indicated that driving tests are conducted in unrealistic conditions, particularly as the 
vehicle used is empty. As asked by one Company B driver, “what’s the use in going in an 
empty truck?” 
Second, members of Company B suggested that the current licensing brackets were too 
broad and easy to acquire. It was often argued that different vehicle types and loads require 
significantly different abilities. A driver may be competent for one type of vehicle, but hold 
licences for vehicle types they cannot safely operate. Similarly, drivers are not required to 
demonstrate advanced competency with existing licences prior to receiving a more advanced 
licence. Drivers are, therefore, permitted to shift to more dangerous vehicles without 
sufficient experience and ability. 
 
I have a lot of problems with people coming down with B-double licences and all this and 
they can’t drive a single trailer with steel. You know 25 tonne of steel on is a little bit 
different to handle on a trailer than 22 tonne of Weet-bix, do you know what I mean? It’s a 
whole different aspect you know. Especially when they’re about 20 metres and all that, 
because they’re long and they get trailers out 20 metres and they’re 3.2 wide, sometimes 
3.3...it’s a whole different ball game. Like we’ve had a lot of drivers come here with B-
double licences and couldn’t drive a body truck you know. I believe that goes back to the 
government. You can hold a HR (heavy rigid) licence in Queensland, go and pay $3000 to 
Major or whoever does B-double national, or whoever does that, of a weekend and come 
out a B-double driver. And yet you’ve never driven a trailer. Why’s that?  So I believe if 
you’re going to become a B-double driver in Queensland... you know it used to be in NSW, 
when I got my artic (‘articulated’) licence, you had to drive for years, as a 21-year-old, say 
I think it was three years before you could actually step up and go for your thing like that. 
And I believe you should have to drive a single trailer before you can sit for your –  
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Drivers from Company C also raised concerns about the licensing process. First, it was 
suggested that the difficulty of obtaining a licence was partly responsible for the shortage of 
drivers. Second, the absence of a requirement for knowledge about maintenance, despite 
requiring the same knowledge for a forklift ticket, was indicated to be dangerous due to the 
amount of time a truck driver may be alone on the road. 
8.3.5.2. On-road enforcement  
Once licensed and employed within the industry, drivers must adhere to road rules and 
laws. To enforce these policies, transport inspectors and police may fine drivers or even 
demerit their licence. As stated by one Company A driver, “when your whole career depends 
on your licence you don’t want to jeopardise it”.  
 
A number of weaknesses regarding enforcement were exposed by members of the 
participating organisations. Drivers often suggested that they have had little interaction with 
law enforcement on the road. One Company B driver even said that after years within the 
industry he had only been pulled over once by police and never at a weighbridge. Thus, the 
uncertainty of punishment may reduce the deterrence effect of road laws. This uncertainty is 
– B-double. Say two years, let’s say that...you can go from a HR pushing 12 to 14 tonne 
around to pushing 86... Friday afternoon you stop the truck and you’re pushing 12 tonne of 
steel. Monday morning you’re in a truck pushing 86 tonne of steel. What’s the go? Where’s 
the experience? (Company B Trainer One) 
 
Seat belt... mainly for the fines to be honest... if you get booked not wearing one you can’t 
bitch about it. I don’t wear it for safety coz I don’t believe it will help you, in a head on 
you’re stuffed anyway. You just leave it on ‘til they see it if you get pulled over. Even the 
safest things, you can have an argument about if they are safe, I just find it’s easier just to 
put the bastard on. (Company B Driver Three) 
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further increased by communication between drivers over UHF radio. Drivers typically 
inform one another of the location of enforcement, enabling adjusted behaviour in the 
presence of enforcement. For this reason, detection of speeding was a seen as unlucky. 
 
Nonetheless, the threat of fines and punishments is a significant deterrent for many 
drivers. Additionally, this deterrence can extend to organisational punishment, as fixed 
enforcement fines are typically sent to the organisation. Within Company B one driver 
reported that the company owner has stated that “if you got a speeding fine he takes it as an 
offence against the company”. Thus, through the combined efforts of organisations and 
enforcement, there is significant motivation for compliance. The two primary forms of on-
road enforcement are fixed enforcement sites and mobile or random enforcement.  
Drivers tend to know the location of each fixed enforcement site passed on regular 
journeys. Drivers regularly pointed out and discussed specific camera sites, including heavy 
vehicle access enforcement cameras, red light cameras and speed cameras. Thus, drivers are 
unlikely to be caught by fixed enforcement. Conversely, mobile enforcement has the benefit 
of detecting drivers at any location. It was often suggested that fatigue management and 
seatbelt non-compliance could result in fines if pulled over by police. Similarly, one 
Company B driver stated that “if you do take drugs you’re going to get caught, you see 
blitzes on the highway and now they’ve got the drug swabs”. Therefore, mobile enforcement 
has a greater deterrence effect on long-term behavioural patterns than merely controlling 
behaviour in set locations. 
Though conducted in specific locations, weighbridges serve as a form of random 
enforcement due to their irregular opening. A number of drivers for Company B said that 
I have had two speeding tickets from running off hills in the past seven months... just my 
bad luck that when I did it there was a cop down the bottom, plus I was on the wrong radio 
station so I didn’t hear about them. (Company A Driver Six) 
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they had never been pulled over at a weighbridge, yet that they ensured adequate load 
restraint because of the risk of being pulled over. Weighbridges primarily serve to check that 
vehicles have not been overloaded and that their load is adequately restrained. However, 
when a driver is pulled into a weighbridge it is typical for their work diary to also be checked 
to ensure the driver has adhered to fatigue management legislation. As both load restraint and 
fatigue management must be handled correctly from the onset of a journey, the effect of 
weighbridges is more similar to that of mobile enforcement in that the driver must be 
conducting the correct behaviour for the entirety of a journey to reduce risk of punishment. 
8.3.6. Animal welfare and the RSPCA 
The involvement of animal welfare and the RSPCA was specific to Company C. As 
Company C transports livestock, they must adhere to specific policies and laws governing the 
treatment of animals. Prior to discussing the influence of these groups on safety, it is 
important to note that Company C views such policies as requiring standards that the 
organisation already meets. For example, the manager-driver of Company C stated that “it’s 
straight forward mate, it’s what we do anyway”.  
Similarly to other government departments, the primary method through which these 
bodies influence safety is the enforcement of punishments for breaches of laws. Whilst the 
primary purpose of these rules is animal welfare, some policies such as those regarding the 
amount of time which an animal is allowed to stay on the truck also influence safety. It was 
stated by one Company C driver that “you can only have them on your deck for 36 hours”. 
This is further discussed in Chapter 10 (section 10.2.1), however, it is important to note that 
animal welfare issues appeared to take precedence over fatigue management laws, as the 
organisation is more likely to be punished for failing to abide by animal welfare issues.  
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8.3.7. Unique factors relating to government enforcement in Company B 
A number of differences regarding the influence of enforcement were identified 
between companies. Company B appeared to place a lower emphasis on government 
branches and their involvement in safety. This appeared to stem from a greater reliance on 
their own policies and procedures in managing safety. Whilst the differential effect of 
government enforcement on Company B is influenced by the attitudes of managers, it is 
important to recognise that the purpose of providing this discussion is to understand the 
influence of government enforcement on drivers. Thus, again this section will not seek to 
explain individual attitudes or culture. 
When discussing government policies, a number of organisational staff members 
suggested that Company B holds drivers to a higher standard than legally required. For 
example, Company B requires its drivers to restrain loads more securely than current 
legislation requires. 
 
I think the law is 80% restrain your load, but we do it 100% here. You know we go, we got 
20 tonne on, it’s five four tonne chains, simple as that. Whereas, elsewhere the law says 
you’ve only got to restrain 80%, so you can put four chains on, Okay? Restrain 16 tonne of 
it. (Company B Trainer One) 
 
I mean I think chain of responsibility for animal welfare and chain of responsibility for 
driving hours umm it’s easier for me to justify allowing them to go another half an hour or 
an hour. And I don't mean 24 hours a day, I just mean extra time to do what needs to be 
done. It’s easier for me to justify that from a driving hours point of view than it will be if we 
have a disaster and we’ve got cattle down and dead, simply because they couldn’t drive 
that extra hour to get them off. (Company C Manager) 
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Similarly, despite legally being able to work for up to 12 hours, Company B typically 
rosters drivers for 10-hour shifts. Additionally, rather than allowing delays to leave a driver 
stranded on the side of the road, Company B will send another vehicle with a spare driver to 
bring the stranded driver and vehicle home. Finally, Company B has a heavy haulage branch 
which carries many loads that require permits and pilot vehicles or police escorts. In the case 
of police-escorted vehicles, the immediate presence of police for the duration of the journey 
will significantly influence behaviour.  
 
8.3.8. Summary: Government departments and enforcement 
The above discussion outlined the specific contextual factors relating to government 
departments that influence members of the studied organisations. There are a number of 
government departments which have an influence on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. 
These departments focus on a variety of different safety issues ranging from fair work 
conditions to safe driving. These departments typically serve a deterrent effect through 
punishments of breaches. Additionally, COR legislation increases the risk of punishment for 
organisations and customers, thus increasing the attention they give to safety. Despite the 
If they go somewhere and get held up and they’re only allowed to drive 12 hours* or 
something like that and they’ve driven the 12 hours they have to stop. They call here, our 
night loader (name) organises a driver to go there and pick that truck up and drive home. 
We don’t let them drive over the designated hours that are allowed. So he’s done his 14 
hours* coming back from (location Name), you know he’s been up there, he got bogged or 
something, you know, whatever. And hasn’t had a rest, but soon as his hours are up he has 
to stop on the side of the road and ring (name) the night loader and then he organises a 
driver to go out and get that vehicle. (Company B Trainer One) 
*discrepancy in hours due to differences between BFM and standard hours 
–  
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benefits of enforcement, a number of weaknesses were identified, including organisations 
complying with policies in order to ‘cover their arse’ rather than improve safety, individuals 
falsely claiming on WorkCover and on-road enforcement being easily avoided by drivers. 
8.4. THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
Whilst driving a truck on Australian roads, drivers share the roads with members of the 
general public driving other vehicles. The following discussion outlines the specific impact of 
members of the general public on truck drivers. Again, this discussion does not seek to 
explain the culture of drivers, nor the attitudes of individual respondents. 
When asked what the major hazards faced by truck drivers are, the vast majority of 
members of all three companies indicated other vehicles as the primary concern. Managers 
and drivers consistently discussed the hazards related to members of the general public. First 
and foremost, other vehicles were stated to drive dangerously and could directly cause 
crashes which are unavoidable for the truck driver. Secondly, other vehicles can cause 
significant delays for truck drivers, which may lead to increased stress, frustration and 
fatigue. Ultimately, truck drivers are limited in their ability to control the hazards presented 
by other vehicles, however, they typically stressed the importance of maintaining a high level 
of awareness. 
 
“Other drivers are our biggest fear... You never know what they are going to do...You 
always have to be aware of what they could do.”  
(Company A Driver Three) 
 
“Our biggest problem is what cars are doing. Some of them have no fucking idea... My 
main concern is cars.”  
(Company B Driver Two) 
 
“Main hazards? ... cars mainly... people cutting across you, push bikes too you get them 
in town and along some of the highways and there is no room.”  
(Company B Driver Three) 
 
“Just cars really.”  
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8.4.1. Dangerous behaviours of other vehicles  
It was regularly indicated that the manner in which cars drive around trucks was 
dangerous and led to an increased risk of crashes. Despite this danger being commonly 
recognised by members of the industry, it was suggested that many regulatory officials 
neither believe members of the industry, nor recognise the severity of the problem. One 
Company C driver even suggested that he “would love to bring police on the road with [him] 
to show them”.  
Other vehicles were reported to drive dangerously fast, conduct illegal overtaking 
manoeuvres and jump in front of trucks within their stopping distance. As phrased by one 
Company B driver, you often “see vehicles that make you feel like you’re standing still”. 
During the observations in each case study, on multiple occasions car drivers were observed 
speeding around low visibility corners where trucks enter or exit depots. The truck drivers 
being observed in such instances showed significant concern, as they often were required to 
“Main hazards? ... cars mainly... people cutting across you, push bikes too you get them 
in town and along some of the highways and there is no room.”  
(Company B Driver Three) 
 
“Just cars really.”  
(Company B Driver Eight) 
 
“Other vehicles.”  
(Company C Manager) 
 
“Just other vehicles.”  
(Company C Manager/Driver) 
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begin manoeuvres in fear of a vehicle driving too fast to be able to stop without crashing into 
them. 
Drivers also often discussed patterns of weaving between lanes and overtaking trucks 
during turning or similar manoeuvres. One Company B driver stated that when reversing into 
depots, cars will often speed around the truck, whether due to impatience or a belief that they 
could pass the truck without posing a significant risk to safety.  
 
The risks posed by cars are amplified by the limited visibility within trucks. One 
Company B driver highlighted his limited driver visibility, stating that as soon as “there’s a 
gap there they pull in front of you, you just look for antennas all the time coz you never know 
what they’ll do”. During one observation, a car driver deliberately accelerated when two 
lanes were merging despite the truck being significantly further ahead. The driver made the 
following comment: 
Like this idiot she has seen my indicator but she still tried to run up inside of me... 
it just makes you so fucking angry coz if anything happens you’re at fault... she not even 
behind us now but she was willing to jeopardise us and everyone around us for a short 
gain. (Company B Driver Three) 
8.4.2. Need for better awareness 
A number of participants suggested that there is a need to provide better education to 
car drivers. Whilst some risky behaviour may have been caused by impatience, it was 
suggested that much of this behaviour stemmed from a lack of understanding about the 
limitations of trucks. One Company A driver specifically stated that “they need more 
When you’re reversing one of these you can’t see much... you don’t need cars jumping 
around you... even when pulling into a driveway and your cab’s gonna swing around pretty 
far cars jump in front. (Company B Driver Two) 
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awareness of trucks; it should be part of getting a licence”. The main topics indicated to 
require education were the turning circles, blind spots and typical stopping distance of trucks.  
 
It was often suggested that cars will enter small gaps in front of trucks, creating a risk 
of a collision in the event of heavy braking, and that then they will often brake strongly when 
it is not always necessary. As put by one Company B driver, “cars don’t give you space, 
when you try to manoeuvre they zip around you, and they slam on the brakes when a light 
goes yellow... they don’t realise I can’t stop that quick”. 
 
People don’t realise that when you try to stop a truck you have 60-80 tonnes that keeps 
pushing you... that’s why jack-knifes happen, you stop the PM (prime mover) but the –  
I mean the little bubble car stops pretty quickly, they’re pretty nimble, they zip in and out 
everywhere and unfortunately drive whether it’s a bubble car or a big Falcon or whatever 
it might be, people drive that thing every day. That’s what they’re accustomed to, they see 
another car just like theirs it does exactly the same thing. They see the bigger car, it 
probably just goes faster, they see the truck, it’s old, slow you know. They don't see that it 
takes an extra 30 metres to stop. They don't see that, you know, go down the left hand side 
of a truck you can’t see, a truck can’t see you, you just disappear from view. I was driving 
years ago and I remember on Parramatta Road in Sydney you could see aerials, you’d look 
for aerials, that’s all you could frigging see. So yeah car drivers, probably not deliberately, 
more so because they just don't know any better, are an issue. You’ve got to, it’s like riding 
a motorbike, you can blame the bike riders all you like, sorry the car drivers, for knocking 
the bike riders off but it’s the bike rider’s fault. He shouldn’t have been there. You don't 
ride a motorcycle when you can’t see the driver in the mirror or in the eye, you move away.  
Yeah it’s education with the car drivers. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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A number of participants also indicated that car drivers do not understand the blind 
spots of trucks. Thus, other vehicles regularly position themself in a blind spot and are at risk 
of being involved in a crash. 
 
– trailer keeps pushing and has to go either left or right... That why you always try to leave 
four car spaces in front. (Company A Driver One) 
 
The biggest issue is traffic and motorists and a lack of awareness and education about 
trucks... We can’t pull up as quick as cars... They should start looking at their mirrors 
before stopping. They see a gap and jump in, they don’t realise that we left that gap 
because we need it for stopping distances... every day you have near misses with cars 
overtaking you. (Company C Driver Three) 
 
So the behaviour of motorists and the behaviour and the understanding of other drivers 
who just simply drive cars, they have no understanding of what it means to drive a heavy 
vehicle. But them sitting as a certain point on the truck or behind the truck, next to the truck 
is anything like a car view. The truck won’t see them! Then they go ‘this truck just launched 
itself in front of me’. Well no, you’re driving a very, very small car in the blind spot. Do 
you even know where the blind spot is? Do you have any understanding that you’re right in 
the blind spot? He wasn’t actually trying to hurt you, he just thought he was clear to drive. 
(Company B Branch Manager One) 
 
...they don’t quite understand all the other aspects that go to it because it’s not included in 
any exams for your licence. Nothing like that. The education campaign is not about how to 
make you driving around a heavy vehicle safer, it’s how do you get rid of your trucks or 
how do these trucks not do, should they just drive at night? Well god how many people in –  
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Due to the lack of understanding regarding trucks, it was commonly suggested that 
better public education was required. Ultimately, it was indicated by one participant that 
without public education car drivers will simply receive incorrect information about trucks 
through public media. 
 
8.4.3. Cause delays, stress, rrustration and fatigue 
Car drivers were indicated to often contribute to stress and frustration for truck drivers. 
This stress can contribute to fatigue and reduced alertness, increasing the risk of a crash. One 
primary situation in which cars contribute to stress is through overtaking. As was stated by 
one Company B driver, “cars always speed up when you’re overtaking, coz they don’t want 
to be overtaken by a truck”. It was often stated that despite being happy to drive at low 
speeds when in single lane highway, the moment there is a lane enabling the truck to overtake 
them they will drive faster. When combined with speed limiters, truck drivers are often 
unable to pass slower vehicles, causing longer trip times and frustration, in addition to the 
potential for near misses or crashes at the end of overtaking lanes. 
You know some people are scared of driving or they’re scared of big trucks or whatever. 
So there’s they get paranoid about it... you see the crap on A Current Affair every couple of 
months about bad arse truck drivers and unfortunately there’s bad arse truck drivers and I 
was going to say there’s not ..there’s bad arse car drivers too.  But you know everyone sees 
that crap they don't have a story oh yeah this bloke’s a top driver he’s done 40 million 
kilometres in his lifetime and hasn’t had a crash or whatever. You know so people are 
going to think oh most of them are good, there’s some dickheads around, they just think 
everyone is a dickhead. (Company A Manager One) 
– the transport industry and how many of them have kids? Do they really want to be driving 
at night? That’s the prime time, is it? Not. (Company B Director) 
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8.4.4. What can drivers do? 
Truck drivers can be powerless to avoid the risks posed by other vehicles. As said by 
the manager of Company C, “there’s not a lot they can do about it, it’s just grit your teeth 
and back off and see what happens”. Cars pose a heightened risk of crashes which may be 
beyond the control of truck drivers. The account of one crash between a car and truck is 
provided over the page. 
In some cases, avoiding a crash may be possible but may hold risks for the truck driver. 
The driver may be faced with the option of swerving to avoid the car, risking a single vehicle 
crash by running off the road, or hold their current heading and hope the car moves. In this 
situation, the driver is effectively forced to choose between potentially killing the car driver 
and risking their own life. Whilst some drivers suggested that instinctual reaction would most 
likely be to swerve, others indicated that they would hold their line. 
Unfortunately though... you know you seem to me like a pretty cool, calm, collected sort of 
dude but I'm sure you get the shits driving your car every now and then. Everyone does. 
And the problem with it is man is if you’re sitting in your car for 12 hours you’re probably 
going to get the shits on more and more.  Especially like these blokes are in a speed limited 
truck that’s timed, you know you’ve got a time to get to here to there whatever. And then 
grandpa in his caravan, not even necessarily an old dude, just anyone doesn’t want to, you 
know, they’re too scared to do a hundred kilometres an hour. That’s going to cause you 
dramas. And then the problem, and it happens every day mate, you know you get two set of 
dual lanes so you want to go round them so they’ll speed up because then they don't want 
to be behind a truck because they’re scared of it or they don't want the truck overtaking 
them because they’re scared of it. (Company A Manager One) 
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Despite the difficulty of avoiding some crashes with cars, drivers must still take steps to 
minimise this hazard. First, it was regularly stated that truck drivers must be constantly aware 
of other vehicles in order to adjust their own driving behaviours. As said by the driver-
manager of Company C, you have to “drive your vehicle plus everybody else’s”. The danger 
of other vehicles also requires truck drivers to make constant adjustments in response to 
hazards ahead. As stated by one Company C Driver, “you gotta be driving ahead and you 
gotta be planning your fucking stopping distance way ahead”.  
 
A number of drivers suggested that they try to maintain a significant distance between 
themselves and other vehicles. One Company B driver stated that he tries “to leave a couple 
of hundred meters, but through town you’ll be lucky to get 100m”, due to the tendency of cars 
to fill these gaps. Thus, it is not always possible to maintain a safe distance. However, as 
stated by one Company B driver, “if another vehicle pulls in front of me I slow down a bit, 
once again, it’s about safety, I want to go home to my family”. 
Despite most truck drivers taking specific care when travelling near cars, others are not 
so careful. As was discussed by one manager from Company B, some truck drivers want to 
get away from cars as quickly as possible. Thus, when cars get in their way they may 
forcefully encourage the car to get out of their way. One Company B driver stated that his 
I’m driving for everyone else on the road, I’m doing it all anyway, keeping mirrors to see 
who’s coming coz you never know who’s there and when you’re gonna have to take 
evasive action... There’s not much more you can do. (Company C Driver Three) 
 
When someone drifts over you need to hold your line and hope they wake up... If you 
crash without them it’s your fault... If you go into their lane to avoid them then they wake 
up and swing back to their lane it’s your fault. (Company A Driver Two) 
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Company A Driver One’s Story 
As the driver was driving along the freeway a drunk driver swerved into his lane and 
crashed into the lower driver’s side of the truck. It was stated that the collision “ripped 
the truck up” from the front through to the fuel tank on the driver’s side (fuel tanks are 
located towards the rear of a prime mover on either side). This impact destroyed the steer 
tyre and caused fuel to leak onto the road. Further, the first few trailer tyres on that side 
were pushed backwards. Due to the loss of the steer tyre the driver was unable to control 
the vehicle well and was heading towards the edge of the road in the direction of a river. 
As the driver feared the possibility of drowning in the river, he pulled the steering wheel 
as hard as possible to the right. This evasive action led the truck into the path of an 
oncoming B-double. The driver stated that at this point he closed his eyes thinking that 
the collision would not be avoided and that he was likely to die as a result. After a short 
moment without a collision the driver re-opened his eyes to see that the approaching B-
double had avoided the collision.  
Due to the collision the drunken car driver was admitted to hospital and placed on life 
support.  Whilst the truck driver is unaware whether the car driver ever made it out of 
hospital he stated that this was “as good as dead”. The truck driver stated that this 
outcome was and remains to this day very difficult to cope with, and that he has to keep 
reminding himself that it was “the other guy’s fault”. The truck driver took a long time 
to drive again. Whilst his managers were pressing him to return to work he said he would 
drive when he was “good and ready”. Despite surviving the crash and returning to work 
the driver still appeared quite emotional when sharing the story and repeatedly said that 
he hopes “the guy didn’t have a family” as he “wouldn’t want to kill a father”. Then the 
driver continued to remind himself that it was not his fault by using phrases such as “but 
I didn’t (kill him), he did”. 
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partner often suggests that trucks should have their own road, to which he responds “they do, 
you’re on it”. He explained this further by stating that “sometimes with cars you have to flex 
your muscles, you gotta make space, they’ll get out of your way”. Therefore, it is clear that 
some truck drivers are not afraid to take risks in order to achieve right of way on the roads. 
8.4.5. Summary: The general public 
The above discussion outlined the specific influence of members of the general public 
on truck drivers, for the purpose of providing a detailed account of the context surrounding 
drivers. Unlike Study Two, the information gained regarding the general public in Study 
Three centred around the role of cars on the road. Members of the general public on the road 
serve as a significant hazard for truck drivers to navigate. Whilst in many cases crashes with 
other vehicles may be unavoidable for the truck driver, there are many situations in which the 
truck driver can manage their own behaviour in order to reduce the risk of incidents. Thus, it 
is important to note that there may be interactions between the culture of truck drivers and the 
behaviour of car drivers. 
 
8.5. THE CUSTOMER 
As the customer is the source of income for all transport companies, the desires of 
customers can have a large impact on the industry. Customers may make significant demands 
of transport companies, demanding either a high level of safety or the cheapest and quickest 
service, and they have the ability to follow up these demands with financial reward or 
punishment. The following section outlines the specific approaches used by customers of the 
studied organisations, as they are perceived by respondents. Whilst some of the themes which 
emerged are influenced by the attitudes of respondents, the purpose of this section is to detail 
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the customer-related context surrounding safety. Prior to exploring the influence of customers 
it is necessary to note the relationship between each company and their customers. 
8.5.1. The customer-company relationship 
Company A has a single customer accounting for approximately 70% of their 
workload. Thus, Company A is susceptible to the requirements and demands made by this 
customer. Conversely, Company B has a number of long-term major customers supplying a 
steady workload, along with a number of smaller and short-term customers. Each of these 
customers has an influence over safety within Company B. Additionally, Company B 
regularly transports to their customers’ customers; thus, Company B must provide a quality 
service to these additional organisations. Due to a lower influence of each individual 
customer, and the fact that Company B does not struggle to find sufficient work, members of 
Company B often suggested that the company is not easily swayed by customer pressures and 
demands. One manager suggested that during the global financial crisis Company B had to 
carefully consider each quote to ensure maximum competitiveness. However, more recently 
this is not the case. Finally, as was stated by one manager, Company B likes to service a 
niche market and aims for quality and reliability over the lowest price, thus resisting some 
common pressures. 
 
We want to be specialised. So we’re not going to go and fight with these major transport 
carriers that cart containers off the wharf and have depots at Fisherman’s Island and work 
24 hours a day, seven days a week. We’re not going to fight with those guys. But we are 
going to provide a service to the customer at a higher price but a lot of the time people 
want service... It’s not just a case of fighting the wars with everyone that wants to cut the 
rates, let them go I say. Let them go and fight their wars and cut their rates because in the 
end they’ll all go broke. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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The livestock transport industry, however, operates differently to other sectors of the 
transport industry. When compared to other transport types, livestock transport could be 
defined as informal at best, or disorganised at worst. This is not to criticise the transport 
industry, but rather that in many ways it is based upon relationships and simply getting the 
job done. As described by a number of members of Company C, the relationship between 
graziers and transport companies is like a family. 
 
As discussed in section 7.3.5, within livestock transport it is difficult to know what 
work will be conducted in advance, thus, limiting the ability of Company C to schedule 
drivers to be available for the workload. Additionally, as indicated in section 8.3.1, cattle 
agents appear to have a limited understanding of their requirements under COR and, 
therefore, may request transport which is impossible with the fatigue management 
requirements of drivers. 
 
Agents, to be honest with you agents are the biggest problem. They expect more and think 
they’re exempt from lots of things. Like chain of responsibility etc you know we need you to 
be, or they’ll ring at eight o’clock tonight and want you somewhere that’s quite impossible 
at six o’clock in the morning and not get their head around the fact that there are other 
issues. We’ve had boys working in the shed here all day. They can’t just get in the truck and 
be there tomorrow morning, that’s just not how it works. So convincing them of their 
responsibilities is very difficult. (Company C Manager) 
 
You spend 70% of your time on the dirt roads around farms with no other vehicles around, 
and when you arrive the graziers all chat with you and offer you food and drinks... it’s like 
a family... Even when we used to load boats at the end of the day they would give you beer 
and food as well as paying you. (Company C Driving Manager) 
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Within the case study of Company C, it was evident that due to a focus on sales and 
quick transport there were minimal, if any, formal systems utilised by livestock customers to 
improve safety. Thus, many of the factors such as customer requirements, policies and 
inductions, that were identified in companies A and B were absent within Company C. 
8.5.2. The influence of customers 
During the case studies a number of key themes emerged regarding the influence of 
customers on safety. These included the standards placed on the transport company, 
communication regarding standards and procedures between the customer and transport 
company, policy and procedure enforcement, and pressures placed on members of the 
company. Each of these aspects is discussed below for the purpose of providing a detailed 
description of the context surrounding drivers. 
8.5.2.1. Customer standards.  
Each customer has a certain standard regarding safety. Some customers are very strict 
regarding safety, requiring all their business to be conducted safely, and others are more 
interested in reducing cost and time. Thus, customers may influence safety in different ways. 
While it is common to hear about unsafe customers, customers can also require high safety 
standards from transport companies. For example, Company A’s principal customer requires 
them to have NHVAS (National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme) accreditation and up-
to-date information on all of the drivers who are used to transport their goods. 
 
Our employment application and our induction says that you’re supposed to notify us of 
any speeding fines whether they be in your car or our truck because we need to keep a 
record if you’ve got a licence still or not.  And we also have to supply that information to 
one of our customers; they require that of us. (Company A Manager One) 
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In regards to the standards of customers, one Company B manager stated that the 
company prefers to work with safe customers, due to previous experience with customers that 
have lower safety standards. It was indicated that working with customers without high safety 
standards can lead to poor safety outcomes caused both directly by the customer and through 
pressure placed on drivers. 
 
 
Yeah. I much prefer to work in, work with customers who have those requirements on us 
than those who don’t. Because those that don’t have unsafe environments for us to work in. 
We’ve had, where we were loading a flat rack, it’s like a container but you could see 
through the sides onto a side loader... So we got told something was 10 tonne. Ten tonne, 
three pieces, you look at it okay 10 tonne, three pieces, heavier this end, that end but it’s 
only 10 tonne, my crane ... can hold nine on each arm so it’s 18 tonne overall... The people 
who filled out all the paperwork were filling it out to get the cheapest possible rates they 
could through the wharf. The product was over 20 tonne and our swing lifter rolled. So we 
got all this damage to our side loader or our swing lifter and the product was damaged. No 
people were damaged or hurt because we had set up the exclusion zones, we had the remote 
controls so you could stand away from it as it was happening so no one was hurt. So 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland weren’t interested in it but it was still damaged 
to us and evidence found was that it was grossly under-weighted. It was just over. We 
would have been over mass had we gone on the road with it .... But those people, their 
behaviour and their whatever, “I'm just going to try and do this cheaply” were going to try 
and lie and have us wear the consequences... So I’d much prefer to deal with somebody 
who is willing to meet legislation and expect that of me as well because they have 
standards. If I’ve got someone who’s operating to my standards as a customer then we’re 
going to be in a more harmonious relationship. (Company B Director) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 233 
 
Low safety standards can be evident through unsafe demands and pressures and 
through shortcuts made by the customer. Conversely, customers with high safety standards 
can demand adherence with certain policies and procedures, require drivers to have 
completed inductions and be medically cleared, and can even provide information and 
guidelines to the transport company.  
8.5.2.2. Auditing  
Both at the start of a contract, and at regular intervals following, some customers will 
conduct audits of transport companies. For example, the principal customer of Company A 
conducts its own regular audits of Company A in order to ensure that it are meeting those 
requirements. 
 
8.5.2.3. Communication  
In order for the requirements of customers to be fulfilled, adequate communication is 
necessary. Such communication within the studied organisations included driver inductions, 
feedback provided to the organisation and, in the case of Company B, the provision of serious 
occurrence reports. 
8.5.2.3.1. Inductions  
The first approach used by many customers to ensure compliance with their standards is 
the use of inductions. Inductions serve to educate drivers regarding the risks and management 
We do a lot of work for them, we’re very closely monitored and essentially they even do 
their own audit on us every... Every six or 12 months they audit us themselves to make sure 
we’re not breaking the law because under chain of responsibility these days they’re in as 
much shit as we are because as the customer they’re seen to push us to do the job. So you 
know they watch us just as closely as anyone else watching us. (Company A Manager One) 
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strategies for hazards encountered when working for the customer, Sometimes, due to the 
provision of an induction or pass card, they also provide a means of enforcement.  
Company A’s principal customer uses an online induction required to be completed by 
all drivers. Similarly, Company B conducts inductions for their drivers as a necessary 
component of working at depots which serve particular customers. Additionally, some 
customer sites (particularly temporary sites such as construction sites) may require drivers to 
complete a site induction prior to delivering goods. During one Company B observation, both 
the driver and researcher were required to complete an induction upon arriving at a building 
site. A number of forms were required to be completed and the site supervisor provided 
instruction regarding general safety procedures on site. After leaving the site the driver stated 
that “it’s quite rare to have to sign into a site, these guys were overboard but good, the only 
sites I’ve had to do inductions on are the air force base and military barracks”. 
Whilst the driver above indicated that inductions were rare, other Company B drivers 
suggested they were very common. There was some frustration expressed regarding such 
inductions. At the core of this frustration, is the time lost to inductions coupled with the 
perception that most of the inductions are common sense. One Company B driver suggested 
that inductions could be summarised as “use the walkways, follow instructions, wear the 
correct PPE”. Many drivers from Company A and B indicated that the content of these 
inductions is relatively simple and “all boils down to common sense”.  
 
... it’s a pain in the arse. I did four hours doing an induction yesterday for one container, 
but a lot don’t do it as well. I don’t remember much of it, I did five hours for one the other 
week and hardly any of it was about trucks... Inductions give me the shits. Everywhere you 
go they give you an induction. I understand that their shithouses are in different places and 
their offices are in different places but surely there could be a proper one we should have to 
do. I switch off in a lot of them. (Company B Driver Three) 
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Despite this frustration, many of the drivers accepted the importance of inductions. As 
worded by one Company B driver, “they’re pretty full on, there’s a lot of it, but it’s for safety 
so it’s all good”.  Whilst inductions primarily serve an educational purpose, a number of 
larger sites will provide an induction card to the driver which the driver must be in possession 
of to enter the site. In the event of a breach of policy, the driver may have this card revoked 
and, therefore, be banned entry until re-inducted or permitted to re-enter the site. Thus, 
inductions can also provide an enforcement benefit. 
 
8.5.2.3.2. Feedback  
Customers often serve as the primary source of feedback for the company. Whilst 
incidents and fines provide post-event feedback, customers are able to provide information 
regarding risky behaviour which did not result in an incident. 
 
Through this communication, one Company B manager indicated that they have 
developed a feedback loop with the customer, enabling open discussion of safety concerns. 
So look to be honest I hope not but whenever there is an issue where, whether or not a 
driver has done something on site unsafe, we usually get that reported through to (steel 
customer) and we correct, do some corrective actions. Like we’d either do an interim 
report on it depending on how severe the incident is, we’d obviously report it through and 
put it probably a new...well not so much a new policy or procedure in place, we would just 
direct them back to what’s probably already in place there that they’ve actually gone away 
from. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
There’s not too many safety issues really... I need to abide by site rules... If I breach the 
rules they can breach me and then the truck will need to be picked up by another driver... I 
won’t be permitted to work on their site (Company A Driver Five) 
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Further, due to the longstanding relationship between the customer and Company B, both are 
quick to amend problems to ensure a continued safe working environment. 
 
8.5.2.3.3. Serious occurrence reports 
As discussed in section 7.3.4, one of Company B’s larger customers provides serious 
occurrence reports (SORs), also sometimes called serious safety occurrences (SSOs) detailing 
incidents not involving Company B. As this has already been discussed no further discussion 
is provided here.  
8.5.2.4. Customer policies and enforcement  
Depending on the emphasis that customers place on safety, they may have a number of 
different policies. It was often indicated by members of Company B that many of their 
customers have different policies and procedures. One Company B driver stated that it is 
often not until the driver arrives on site that they will know what policies a new customer has.  
Yeah absolutely they’ve given us very clear grounds to work on, where if we deem it unsafe, 
we filter that information through. Now that’s if we deem it unsafe we will then do an 
interim report. If we’re reporting it through like from a customer, we do an incident report 
up. We’d give it to (steel customer), review it because there’s a bit of, there’s sensitive 
information as far as like this customer might be you know $500,000 a month. They don't 
want to come down too heavily hard and say you know we’re not going to deliver here no 
more, they try and find other arrangements. Now whether or not that’s go and deliver to 
another business, you know, where they’re incorporated with like other business that buy in 
with them. But no (steel customer) are very much about our beliefs, they see safety at a high 
level as we do. In some cases we exceed their expectations. (Company B Branch Manager 
Five)  
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The vast majority of customer policies discussed throughout the case studies centred on 
loading and unloading practices and the use of PPE. While the impact of policies and 
procedures on specific behaviours is discussed in Chapter 10, it is important to note that the 
presence or absence of such policies presents a significant influence on safety. 
 
No a lot of customers just don't have, you know, safe procedures. I suppose if you draw, you 
know, if you go into a Woolworths shopping centre it’s all, it’s well laid out, you know what 
you want to buy, you know where it is, it’s clearly marked, you know the procedure to 
follow.  Or if you go in, you know, pull up in a little country shop out in the back of 
nowhere and you walk through and there’s stuff all over the place and you’re not really 
sure...it’s very similar to some of our customers that we deliver. Some sites are very good, 
well placarded, signed, go to this point, contact this person. When the vehicle has been 
unloaded you’ve got to stand in designated areas so one can see where you are so you’re 
not likely to be hit with the vehicle or products.  That’s the ideal situation, the driver has 
got to wear PPE, that’s part of our, the unloading site’s policy. That’s a good one. There’s 
the other extreme. You drive into a dingy old shed that’s ill-lit you know ‘oh she’ll be right 
mate’ and ‘can you get up and just help us with this?’  And the forklift is not well 
maintained, the operator probably hasn’t got the appropriate licences, you know, they’re 
bashing into the truck because the brakes don't work that well on the fork lift, all that style 
of thing. So yeah that’s probably where our biggest exposure lies. (Company B Region 
Manager One) 
 
 
On this site today there may be a driver exclusion zone, there will be required PPE 
(personal protective equipment), you may be able to help, you may have to unload it 
yourself or they may not let you help at all. You find this all out when you drive on site. 
(Company B Driver Four) 
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A number of customers, particularly those with higher safety standards, also utilise 
checklists and declaration forms which drivers are required to complete. Many Company B 
drivers were observed completing such forms, which generally focussed on correct loading 
and restraint and whether the drivers were fit to drive and legally capable of completing the 
journey. Whilst these forms do not prevent unsafe behaviour, they do remind drivers of their 
requirements and protect the customer from legal repercussions from incidents. 
Without adequate enforcement, however, policies will not influence safety. Some 
customer depots are extremely strict on their policies. For example, one customer of 
Company B prohibits drivers from climbing onto the back of the truck. One manager at the 
depot servicing this customer stated that this policy is enforced both on and off site and that 
the customer is adamant that this risk be avoided at all times. Conversely, some depots, even 
within otherwise strict customers, may insufficiently enforce policies. Company A drivers 
noted that the enforcement of rules is inconsistent within depots of their primary customer. 
One Company A driver was observed to not use a high visibility vest at a smaller depot, but 
wear it upon reaching the main depot. Similarly, another Company A driver wore thongs for 
the majority of his shift, stating that he would only put work boots on at the larger depot. 
Despite enforcement inconsistencies, it was clear that when policies were enforced there was 
a high level of compliance. 
 
It’s looked after by us. I’d be very, very confident that if (building customer) thought 
something untoward was happening between their site and their customer’s premises 
they’d be all over it like a rash. Yeah they are big on safety. So I guess as an example to 
that, they’re not allowed to get on the back of a semi trailer here or any truck right? So 
what, 1.8 metres, you can’t get up there, so they’ve implemented ways and means to 
manage that on site here. Some of our guys go ‘well I can get around that, I will just take –  
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8.5.2.5. Pressures and delays 
It was often noted throughout the case studies that customers can also pressure 
companies and drivers to act in unsafe manner. These pressures can be formal, such as the 
use of delivery timeslots, or informal, through direct demands on drivers to commit an unsafe 
act at a site. Within Company A, there is also an implicit pressure which comes as a result of 
transporting express delivery loads. Company A drivers indicated that the moment a load is 
accepted and carried there is significant pressure to get the job done. One driver specifically 
noted that “express is time critical; if the customer doesn’t get it the next day they get it free, 
so once you get in that seat you have to go”. Lastly, customers can also cause significant 
delays for drivers, leading to fatigue. 
8.5.2.5.1. Timeslots  
The use of timeslots is common within larger customer sites that experience large 
numbers of deliveries. One Company A driver stated that when a load is carried from 
interstate there is enough time to reach the destination city and have a one-hour nap. Though 
presented positively, as the delivery window only left one hour longer than the travel time, 
the driver may be pressured to continue driving when fatigued and in need of a longer break, 
or drive faster to make up for longer break times. As one driver stated, “sometimes you got 
held up but you need to be there by a certain time so the truck is available for the next run, so 
you have to speed”.  
– the truck out on the street right? So we’ll take the truck out on the street or we’ll pack the 
truck up on the street before we bring it in to (building customer). That way we don't break 
their rules’... (Building customer) is like ‘no sorry you’re not doing that. You’re not doing 
what you’re not allowed to here on the street’. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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Whilst timeslots can lead to unsafe pressures, some timeslots were seen to improve 
safety by drivers and managers. For example, one Company A driver stated that, due to the 
use of timeslots, “you don’t need to rush”. In these cases, timeslots are typically allocated as 
a minimum amount of time before the driver is allowed to arrive. Thus, dependant on the 
strictness of timeslots, and how well they are allocated to allow for safe travel times, 
timeslots can either help or hinder safety. 
8.5.2.5.2. Informal demands 
Informal customer demands are difficult to summarise. This form of demand was often 
discussed using specific case examples that revealed few patterns. Nonetheless, a brief 
discussion of the nature of such pressures is necessary. When arriving at a new site, drivers 
may be unaware of safety policies and procedures and the customer will inform them of their 
requirements. In some cases, the requests made by the customer can be unsafe or require the 
driver to break a company policy. In such situations, the driver either must comply with these 
requests or refuse to service the customer. 
 
8.5.2.5.3. Delays 
Despite commonly requiring drivers to adhere to strict timeslots, customers do not 
always place the same pressure on their own loaders and unloaders to quickly process the 
vehicle. It was noted by a number of managers long loading delays are common. Many of 
So the driver will go ‘well I'm supposed to do all this stuff, I'm supposed to get you to do a 
commission into property’ or ‘I'm not supposed to lift product over a fence and put it on the 
ground because I can’t see what’s on the other side of the fence, I'm not supposed to. But 
you’re yelling at me, this is my last drop of the day, you just say it’s so hard, you can’t 
leave it there’, blah, blah, blah, pressure. ‘Will do’. And then if their fence is damaged, 
guess who gets rung up? (Company B Director) 
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Company A drivers noted that time spent waiting at customer depots was boring and 
draining, leading to fatigue. Though drivers suggested that they often nap during these 
waiting times, others indicated that truck movements from loading can prevent sleep. One 
Company A driver suggested that, at a smaller depot, he would “help to unload the truck” as 
it “takes too long otherwise”, despite organisational policies preventing him from providing 
such aid. Unfortunately however, involvement in loading and unloading can serve to increase 
fatigue. 
 
8.5.3. Summary: The customer 
The above discussion outlined the specific approaches used by customers to influence 
the organisations and drivers. Customers play a pivotal role in safety within the industry. 
Customers can require high standards of transport organisations and drivers through a number 
of policies and requirements. These requirements are enforced by the customer’s ability to 
provide or retain work from the organisation, and their ability to ban drivers from entering 
their sites. Thus, the effects of the customer can be similar to that of government departments. 
Additionally, customers can provide significant education for drivers through inductions and 
provide significant feedback to organisations. Conversely, customers can also place 
Safety concerns in terms of breaks are definitely with clients, lots of hold ups in queues and 
there are people who are known to do it more so than others. So that’s a really big issue in 
this industry. (Company A Manager Two) 
 
Some of the other customers, you know (customer name), you can get held up, (customer 
name) you can get held up, it’s just three or four trucks in front of you, (customer name), 
and that’s it. It’s not like everyone drops everything because a (steel customer) truck comes 
in.  You know, but yeah, just in the normal delivery sequence so to speak you can get held 
up, yeah. (Company B Trainer One) 
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significant demands and delays upon drivers and organisations, resulting in unsafe 
behaviours. 
8.6. ACCREDITATION SCHEMES 
Another major influence on safety in the heavy vehicle industry is accreditation 
schemes. One of the most prominent accreditation schemes in the industry is the National 
Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme (NHVAS). The NHVAS has a number of specific 
schemes providing direct benefits to the organisation. These include: (a) mass management, 
allowing companies to utilise their own weighbridges and carry a higher mass of goods; (b) 
maintenance management, permitting companies to conduct their own maintenance; and (c) 
fatigue management, allowing the use of BFM (basic fatigue management). Another major 
accreditation system, Trucksafe, is a voluntary ‘industry standard’ accreditation scheme. A 
number of other accreditation schemes were noted by members of Company B, though 
insufficient detail was provided with which to discuss their effects. The accreditations held by 
each company that was studied are identified in Table 8.1. 
8.6.1. Benefits of accreditation 
In addition to the direct benefits attained from NHVAS, accreditation can provide a 
competitive advantage to the organisation by attracting business. 
 
Unfortunately, however, it was recognised that many accreditation schemes which are 
highly respected within the industry have failed to achieve a high enough public profile. 
 
  
I'm always saying in training if you have any ideas let us know because without NHVAS we 
can’t work for (customer name), they’re our biggest client, so none of us have jobs. 
(Company A Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 243 
 
Table 8.1: Accreditation schemes held by each case study organisation 
Accreditation Scheme Comp. A Comp. B Comp. C 
NHVAS 
Mass Management 
Maintenance Management 
Fatigue Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TruckSafe    
Industry Recognised Standards    
Quality Assurance    
Western Australian Heavy Vehicle Accreditation    
 
 
It was also indicated that accreditation schemes can be used as an excuse to ensure 
driver compliance. For example, during the Company B toolbox meeting attended by the 
researcher the use of satellite tracking of speed was discussed. One Company B driver 
questioned whether government authorities require satellite tracking and why the company 
does not remove satellite tracking. Rather than explain the safety benefits of satellite tracking 
and the risks of speeding, the manager simply stated that one of their accreditation schemes 
required satellite tracking. In a later observation, another Company B driver raised the 
toolbox discussion and stated that the question was “just stupidity, it’s there for a reason”. 
Pointing to an accreditation sticker, the driver then said “see this? They require us to do 
We’ve got industry accreditation standards and we’ve got the TruckSafe logo and the 
TruckSafe branding and that’s all for quality. I just don’t think it’s gone to a level of the 
general public to look at it and go that means that person has a higher standard of 
operation than the next person. (Company B Director) 
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certain things for safety”. The same tactic for increasing driver compliance was evident in 
each company. 
 
8.6.2. Gaining and maintaining accreditation 
In order to gain and maintain accreditation, there are a number of standards which must 
be met. Once a company has proven that they meet these standards, they are audited or 
reviewed on a regular basis to ensure ongoing compliance. 
 
During the study of Company C the researcher was able to observe a TruckSafe 
accreditation audit. It was stated by the auditor that TruckSafe generally governs four areas: 
I have to do all the safety assessments for all our sites, all our depots. I need to maintain 
the TruckSafe quality system and any code of conduct that we’re part of, like the retail 
logistics supply chain code of conduct, NHVAS... every two years TruckSafe and NHVAS 
get reviewed and re-entered into. (Company B Director) 
 
We get audited regularly for all of our different accreditations and they audit us, they see 
that we’ve got those speeding fines and whatever...it’s the same if blokes don’t fill out their 
required paperwork of pre-trip checks they get a non-conformance for that as well because 
as a company we have to ensure that they’re doing that stuff for our accreditation.  So if the 
auditor says well from this day this bloke didn’t fill his log book out right or didn’t fill his 
pre-trip check sheet out right, you know what have you done to curb that? So we say well 
he got this non-conformance. Obviously it worked coz he hasn’t done it again. (Company A 
Manager One) 
But there’s been a big cultural change within this organisation in the last three years 
around training. Well that’s when we’ve gotten into NHVAS and it’s been a huge change 
for everybody. (Company A Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 245 
 
(1) training; (2) management standards; (3) maintenance (also covering the NHVAS 
maintenance management accreditation); and (4) occupational health and safety. 
Additionally, though it will not be discussed in detail, the TruckSafe auditor also examined 
animal welfare related issues. 
Whilst the auditor was assessing whether or not Company C adhered to the required 
standards, they also utilised the audit to teach the company management strategies and how 
to prove their compliance. It was noted that if a company fails the audit, they are provided 
with a list of changes to make, rather than simply losing accreditation, and a subsequent audit 
will be conducted shortly afterward. Thus, the TruckSafe auditor appeared more concerned 
with assisting the organisation than punishing failure. 
Regarding training, it was noted by the auditor that accreditation requirements are 
based upon “how the department checks the standards”. It was also noted by the auditor that 
the company must demonstrate not that training has occurred, but that training needs have 
been assessed and met.  
For management standards, the auditor checked the adequacy of company policy 
statements and compliance rates. It was noted that if the company’s own policies and 
procedures exceed that of the standards, the company must demonstrate adherence to their 
own policies. Thus, the manner in which policies are written was deemed important. To assist 
the company in this process, two questions were suggested. First, do company practices meet 
the standards? Second, are company policies being met?  If policies do not meet the standards 
they need to be changed. Conversely, if the policies exceed the standards but are not being 
met, it was argued to be better to simplify the policies to the standards’ level.  
Regarding maintenance, there were a number of components that the auditor checked 
within Company C. The auditor checked that pre-trip vehicle inspections and maintenance 
were being conducted, and that staff members who completed maintenance had the required 
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competencies. The auditor stated that service records needed to demonstrate that problems 
were identified and remedied, rather than simply that everything was fine with the vehicle. 
Lastly, regarding occupational health and safety, the auditor checked that staff had the 
required medical examinations and licences. The auditor also assessed whether or not any 
incidents had occurred, including if they required any rehabilitation that was conducted. 
Records and management strategies for a number of specific safety hazards were also 
examined.  
8.6.3. Summary: Accreditation schemes 
Accreditation schemes have a number of benefits to the organisation, such as the ability 
to utilise more advanced forms of fatigue management – enabling a company to conduct their 
own maintenance and mass management – and the ability to gain work from customers which 
may require accreditation. Accreditation schemes also hold benefits to safety due to the 
requirement for high safety standards to gain accreditation. Additionally, it was noted that 
companies can utilise the requirements of accreditation to gain driver compliance with 
procedures. Due to the fact that many of the noted accreditation schemes are common 
between the studied companies, it may be difficult to adequately detect how accreditation 
interacts with organisations and drivers to influence behaviour. 
8.7. THE BROADER HEAVY VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
The broader industry may also have a number of impacts on safety in a given company. 
Throughout the case studies a number of comments were made regarding the broader 
industry. Members of Company B indicated that there may be an industry culture which is at 
odds with their own. Further, other transport companies can either improve safety by offering 
support and assistance, or negatively influence safety through financial competition. Lastly, 
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other truck drivers on the road interact with drivers, particularly through the use of UHF 
radio. 
Each of the studied organisations placed different emphasis on the broader industry. In 
the case of Company C the influence of the broader industry appeared minimal, potentially 
due to the location of Company C limiting interaction with other transport companies. 
Additionally, Company C drivers spend much of their time within private properties and 
access roads, and thus are isolated from interactions with the broader industry. Conversely, 
members of Company A typically travel on common highways increasing their interaction 
with other trucks and organisations. Lastly, only Company B members made reference to the 
culture of the wider industry, potentially due to the self-perceived uniqueness of the company 
(see section 9.2.1) resulting in viewing this culture from an ‘external’ perspective. Despite the 
varied manner in which this information appeared, a number of similarities were evident. 
Thus, these influences will be discussed collectively.  
8.7.1. The industrial culture 
Members of Company B regularly discussed the culture and practices of the wider 
industry. Interestingly, many of the comments made about the wider industry were presented 
negatively. For instance, when discussing participant confidentiality with one driver and that 
the case study was for the purpose of understanding, rather than evaluation leading to 
punitive outcomes, the driver responded that “someone should be checking up on the 
industry”. 
Many references to unsafe and illegal activities in other organisations were made. Of 
particular note, many drivers suggested that other members of the industry accept and support 
speeding behaviours. One Company B driver suggested that this was caused by distance-
based payment methods, arguing that such payment provides a “good incentive to driver fast 
hey?”. Most of the drivers at Company B appeared unaffected by this tendency to speed. 
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However, one driver suggested that when the company considered limiting their vehicles to 
90km/h, many drivers objected, partly because “interstaters would be grief, they’d run us off 
the roads”. Thus, at least to some extent, drivers are influenced by how they perceive other 
members of the industry would react to them.  
8.7.2. Organisational assistance  
Members of the industry may also offer assistance to one another which serves to 
improve safety. Assistance offered between organisations differed for each company. As 
discussed in section 7.3.1, Company C interacts with other livestock transporters to 
investigate potential new employees. Additionally, it was noted by the manager of Company 
C that they have previously assisted other livestock transport companies by supplying them 
with their driver’s manual. The manager stated that a number of other companies have also 
used the manual in the design of their own driver’s manuals. 
 
Members of Companies A and B also indicated that they work cooperatively with other 
transport companies. In some instances, Company A will contact other organisations to 
arrange to swap trailers, allowing a fatigued driver to rest and take a less urgent load.  
 
If they’re tired and they need to sleep longer than their legal break which is going to put 
them behind their delivery time we swap trailers. We have another truck pull up and swap 
trailers so if that’s a less urgent delivery doesn’t matter. Old mate who’s not tired can take 
the super urgent stuff in and we work with other companies as well. If they’ve got a truck –  
I think we’ve covered pretty well all the safety aspects in that little book and that just comes 
from our experience. I’ve actually handed that to around any livestock transport 
association members that want to see it as well and they’ve modified it to suit themselves. 
Many of them have that or something similar to it. (Company C Manager) 
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Similarly, Company B has previously engaged other transport companies to learn how 
to achieve novel tasks. One Company B manager stated that, to prepare for an upcoming job, 
drivers have been sent to observe similar loads being carried by another company. 
8.7.3. Competition 
The broader industry may also negatively influence safety through competition. It was 
often suggested that the level of competition within the industry leads many transport 
companies to cut corners in order to make sufficient money. 
 
As could be expected, members of the studied companies appeared to indicate that this 
was not a problem for them. It was however, noted by a number of participants that this level 
of competition can reduce industry-wide safety by enabling customers to seek cheaper 
organisations, rather than organisations with higher levels of safety.  
 
– in the area that’s got something that’s not important they’ll take our trailers and we’ll 
take their trailers when old mate is fit enough to drive his truck again. (Company A 
Manager One) 
 
The economy runs the industry, safety all comes back to level rates... you level the rates and 
you’ll get the job based on your morals and the way you work... but at the moment it’s 
about who can offer the cheapest rate. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
Everybody does it cheap because they have this mentality that their trucks have to do so 
many round trips a week. Out at Melbourne is a classic one, they want to do two round 
trips a week in six days. They want to get to Brisbane on say a Wednesday morning, they 
want to leave Brisbane on Wednesday afternoon and they’ll just pretty much take anything. 
They’ll just take a load, as long as it pays for their fuel to get home, that’s what they’re 
worried about and that’s the mentality of some of the companies and how they work. 
(Company B Operational Manager) 
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Despite the studied companies claiming to be unswayed by this competition, it is worth 
understanding this competition given the relevance it holds for the wider industry. The 
tendency for transport companies to compete on prices leads to minimal profit margins and, 
therefore, less emphasis placed on safety. This is particularly relevant for long-distance 
travel, where travelling from Brisbane to Sydney is considered ‘back-loading’ and therefore 
receives a lower average payment. 
8.7.4. Interactions with other drivers 
Whilst on the road, drivers may have a number of interactions with other truck drivers. 
Whilst these interactions can be negative in nature, drivers may also rely heavily on other 
drivers. In past years, this would include other drivers offering assistance if a truck broke 
down or needed to swap a tyre. However, there is concern that such assistance is less 
common now due to driving hours’ constraints. 
 
While stopping to assist other drivers is becoming less common, drivers assist one 
another using other means. For example, whenever a truck overtakes another truck, the 
rearward vehicle typically flashes their lights to indicate that it is now safe to merge back 
across. Similarly, when following another truck, the forward vehicle will use indicators to 
communicate the need to veer slightly to one side to avoid an upcoming hazard. In this sense, 
drivers are able to avoid risks they were unaware of through the assistance of other drivers. 
There used to be a lot of courtesy... People would help you with a tyre... with driving hours 
you can’t afford to pull up to help anymore... it takes 20mins to even just pull up and drive 
right off. (Company A Driver Three) 
 
People used to pull over and help you, now they will run you over... it’s just a new breed of 
drivers coming through. (Company C Driver Two) 
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Additionally, drivers also use UHF radio to offer assistance to each other. During one 
observation, a Company B driver indicated that the UHF is particularly useful along certain 
stretches of highway. For example, it was stated that in the past Company B did not fit their 
vehicles with UHF radios. The driver recounted a near-miss in which he was driving past a 
dangerous on-ramp, which is relatively short and has limited visibility. The dangers of this 
on-ramp are further compounded by the fact that the on-ramp is located beside a low bridge, 
requiring some heavy vehicles to exit the highway and re-enter through the on-ramp. As the 
driver passed this intersection, driving side-by-side with another truck, he was unaware of a 
third truck entering from the ramp, resulting in the three trucks driving three abreast on a two 
lane stretch of highway. It was stated that the incident was used to convince management to 
install UHF radios, as drivers use UHF to warn that they are entering the highway. 
Drivers will also regularly warn and advise others. It was stated by a number of drivers, 
that if you are following another slower truck, the forward driver will use the call “all dark 
up here” to indicate it is safe to overtake. Similarly, the radio is often used to warn about bad 
drivers on the road and of police enforcement. One Company A driver provided a detailed 
description of the phrases used to describe different types of enforcement (see Table 8.2).  
Warnings regarding enforcement may undermine attempts to enforce road rules, as the 
possibility of being pulled over unexpectedly is decreased. However, a number of drivers 
indicated that the radio is also used to correct unsafe drivers. For example, one Company C 
driver, who was being tailgated by another truck, used the radio to tell them to back off.  
 
 
  
I had a B-double tailgating me so I asked if the guy wanted me to pull over and open the 
crate. “Are you being a smartass?” “No I just don’t like someone on my arse”. (Company 
C Driver Two) 
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Table 8.2: Radio phrases for different types of enforcement 
Radio Phrase Description 
Candy Car Coloured highway patrol vehicles (red, green, blue, etc) 
Double-Double Traditional police vehicle 
Flash for Cash Mobile speed camera enforcement 
Angry Lights Siren and flashing lights (e.g. “candy car coming at pace with their 
angry lights on”) 
Dog Box Police vehicle with sealed compartment at the back for transporting 
criminals 
Evil Knievel Police motorbike 
 
Similarly, one Company A driver recalled a radio conversation between two drivers in 
which one vehicle was “wandering all over the road”. The other driver asked him if he was 
alright and the first driver stated he was getting something out of his glove box. The driver 
berated him, asking if he had been doing so for the last 20 minutes, before finishing with the 
statement “Get off the fucking road!” Thus, drivers will commonly use the radio to correct 
people they deem to be unsafe.  
8.7.5. Summary: The broader industry 
The broader industry is another contextual variable which may impact upon safety. The 
broader industry culture may have a negative influence on safety. Additionally, the level of 
competition within the industry leads some organisations to cut corners, thereby offering 
lower prices and reducing available work for higher-charging organisations. Drivers are 
known to regularly warn one another of upcoming enforcement, reducing the deterrence of 
government enforcement on unsafe behaviours. Conversely, however, organisations and 
drivers may offer assistance to one another which serves to improve safety. This includes 
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taking urgent loads to allow fatigued drivers to rest, helping determine if drivers are fit to 
employ, and sharing knowledge and experience, particularly regarding novel tasks. 
8.8. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
Study Three also identified a number of environmental and situational factors that 
influence safety. These could be broadly categorised as road design and conditions, truck 
design, and environmental conditions. Additionally, a number of factors related to the load 
carried were identified by members of Companies B and C. In many cases these factors can 
present a direct hazard or risk to the driver, which must be managed through correct 
behaviour. Additionally, these factors can shape the choice of action made by the driver when 
responding to another hazard. 
8.8.1. Road design and conditions 
The road is one of the most immediate and prevailing contextual factors influencing 
heavy vehicle safety. It was stated by one driver from Company C that “the government goes 
on about safety but three-quarters of safety is the state of the road”. Regardless of any other 
contextual factors which vary between drivers, all drivers who travel the same roads are 
exposed to certain road-related risk factors. Whilst many road-related factors are relatively 
consistent and predictable, it is important to note that there may be any number of more 
random occurrences which the driver must also be aware of. 
 
8.8.1.1. Road design 
There were a number of concerns raised about the condition of the roads on which the 
drivers work. Participants generally indicated that the Australian road infrastructure is poor, 
due to flaws in road design and a lack of adequate roads for the amount of traffic. One 
You have to be aware of your surroundings, you just never know. You can get a kangaroo 
jump out and they can rip up under the truck. (Company B Driver Six) 
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organisational staff member from Company A said that there are a number of insufficiencies 
in Australian road design, ranging from inconsistencies between similar roads and 
intersections to poorly-signed hazards and dangerous use of adverse camber. These issues can 
either present an immediate hazard to the driver or can contribute to issues such as speeding 
and fatigue. 
As discussed in section 8.7.4, one Company B driver provided an account of a near 
miss caused by a combination of poor on-ramp design and a lack of UHF radio within the 
truck. Similarly, one organisational staff member from Company A indicated that the 
extensive use of single carriageways on major Australian highways presents a direct safety 
risk. It was noted that two trucks can pass within inches at high speeds, due to the design of 
these highways, increasing the risk of a collision and its likely severity. 
 
Within Company B a number of specific road design issues were raised, including 
locations where it is impossible to pull over and the design of road access to depots. Whilst 
not specifically a road design issue it was also noted by a number of drivers that it can be 
very difficult to find locations to pull over.  
During one observation a driver needed to pull over to check his load was still 
adequately restrained. Due to the absence of major stopping locations, the driver had to resort 
to pulling into an emergency stopping bay. In addition to the need to stop to check load 
Number one, the general condition of Australia’s highways is shit. That’s a massive safety 
problem. The fact that you can still drive just about anywhere in this country and you’re 
mostly on dual carriage (sic, referring to single carriage) highway. This is Australia’s 
national highway system and you’re within inches of a truck going in the opposite direction 
at a hundred odd km/h. That’s a massive impact if you happen to clip them. You know 
there’s a lot of good highway now but there’s still way more terrible, terrible to be on. 
(Company A Manager One) 
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restraint, drivers often need to stop for their log book breaks, to purchase food, or to take a 
nap. It was noted by a number of drivers that there are few locations along the highways 
where such stops are possible. One driver noted that when travelling from southern Brisbane 
to the Sunshine Coast, north of Brisbane, the earliest it is possible to pull over is 
approximately 30 minutes outside of the Brisbane boundary. The lack of sufficient stopping 
locations restricts the ability of truck drivers to eat healthily and to rest when fatigued. 
Further, a number of drivers noted the high level of traffic and the lack of clean amenities at 
many truck stops make it difficult to find a suitable location to sleep.  
 
Due to the size and manoeuvrability of trucks it can also be difficult to navigate narrow 
or difficult access points. As discussed in section 8.4.1, when coupled with interactions with 
other vehicles, this can increase the risk of incidents. In many cases the access point to a 
customer depot can be poorly designed or located, relative to the surroundings. In addition to 
the placement of depot entrances, the design of access roads can also present a risk. During 
one observation a driver was required to reverse approximately 100m down a very narrow 
driveway. Whilst the driver handled this manoeuvres with ease, the driver noted how difficult 
it was to initially line up the truck with the driveway due to road width. Additionally, when 
combined with limited visibility from trucks, it was noted that the driver must estimate the 
correct place to begin the turn and was unable to determine if they were accurate until they 
had made a significant portion of the turn. A number of other drivers were also observed 
struggling to enter depots and warehouses. 
It’s not too bad sleeping in the bunk... if you pull up on the side of the road you get cars and 
trucks passing you all night... road houses generally aren’t good because you’ll get trucks 
pulling up all night. (Company B Driver Three) 
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The design and conditions of access points present a direct hazard which driver must 
manage on a regular basis. Whilst it was noted that drivers become familiar with the sites 
they visit on a regular basis, differences in the behaviour of car drivers and position of parked 
vehicles can increase the risk of collision. 
 
No, no not really because we teach our blokes just to be that little bit patient and, as I say, 
well I just say, talking about setting yourself up early. You know, you know if you’re going 
to have block-off both lanes and get in this bloke’s driveway and that’s the only way you 
can get in there, or even just turn left or right of this bloke. Right is not too bad because 
oncoming traffic and you’ve got that turn to swing, it’s left. Sometimes because a car might 
be parked right up against the edge of the driveway, so you have to bring your truck, your 
prime mover out on the wrong side of the road to get your trailer around to get in... They’ll 
stop 50m up the road, you know indicate left, put the hazards on, let the cars get around 
you it’s all clear, then do your left turn in. We don't have a lot of incidents like that because 
... this job is repetitious. After three months you get to know all the places and they don't 
change customers every day. They don't say I’ve got a new customer. You’re always going 
to (Customer X) or you’re always going to (Customer Y) or you’re always going here you 
know what I mean? So you get to know the customer after a while. You get to know the 
limitations of your truck and all that, you get to know who’s building your truck and your 
ability. So yeah it’s...in that sense I suppose you get too complacent sometimes.  You can be 
you know ‘oh yeah (Customer Y) I do this, then I do this’.  And this bloke will have his –  
 
Wheel placement is everything, just getting it off the road is the hardest... little guesswork 
at first til you can see where you’re going... The worst part of the job is little shit holes like 
this. (Company B Driver Two) 
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8.8.1.2. Road conditions 
In addition to the design of roads, a number of other issues were identified regarding 
road conditions. It was indicated by drivers that there are many distractions on the road, 
including roadside billboards, and that many roads are rough, leading to vibration-related 
back problems. Additionally one Company B driver specifically stated that whilst “people 
think trucks wouldn’t feel much, you can run over a rat and feel it”. 
 
In addition to general road conditions, a number of drivers also discussed the effect that 
roadworks may have on safety. Due to the transient nature of roadworks, they have been 
grouped with road conditions rather than design. Roadworks can cause significant delays 
along the roads, leading to issues with fatigue management. One Company C driver indicated 
that “you can lose 15 minutes just sitting there, and you can’t take them off the time”. 
Additionally, one Company B driver noted that on many occasions the overall width of the 
– car parked there, about three inches more than he normally does.  We don't have a lot of 
accidents like that. We have a lot of umm near misses to gates, hitting gate poles or 
something like that. As I say you’ve got to try and have 15 sets of eyes. You might be 
watching something else and it might be real tight this side and he’s just nicked the gate 
with a bed pin that side. Customer doesn’t worry about it too much as long as you don't 
push it right over like ninety degrees, he’s not worried, he realises it’s tight. But that’s...our 
accident rate I think here is good for some of the places they’ve got to actually put the 
vehicle.  (Company B Trainer One) 
 
Road conditions are bad, it’s disgraceful some of our roads... just the general condition of 
the road... they’re narrow, they’re rough, they’re broken up a lot of times, they’re not wide 
enough... In a car it’s fine but this truck is heavy haulage so has hard suspension. 
(Company B Driver Three) 
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road is altered for the duration of the roadworks however, rather than close lanes, roadwork 
sites often narrow one or more of the lanes to reduce slowing traffic. This can provide a 
significant risk for tucks, which often utilise much of the lane they are travelling in.  
 
 
8.8.1.3. Specific issues related to dirt roads gleaned from Company C 
In Company C specific reference was made to the hazards and risks associated with 
travelling along dirt roads. It was indicated by one member of Company C that over 70% of 
their driving time is spent on dirt roads. Due to the required lower speeds that must be 
travelled on dirt roads, it can take many hours to travel short distances. This was indicated to 
pose difficulties when combined with fatigue management, as it can take a full working day 
to travel only 300kms. 
 
It’s 143km takes you five hours on some of those roads. So there’s a fatigue management 
issue before you even start. You get back to the bitumen and then you’ve already wasted 10 
hours of your day virtually, getting there and getting out. Unless you go in the afternoon 
before and that’s an issue. We had umm I can’t even think of his name now, was Chairman 
of the NTC, (name) went with (driver/manager name) up the (road name) and it’s a similar 
way to where you went ... the other day only probably worse and he was all full of you 
know ‘everybody is the same, there is no difference’. Once you get into those roads and 
understand number one there’s no traffic, number two how long it takes you to do what 
you’ve got to do and a lot of that, there was an understanding then oh this is different. So I 
think that’s important. (Company C Manager) 
 
No I think in our industry in our industry where we probably do hours-wise, not kilometre-
wise, hours-wise we probably do 70% of our driving time would be spent on unsealed roads 
where the speed probably you could average a speed on unsealed roads probably about 
Roadworks sometimes give you no warning, sometimes give you 3kms... The roadworks 
have narrowed the left lane on the Gateway... there’s no warning you just suddenly have no 
room. (Company B Driver Eight) 
 
Chapter 8: Study Three Results – Contextual Factors 259 
 
 
It was also noted by a number of members of Company C that rough surface of dirt 
roads can lead an increased risk of rolling the trailer. It was indicated that when driving on 
these roads it is necessary to find the “right pace” as if you drive “too slow and the bumps 
are worse” and “too fast and they are worse”. 
8.8.2. Truck design 
The design and size of trucks were also regularly discussed by a number of drivers. 
Whilst drivers from some companies gave different emphasis to specific aspects of vehicle 
design, these factors are common throughout the industry and thus will be discussed 
collectively. The specific aspects which were discussed by drivers included the turning circle 
of trucks, their stopping distance, visibility, and a number of issues related to trailer and cab 
design. As the impact of these design factors will be discussed in Chapter 10, only a brief 
discussion of the nature of these factors is provided here. 
8.8.2.1. Turning 
Due to the length of trucks their ability to turn and manoeuvre is significantly different 
to that of a car. For this reason truck drivers are often required to take wide corners and may 
be unable to enter locations in the usual manner. The limitations of truck manoeuvrability can 
pose a direct hazard if the driver underestimates the space required, and can act as a stimulus 
for other drivers to behave in an unsafe manner by trying to rush past a truck.  
No I think in our industry in our industry where we probably do hours-wise, not kilometre-
wise, hours-wise we probably do 70% of our driving time would be spent on unsealed roads 
where the speed probably you could average a speed on unsealed roads probably about 
maximum 50km/h down to  30km/h. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Even between trucks there can be significant differences in manoeuvrability. One 
Company B driver indicated the difficulties associated with access point and turning circles 
by stating “it’s fun getting one of these (B-doubles) in the doorway”. Conversely, however, 
another Company B driver indicated that manoeuvrability is not an issue when driving 
smaller trucks, as they “can go anywhere, it just doesn’t have the power and speed of a car”. 
8.8.2.2. Stopping distance 
Another common limitation associated with trucks is their stopping distance. One 
Company A driver specifically discussed the nature of stopping a truck weighing 60 to 80 
tonnes, stating that when you try to stop the truck this weight “keeps pushing you; that’s why 
jack-knifes happen, you stop the prime mover but the trailer keeps pushing and has to go 
either left or right”. For this reason truck drivers need to leave significantly longer times to 
stop, and have a reduced ability to avoid an impact if another vehicle crosses their path. 
 
Yeah I mean the little bubble car stops pretty quickly, they’re pretty nimble, they zip in and 
out everywhere and unfortunately drive whether it’s a bubble car or a big Falcon or 
whatever it might be, people drive that thing every day. That’s what they’re accustomed to, 
they see another car just like theirs it does exactly the same thing. They see the bigger –  
He’s looking ahead, he’s thinking of all these other things that he’s got to think as well as a 
slosh factor in his liquid tank and all these things and his speed and you know, where he 
needs to be turning because he’s got a very long vehicle and if he’s got to turn right at 
some time, he is going to make sure he’s in the right lane well before he needs to turn right, 
not just do it at the last minute because he needs 25m to do that. All these things he’s 
thinking about and somebody is just going, you’re not going to the speed of a normal car, 
well he’s not a normal car. (Company B Director) 
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8.8.2.3. Visibility and Blind spots 
The last general limitation of trucks is associated with visibility from behind the wheel. 
Due in part to the length of the vehicle, the lack of rear vision in the presence of a trailer, and 
the design of the cab, truck drivers have significantly decreased side and rear visibility. 
Paradoxically, the increased elevation of trucks enables further forward vision than other 
vehicles, increasing truck driver ability to prepare for increased stopping distances, yet 
reduces ability to see lower height vehicles at closer distances.  
 
Whilst most people are aware that trucks have large blind spots, it is difficult to truly 
appreciate this fact without having sat in a truck. During one observation, when the truck was 
stopped, two pedestrians walked past the front of the vehicle at a reasonable distance, 
completely disappearing from view. After this occurrence, the observed driver discussed the 
difficulties in visibility, indicating that bonneted trucks have a 12-meter blind spot directly in 
front of the vehicle. 
– car,it probably just goes faster, they see the truck it’s old, slow you know. They don't see 
that it takes an extra 30m to stop. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
 
They don't see that you know go down the left hand side of a truck you can’t see...a truck 
can’t see you, you just disappear from view. I was driving years ago and I remember on 
Parramatta Road in Sydney you could see aerials, you’d look for aerials, that’s all you 
could frigging see. So yeah car drivers, probably not deliberately, more so because they 
just don't know any better are an issue. You’ve got to, it’s like riding a motorbike, you can 
blame the car drivers all you like for knocking the bike riders off, but it’s the bike rider’s 
fault. He shouldn’t have been there. You don't ride a motorcycle when you can’t see the 
driver in the mirror or in the eye, you move away. (Company B Branch Manager Four)  
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One Company A driver even recounted a collision in which a motorbike had moved in 
front of the truck at a set of traffic lights without the driver seeing them. As the motorbike 
intended to turn, when the lights when green they did not accelerate, and the truck drove into 
them. The driver stated that truck drivers just have to drive and hope that nothing is there. 
8.8.2.4. Trailer design 
In addition to the aforementioned issues of manoeuvrability, stopping distance and 
visibility, the design of trailers can pose a risk to the truck driver. Whilst the risk associated 
with climbing onto the back of trucks was briefly discussed in section 7.4.2, there are a 
number of other factors worth noting. First, when driving a taut-liner (a trailer with canvas 
sides) the use of metal gates is required along the side of the trailer to support the load. These 
gates are heavy and can be difficult to correctly insert and remove, leading to a risk of 
muscular injuries. However, on one Company B observation, rather than the use of metal 
gates the canvas sides had Kevlar inserts removing the risks associated with metal gates and 
reducing the requirement to strap each item. The lack of a requirement to strap each item 
reduces the repetitive strain of throwing straps over loads and entirely removes the 
requirement to climb the trailer to dislodge straps which become caught.  
Second, during one observation a driver discussed the technology present in some of 
the extendable trailers used by Company B to transport long loads. Long loads are typically 
very difficult to safety navigate on some roads. Further, there is a significant level of skill 
required to safely handle these trailers. Company B possessed two specialised trailers which 
Bonneted trucks have a 12m blind spot directly in front. The sloped bonnets are easier to 
see in front of you though. There’s also a blind spot behind your side mirrors, on 
roundabouts you have to look around them... That window [passenger side foot level 
window] helps you see anyone hiding down there. (Company A Driver Three) 
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were fitted with additional steering assists absent from standard trailers. The first of these 
‘self steers’ in response to the steering movements made by the driver, permitting the trailer 
to better follow the path of the prime mover. The second trailer could be steered by a pilot 
following the truck in a second vehicle. In these two examples it can be seen that the use of 
new technology can reduce the hazards associated with trailer design. 
8.8.2.4.1. Company C specific: Livestock crates 
When transporting livestock it is necessary to use a specific form of trailer referred to 
as a ‘crate’. The crates used by Company C are two-level trailers, which consist of a number 
of subsections or ‘pens’. These crates are designed to allow sufficient air movement for cattle 
and are open-sided with fence-like walls. It was noted by members of Company C that it is 
necessary to enter the crate, during unloading and loading, in order to close or open pens and 
guide livestock between pens. It was for this reason that one Company C driver indicated that 
“the cattle game is hard for bringing safety in”. Whilst inside the crate there is a risk of 
being kicked by cattle or being struck by kicked gates. However, some recent design changes 
have significantly reduced the risks associated with crates. 
 
So they can’t really get at you. They can get at you but they can’t hurt you. But that’s why 
the crates are made and that’s where manufacturing and industry and itself .... most crates 
are designed out of people like us, or whatever, who come up with these little ideas. And 
then the manufacturers take them on board and they refine them and....it’s all come from 
industry. It hasn’t come from manufacturers...  Oh L pens and just chains around gates, 
they all got slam-shuts now so you just slam the gate and it shuts. Like before you had to go 
and push the gate and put your chain around it. Yeah. And anyone that’s been carting cows 
for 30-odd years will have some sort of a mark on his face or his teeth or somewhere where 
he’s been kicked in the head with a gate. It’s true. But in the last 20 years it’s come a –  
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Additionally, in order to get to cattle on the higher level of the crate, it is often a 
requirement to climb to the top of the crate via a ladder at the back, leading to a risk of falling 
from heights. It was noted that health and safety departments have sought to identify safer 
means by which working from these heights can be achieved, however, it has generally been 
recognised that this is a necessary risk for transporting livestock. 
 
8.8.2.5. Cab design 
Cab design can also influence driver safety. As noted in section 7.4.2, many Company 
B trucks do not possess bunks and drivers may be unable to receive adequate rest on the road. 
Despite providing accommodation for over-night drivers, it is difficult for drivers to pull over 
– long way. To the safety side of it which probably has taken the common sense thing out of 
it. You know what I mean? (Company C Driver/Manager) 
 
Yeah in the actual industry I think Work Health and Safety has been pretty good. They don't 
really like we’ve had them look at putting handrails on crates and safety harnesses and all 
this and it just don't work in this industry. They look at it, and they see what we do and they 
come away with it, you know they put issues on there. They put stipulations on that we’ve 
done anyway. But they had to be in writing, another little chapter that you can’t climb up 
the side of the crate, you must use the ladders, you must do this.. which is common sense. 
But they had to put their little bit in there make it look like they were doing something... 
Like you can climb on the top of the crate even though it’s four-and-a-half metres off the 
ground, when you’re on the catwalk you can only fall one-and-a-half metres into the crate. 
Because you’re not walking along the little bar on the side, four-and-a-half metres above 
the ground, you’re walking along a catwalk. And if you fall in there you’re going to get 
hurt. Because there’s 40 other things in there with four legs. So you don't fall in there. Do 
you know what I mean? (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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to sleep during a journey. Other design issues associated with truck cabs included the access 
points and the quality of seats within trucks. In regards to Kenworth cab-overs, one Company 
B driver stated that “if you’re not careful you bash your head getting in and bash your head 
getting out of them”. Whilst this seems a minor issue, the requirement to focus on avoiding 
hitting your head, draws attention away from safe exiting and entering of the vehicle. Finally, 
it was indicated by one Company B driver that “if you are not comfortable you are not able 
to concentrate” and thus the quality of seats can present difficulties for drivers. 
8.8.3. Environmental conditions 
Regarding environmental conditions, a number of participants noted the influence of 
weather and the time of day in safety. The time of day was specifically discussed by members 
of Company A, as the majority of their work was conducted during the night. Driving at night 
carries an increased fatigue risks and specific reference was made to the perceived heightened 
risk of driving during dawn and dusk. 
Weather was also discussed by a number of participants, particularly with regards to 
reduced visibility and slipperiness. In Company C specific reference was made to the need to 
drive slower in foggy conditions, as it was noted that one Company C truck was involved in a 
significant incident due to decreased visibility. Additionally, a significant amount of focus 
was placed on the effect of rain on the roads. As this effect is common to all vehicle types, 
little discussion is required here. One Company A manager raised two incidents where a 
truck had a crash in wet weather conditions. 
 
He had to loose in the wet because he’s fucking retarded. He was driving to Sydney with 
empty trailers on, he went through the  main street of a town, 60km/h and lose in the wet. 
(Company A Manager One) 
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Additionally, it is worth noting that due to a previous crash involving Company B and 
wet weather, in the event of rain they will remind their drivers to take extra care.  
 
8.8.4. The load 
The final environmental and situational factors highlighted in Company B and C related 
to the load being carried. Each load type can present specific hazards for drivers. In Company 
B a number of risks were associated with transporting steel goods, sharp products, over-
dimension loads, and craned loads. Additionally, in Company C a number of factors were 
identified as relating to the transporting of livestock. 
8.8.4.1. Steel  
Steel can be a difficult product to correctly restrain, is especially heavy, and can be a 
difficult product to work around on a trailer. As stated by one Company B manager, “it’s a 
whole different aspect carrying steel to carrying Kleenex tissues or dog food or something 
like that you know, there’s a whole new ball game carrying steel”. Steel naturally has little 
friction and steel loads can shift significantly if incorrectly restrained. One Company B driver 
stated that “if you restrain it properly it won’t move, the main thing is taking the time to look 
We have a bloke in I think it was [Year of crash] jack knifed a B-double out [Name of town 
where incident occurred] in the rain Friday night. All he had to do when he left here on 
Friday night was get to Sydney before 4am Monday morning. The front trailer was written 
off, the back trailer was almost written off and the truck was pretty fucked but they repaired 
it. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Obviously when it rains yes obviously we get on the two-way and say you know it’s more, 
it’s probably highlighted because you know the risk is actually there, it’s real like the wet 
roads. But you know we don't get on the two-way and say hey, you know, like don't be 
speeding. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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at it and restrain it properly”. In order to minimise the risks associated with transporting 
steel, it is therefore necessary to have adequately skilled and educated drivers.  
 
Due to this level of friction, it is necessary to ensure that there are limited gaps between 
steel products. One method of reducing these gaps is to ‘belly wrap’ the product. Belly 
wrapping is conducted by running a chain from either side of the trailer, wrapping it around a 
load, or part thereof, and pulling it tight on the far side. This reduces the distance the load can 
shift along the length of the trailer, as the chain pulls tight when the goods shift. 
Even after adequate restraint, steel has a tendency to ‘settle’. Within a few kilometres 
of leaving the depot it is possible for this load to no longer be safely restrained. Observed 
drivers were often witnessed regularly keeping an eye on their load when driving and 
stopping at intervals to check if the load was still restrained. 
 
Unfortunately, regardless of how well a load of steel is restrained, rough driving can 
still lead to significant problems. It was regularly noted by Company B managers that, under 
heavy breaking or jerky movements, steel can shift dramatically and put both the truck driver 
and other road users at significant risk. Heavy braking is likely to put greater force on the 
load than the acceleration capabilities of the truck and thus the heavy vehicle driver is at 
significant risk because steel products can leave the trailer and pierce the cab. Due to this 
After a couple of months they realise, like you go out of here, turn right, go a 
kilometredown the road and all your chains will be loose, because steels come together and 
all that. So you’ve got to get out and tighten it all up again.  Steel moves a lot more than 
most products. (Company B Trainer One) 
 
You can’t just come out and say I’ve been driving tippers for 10 years and walk in here and 
do the same with steel. You just have to change your driving attitude a little bit yeah. 
(Company B Trainer One) 
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risk, the trailers used by the steel transporting branch of Company B use an engineered 
headboard. The engineered headboard is a panel at the front of the trailer which is designed to 
prevent the goods from sliding forward into the cab of the truck. However, even with an 
engineered headboard the load can only be slowed and heavy braking can still pose a risk for 
the driver.  
 
The final difficulty associated with carrying steel was the slipperiness of steel when 
walking on top of it. Whilst Company B has rules preventing drivers from climbing onto the 
trailer, this behaviour still occurs. One driver stated that when they are required to cover a 
steel load with a tarp, or on some occasions during belly wrapping, it becomes necessary to 
climb onto the trailer. Steel loads often have irregular surfaces and, when accompanied by the 
slipperiness of steel, it is dangerous for drivers to walk on.  
 
It’s deadly, you just need one foot in the wrong place and you’ll go off the side... I know one 
bloke who fell off... he didn’t die but he got a lot of internal injuries. (Company B Driver 
Two) 
 
If you have a look out there you’ll see our headboards are thicker, they’re big RHS 
(rectangular hollow sections of steel) ...it’s what they call an engineered head board. The 
normal trucks you see carrying around freight just have a pipe headboard, so to speak, and 
a pipe tailgate and that’s why we have an engineered headboard, it just stops it a little bit. 
Won’t stop it completely, no way it will still come through. You only have, you wouldn’t 
have a metre between that and the back of your cab so to speak and...once a big bit of pipe 
or a heavy bit of RHS or flap or whatever it is gets going, and you lock, once you brake 
trying to stop from 100 to nothing and try and do it, it’s going to be a good spear comes in 
the back of your head. So you’ve got to drive a bit more defensively or so yeah. (Company 
B Trainer One) 
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8.8.4.2. Sharp goods  
When carrying building and steel products, there is often a risk of cut injuries from 
sharp edges. One Company B driver, who works transporting building materials, indicated 
that his major safety concern was “cuts, it’s a sharp product, you gotta wear gloves, long 
sleeves and trousers to make sure you don’t slice yourself”. It was noted that the sharpness of 
products is a hazard for drivers when handling and restraining goods and when walking on 
the trailer. Thus, there are specific PPE requirements when working with such products. 
 
 
And we...funnily enough (building material customer), I believe, have a few cut issues, we 
don't generally get them, our guys wear their PPE, they wear their gloves. You don't see too 
many, I'm trying to think when I saw one last. But basic things, if you get, I guess if you get 
a razor blade which a piece of tin can be, when the...a bit of 1.5 mil sheet just laid on the 
guillotine and it chops it. It leaves a burr underneath and you can’t see it but it’s there, this 
end is smooth, that end is not, it’s like a razor blade. If it’s on a rainy day you have a piece 
of bent tin on the back of your truck, you’re talking to your mate, you’ve got the paperwork, 
do you want this one? Yeah. You grab it, oh it’s stuck, you give it a pull, it’s wet, it 
slips...goes straight through your gloves and it cuts all your fingers. It’s happened so many 
times. The glove itself has improved, you only use gloves with certain ratings and cut 
resistance and so on and so forth. I guess we’re lucky here because Company B is one 
thing, they have 35-year employees, you know guys who have been here, long service is 
incredible in Company B. At (building material customer) here again I think there’s only 
two drivers that have been here less than two years, you know, so longevity in the business, 
the guys learned. All your skills factors and your safety improves the longer the people 
stay. So with experience you know it helps us out. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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8.8.4.3. Over dimension 
Over-dimension products can pose significant risks in the form of wide loads requiring 
extra width to travel, long loads being incapable of taking certain corners, and heavy goods 
placing extra load on the vehicle and restraints. As discussed in section 8.8.2.4, Company B 
has a number of specialised trailers which are designed to improve the manoeuvrability of  
long loads. Similarly, in order to carry heavy loads Company B is legally required to have 
trailers designed for the extra weight. 
The use of police escorts for heavy haulage was already discussed in section 8.3.7. Due 
to the requirement for police escorts, a significant amount of planning is put into the transport 
of over-dimension freight, helping to reduce the risk of incidents. Additionally, the presence 
of police escorts makes it much less likely for the driver to engage in illegal behaviour. 
 
Over-dimension freight also requires a certain level of skill and knowledge for drivers. 
These drivers must be aware of the limitations of the load they are carrying to ensure that 
they do not cause an incident. Examples of this can include cornering at the wrong speed or 
simply colliding with an object due to forgetting the size of the goods. 
 
But when you get into the over-dimensional freight where it’s wider than what the trailer is 
or if it’s super high load you’ve got to take into consideration of are you going to hit 
anything through the course of the journey. And the same for the width, you’ve got to be 
considerate of who you put on there, it’s got to be a person that’s experienced in that sort –  
When you are transporting the gear on the road we transport up to 42m so you need police 
escorts, pilot escorts, your lights to be switched on in your head and then you have to trust 
that all the other people on the road have a little bit of courtesy and respect. (Company B 
Branch Manager Four) 
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Finally, with heavier products there is an increased potential for harm resulting from 
freight falling off of the trailer. Further, in the event of this occurring, the time taken to 
remove a fallen object from the road is increased by the need for specialised equipment. 
Thus, ensuring that the load is adequately restrained becomes even more important. However, 
due to the weight of the product, adequate restraint is made more difficult as vibrations along 
the road can cause a loss of tension. It is therefore necessary for drivers to regularly check 
their restraints. 
 
8.8.4.4. Craned loads 
There are two types of craned loads commonly used by company B. The first are those 
which can be loaded and unloaded by a trailer mounted crane and the second are those that 
are unloaded by a crane operated by a customer. Regardless of the type of crane required, 
there are a number of risks faced by the driver. A driver is typically required to climb onto 
the back of the trailer in order attach the crane cable/chain around the goods, increasing the 
risk of falls. Additionally, the driver must be sufficiently clear of the load in case the goods 
fall from the crane. When unloading goods with a trailer mounted crane, drivers must also be 
aware of powerlines. Whilst drivers are encouraged by Company B to refuse the work if they 
– of work that knows the hazards to look for and knows that driving around corners you’ve 
got to take a wider sweep to get around corners and that sort of thing. (Company B 
Operational Manager) 
Yeah throughout the drive, particularly if you’re carrying whatever you’re carrying, you 
have to stop at points throughout the drive to check your load restraints, check they haven’t 
come loose. If you’re carrying a large piece of mining equipment, that tension can come 
loose with the vibration of the road, vibration of the vehicle so you’d have to pull over 
every few hours to check them. (Company B Director) 
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believe it is dangerous, one driver suggested that many drivers believe themselves to be 
capable of working safely in dangerous conditions. 
 
8.8.4.5. Livestock  
Whilst the risks associated with utilising livestock crates and the limitations working 
with livestock places on driving hours and the use of PPE were already discussed, a number 
of additional issues were raised by members of Company C. First, when transporting 
livestock the potential to damage the ‘goods’ is increased and can have significant costs to 
the transporting company and their customers. It was noted that bruising of cattle during 
transport may cost the grazier significantly, as the animal is less suitable for use as meat. 
Further, cattle which fall over are at risk of being crushed or trampled and may die. In the 
event that an animal is harmed or killed, the transport company may be at risk of punishment 
from animal welfare agencies and may need to pay damages to the grazier. Additionally, as 
cattle may move around within the crate, there is an increased risk of rolling the truck if it is 
poorly loaded. It was indicated that it is, therefore, necessary to drive more carefully and to 
ensure that the load is heavier on the lower level of the crate. Lastly, it was noted that it is 
necessary for drivers to understand that cattle are animals with their own personality and 
transporters are required to have a level of empathy with their load. 
 
My men actually form little relationships. That sounds really crazy, that sounds really 
stupid but they’ll ring me up and say oh the old girl she’s got her head out here, she’s 
looking at me and you know what I mean, all of this little baby is in the corner there how –  
 
The powerlines are often lower than they are meant to be so sometimes we are touching 
them... Most of the guys have been here long enough that they know how to work around 
powerlines... but some of the newer guys refuse the work ... we’re not working in dangerous 
conditions... you just gotta be safe. (Company B Driver One) 
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8.8.5. Summary: Environmental and situational factors 
In addition to interpersonal contextual factors, there are a number of inanimate 
contextual factors which may influence safety in the heavy vehicle industry. These included 
factors related to road design and conditions, truck designs, environmental conditions and the 
load being carried. These factors influence safety by providing the immediate contextual 
setting in which behaviours occur. Whilst many of the previously discussed contextual 
influences, such as government departments, exert their influence through modifying the 
decisions of drivers, environmental and situational factors appear to exert their primary 
influence through presenting hazards and scenarios which require action. Some of the 
identified factors pose a direct hazard to the driver, for example slippery or rough road 
surfaces. Additionally, however, they can also serve to increase the risks associated with 
other hazards. For instance, crashes with other vehicles may be more likely due to truck blind 
spots and stopping distance. 
8.9. SUMMARY: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE SAFETY 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline and detail the contextual influences on safety 
which may interact with the culture of the industry to shape driver behaviours. Whilst the role 
of the organisation was detailed in the previous chapter, the current chapter explored the 
influence of: (1) national and global climate; (2) government departments and enforcement; 
(3) the general public; (4) the customer; (5) accreditation schemes; (6) the broader industry; 
– cute is that? And so they form this, because they do have a personality and every cow is a 
little bit different you know. Some that you know are going to eat you when you look at 
them and some that and you would have seen that. You would have seen the other day when 
you loaded them up and I think got their head out, what’s going on today? (Company C 
Manager) 
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and (7) environmental and situational Factors. At a broad level, these influences can be 
categorised under either: (a) the external context surrounding the industry; (b) the industrial 
context; or (c) the environmental context. This categorisation is used in Figure 8.1 below. 
Whilst each of these factors holds relevance to the current safety culture framework, they 
would not receive attention within traditional views of safety culture. Whilst some of the 
above factors are relevant in many industries, many hold specific relevance for the heavy 
vehicle industry. The wide variety of factors present makes the heavy vehicle industry a 
particularly complicated example of safety culture. The next chapter examines cultural 
factors present within the studied organisations. 
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Figure 8.1: Contextual influences on safety identified within the Study Three 
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9.  
Chapter 9: Study Three Results Part III – Cultural Influences on Safety  
 
 
 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
Study Three consisted of a series of three case studies with transport organisations. 
During these case studies, observations of drivers and interviews with organisational staff and 
drivers were conducted. The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, which forms the 
theoretical framework for the current research, emphasises safety outcomes that are the result 
of behaviours influenced by culture and specific contextual factors. The purpose of Study 
Three was to examine how cultural and contextual factors affect safety-related behaviours 
through the use of case studies. Chapters 7 and 8 reported on the specific context surrounding 
drivers. The next component of the current framework which should be explored is the 
culture held by drivers. Study Three identified a number of cultural syndromes or 
dimensions, referred to throughout this chapter as cultural traits. Prior to exploring these 
traits, it is important to note that due to the use of qualitative research methods, the identified 
factors could still be viewed as potential cultural traits, as the extent to which they are shared 
is yet to be demonstrated. Nonetheless, the ethnographic methodology which was used in 
Study Three is the standard method used to explore cultures and it is evident that these traits 
were shared to at least some extent within each of the studied organisations.
Each of the discussed cultural traits was held by drivers. There are a number of reasons 
for focussing on the culture of drivers rather than managers and organisational staff. First, a 
Chapter Focus 
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significant proportion of safety-related behaviours within the industry are performed by 
individual drivers. Whilst organisational staff member (managers and administrative 
personnel) behaviour influences the context surrounding the driver, it is ultimately the 
driver’s behaviour that causes an incident (with exception to crashes caused by other 
vehicles). Second, though culture may influence decisions of organisational staff, it is often 
suggested within the literature that a leader should aim to develop or create a ‘positive’ or 
‘good’ safety culture (e.g. Choudhry et al., 2007; M. Cooper, D., 2000; Crum & Morrow, 
2002; International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1991, 1992; Sully, 2001). Schein (1992) 
even suggests that creating a good organisational culture is the ultimate responsibility of a 
leader. While the ability to change or shape culture is debated within the literature, if an 
organisation’s leadership is truly interested in influencing safety they must be able to step 
outside of their culture to seek improved safety. On this basis, the culture of organisational 
leadership is not relevant for an organisation seeking to improve safety, as their leaders will 
lay aside their beliefs and values to make decisions which will improve safety. This chapter 
focuses on cultural traits held but drivers, but also indicates where it was evident that these 
cultural traits also applied to organisational staff members.  A number of quotes from 
managers have been used to illustrate the traits identified. Due to the fact that recording was 
not possible during observations, it was difficult to gain accurate quotes from drivers. 
Wherever possible, quotes from drivers have been used, however, at times managers and 
organisational staff accurately described the identified traits in a more fluent manner than 
drivers. In these cases the quotes have been used to provide thicker description and to better 
convey the nature of the traits identified. 
9.1.1. The format of the current chapter 
Study Three used an ethnographic, grounded theory approach to examining the culture 
of the industry through a selection of three organisations, somewhat representative of the 
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broader industry. As such, the identified cultural traits were identified from data, with only 
the definitional condition that they be shared (within a single organisation) beliefs, attitudes 
and values which appeared to influence safety. Despite taking a grounded approach, there 
was a significant overlap between the identified traits and a series of example cultural 
dimensions identified by Schein (1990, 1992). The overlapping dimensions appeared to form 
the underlying core group of cultural traits identified within the case studies and, as such, are 
discussed in the first half of this chapter (section 9.2). Though the traits were identified 
inductively, through the use of grounded theory, the dimensions identified by Schein have 
been overlayed upon these underlying traits to provide an organising structure enabling easier 
reading and understanding. Additionally, whilst the current research is based upon the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, in this conceptualisation cultural traits include 
any shared beliefs, attitudes and values which impact upon safety. Thus, the use of Schein’s 
cultural dimensions does not conflict with, or replace, the current framework, but serves to 
provide internal structure to the existing framework.  
Study Three also identified a number of traits which appeared to be specific 
applications of these underlying traits, or the result of a combination of cultural and 
contextual factors. As these traits appeared to be a result or application of underlying traits, 
they formed a somewhat tiered structure and have been labelled as second and third order 
traits to highlight this structure. These traits are discussed in the second half of the current 
chapter (section 9.3).  
It was stated in section 2.3.5 that culture does not lead directly to behaviour, but rather 
interacts with specific contextual factors. However, in some cases it was seen that culture 
could directly shape behaviour without requiring interactions with contextual factors. In these 
cases, the direct behavioural outcomes of cultural traits will be discussed; however, for the 
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vast majority of cultural traits, the effect they have on behaviour will be discussed in Chapter 
10.  
Prior to presenting the identified traits, however, it is important to note that many 
sources were used to identify multiple cultural traits. Thus, the discussion of some traits can 
be seen to overlap. Whilst related, or even apparently conflicting, cultural traits may be 
evident within the discussion of a given trait, the current chapter focusses on individual traits 
to enable in depth discussion, rather than shallow discussion of multiple traits simultaneously.  
Additionally, many of the cultural beliefs, attitudes and values could be seen to be at 
odds with safe behaviours. Further, at times the beliefs held by drivers do not align with 
objective truth or with what research has shown to be true (for example, some drivers 
suggested that they could drive for 10 hours straight without being fatigued despite 
significant evidence to the contrary). However, as discussed in section 2.3.1, there is 
significant debate within the literature as to the extent to which it is possible to change 
culture. Thus, there is little benefit to critiquing the validity of cultural beliefs and values. 
Conversely, by understanding the culture held by drivers it is possible to understand their 
behaviour and thus identify changes that could be made to the structures and systems which 
surround them in order to shape behaviour in the presence of problematic beliefs. Thus, the 
current chapter seeks to understand the culture of drivers and gain insight on their perspective 
of safety, rather than to identify faults within their beliefs. Whilst it is occasionally noted 
where beliefs are incorrect, this is not typically pertinent to the current discussion. 
9.2. UNDERLYING CULTURAL TRAITS 
Schein (1990, 1992) identified a number of cultural dimensions which overlap 
considerably with the cultural traits identified within Study Three. These dimensions were: 
(1) the organisations relationship to its environment; (2) the nature of human activity; (3) the 
nature of reality and truth; (4) the nature of time; (5) the nature of human nature; (6) the 
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nature of human relationships; and (7) homogeneity versus diversity. Only the final 
dimension, homogeneity versus diversity, was not present within Study Three.  
It was stated by Schein (1990) that these dimensions were drawn from 
“anthropological typologies of universal issues faced by all societies” (p.112). Thus, it is not 
surprising that there was some degree of overlap between these dimensions and the cultural 
traits identified in this study. In fact, the noted overlap could be argued to show support for 
these traits as likely dimensions present to differing degrees throughout the broader industry. 
These dimensions were used to categorise a number of more specific traits identified within 
the study. 
9.2.1. The industry and organisations relationship to its environment  
Schein’s (1990) first typological dimension was the organisation’s relationship to its 
environment. Schein (p.114) suggested that a central question to this dimension was “does 
the organisation perceive itself to be dominant, submissive, harmonising, searching out a 
niche?” In the context of the present study, it is important to understand how each company 
views itself relative to its broader context. Whilst the target environment differed between 
each company, it was apparent that they each perceived themselves to be unique, aligning 
somewhat with the concept of ‘searching out a niche’. 
9.2.1.1.  The uniqueness of the industry/organisation 
Each of the studied organisations viewed themselves to be unique. In Company A this 
uniqueness was extended to the industry as a whole, in Company C this it extended to the 
livestock transporting industry, and in Company B it was specific to the organisation. Each 
organisation is discussed separately below. 
Company A. Members of Company A expressed a belief that the industry is different to 
other industries and vocations. This uniqueness is based upon the nature and requirements of 
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their work, the challenges the industry faces and the individuals who are part of the industry. 
This perceived uniqueness has two major effects on safety. First, members of Company A 
regularly indicated that the individuals who write policies for the industry have never driven a 
truck. It was believed that individuals outside of the industry, while well meaning, do not 
understand the industry and, therefore, make incorrect policy decisions. This contributes to a 
perception that policies are typically impractical or simply wrong. As discussed in section 
9.3.3, this perception can influence compliance rates. This perceived uniqueness of the 
industry can result in a resistance to policies. 
 
Secondly, because of this uniqueness, safety aims such as zero harm may not be 
believed to apply to the industry. Members of Company A suggested that due to the nature of 
the task, there is little more that can be done about safety within the industry. One staff 
member indicated that due to the long history of the industry, it is already quite controlled 
and has been made as safe as is possible at this time. Therefore, perceived uniqueness also 
may reduce self-efficacy regarding the ability to improve safety. 
 
Company C. Similarly to Company A, Company C appeared to believe that livestock 
transporters should be exempt from many industry legislations. It was stated by the 
driver/manager of Company C that “every time there is a story on the news about truck 
drivers being bad they hit us all with more legislations”, but “the livestock transport industry 
is so much different to the rest”. This was particularly relevant to fatigue management laws, 
The industry has improved heaps since I started... But it comes a time when it can’t get any 
better... It’s as good as it will get... It’s the nature of the task. (Company A Driver Three) 
 
The industry is so different to anything else... Drivers are a breed of their own... the 
industry attracts a certain type of person and shapes them too... To be a good driver you’ve 
gotta have it in your blood, or at least understand it. (Company A Driver Three) 
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which were considered to be unsuited to the livestock transport industry. Whilst the belief 
that fatigue management laws do not suit the industry was largely based on contextual 
variations between livestock transport and other transporters, the perception that livestock 
transport is unique appeared may provide an internal justification for non-compliance. 
 
Company B. Whilst Companies A and C viewed the industry, or their section thereof, as 
unique resulting in legislations not suiting them, this pattern was not evident in Company B. 
Nonetheless, members of Company B considered their organisation to be unique compared to 
the broader industry. This uniqueness was a source of pride, linked with positive practices. 
Relative to other organisations, one Company B manager indicated that “Company B is 
probably one of the ones that is most focussed on safety that I’ve been with”. Similarly, one 
Company B driver stated that “other truck companies I’ve worked for seemed a bit shifty but 
So as far as the laws go I’d like to see all that rural side of driving exempt from logbooks 
on unsealed roads because you can’t do 800 k in five hours. Some days it takes you a 
hundred, to do 150k, might take you four hours. So by the time you get to the sealed road 
you can’t go anywhere. Which makes it hard... and while you’re driving on those unsealed 
roads at a slow speed there’s no other traffic, there’s only you and the road. There’s nobody 
to worry about, you haven’t got to worry about trucks coming at you or cars coming at you 
or cars overtaking you or anything like that. It’s just you and the environment if you want 
to call it that. I don't know what the word is. So once you do get over that then you got to 
your sealed sections of your road it’s like starting a new day. Does that make sense?... plus 
with our industry we’re also stopping a lot anyway when you do stop and check your cattle 
and have a walk about, you check cows, you kick your tyres, that sort of stuff, that’s all a 
part of it...it’s the only industry it’s part of.  You don't have to stop and check your bananas 
or your pallets of god knows what. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Company B are good”, arguing that “it’s all above board, nice and simple, pays well and I 
get to spend a lot of time with my family”. 
This positive form of uniqueness was often present in discussions of the role of 
government and customers. Company B often exceeds legal requirements, particularly for 
fatigue and load restraint, and avoids competition by servicing a niche market. The direct 
impact of this trait on safety was unclear, however, drivers may go to greater lengths to 
uphold the perceived unique safety focus. 
 
9.2.1.2.  The industry and organisations’ relationships to its environment: 
Summary 
Each company believe themselves to be unique. This uniqueness applied to either the 
broader industry, a subsection of the industry, or their organisation alone. Perceptions 
regarding broader uniqueness appeared to result in a belief that external governance was 
inappropriate, particularly as ‘only members of the industry could understand how the 
industry works’. This has the potential to justify unsafe acts. Conversely, however, within 
I think the fines affect the business but you’ve met (Director). I don't know your opinion 
there but they’re a family organisation. They’re a family, they give a shit about their people 
you know I was involved in the passing of one of our employees and the effort that 
Company B went to in that regard. They didn’t have to, financially umm let’s not put it 
morally, it’s financially and supportive, in a supportive manner they were there for the 
family you know. They didn’t have to, there was no rule or regulation that said here we 
need to give you some money oh we need to ring up and make sure you’re okay. We need to 
offer you assistance through guidance counselling. They don't have to do that, they choose 
to do that you know. (Company B Branch Manager Four)  
 
Chapter 9: Study III Results – Culture  285 
  
Company B the perceived uniqueness of the company was used to explain why the company 
exceeds the standards of others and may set a high benchmark for drivers to strive toward.  
9.2.2. The nature of human activity 
The second dimension highlighted by Schein (1990) was entitled the nature of human 
activity. The central question to this dimension was said to be “is the “correct” way for 
humans to behave to be dominant/pro-active, harmonizing, or passive/fatalistic?” (p.114). A 
number of work expectation-related traits were identified in Study Three. Whilst Schein’s 
question suggested ‘correctness’ to be important, which is common within his writing, within 
the studies these traits generally centred around the way a driver would act, not necessarily 
whether this was correct. The expectations, beliefs, attitudes and values which were identified 
in this category included: (1) hard work; (2) fairness; (3) ‘hold your line’; and (4) safety. 
9.2.2.1.  Hard work 
Many members of the industry have a strong work ethic and place high expectations on 
one another. Drivers feel a sense of achievement from a well-executed, hard day’s work. 
 
Further, many members of the studied organisations had a low tolerance for laziness. 
One Company A driver stated that “there’s no reason the guys can’t do what they are asked 
Like when you get, when you load them and when you get to where you deliver them there’s 
no better feeling than to have all your stock walk off all good and you’ve achieved 
something. I mean there’s a big sense of achievement in delivering your freight, call it 
freight, all in good order. So you don't want to be stopping hard and throwing them down 
and causing them to stress and giving you a headache. So you just do what you do.  And it’s 
like mowing the grass, you mow the grass and you look back and you think geez I’ve done a 
good job today. (Company C Manager) 
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to do... they are just lazy and whingers”. Similarly, the Company C manager indicated that 
they are angered by workers who oversleep out of laziness. 
 
Due to this ‘hard work’ ethic, drivers may feel pressure to work beyond their ability. 
For example, one Company A driver stated that “other guys just get to a loading point and 
just nap in the bunk when they should be offering help”, suggesting that fatigued drivers 
should not rest. Pressure from this trait was less evident in Company B drivers, however, it 
was still evident that drivers had a high work ethic.  
I sent him to do a job to (location), he cross loaded onto somebody else’s because we don't 
do any more long distance as into Brisbane anymore because of the driving hours issue. 
Sent him there, cross loaded onto (company name) at six o’clock that night. Was meant to 
be somewhere else within plenty of time the next day, he rang me at 8:30 in the morning 
and he was 400 kilometres away from where he had to be and...and....like it’s 14 hours 
later. I did ring him up and wanted to know where he was, he actually rang me and said 
‘I'm still at the hundred mile ha, ha’.  Now I don't care that he was still there except that 
it’s 14 hours later. It’s not, you know I'm not pushing him to say, you know, you’ve only 
had four hours sleep and that’s all you need, you better go. There’s a need from my 
perspective and you know 34 years in business reliability is what we actually, it’s our 
motto, reliability backed on experience that’s what we do.  Backed by..and he knows that, 
he’s been with us for quite a while. I was angry with him. Not because he had a sleep 
because of course you’re allowed to have a sleep and not because he slept in but 14 hours 
after you’ve had two days off for me was just too much. And too much, look I could sleep 24 
hours a day too if you let me. But if you’ve got a commitment and you had plenty of sleep 
it’s not a big deal to set the alarm to get up. (Company C Manager) 
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Despite the absence of correctness from some of the traits in this category, managers 
indicated that hard work was the correct behaviour for drivers. It was indicated by one 
Company B manager that drivers should have a mentality of doing whatever is required for 
their employer. 
 
This hard work trait also directly relates to safety through shaping expectations 
surrounding an injury. Organisational staff members within Company A had a low tolerance 
for lost time injuries. One Company A manager discussed his own experience with 
rehabilitation and insurance claims after a serious car crash, stating that whilst he was able to 
return to work after a couple of weeks, a specialist suggested that they would prescribe five 
years off work. The manager found this to be ridiculous, stating that there was no need for 
such an extensive recovery period, as he could return to work after two weeks.  
 
The expectation that individuals should be able to work through pain and return to work 
may be unreasonable. Nonetheless, it was common to hear organisational staff members and 
You get other blokes here that you know you could chop their arm off and it’s like ‘oh fuck 
I’ve got to go to work, but fuck, my arm, you know; it’s not even there but it’s still sore’. 
And then there’s just stupid shit, the blokes just need a month off work because they pulled 
a muscle. (Company A Manager One) 
 
You know you need a union to back you up, why? If you do the right thing, if you get 
employed; I’m employed between the hours of eight and six, if you don't want me to kill 
anybody or do anything wrong, I’ll do whatever you like. Want me to wear a dress to work 
I don't care. If that’s what my employment involves right? I’ve agreed to work for the 
company, yes I’ve got a piece of paper that says I’ll do all these things but I do more than 
that, some days I do less. But you know ultimately do you want to work for a company? 
(Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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drivers suggest that certain individuals, who could work withstanding significant pain, were 
better workers than others.  
 
Whilst this aspect was also less evident in company B, it was clear that one of the 
company directors had a high level of respect for individuals who aimed to return to work 
with minimal compensation after an injury. 
 
 
 
I had one person who fell off the truck, the trailer and fractured his hip. Fifty per cent 
overall permanent impairment, can’t drive a truck today, has never gone common law. 
Could have gone to state claim and common law no worries, never gone common law 
because he felt supported through the process. He has a job that he still works around the 
heavy vehicle injury but he just said, I'm not that type of person. I don’t believe in that sort 
of system. I’ve got a payout that has been sufficient for me to do what I need to do for 
ongoing surgery because he needed a hip replacement in the end and that came out of a 
stat payment. He did all that, he’s happy... I’ve got some people that use the system because 
they know they’ve got money and they’re not really going to need it going forward but they 
know they can get it. Got other people who don’t believe that they should milk the system 
like that then we have other injuries where people haven’t even, they don’t even think about 
it. They just focus on, I'm going to get back to work and it’s a small part and it’s then back 
on the job. (Company B Director) 
I don't really, you know, we had a bloke I think it was earlier this year that broke his ankle. 
He broke his ankle at Wyong, that’s just out of Sydney, fell off the back of the truck and 
broke his ankle. He drove it to Kempsey before he said I can’t go any further. That’s a 
fucking good bloke. (Company A Manager One) 
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9.2.2.2.  Fairness 
Drivers within the studied organisations also placed a large focus on ‘fairness’. Many 
rules and regulations were considered to be unfair, whether due to sole application to the 
heavy vehicle industry or simply the nature of the regulation. Further, a number of drivers 
made reference to the work diaries fines resulting from spelling errors, though as stated by 
one Company A driver, if “if the RTA make a mistake though it is different”. Similarly, one 
Company C driver stated that the design of work diaries placed unfair restrictions on truck 
drivers that are not required of other workers. The driver compared truck drivers to police 
officers and doctors, indicating that doctors who work long hours then drive home are highly 
respected, yet that if a truck driver works 16 hours they are considered ‘a criminal’. 
 
Within company B, it was suggested that the company owners place unfair expectations 
on drivers which they do not place on themselves. For example, one driver indicated that the 
owners believe that small accidents were not possible for good drivers, yet, when the owners 
have made a mistake they simply get someone else to fix it. Whilst it may appear this way to 
a driver, it is important to note that the owners would likely be equally disappointed with 
their own mistakes as the mistakes of others, viewing their financial loss as significant self-
punishment. Nonetheless, the perception of a lack of fairness highlights this trait in drivers. 
Police that book you they work eight hours but then they go home and you can be sure they 
don’t go to bed, they play with their families and it makes it a 16-hour day, what’s the 
difference? Even doctors, there’s a huge doctor shortage, but the intern that does a double 
shift, he’s a hero, but if I work 16 hours I’m a criminal. Fatigue is fatigue, if you work a 
long day then drive 20 minutes it’s the same as driving all day and I’ve been doing it for 20 
years, I know the signs of fatigue but they are doing it because of circumstance that bought 
it up. (Company C Driver 3) 
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There to be two primary means by which safety may be influenced by the fairness trait. 
Firstly, as indicated by one Company A manager, rather than accepting responsibility and 
punishments for speeding infringements, some drivers will “get the shits and finish up 
because they think it’s unfair”. These drivers may then seek employment within less safe 
organisations which they view as fair. Further, companies may be restricted in their use of 
enforcement out of fear of losing workers. Second, though never observed, the perception 
that regulations and policies are unfair may serve as a catalyst for non-compliance. However, 
one manager highlighted that despite viewing specific heavy vehicle fatigue and licensing 
regulations as unfair, many believe that they should apply to other drivers, not that the 
policies are wrong. Thus unfairness cannot be confused with disagreement with the principle 
of policies. 
 
Little Johnnie can drive his little bubble car alright? You can drive that, let’s just say you 
live at Brown’s Plains and you work here, takes you 10 minutes every day for 30 years, 
then you retire and you go and buy a monstrous big frigging F250 and a 36-foot caravan 
and off you go. You don't need another licence, you can do that, but a truck driver can’t. 
The bloke who drives a 12-tonne rigid with no trailer licence he can’t do that, yet he can 
go home and tow a trailer. He has more experience than the average Joe Blow driving a 
trailer yet the truck driver is, again what is it, because of their potential to cause harm or 
death? They are regulated so highly. And I don't disagree with it, I'm not saying they 
shouldn’t be, I think the regulation is great, I just think there should be more of it lower 
down. There should be more of it down where we start. You know we put kids in charge of 
frigging missiles, no regulation. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
Accidents can’t happen as far as they are concerned, not major ones but small ones. But if 
the owner makes a mistake he can just tell someone to fix it. (Company B Driver Three) 
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9.2.2.3.   ‘Hold your line’ 
Another key work expectation highlighted within Study Three was that as a driver, you 
should ‘hold your line’. In essence, holding your line means to maintain your current course 
as much as is possible. Whilst it was indicated by one Company A driver that many truck 
drivers dislike a certain company who use lower speed limits, resulting in holding up other 
drivers, the driver stated that ‘if they are holding their line, they’re not doing anything 
wrong’. 
This trait bears immediate relevance to the interactions between trucks and other 
vehicles on the road. Three specific scenarios were identified as posing as issue potentially 
requiring drivers to hold their line. These were overtaking, when a car brakes heavily in front 
of a truck, and when another vehicle drifts into oncoming traffic. As put by one Company A 
driver, when a truck tries to overtake a car and the car speeds up “there’s not much you can 
do, you’ve gotta hold your line”. Due to the shortness of many overtaking lanes, there is a 
heightened risk of a crash, rather than suggest the truck driver slow down to avoid a collision 
the driver simply said “if they want to play games with a truck they shouldn’t be on the 
road”.  
One Company B driver also gave significant discussion to cars that brake heavily in 
front of a truck. The driver noted that they have been instructed, due to the risks associated 
with steel transport (section 8.8.4.1), not to brake suddenly under any circumstances. Due to 
the potential for truck driver injury from shifting loads, it was seen to be better to run into the 
back of a car than brake to avoid a crash. 
 
With steel if a car stops in front, (trainer name) said don’t slam the brakes, hit them. The 
steel will go through the cab. It’s not about fault or anything it’s just not safe. (Company B 
Driver Two) 
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Similarly, when a car drifts into oncoming traffic risking a collision with a truck, a 
number of drivers suggested that the truck driver has to hold their line due to the potential 
outcomes associated with different actions. If the car driver is able to recover in time and 
return to their own lane, a crash will be averted by the truck driver holding their line. 
Alternatively, if the truck driver swerves they risk a potentially fatal single vehicle crash or 
an at-fault crash with another vehicle in the opposite lane. Additionally, if they swerve into 
the opposite lane and the car driver recovers, they will be deemed at fault for the crash, due to 
being on the wrong side of the road. Unfortunately, however, if the car driver does not 
recover, the decision to hold their line may result in the car driver’s death. Thus, no matter 
what course of action is taken, there is a risk of a fatality crash. However, the truck driver is 
at greater risk of personal injury, death and legal repercussions if they swerve. Many such 
discussions occurred, yet they were typically hypothetical in nature and none of the drivers 
could guarantee how they would instinctively react in this situation. As argued by one 
Company B driver “instinct will stop you from ploughing through a car; plus there could be 
a family in there. I think I’d run off the road, even though we’d probably die”. Nonetheless, 
in these hypothetical scenarios the majority of drivers suggested they would hold their line. 
 
This trait was absent from Company C. The expectation for drivers to hold their line 
generally emerged when discussing interactions other vehicles. The higher proportion of time 
spent on dirt roads away from other traffic may explain the absence of this trait within 
Company C. 
 
 
When someone drifts over you need to hold your line... If you crash without them it’s your 
fault and if you go into their lane to avoid them then they wake up and swing back to their 
lane it’s your fault for being in their lane. (Company A Driver Two) 
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9.2.2.4.   Safety 
Central to the effect of culture on safety are the drivers’ attitudes towards safety. 
Generally speaking, drivers were willing to go to great lengths for safety. Drivers often 
indicated a high priority on safety and were willing to ignore infringements on other cultural 
traits in the name of safety. The value placed on safety often appeared to override a number 
of other cultural traits. 
 
As said by one driver from Company B, “safety is absolutely paramount”. Another 
Company B driver simply stated “safety is safety”. One Company A driver even suggested 
that despite public opinion holding that truck drivers do not care about car drivers, “at the 
end of the day it’s about our safety too, I want to go home and see my partner”. Thus, within 
the studied organisations, drivers often stated that safety was a key behavioural motivator. 
 
It was often noted that drivers need to be motivated by safety to adhere to policies and 
practices. For reasons explained in section 9.3.1, members of Company B were more likely to 
see the safety benefit of given actions and are over-represented within the following 
discussion. Nonetheless, this trait was clearly present within each company. As stated by one 
Company B Driver, “I don’t take chances, we just do everything in accordance with what 
we’re supposed to do at (Company B)”. Similarly, another Company B driver stated that “at 
the end of the day you just want to go home, so if you follow the policies and procedures 
everything should happen”. If drivers believe that a given policy has safety benefits they are 
I try to keep a safe distance, if another vehicle pulls in front of me I slow down a bit... once 
again it’s about safety, I want to go home to my family. (Company B Driver Four) 
 
 
These guys leave you alone, but you’re never really alone, they track you, but they are 
checking up on you for your own wellbeing so it’s ok... If you took it wrong you could get 
angry about it but it’s for your safety. (Company C Driver Two) 
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highly likely to comply. As stated by one Company B manager, “people have got to want to 
be safe”. 
 
In regards to seatbelt use, a number of Company B drivers specifically cited safety as 
their motivation for compliance. Even when acknowledging other motivations, one Company 
B driver stated that “there’s a fine too but I don’t wanna die in a crash”. 
Similarly, one Company C driver indicated that, despite having exceeded fatigue 
regulations on many occasions in the past and utilised substances to assist in driving long 
hours, increased traffic in recent years means he no longer considers this type of behaviour to 
be safe and now adheres to the policies. 
 
Further, whilst there are many pressures and demands within the industry which may 
lead to some drivers conducting unsafe behaviours, if a driver perceives the requested course 
of action to be unsafe they will typically resist this pressure. For example, one Company C 
driver said “I don’t care who I work for, I’m not taking drugs to stay awake, it’s my life at 
risk not theirs”. Drivers within Company A also commonly suggested that, when pressured 
by organisations and customers, it’s “better late than sorry”. This was particularly prevalent 
to fatigue, with one Company A driver stating that “if I need a sleep I do it, it doesn’t matter 
what they say”.  
I’ve been around long enough to talk about the old days. I’ve done days on end with only 
an hours sleep here and there and taken whet was needed to stay awake, but there so much 
more traffic these days it’s not safe, I wouldn’t do it now, self preservation is a pretty good 
motivation. (Company C Driver Three) 
 
If you drive to the conditions, drive to the speed limits, make sure you do everything safe 
and follow the policies and procedures you’ll be ok... You probably look at me and think 
I’m a company man, yeah if you do everything right you’ll be alright. (Company B Driver 
four) 
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Additionally, drivers will conduct activities they are not required to do in order to 
ensure their safety and the safety of others. For example, one Company B driver stated that he 
chooses to always drive with two hands on the steering wheel, “reason being you have better 
control”. This general approach to safety was also highlighted by one Company A driver 
who stated that even when ridiculed for cleaning the ‘long vehicle’ signs on a trailer, he 
continued to clean it because “that is safety, people need to be able to read those signs”. 
Similarly, one Company B driver indicated that whilst he was not required to do so, he 
always checks his load restraint on journeys exceeding 30 minutes as “it only takes two 
minutes to make sure”.  
For drivers to be motivated by safety, they must believe that a given behaviour has the 
potential to reduce harm. This underlying requirement was noted by one Company B 
manager who stated that drivers must have ‘a sincere belief’ that their ‘work can result in 
them hurting themselves’. 
 
Company C drivers indicated that some risks associated with livestock transport are 
easily evident and that they understand the importance of behaving in a safe manner around 
cattle. 
 
Carrying cattle you gotta make sure you don’t get injured by a beast, where you put your 
arms and where you stand, you can quite easily get hurt by getting kicked by the cattle. 
(Company C Driver Three) 
 
That’s I think that’s the underlying fact that the driver has got to have a sincere belief that 
whatever they do when they’re at work can result in them hurting themselves. So 
consequently they need to have that safety focus at all times. (Company B Region Manager 
One) 
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Similarly, the belief that harm can occur led one Company B driver to indicate that, 
whilst he may sound like a ‘do-gooder’, he actually just wants to avoid harming himself or 
others. There were many similar examples within Company B. Rather than discuss each 
example, however, a selection of such cases is present within excerpts over the page. 
 
Despite placing significant value on safety, drivers do not always see the safety benefit 
associated with behaviours. If a driver is expected to complete a ‘safety’ task which they do 
not believe will improve safety, they may not comply. Further, if a legislated behaviour is 
actually believed to increase risk, drivers may choose not to comply. This was common for 
seatbelts. As stated by one manager, “most blokes don’t wear it because they think it’s safer 
without it, and quite often it is in a truck”.  
 
It’s a safe job if you keep your mind to it, but it can be very unsafe if you don’t know what 
you’re doing. (Company B Driver One) 
 
Always have worn a seatbelt... just habit... in an abrupt stop you’ve got more chance of 
surviving if you stay in the truck rather than through the windscreen. (Company B Driver 
Seven) 
 
You do the speed limits for a reason... the signs are on the road for a reason, they’re there 
for safety... you go through roadworks that are 40km/h and some go through at 80km/h... if 
you lose a tyre all sort of things can happen to someone working on the side of the road. 
(Company B Driver Four) 
 
How would you be if you lost a load on a family... fuck dying yourself, that would be worse. 
I might sound like a do-gooder. I’m fucking not I tell you but I just don’t want to get in 
strife... I wanna drag this life out as long as I can. (Company B Driver Three) 
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Similarly, however, if drivers perceive that they can be safe without compliance, they 
are less likely to invest effort to comply. It was noted by one Company B driver that despite a 
legal clearance around power lines, truck crane operators will often breach this legislation as 
they believe they are “not working in dangerous conditions; you just gotta be safe”. As an 
additional example, one Company C driver stated that, when changing a tyre, “if you know 
what you’re doing, it might not look safe but it is”. Thus, due to a lack of safety benefit, 
many safety regulations are considered a waste of time. As stated by one of the directors of 
company B, ultimately this may come down to a narrow view of what safety is. 
These guys have their own safety *pointing to an exclusion zone*... some have nothing, you 
gotta use your common sense ... they’ll let you stand right next to a forklift... but if you 
don’t want to die... This job’s pretty dangerous if you’re not careful... some loads are 12m 
long but the forks of a forklift might only be a metre apart... pretty hard to balance ... you 
can get hit 8m away... Some depots have pissy little forklifts for two tonnes of metal... you 
gotta stand back... depends on the driver of the forklift, some are good but some have no 
idea. (Company B Driver Two) 
 
In the old days I used to jump off the trailer, but now I’m trying to be safer... you’ll hurt 
yourself and bugger your knees... I don’t know if its coz the industry has gotten more aware 
about it or because I have gotten older and more conscious of looking after myself... The 
last company I was with works blokes hard and were working illegal hours. I’m old now; I 
own my house and if I die my wife can sell my bike to pay off the credit card... but I’m not 
risking that for a company.  (Company B Driver Three) 
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Due to the potential to not recognise the safety benefit behind certain policies, it is 
important to identify how to adequately communicate the safety benefits of policies and 
practices to drivers. It was argued by one Company B manager that “if they are 
communicated with properly, they understand”. Thus the means by which drivers identify 
reality and truth, which is discussed in the next section, is of critical importance. 
 
Safety can be frustrating. If you I guess if you look at doing the job that we’re doing now, 
20 years ago we could do it quicker, cheaper, yes we’d have less fingers. But what people 
don't realise is when companies are trying to implement safety they’re not doing it to fuck 
you around, they’re doing it to save your fingers, toes, life you know. And what they don't –  
We have lots of paperwork and it is, we need to cover our arse to prove that we are 
behaving in a safe manner but that’s my view of looking at it. The other view is by having 
the drivers fill out job safety analysis, it is making them think about safety before they do it. 
The guys won’t see that perspective, they’ll just see it as I have to provide a piece of paper, 
I have to fill out this paperwork about it. So I think in their view if they thought it was 
safer, yeah they’ll go do it. But I don’t think they quite understand all the aspects of why it 
is safer. They don’t see this, if I do this here it will avoid something that I never have had 
happen to me before so therefore it mustn’t be really relevant to my safety. If I climb up 
and down from this trailer, it’s not actually safer because I’ve got to take more steps and I 
have more risk of falling off it. Jumping down might actually be safer to me because I’ve 
done it a lot, I’ve never had it happen, I don’t know what they’re talking about, not 
relevant. So it’s their perspective that they have. I can totally see that statement being true 
just by the fact that they’re saying it as ... in so many ways because it’s a narrow-minded 
view of how they define what safe is and what isn’t. (Company B Director) 
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9.2.3. The nature of reality and truth 
The third dimension noted by Schein (1990) was entitled the nature of reality and truth. 
The central questions relating to this dimension (see p.114) was said to be:  
“How do we define what is true and what is not true; and how is truth ultimately 
determined both in the physical and social world? By pragmatic test, reliance on 
wisdom, or social consensus?” 
Within the studied organisations, drivers were found to learn through experience and 
stories rather than relayed facts. Given the relative low frequency of incidents, the industry is 
prone to normalisation of deviance. Additionally, many drivers also place a high value on 
‘common sense’. Each of these issues is discussed below. 
9.2.3.1.   Experiential and narrative learning 
In almost every discussion regarding a safety matter, drivers would resort to either their 
own experience or stories of other drivers. Whilst it easy to find statistics which reveal the 
risk associated with given behaviours, drivers do not view behaviour as unsafe if their own 
experience and stories of others suggest otherwise. This emphasis on experience and stories 
may relate to the fact that, until recently, there has been little focus on safety within the heavy 
– realise there is a massive cost right? The drivers think oh this is frigging...and I do it, the 
points I do it...I go this is frigging stupid, this is ridiculous, safety is out of control.  People 
aren’t throwing money at safety because they don't want the money, they’re throwing 
money at safety because they don't want the injuries and the accidents you know. And it’s 
all, it’s education I guess, everybody is going there, some faster than others.  But if the 
guys I guess if the guys are communicated with properly they understand and yeah we have 
a few negative people at the bottom niggling away. We just have to have, put more in than 
they do you know. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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vehicle industry. It was stated by one Company B manager, that due to the lack of emphasis 
on safety in past years, drivers would typically only learn about safety from the advice of 
friends. The value placed on stories and experience may, therefore, be an artefact of this 
being the only source of advice in past years.  
A number of drivers suggested that their own behaviour was motivated by past 
experience or stories of others. For example, one Company A driver indicated that as a result 
of a collision with a drunk car driver, he would never again drink and drive. Within company 
A, this learning style was particularly important for the use of seatbelts, as every driver had 
stories of people who ‘would have died if they were wearing a seatbelt’. However, a small 
number of drivers cited their own experience with punishments as the motivation for seatbelt 
use.  
 
Interestingly, within Company B, many stories and the behaviours they influence fell 
outside of typical safety concerns within the industry. For example, one driver cited their own 
experience of heart surgery as the reason he needs to watch his health. Similarly, another 
driver related a story of a friend who suffered sciatic nerve damage and was “told never to 
drive with his wallet in his pocket”. The driver said that upon hearing the doctor’s 
recommendation to his friend, “I thought ‘well I’ll practice that’”. 
In Company C these stories and experiences typically related to injuries sustained 
around cattle. For example, the driver/manager of Company C provided a number of stories 
of his own injuries and the injuries of others to explain how to correctly work within a crate. 
It wouldn’t even be the last 20 years where there’s been a big focus on safety and I'm not 
saying it’s wrong I totally agree with it. But before that, like when I was driving... your 
mate might come along to you and say oh just be careful tying that down it might slip and 
that sort of thing but there’s no real focus on safety. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 9: Study III Results – Culture  301 
  
 
Additionally, one Company C driver also cited his own experience as the reason why 
he always wears thongs. The driver argued that he ise safer when wearing thongs, as he is not 
used to the size of the sole of enclosed footwear and is more likely to trip wearing enclosed 
shoes. 
 
Non-safety related consequences were also seen to motivate behaviour. One Company 
A driver stated that his own experience of punishment leads him to wear a seatbelt even 
though he has “had a few friends crash without a seatbelt and said that if they were wearing 
it they would be dead; I just hope I never have to find out”. Whilst this can be seen as a 
simple example of specific deterrence, it demonstrates that many outcomes may be relevant 
in teaching drivers the correct behaviour. 
Experiential learning is by nature retrospective. As stated by one Company B manager 
that “it’s not until an incident happens that a driver goes oh shit and they start to see the 
I’m not really one for safety, I always wear thongs, never my boots. I’ve got them with me 
but I never wear them. I even used to work in steel but got out of that when they got all 
safety focussed. I’m less safe in boots. I have worked with thongs for years and never 
crushed a toe but when I wear boots I trip on everything coz I’m not used to the extra 
depth. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
When the thing kicked me in the face, I knew, I knew soon as I pushed the gate that it was 
going to hurt. You know what I'm saying? Like it’s oh shit. Because the cow’s bum was 
there, I was here, I had the gate, when I touched her with the gate. I knew like you know 
that split second you think oh shit. And when my old mate fell in the crate he was closing 
the gate with his foot. Instead of going down and shutting the gate with his hands he put his 
foot on the gate and pushed the gate. Cow kicked the gate and threw his leg back there. He 
won’t tell you that but that’s a fact. And that would be the worst injury we’ve had. 
(Company C Driver/Manager) 
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bigger picture of it”. Nonetheless, major incidents are not required to learn from experience. 
Near misses and close calls can also be significant source of learning. For example, a number 
of drivers suggested that close calls have taught them how to judge and manage fatigue. 
 
Further, even when an incident occurs there is a need for a lesson to be present in the 
experience (i.e. the driver must be able to make a causal attribution which could be used to 
shape future behaviour) in order for learning to occur. For example, one driver discussed a 
fatigue-related incident in which he awoke with the truck in a highway-side gutter. In this 
case, the driver was unable to take any lesson from the experience as, as far as he knew, he 
had received adequate rest and was prepared for the journey. 
 
Experiential and narrative learning was seen as a frustration by many managers. When 
warning drivers that a given behaviour would result in injury, it was common for managers to 
state that drivers would argue that they have been doing things ‘this way since before you 
were born’ and never had a problem. Despite the potential for false or inaccurate stories, 
drivers often adhere to them.  
The finding that drivers primarily learn through personal experience and stories 
coincides well with past research. The tendency to place personal experience over rules or 
Woke up with the truck in a gutter beside the road and the trailer coming up beside me coz 
it had broke off. Don’t know why it happened or how to avoid it. My friend told me that 
whenever it gets to sunrise or sunset, take a one-hour break, something about the changing 
light conditions puts people to sleep. (Company A Driver One) 
 
Have had a few near misses when tired... never a fatal though... a fair bit of that is luck. 
It’s not that I’m a better driver than others, just lucky to pull out of the near miss... then 
you think ‘Fuck I gotta sleep’... Those experiences help you judge your fatigue... For me, it 
is speed. If I start slowing down and can’t keep it at 100km that’s my first sign. (Company 
A Driver Six) 
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reported truths was also observed within both the truck safety literature (Snyder, 2012) and 
the safety culture literature (Håvold, 2010; Hopkins, 1999) reviewed in Chapters 4 and 2 
respectively. Additionally, Baumeister et al. (2004) found that gossip can be used to teach the 
rules of a culture by highlighting heroic behaviour or revealing how an individual has 
breached certain unspoken rules, serving as an extension of observational learning.  
Because of the importance placed on stories and experience, the use of stories may 
serve as a vital path by which to improve safety within the industry. However, due to the 
perceived uniqueness of the industry, non-truck drivers may be viewed as insufficiently 
knowledgeable to be able to relate stories which are considered believable. For this reason 
future research must explore the perceived legitimacy of stories from various sources to 
confirm the validity of this approach. 
9.2.3.1.1. Normalisation of deviance 
‘Normalisation of deviance’ was a phrase first used to describe a process evident in the 
challenger space shuttle disaster. Vaughan (1996) argued that after successive disaster-free 
flights involving shuttles with the same flaws present in the Challenger shuttle, members of 
NASA began to believe the flaws were acceptable. This process of past experiences justifying 
unsafe acts was referred to as normalisation of deviance (NOD).  
In the heavy vehicle industry, NOD occurs when an unsafe act has regularly occurred 
without severe consequences, leading to the assumption that the behaviour is safe. This 
process was described by one Company B manager who stated that the consequences of 
behaviour are often unknown until it is too late. 
 
And it’s usually, and I've always said to them, it’s the stuff you find out after the incidents 
happen right? Because the drivers will drive around for 30 years and say: I’ve never had 
an incident, never happen to me. You don't know what can happen after the fact. (Company 
B Branch Manager Five) 
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Similarly, the driver/manager of Company C shared an incident involving a driver who 
broke their leg climbing a ladder. It was stated that whilst it could be argued that the incident 
was always likely to occur, “it hadn’t happened”. Thus, due to a lack of past incidents the 
injured driver was performing a task typically deemed safe. 
 
NOD was evident within the industry for a number of safety issues. As discussed in 
section 9.2.2.4, drivers will often work beside powerlines, believing themselves to be 
sufficiently safe. One specific Company B driver even stated that it was safe to operate a 
crane whilst touching powerlines. In this case, due to previous instances in which no incident 
had occurred, the driver did not recognise the dangers associated with this activity. Similarly, 
one Company B manager indicated that many drivers view jumping from a vehicle as safe 
due to a lack of incidents, yet that the impact of each jump can cause repetitive strain injuries. 
 
They don’t climb down, just like a trailer, they will jump from the trailer rather than climb 
down the points. Because my experience is that people seem to do things that are quicker, 
they’ll take shortcuts to do things. So they think they’re young, they’ve done this a hundred 
times before, it’s not that far, the calculated risk they’ll take. But the amount of times 
they’ve done that, there’s just going to be one time they jump and then they go, my knee –  
There was another one, a bloke, but this was at the sale yard on a very dewy wet morning, 
a cover up job. He went to climb the ladder to go up to the top ramp, it had no hand rails 
on the ladder, just a ladder, just a ladder. He put his foot on the ladder and grabbed the 
ladder because there was no rails and he’d been doing it for 50 years, the same old ladder 
had been there, but it was just one of those things. You could say it was an accident going 
somewhere to happen but it hadn’t happened.  And when he grabbed the rail the ..the 
runners of the ladder it was slippery from the dew, his hand slipped, his foot went through 
the rungs and he fell back and broke his leg off there. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Minor injuries can also be viewed as acceptable in the absence of serious injuries. For 
example, when the driver/manager of Company C was discussing being struck by a kicked 
gate, it was stated that being “kicked in the head with a gate” is “normal in the livestock 
industry”.  
NOD appeared to be the cause of resistance to instruction within Company A. However 
this was not solely a driver issue. It was evident that NOD also occurs at the organisational 
level. For example, one Company A manager stated that speeding was common and that the 
organisation has few speed-related incidents. Due to the lack of incidents, speeding was not 
viewed as sufficiently dangerous to warrant significant attention. 
 
NOD may be somewhat unavoidable within the industry. Crashes and incidents are 
relatively rare, even in the presence of unsafe behaviour, due to fact that many factors must 
align to produce an incident. Many unsafe behaviours may increase risk, yet do not guarantee 
an incident. Thus, unsafe behaviour can be conducted many times before other circumstances 
occur which cumulate in an incident. Additionally, when multiple risk factors align, it is 
common for incidents to be attributed to the most novel factor. For example, if a driver is 
speeding and a car cuts across his path resulting in a crash, it is most likely that the car driver 
will be blamed for the incident, even if the incident would have been avoided at lower speeds. 
This is both a cause and effect of normalisation of deviance, in that false attributions 
contribute to a belief that behaviour is safe and a belief that behaviour is safe reduces the 
likelihood of the behaviour being labelled as the cause of the incident.  
– hurts from that one jump. No it’s not from the one jump, it’s from the 200 jumps you’ve 
done prior because you’ve just taken it as, ‘this is okay’. (Company B Director) 
But you know everyone does it, it’s not a purposeful thing; it just happens you know. We 
have very, very few speed-related crashes. They’re normally road condition-related or 
stupidity-related or fatigue-related. (Organisational Staff Member) 
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Lastly, due to the reliance on stories and experience, drivers may not learn from fatal 
incidents. Whilst many drivers held stories of individuals who ‘would have died’ if they 
weren’t wearing a seatbelt, it is impossible to determine the accuracy of such claims. 
Conversely, drivers who die in an incident cannot share their story. Thus, all first-person 
accounts are drawn from individuals who survived an incident. 
9.2.3.2.  Common sense 
Common sense appeared to be viewed as the second most reliable source of truth about 
safety within the studied organisations. It was common throughout the case studies for drivers 
to state that safety is essentially a matter of common sense. The driver/manager from 
Company C even stated that “it’s all common sense”.  
 
When discussing customer safety precautions one Company B driver stated that “some 
have nothing, you gotta use your common sense”. Thus, the cultural emphasis on common 
sense may have originally stemmed from the autonomy (section 9.2.6.1) and responsibility 
(section 9.3.2) of drivers and regularly changing work environments. As it is difficult for 
organisations and government personal to compile a complete list of policies and procedures 
for safety in every situation, drivers often must rely on their own ability to recognise danger. 
However, it was often indicated that not all driver possess significant common sense. 
 
A lot of safety and all that is just common sense... but a lot of them don’t have all that. 
(Company B Driver Six) 
It’s common sense, you just need to use common sense ... It all comes down to common 
sense, if you drive sensibly and do everything smooth and neat you shouldn’t have any 
problems ... It all comes back to common sense dunnit ... Safety videos we look at all them, 
it’s just common sense ... Just coz you’re a truck driver doesn’t mean you have to 
compromise your common sense and be stupid. (Company B Driver Seven) 
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Due to a past reliance on common sense, many rules and regulations are viewed as 
negative. Further, due to the belief that safety is common sense, many incidents are blamed 
on stupidity. As stated by one Company A driver, “most accidents are from stupidity and 
impatience”. Similarly, even when asked if Company C has experienced many incidents 
when working around crates, the driver/manager simply responded “no; had stupid things 
like common sense things”. Blaming an incident on stupidity typically indicated a deviation 
from ‘common sense’. For example, when discussing injuries resulting from standing close to 
a forklift, one Company B driver said “what did you think would happen if you stand that 
close?” Thus, rather than suggesting better policies and procedures are required, the 
individual is typically blamed for being ‘stupid’. 
 
Blaming an incident on stupidity appeared to also be linked with a desire to distance the 
individual from the organisation. For example, in every discussion of drivers making 
common law claims against the company, one Company A manager attributed the incidents 
to stupidity.  
It’s common sense is the issue, and common sense is not so common here. (Company A 
Health and Safety Officer) 
 
We are breeding idiots these days with the safety... people don’t take responsibility... like 
they’ll get hurt standing next to a forklift... what did you think would happen if you stand 
that close? (Company B Driver Five) 
 
...the guy shouldn’t have been there. What part of stupid don't you understand? You know 
umm it’s just, as I said to you at the beginning of this, it’s common sense, you know, stand 
back where the motor is going to be. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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When an incident is attributed to stupidity, it is unnecessary for the organisation or 
drivers to make changes to prevent recurrence. 
 
9.2.3.3.  Summary: The nature of reality and truth 
There were two key traits identified within Study Three which related to the nature of 
reality and truth. First, drivers learn from experience and stories and may, therefore, be 
resistant to the instruction of others. Due to the relatively low incidence of injuries and 
crashes, however, this trait lends itself towards normalisation of deviance, where unsafe acts 
begin to be viewed as safe and acceptable. Second, potentially due to the autonomous and 
varied nature of the industry, drivers rely more upon common sense than on policies and 
procedures. Due to this reliance on common sense injuries are often blamed on individual 
stupidity rather than procedural flaws. 
9.2.4. The nature of time 
Schein’s (1990) fourth dimension was labelled as the nature of time, within which the 
central question was: “What is our basic orientation in terms of past, present, and future, and 
what kinds of time units are most relevant for the conduct of daily affairs?”. Drivers from 
each company placed a different value on time, resulting in a somewhat bi-polar cultural 
Apart from that just I guess not so much safety but stupidity is the problem rather than... 
people not acting safely or not working safely is just people working stupidly... You can’t 
fix stupidity. Most injuries are just stupidity, blokes doing the wrong thing you know. 
(Company A Manager One) 
 
...now he’s too scared to drive a truck. He had to lose it in the wet because he’s fucking 
retarded, he was driving to Sydney with empty trailers on, he went through the main street 
of a town, 60km/h and lose it in the wet, crashed into the front of a house. (Company A 
Manager One) 
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dimension. Unlike many other cultural traits, contextual factors, particularly the payment 
method of drivers, appear to dictate at which end of the dimension a company’s culture sat. 
Thus each organisation will be discussed separately. 
Company A. Company A drivers see time as a precious commodity and do not like to 
be delayed. As discussed in section 7.3.6.1, drivers from Company A are employed on a 
permanent basis, yet are typically paid a distance-based rate, unless conducting local work, 
which incurs an hourly rate. One Company A driver stated that “on local, time doesn’t matter 
coz you’re paid by the hour; line-haul you want to get finished and get to bed to have your 
long break”. Due to the manner in which drivers are paid, there is an increased incentive to 
attempt to reduce non-driving time or to maximise the distance travelled in a given period of 
time.  
The desire to save time specifically influences speeding. It was often suggested that 
drivers will speed to make up time lost to delays. Whilst typically occurring when running off 
hills, alarmingly, drivers reportedly may also hold higher speeds through small towns. 
 
Additionally, a number of drivers noted that they will not accurately complete pre-trip 
vehicle inspection as they take too long. Finally, this desire to save time was evident even 
So they get to an 80 km/h zone or a 70 or a 60 and they just keep on going. They come into 
an 80 K zone and say keep doing a hundred. And I'm sure you’re guilty of doing it... you 
know you go down the road and it drops back to 80 for a section or whatever and you just 
keep it at whatever was the cruise control was set at. And it’s the same as truck drivers that 
have been stuffed around for the last hour by someone so they just hold it flat through a 
village to make up that time... So you know speeding not so much you know a lot of the 
highway is a hundred but through the towns and that it is somewhat of an issue because 
blokes like to make up time so of course they speed through towns. (Company A Manager 
One) 
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when there was no benefit to faster work. On one observation, a Company A driver stated 
that they would assist in the unloading because “it takes too long otherwise”. After giving 
significant assistance to the unloaders, the driver and researcher waited approximately four 
hours for the return-journey goods to arrive at the customer depot and be loaded. In this case, 
the driver opted to make significant effort to ‘speed up’ the unloading, despite acknowledging 
that the long wait after unloading was expected and occurred every time the same run is 
conducted. 
Company B. All of Company B’s drivers are paid by the hour. Thus, as could be 
expected, Company B drivers placed a lower priority on time. Two drivers particularly 
emphasised this, one stating that “they pay by the hour so you’re not really rushed” and the 
other, “why bother rushing when you are paid by the hour?”  
 
Despite being paid an hourly rate, some drivers still placed significant value on time. 
This may be the result of a history driving under different payment methods. However, it was 
indicated by two drivers that some individuals simply want to spend as little time working as 
possible to get home sooner. Thus, even within Company B there still appears to be a 
subgroup that places a high value on working quickly.  
 
We are paid overtime so there’s no use rushing. I know some of the drivers will work 
during their breaks to get home. I tell them they’re mad; it’s just giving the company 
money. (Company B Driver One) 
 
And the thing about (Company B) where the drivers don't have to push the limit is our 
drivers that go away are paid by the hour. Whereas a lot of companies pay by the trip or by 
the kilometre or others, whereas (Company B) it’s by the hour. So the driver doesn’t have 
to force himself to do the trip a little bit quicker so his pay packet looks a little bit better. 
And that’s a lot of the problem with our industry. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 9: Study III Results – Culture  311 
  
 
Company C. Drivers from Company C are paid a daily rate. Thus, similarly to 
Company B, it could be suggested that there is no financial incentive to save time. However, 
the lack of additional pay for trips that go over time may increase the value placed on time. 
Company C drivers, however, indicated that fatigue management work diaries create 
significant time constraints. Given the industry wide use of work diaries, this likely applies to 
drivers from all companies. Whilst the purpose of work diaries is to limit fatigue through 
limiting maximum working hours, work diaries can motivate drivers to maximise the use of 
these hours. As stated by one Company C driver logbooks might ‘look good on paper’ but the 
limits placed on drivers, lead to pressure to ‘go hard’. 
 
The time spent traversing dirt roads, and the restrictions of animal welfare issues, may 
explain why work diaries were only linked with the value placed on time in Company C. Due 
to these addition pressures, drivers from Company C appeared to place significant emphasis 
on time and desired to avoid delays. 
 
Some other drivers just wanna have a whinge. Sometimes you drive around all day and the 
last drop is just near the depot. Some whinge about time. So what? I get some overtime. 
Some just want their hours and to go home. (Company B Driver Two) 
 
So as far as the laws go I’d like to see all that rural side of driving exempt from logbooks 
on unsealed roads because you can’t do 800km in five hours. Some days it takes you 100, –  
 
You are restricted by the logbooks, you can work all day and have a sleep for eight hours 
then you have to wait three hours to drive again. The way the books are once you put a 
mark in the book you gotta go, it might look good on paper, but you gotta go hard, if I had 
1000km to go, if left to my own devices it might take me 15 hours but I’ve gotta cover it in 
12. (Company C Driver Three) 
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9.2.4.1.   Summary: The nature of time 
As can be seen from the above discussion it is evident that the value placed on time can 
differ between organisations. Whilst all drivers placed some value on time, being paid a 
distance-based rate was linked with an increased value on time and a desire to make up lost 
time. Conversely, being paid an hourly rate appeared to reduce the value placed on time. 
Additionally, due to work diary constraints, some driver may feel an increased pressure 
which is exerted through a higher priority on time. Thus, it was evident that despite a general 
value placed on time within each company, contextual values appeared to shape the extent to 
which time was prioritised. 
9.2.5. The nature of human nature 
The fifth dimension outlined by Schein (1990) was entitled ‘the nature of human 
nature’, with the central question being “are humans basically good, neutral, or evil, and is 
human nature perfectible or fixed?” (p.114). Study Three identified a number of cultural 
traits which related to this key theme. Generally, members of each organisation believed that 
drivers are good, expressed through traits which indicated that unsafe behaviour is 
unintentional and that drivers are just like everyone else. Occasionally, individual drivers or 
groups of drivers were viewed negatively, however, in these instances they are categorised as 
‘rebels’, ‘rogues’, or ‘cowboys’. Lastly, though drivers were typically viewed positively, 
many drivers were indicated to be motivated by a desire for money and other gains. Whilst 
each of these traits is different, they centred on the nature and character of drivers. 
 
 
– to do 150km might take you four hours. So by the time you get to the sealed road you 
can’t go anywhere. Which makes it hard. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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9.2.5.1.   Unintentional 
Members of Company A and B commonly excused the responsibility of unsafe acts by 
indicating that the behaviour was unintentional. Thus, drivers are viewed as good people who 
make mistakes. Within Company A, this was even evident in discussions of speeding, with 
one manager stating that “everyone does it, it’s not a purposeful thing”.  
Failure to wear a seatbelt was also attributed to unintentionality within both Company 
A and B. A number of drivers suggested that despite regular use of seatbelts they sometimes 
forget. Similarly, one Company B manager indicated that drivers may forget to wear the 
correct PPE, but that even he has done this on occasion. 
 
Within Company A, the ‘unintentional’ excuse appeared to, at times, be applied too 
broadly, resulting in diffused responsibility. In an extreme example, it was argued that some 
truck drivers will tailgate cars in an attempt to make them speed up, yet that sometimes it was 
unintentional and just a habit. Whilst this trait can be seen as a means to reduce 
responsibility, it was evident within Company B that the use of this excuse was actually just 
an explanation of the fact that sometimes drivers and managers will ‘slip up’.  
9.2.5.2.   ‘Just like everyone else’ 
Unique to Company A, willingly committed unsafe acts were sometimes justified, with 
the behaviour being viewed as ‘just the same as everyone else’. The range of behaviours that 
A lot of effort goes into it, you’d be surprised the number of times you will pick up, even 
myself, walked out of a meeting this morning at the room here, on the phone and I try not 
to walk around while I'm on the phone, just try to stand still so I stood still. Good me, seen 
some drivers down the back and started walking down to them. And I thought hang on I 
haven’t got me vest on so I had to come back in and get me vest. (Company B Regional 
Manager Two) 
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this justification applied to include a number of serious safety breaches. One such behaviour 
was incomplete overtaking, leading to another vehicle being forced to heavily brake or run 
off the road. Due to the limited speed of trucks, it is common for attempts to overtake cars to 
be unsuccessful if the car speeds up. Whilst this is a frustrating and regular occurrence, it can 
lead to a significant risk of crashes when the truck chooses to continue attempting to overtake 
the vehicle. Nonetheless, such behaviour was suggested to be no different to asking a loud 
office visitor to leave. 
 
Similarly, failure to reduce speed after changes in the posted speed limit was argued to 
be something everyone is guilty of. Additionally, a number of workplace hazards were also 
justified in this manner. For example, one Company A manager stated that some drivers will 
fail to wear the required enclosed footwear in the depot. The manager equated this with the 
desire to remove shoes upon arriving home, stating “I'm sure when you get home from work 
the first thing you do is kick your shoes off”. Whilst this justification was unique to Company 
A, it further demonstrates the general belief in the ‘goodness’ of drivers. 
 
Come the end of [the overtaking lane] if you’re only most of the way past, well you’re not 
going to stop, so the car has to slow down or run off the road. So then that automatically 
makes the truck driver a cowboy even though he’s just trying to get round because you’re 
holding him up from doing his job. You know if you’re obviously paid to do this research is 
that right... If I come to your office and screw you around talking shit all day, someone will 
eventually get the shits and tell me to get out of the office so you can get on with your work 
right? It’s no different than your grandpa and grandma in their caravan doing 85km/h 
down the highway. And my truck has got to sit behind them for an hour or two because 
there’s no overtaking area or no dual, you know, no four-lane highway for him to get 
round it. (Company A Manager One) 
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9.2.5.3.   Rebels, rogues and cowboys 
Common to each company was the discussion of a ‘rogue element’ within the industry. 
A select minority of the industry, identified as ‘rogues’, ‘cowboys’ or ‘rebels’, were 
commonly suggested to refuse to operate in a safe and legal manner. As stated by one 
Company A driver, “you may hear that we are over-regulated, in some ways we are, but in 
other ways we’re not regulated enough; there’s still too many cowboys”.  
Among other behaviours, rogues are often attributed with excessive speed violations. 
Rogues were suggested to tamper with speed limiters, leading to the suggestion by one 
Company A driver that if the speed limit was increased “it would probably remove a lot of 
cowboys from the industry”. Whilst this may not be an accurate prediction, this demonstrates 
the perceived link between speeding and rogues. 
Members of Company A appeared to blame the majority of industry safety incidents 
upon the rogue element. The accuracy of such claims, however, was unclear. Whilst it is 
possible that there are a select few companies and individuals responsible for a large 
proportion of incidents, the concept of a rogue element may also be a mechanism used to 
justify the greater industry, or distance the organisation from negative industry events. This is 
a distinct possibility given the findings of previous research which suggested heavy vehicle 
drivers view others as less safe than themselves (see section 4.2.4.1.2). If the rogue element is 
a scapegoat to excuse the wider industry, it may reduce responsibility of organisations to 
assess their own actions. Ultimately, the designation of a rebel or rogue company may simply 
be a matter of perspective and only targeted investigation will reveal the extent of the rogue 
element within the industry. 
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The rogue element was only referred to once during the study of Company B. 
Regarding the decision to avoid competition through offering a niche service, one manager 
stated that they would not compete with the “cowboys that do everything illegally”. The lack 
of this cultural trait within Company B may relate to the perceived organisational uniqueness 
(section 9.2.1). Rather than attributing negative characteristics to other companies, Company 
B may focus on the positive characteristics of its own company. Similarly, in Company C 
rogues were only once referred to by name, though it was evident that many members of 
Company C perceived there to be a rogue element within the industry.  
 
Excerpt from a two participant interview within Company C 
Driver/Manager: Yeah it’s like a family like if I went to someone from Toowoomba 
and said you were here at our place the other day he’d say I know him. He was at our 
place. But if you went to Joe Blow in Huendon who’s probably running amuck and 
that, Huendon is just a name, but he’s running amuck and probably giving some of 
the industry a bad name, he would never have heard of you because they...like they’re 
the rogues. There’s always a...  
They get paranoid about it, you know... you see the crap on A Current Affair every couple 
of months about bad arse truck drivers and unfortunately there’s bad arse truck drivers and 
I’m not going to say there’s not ... there’s bad arse car drivers too.  But you know everyone 
sees that crap, they don't have a story ‘oh yeah this bloke’s a top driver he’s done 40 
million kilometres in his lifetime and hasn’t had a crash or whatever’. You know so people 
aren’t going to think ‘oh most of them are good, there’s some dick heads – around’, they 
just think everyone is a dick head. And then because my trucks want to go round them 
because they’re holding them up “they’re obviously a rogue company because this dude is 
trying to run me off the road”. (Company A Manager One) 
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9.2.5.4.   Money and other gains 
Drivers were commonly suggested to be significantly motivated by gains and losses. As 
money is the main gain or loss that can be achieved whilst working, many comments were 
made about the motivating effect of money on drivers. Typically, however, comments 
regarding the motivating effect of money attributed this problem to ‘other drivers’. As stated 
by one Company A driver, “some people push it for an extra run to get money”. This was 
particularly relevant for fatigue management. One Company A driver stated that an 
organisation can “ask a driver if they are fit for duty and they will say they are right just 
because they want the money, but then they might make a wrong decision because they are 
tired.” Similarly, one Company B driver stated that, whilst it is commonly said that you 
shouldn’t “do anything that will need drugs” to stay awake, drivers may use drugs if they’ve 
“got a family and house payments wanting you to make a mile”. As with the value placed on 
time (section 9.2.4), this may be less of a problem for drivers paid by the hour.  
Money can significantly motivate organisational behaviours. The Driver/Manager of 
Company C noted that whilst you try to be as safe as possible, ‘we’re trying to make a living’. 
However, the motivation of money can also drive safe behaviours. It was noted that 
maintenance of vehicles can actually significantly reduce costs associated with breakdowns. 
Compliance officer: In anything there’s always the people who are flaunting the system. 
Driver/Manager: Yeah, yeah. The fiddlers, who fiddle with their, you know them, you 
know them they fiddle with the truck and they fiddle with the book and they fiddle 
with their life and other people’s lives and... 
Compliance officer: And all you have to do is sit around in a road house for an hour and 
you hear about these people. 
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It was also stated that money can drive safe behaviours in drivers. One organisational 
staff member at Company A stated that “unless you hit people in the hip pocket they don’t 
respond”. Similarly, a Company B trainer highlighted the importance of money by stating 
that “incidents cost a lot of money to the individual and the company”. Thus, financial 
punishments associated with safety breaches are particularly effective at reducing unsafe 
behaviour.  
It was suggested that a lack of financial wisdom contributes to the strength of money as 
a motivator for drivers, due to the costs associated with life on the road. When a driver is 
financially struggling, the severity of perceived punishments is further increased.  
 
Because a lot of blokes that drive trucks live week to week. I suppose that’s got a bit to do 
with the fact they spend so much money buying food up and down the road all the time. It’s 
quite an expensive thing to do. You know you can imagine yourself if you eat out every 
night of the week it will cost you a lot of money and a lot of blokes aren’t smart enough to 
pack dinner the night before they leave so they buy tucker up and down the road. Anyway 
you know if you give them a week’s suspension without pay it kills them mate.  Really hurts 
them because like I said they live week to week. So it’s normally once is enough. (Company 
A Manager One) 
 
But we do it, everything we do is done within the, legitimately, as close as you can to being 
perfect because you’ve got to be. Oh, well if you don't get in the shit today you’ll get in the 
shit tomorrow. Like if you do shonky things with your maintenance it might keep you going 
for a week or two weeks but it will break down out there on the road. You know so your 
maintenance, you don't do shonky with your maintenance, your maintenance is important to 
get there. Because well for the other thing is... it’s your livelihood but you’ve got a live 
thing and it’s somebody’s livelihood, somebody else’s livelihood. (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
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Whilst the motivational power of money is commonly recognised, drivers are also 
motivated by other gains and losses. This can include time, as discussed in section 9.2.4, but 
also includes other gains such as comfort. Drivers can be seen to be significantly personal-
outcome oriented, which can influence whether or not they choose to adhere to safety policies 
at any given time. As was stated by one Company A manager, “it’s the same as these blokes 
that work here mate you know they’re still going to disrespect the equipment and run it off 
the hill at 120 if they feel like doing it”. Similarly, one Company B manager stated that 
drivers will adhere to policies “if it suits them”. 
 
A number of drivers suggested that certain safety requirements result in a lack of 
comfort. For example, one Company A driver suggested that, despite the safety benefits, he 
did not wear seatbelts as they were too tight and irritated his shoulder and neck. Conversely, 
another Company A driver stated that, in one of the newer trucks, you’ve “got to wear the 
seatbelt on this one or it beeps”, indicating that his seatbelt use was to avoid an annoying 
noise. Similarly, another Company A driver stated that he would not wear enclosed footwear 
until reaching the customer depot, as boots and even socks, make his feet sweat too much 
when driving.  
The effect of gains and losses, like those discussed above, are common even outside of 
the industry. These gains could be argued to be the result of external motivation from 
contextual influences. Nonetheless, the extent to which drivers would prioritise money and 
But yeah there is some, some drivers, not a lot, but there’s, and depends on what sort of 
mindset they’re in too. Like if they’re in a rush to go home all of a sudden all the policies 
and procedures go out the door. But if it’s to suit them all the policies and procedures come 
in, you know what I mean? So sort of like they want to use them when they want to use them 
but we really push to try and make sure that the drivers are following the procedures and 
policies 100% mate. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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other gains, even above personal safety and legislation on occasions, could be seen to be 
pathological. That is, whilst money is a significant motivation for many people, even outside 
of the industry, it was apparent that many drivers value money to an extreme level leading to 
excessive risk taking. Safety initiatives which have negative consequences associated with 
them may be some resisted by drivers. 
9.2.5.5.   Summary: The nature of human nature 
In terms of the ‘nature of human nature’, it was evident that members of the industry 
generally view drivers in a positive light. Drivers were viewed as good people who 
sometimes make unintentional mistakes. Within Company A, however, even intentional 
breaches were at times viewed as normal and equated with standard worker behaviours from 
other industries. Additionally, however, significantly unsafe behaviours were commonly 
attributed to rebels, rogues and cowboys, distancing these individuals from the majority of 
‘good’ members of the industry. Lastly, it was often noted that drivers can be driven by a 
desire for money or other gains and that, as such, they sometimes do as they please.  
9.2.6. The nature of human relationships 
The last of Schein’s dimensions which was evident in Study Three was ‘the nature of 
human relationships’. According to Schein (1990) the central questions for this dimension 
were: 
“What is the "correct" way for people to relate to each other, to distribute power 
and affection? Is life competitive or cooperative? Is the best way to organize society on 
the basis of individualism or groupism? Is the best authority system 
autocratic/paternalistic or collegial/participative?” (p.114).  
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Study Three identified one key cultural trait related to this dimension, which was 
autonomy. Additionally, however, within Company A, a trait emerged regarding keeping up 
the correct image. 
9.2.6.1.   Autonomy 
 
Drivers have a high level of autonomy from their organisation and customers. As stated 
in section 7.2, this autonomy places limitations on the supervision of drivers. Drivers also 
appear to significantly desire and place a high value on autonomy. Thus, drivers may be 
resistant to organisational monitoring and supervision.  
 
It was indicated by members of each company that drivers are resistant to monitoring 
techniques, such as satellite tracking, due to its impact upon autonomy. As said by one 
I can’t do a job where you’re bound to an office or a factory... but out here you’re your 
own boss... you return the truck at the end of the day in one piece and they’re happy... out 
here I’m my own boss...  so long as you use common sense... But you know I couldn’t work 
with (Director) looking over my shoulder... I couldn’t do it. (Company B Driver Two) 
 
There are some very smart people, but most of the time these are people who haven’t been 
successful at school, who have just floated through life and have just wound up going well I 
can drive a truck because I can drive a car or I like driving, I like being away from people, 
I like being my own person and just doing my stuff, no one tells me what to do. It’s a little 
bit of that thought process, they’re generally older generation. (Company B Director) 
 
There’s no clock guard in a truck, there’s no headmaster watching. If you start at six 
o’clock in the morning you can drive for five hours. No one says you have to have your 
break at five to one or ten past nine. You have it when best suits you I guess. You look at the 
job you’ve got to do, the places you’ve got to go, you know, and then take all that into 
consideration with how you feel. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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Company B manager, many drivers view satellite tracking as “a big brother approach, you 
know, like you’re being arseholes and all that type of stuff”. Similarly, the manager of 
Company C has on many occasions, when asking a driver where they are, received negative 
comments regarding the fact that she knows where they are due to satellite tracking. 
 
As put by one Company A organisational staff member, the desire for autonomy can 
pose difficulties when trying to determine if a driver is still fit for duty. When members of the 
operations team of Company A notice a driver is stopped earlier than anticipated they may 
attempt to call the driver and drivers may view this as a violation of autonomy. 
 
You know they’ll switch their phones off so they don’t have to get spoken to and just things 
like that. But we’re not there to harass them, we’re there to try and help them. You know if 
they pull up for an extra five or 10 minutes past their logbook break we want to know why. 
Do you need more time for a rest? Is there a problem or, you know, are you sick? You know 
we try and sort of pick the eyes out of it and try and work out with them and find out what 
the problem is. And some of them are a bit scared. They think, you know, we’re harassing 
them or ... but in actual fact we’re trying to help them. (Company A Operations Staff 
Member) 
 
And it’s only satellite tracking. I don't have the little thing that says you go here, I don't 
have any of that and they don't have to umm interact with that whatsoever. But there’ll be 
little snide remarks like you know I ring them up and say where are you? And sometimes if 
the Navman’s down and it is down at the moment, it’s very frustrating for me. I hate it. 
They’ll go: You know exactly where I am, you know why are you asking me? Why do we, 
you know, just look at your tracking? Well...and I don't think it’s resentment of the tracking 
but they’ve just spent so many years of their lives just doing what they do and now all of a 
sudden I'm watching. (Company C Manager) 
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In addition to this resistance, some drivers show resistance to audits, training and pre-
trip checks based upon autonomy. It was argued that some drivers will leave organisations 
rather than allow the organisation to monitor or manage them. 
 
9.2.6.2.   Keeping up the trucking image 
Drivers in Company A were also seen to place a significant value on keeping up a 
tough and carefree appearance. At a novel level this even included not wanting to be seen 
driving a Volvo truck.  
 
Whilst this novel concern appears innocent, being too safety conscious was essentially 
considered ‘uncool’ by drivers and some organisational staff. This was clearly evident when 
the occupational health and safety officer of Company A was repeatedly referred to by a 
manager as ‘the safety nerd’. Drivers also want to avoid looking too safety conscious. In 
Driving a Volvo is like getting a blowjob from a poofter. Feels good while it’s happening 
but you don’t want to get caught. (Company A Driver) 
 
We have had drivers leaving us on a regular basis because they refused to do training. 
They don't like getting non-conformances, they don't like the whole process of having a 
formalised audit process, they just want to get in a truck and drive. They don't want to have 
to do pre-trip checks or training or whatever. (Company A Manager Two) 
 
Like and some of them won’t if you hand them a non-conformance they get all angry, if they 
get too many non-conformances because they’re not doing the right thing, they feel like 
they’ve been scolded children. That’s what makes it hard. I'm supposed to do this and I 
can’t just do it and file it away. They have to sign it to say that I’ve told them that they’ve 
done, not the wrong thing, but they just haven’t met the requirements... if you go to three 
pages of non-conformances they’re going to go, coz they’re truck drivers and they throw 
tantrums... they do and they will walk. (Company C Compliance officer) 
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Company A the ‘uncoolness’ of being too safety conscious was found to restrict efforts to 
reward and acknowledge safe behaviour. Company A has previously implemented a system 
whereby drivers who did not receive non-conformances were recognised on the noticeboard 
and provided a personal note from the manager. However, these drivers were unhappy with 
others being aware of their safe behaviour. 
 
It was unclear whether this desire to not look too safety conscious directly influences 
behaviours. Whilst drivers may not want to complete certain tasks in order to ensure they 
maintain their appearance, it is possible that drivers may maintain safe behaviour but attempt 
to avoid being seen to do so. Further, why this trait was found solely within Company A was 
not clear. Of the studied organisations, Company A alone conducts the majority of their work 
through long distance highway journeys. Thus, drivers may be more exposed to the broader 
industry, and, therefore, more motivated to conform to the industry image.  
9.3. SECOND AND THIRD ORDER CULTURAL TRAITS 
As stated at the onset of this chapter, there were a number of additional cultural traits 
identified throughout the case studies which were better viewed as a specific application of an 
underlying trait or result of interactions between multiple traits. The second order cultural 
traits identified within the studied organisations included: (1) luck and the likelihood of 
incidents; (2) responsibility; and (3) attitudes towards rules and regulations. These second 
order traits also appeared to influence further traits, here referred to as third order traits. The 
Like that is an excellent achievement so we used to put names up on noticeboards and do 
memos in their pay slips and stuff. Like the general manager used to give them a note and 
everything. And there was good feedback about the notes but they weren’t happy about 
names being on the board because yeah that whole sort of like peer pressure. (Company A 
Manager Two) 
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third order traits identified included: (1a) limitations; (3a) punishment avoidance; and (3b) 
the ‘go’ mentality. 
9.3.1. Luck and the likelihood of incidents 
The combination of the underlying traits of ‘experiential and narrative learning’ and 
‘safety’, along with organisational training approaches, leads drivers within each company to 
have different views on the likelihood of incidents.  
Whilst drivers highly value safety, they have a tendency to learn through experience 
and stories. Thus due to the relatively low incidence of crashes and injuries, there is a 
tendency for many drivers to experience normalisation of deviance. Further, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, each of the studied organisations utilised different approaches to training and 
communication. Of particular relevance was the use of SORs within Company B (see section 
7.3.4.2.). SORs (serious occurrence reports) are stories of incidents which have occurred 
within similar industries or organisations. Thus, due to experiential and narrative learning, 
drivers from Company B were much more likely to perceive safety benefits associated with 
behaviour and adhere to policies. This was further evident through general perceptions held 
by drivers regarding the likelihood of incidents. Generally, members of Company A viewed 
many incidents as caused, or avoided, by luck. Conversely, Company B drivers and managers 
perceived industry members to be vulnerable to incidents unless they behaved safely.  
Luck. In Company A, the presence or absence of incidents is often attributed to luck. 
For example, rather than recognise the efforts of Company a managers, one Company A 
driver stated that the company “has a good record, a lot of it is luck”. Similarly, when 
discussing fatigue, one Company A driver indicated that he had never had a fatality crash, 
saying that “a fair bit of that is luck, it’s not that I’m a better driver than others, just lucky to 
pull out of the near miss”. 
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This tendency to explain incidents through luck also extended to the occurrence of 
injuries and being booked by police. One Company A driver discussed his own injuries and 
the injuries of a number of friends. These incidents included one individual ‘stepping off’ 
(falling from) the back of the trailer, rolling an ankle on a drain lip, slipping on diesel near the 
fuel tank, and being pinned under an object which fell off a trailer during forklift-assisted 
unloading. Each of these incidents was attributed to bad luck through simply being in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. The attribution of the unloading incident to luck is 
particularly concerning as it is common knowledge that objects can fall during unloading. It 
is for this reason that many companies require driver exclusion zones. Rather than state that 
the driver should have been further away from the vehicle, it was simply stated that it was 
unlucky. As stated in section 9.2.3.1, a lesson needs to be present in experience and stories 
for drivers to believe that behaviour is dangerous. Thus, when luck is seen as the responsible 
factor, drivers do not need to re-assess their own behaviour. 
Vulnerability. Members of Company B never attributed an incident to bad luck. In fact, 
luck was only ever cited as relevant to avoiding an incident when conducting unsafe 
behaviour.  
 
Company B drivers indicated that incidents were a likely result of unsafe behaviour. 
One Company B driver even stated that the industry “can be very unsafe if you don’t know 
You don't know what can happen after the fact. So you know like we talk about load 
restraint, you know like oh I tie my loads down that way all the time or, you know, driver 
rushes at the end, I’ve been doing it for 30 years, you don't tell me how to drive. We sort of 
try to push them in the right direction and say look we understand, you’ve just been lucky 
and that’s how we put it down to. Drivers have just been unlucky, sorry been lucky that they 
haven’t had an incident with that mindset and we try to change that. (Company B Branch 
Manager Five) 
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what you’re doing”. Similarly, one Company B manager suggested that he was so convinced 
of the likelihood of incidents that he did not believe in zero harm.  
 
Company B’s use of SORs (or SSOs) was highly connected to the perceived likelihood 
of incidents. As stated by one manager, many drivers are influenced by SORs, and comment 
on the incidents, suggesting that the injured drivers were lucky to have not been more 
seriously injured. 
 
We have a toolbox meeting once a month religiously. It’s on all of our umm calendars at 
the end of the month and we go through those SSOs. If there’s none, there’s none, if there is 
others. And we try to incorporate it into our day to days. Because a lot of the SSOs that 
have come through may not be relevant to our type of business here on site. But we do try 
to give them examples of, you know, this is you know this is how you get off the truck 
properly, you know the right way and all that type of stuff. And so the drivers yeah they –  
 
Oh I think everyone's role is with safety, it’s directly involved because we’re all responsible 
for it. Don’t get me wrong I support this zero harm concept everyone has got but I don't 
believe it. Not that I don't believe in it, but I don't believe when you’ve got a person, a 
human being working, that you can have zero harm. You can strive towards it and that’s 
what we all should be doing. But I don't believe we’ll ever have zero harm while we’ve got 
people working with anything... I don't, my personal belief is I don't believe an accident 
happens. Something causes it. It’s either human content of it or there’s a failure in a 
machine or something is not done properly at some...because it’s not an accident. Well I 
don't believe in accidents, it’s a personal opinion I don't believe in accidents... But yeah I 
just don't believe while you’ve got persons working, whether it’s using the biro, you know, 
it’s in the hand or something it will happen. So you can’t have, well I don't believe you can 
have zero harm. Let’s all strive towards it but yeah. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
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Whilst the majority of drivers attributed incidents to driver behaviour, it is important to 
note that some incidents are beyond the control of the driver. For example, as discussed in 
section 8.4, some crashes are the sole fault of other vehicles. Whilst Company B drivers 
recognised this hazard they did indicate a need for additional care when working around 
uncontrollable hazards. 
Company C. Due to a lack of sufficient attention given to these matters by members of 
Company C, it was unclear whether this organisation aligned better with Company A or B. 
However, there was some evidence of both ends of this spectrum within Company C. One 
driver stated that “accidents can happen but the way you drive can make it more avoidable”. 
This view appeared to recognise the impact of driver behaviour, whilst still believing that 
incidents can occur regardless of behaviour. Conversely, the driver/manager of Company C 
stated, regarding one particular incident involving a driver falling on a ladder, that “there’s 
nothing you could have done; it was just one of those things that happened”. Thus, similarly 
to Company A, it appears that incidents were also attributed to luck. 
9.3.1.1.   Summary: Luck and the likelihood of incidents 
Whilst members of each company perceived incidents were likely, it was evident that 
there were differences in the attributed cause of incidents. Members of Company A and C 
appeared to perceive an element of luck behind incidents. Conversely, however, members of 
Company B tended to assign behavioural causes to incidents. The use of SORs in Company 
B, through ‘experiential and narrative learning’, increase drivers’ belief in the likelihood of 
an incident under unsafe behavioural conditions. These perceptions may have significant 
– do take it on board because I do have a lot of drivers come into me and say you know like 
that guy was lucky and there’s a bit of talk about it amongst the ranks. (Company B Branch 
Manager Five) 
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impacts upon behaviour conducted by drivers and organisation members. Where an incident 
is perceived to be the result of luck, it is unlikely that further precautionary actions will be 
taken. Conversely, where incidents are attributed to a cause, drivers are more likely to change 
their behaviour. 
9.3.1.2.   Limitations 
A number of limitations in the role of the organisation were highlighted in section 7.2. 
Whilst members of Company B viewed these limitations as challenges which could be 
overcome, members of Companies A and C appeared to hold that these limitations precluded 
an ability to manage certain aspects of safety. Whilst the attribution of incidents to luck was 
seen to exclude the need to take additional precautions, these cultural belief of limitations 
was associated with an inability to improve safety. The lower level traits which appeared to 
result in a belief of limitation were autonomy, common sense/stupidity and luck and the 
likelihood of incidents. 
Generally speaking, organisational staff members of Companies A and C believe that 
they can do little to control the behaviour of their drivers. This was particularly relevant to 
speeding resulting from running off a hill. It was often stated that “you can’t stop anyone 
from doing that” or “there’s nothing we can do as a company to stop someone doing that”.  
 
It was also evident that organisational staff members viewed incidents as inevitable. For 
example, one Company A manager stated that “given the kilometres you know I think they’re 
always going to happen unfortunately no matter how much you train people and do the right 
Unfortunately though you can’t, as soon as someone is out the gate and round that corner, 
you can’t see the truck anymore, you can’t make them do anything. You can’t tell them not 
to... you know you could tell them all you want not to tailgate that doesn’t mean they’re 
going to do it. Same as seatbelts. All trucks are fitted with seatbelts, doesn’t mean they’re 
going to wear them. (Company A Manager One) 
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thing, accidents happen”. Similarly, the compliance officer of Company C stated that “you 
can’t completely make everything safe”. 
 
This general sense of limitation also extended to the drivers of Companies A and C. 
One Company A driver even stated that whilst “the industry has improved heaps since I 
started; it comes a time when it can’t get any better”. Similarly, drivers from Company C 
often suggested that “accidents happen”. This perceived inability to prevent incidents was 
also linked to the role of other vehicle in non-fault crashes and the influence of road condition 
factors.  
9.3.2. Responsibility 
Common within each company is the belief that it is the driver’s own responsibility to 
ensure their safety. Even during the Company B induction it was stated that “drivers are 
expected to be responsible for their own health and safety and the safety of others”. 
Similarly, when discussing pre-trip inspections, the driver/manager from Company C stated 
that drivers are responsible for their own safety. 
 
There’s only one thing between you and a post is your steer tyres and your brakes.  And 
drivers are happy with that, you know drivers are, because they have daily checks and all 
that they’re responsible for their own safety to make sure that it’s within spec. (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
 
All you can do is minimise the dangerous things. Like you can’t completely take danger out 
of it, you can’t completely make everything safe because you just can’t. ...Each person is 
an individual and has their own brain. Each cow is an individual and has its own brain so 
you can’t completely take out the danger factor but you can minimise it. And that’s all we 
can really hope to do, I think. (Company C Compliance Officer) 
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This was also evident in the number of occasions on which incidents were attributed to 
the driver. One Company A driver stated that “accidents often operator error, there’s so 
many rules you can’t get hurt, it’s drivers choosing to break rules”. This typified the 
responses of many participants. On occasions, managers placed fault directly on the 
individual for incidents which were the result of multiple factors. 
 
A number of laws and regulations were seen to take responsibility away from drivers. 
One Company C driver stated that “as far as workplace health and safety, from my point of 
view it’s getting carried away, no one’s responsible anymore”. It was indicated that due to 
this reduction in responsibility, these regulations are typically disliked. Thus, in addition to 
believing drivers are responsible for safety, this was typically believed to be ‘correct’. 
Similarly, a number of participants felt that they should be able to manage their own 
fatigue rather than rely on fatigue management legislation.  
 
This belief was further emphasised by one manager who stated that many of the rules 
and regulations in Company B exist to protect drivers who ‘don’t take responsibility’. Thus, 
incidents are seen to be a failure of individuals to fulfil their responsibility. 
 
So if you’re in a hurry, if you take short cuts, yes, you’ll get the opinion from time to time 
that it’s a load of crap. If you’re a safe person yeah I guess to a lot of extents it is a load –  
 
Like I'm not sure about fatigue mate. I think as a driver I control me own fatigue. That fair 
enough? When I feel like I'm tired I pull up and have a sleep. Or I pull up and do 
something else yeah. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
 
He had to lose in the wet because he’s fucking retarded. He was driving to Sydney with 
empty trailers on, he went through the main street of a town, sixty 60km/h and lose in the 
wet, crashed into the front of a house and now we’re still paying him to do nothing. 
(Company A Manager One) 
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The effects of this responsibility appeared to extend to resisting pressures that 
encourage unsafe acts. Despite pressures exerted by customers and organisations, drivers are 
expected to take responsibility over determining if an action is safe. As noted by one 
Company B manager, he “can’t physically always go out and check a particular site and 
make sure the site is safe, that’s sort of up to the driver when he gets there to make that 
judgment”. In the event a behaviour is unsafe to conduct, it is seen as the driver’s 
responsibility to refuse to conduct the activity.  
 
It’s very clear to the drivers, if you’ve got to do it unsafe you don't do it. The product 
comes back, I’d rather it would be not delivered yes it inconveniences the customer, but 
we’ve done it safe. If there’s something wrong with the load, if there’s something wrong 
with the unloading conditions, the customer or whatever it is, we tell the drivers if you 
believe it’s unsafe bring it back. We’ll assess it for whatever it’s worth and whether that’s 
a risk assessment done on the site, risk, you know, load audit on the load, whatever it may 
be we’ll assess it and make our own call on it. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
We have had that yeah. But we also let our drivers know that they’ve got the full backing of 
management. If they say no to a customer for a safety reason or for any reason, we back 
them. You know they might be wrong, we might have to talk to them later and say well you 
know if you had of done it this way or you had of done it that way, but once a customer is 
on site and he says no I won’t do it because it’s near powerlines with his crane or trucks–   
– of crap because YOU’RE a safe person. We’re trying to protect the safe people but more 
so we’re trying to protect the people who don't take responsibility for their actions. There’s 
people, I read the other day, I think it’s a town not a country a town has banned texting 
whilst walking, because people are falling over too often. Right? So it’s been banned, no 
texting while walking. You know. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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Due to the responsibility of drivers, it was indicated by one Company B manager that a 
driver who gives in to pressure is ‘not standing up for themselves’, and ‘letting’ people ‘walk 
over’ them. This tendency to assign responsibility to the driver may serve to encourage 
customers and organisations to simply press the driver until they say no. Despite the 
expectation that drivers will say no to pressures to complete unsafe acts, at times they will 
break their organisation’s policies in order to avoid disappointing customers.  
Further, due to the significant responsibility placed on drivers, drivers and organisations 
may seek to avoid blame that is likely to be placed upon them after an incident. It was noted 
by one driver from Company A that “people always blame the road too; sometimes the road 
is fine, but the drivers aren’t blamed for speeding”. Similarly, it was noted by a driver from 
Company B that some drivers “don’t want to do anything but then they blame the company if 
they get hurt”. Whilst motivations leading to unsafe acts vary between situations, drivers are 
quick to divert responsibility to other causes. Whilst blame-shifting may appear to be in 
direct contrast to the responsibility of drivers, it was noted by one Company B manager that 
drivers may be afraid of the assignment of blame. Out of this fear, some drivers are hesitant 
– on a slope or something like that, well we back him. And we, if the customer refuses to 
listen to the driver we ask the driver to be very nice, pack his gear up, move off site and ask 
the customer to ring us, or he rings us and then we ring the customer.  [Interviewer: Has 
that had to happen a couple of times?] I’ve had it happen yeah. I’ve had it happen where I 
had to go out to site and explain to the customer that the reason we couldn’t do it was 
because it was on a slope and we can’t use our cranes on a slope because they’ll you know 
run away from the driver sort of thing ... But most drivers we’ve got now they understand if 
they don't think it’s safe or they don't think they can get in, don't do it. Yeah don't take any, 
and some customers can be very aggressive towards the driver because he won’t do what 
they want him to do. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
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to even complete an incident report “because they are worried about blame”. Thus, blame-
shifting may be a result of the responsibility placed on drivers.  
 
9.3.3. Rules and regulations 
There are a number of rules and regulations, implemented by organisations, customers 
and government departments, aimed at improving safety within the industry. One Company 
A driver even stated that “there’s so many rules you can’t get hurt”. When these rules and 
regulations are combined with the traits of autonomy, safety, experiential and narrative 
learning, luck and the likelihood of incidents, and responsibility, drivers may form a number 
of attitudes towards these regulations. 
Drivers from Companies A and C have a strong distaste for many rules and regulations. 
Conversely, Company B drivers exhibited mixed attitudes. When discussing inductions at 
one customer site, one Company B drivers stated that “these guys were overboard but good”. 
This driver effectively summarised these mixed attitudes, as it was evident that whilst many 
Company B drivers saw the value of rules and regulations, many also viewed them as 
somewhat ‘over-the-top’. Similarly, one Company B manager indicated that whilst some 
drivers value rules and regulations, there are others who think ‘it’s all bullshit’. 
 
There’s some drivers that believe that yes. hand on your heart, the drivers are getting 
looked after by Company B because we’ve got all these policies and procedures behind us. 
Some drivers will say oh it’s all bullshit and you know like it’s just as you say it’s like a 
paperwork trail. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
So they’ll accept unsafe behaviours based on a pre-existing set of rules that was done a 
hundred years ago. It’s just, that’s just how you do things and that’s the risk you take when 
you do them, suck it up. When something happens, how did you let me do that? It’s your 
fault that you let me do that. (Company B Director) 
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The inability to see the safety benefits of many regulations was at the core of many 
drivers’ dislike of rules and regulations. When discussing the use of non-conformances by 
Company A one driver stated that “you get them if you don’t fill out your paper work perfect 
and don’t tick every box, or if you don’t write the weight properly; a lot of it goes beyond 
safety, silly things you know”. This was seen to also extend to managers, particularly evident 
regarding speed limiters. One Company A manager stated that that speed limiting was “one 
of the most ridiculous laws that’s ever been invented in the country”, and that speed limiting 
below the posted speed limit actually presented a safety hazard.  
Similarly, when discussing supervision of reversing at customer depots, one Company 
B driver said “bloody hell, we’re truck drivers; I’m sure we can reverse”. Additionally, 
another Company B driver argued that fatigue management legislation assumes “we are all 
the same”, but that “we’re not all robots”. The driver further indicated the ineffectiveness of 
fatigue management on the basis that “just because someone stops the truck doesn’t mean 
they are resting”.  
 
Within Company C the lack of perceived safety benefits was particularly relevant for 
maintenance laws. It was indicated that after completing a thorough pre-trip inspection a 
driver is required to “get in his truck for an hour in the morning and tick the box or mark the 
square”.  
But what people don't realise is when companies are trying to implement safety they’re not 
doing it to fuck you around, they’re doing it to save your fingers, toes, life you know. And 
what they don't realise there is a massive cost right? The drivers think oh this is 
frigging...and I do it, the points I do it...I go this is frigging stupid, this is ridiculous safety 
is out of control. People aren’t throwing money at safety because they don't want the 
money. They’re throwing money at safety because they don't want the injuries and the 
accidents you know. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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Whilst the disbelief regarding the safety benefits of regulations was often based on 
legitimate perceived flaws, at other times this disbelief occurred despite clear hazards. For 
example, one Company C driver expressed a view that fatigue management legislation does 
not have sufficient benefit as it assumes “that when you’ve worked 12 hours you’ve gotta be 
tired”. Whilst a driver may not feel tired, this driver failed to recognise the dangers of fatigue 
faced by driving long hours.  
Even in the presence of recognised safety benefits, drivers can still have a strong dislike 
for rules. For example, despite all Company A drivers recognising the dangers of fatigue, one 
driver stated “I don’t need someone else to tell me I’m tired; you just know when you need a 
sleep”. Thus, due to the desire for autonomy and the belief that drivers should have 
responsibility for their own safety, many drivers thought they could regulate themselves. 
Conversely to Companies A and C, the vast majority of Company B drivers did see the 
safety value of rules and regulations and believed that adhering to rules and regulations 
reduces the likelihood of an incident. A number of Company B drivers indicated that speed 
cameras were an acceptable form of enforcement, due to the dangers of speeding. One 
We’ve been doing it for years anyway except it’s just not written down and it becomes a 
pain in the arse because there’s things on that that are silly things. Like you’ve got brakes 
and you’ve got tyres and you’ve got your steering and your king pins and your ring feeder 
are the main things. Things like ‘one side light out’ or, that that’s not a safety issue. A 
kangaroo could have run into it going down the road do you know what I mean? You know 
like safety issues you know they can pin you for having a side light out and that’s not a 
safety issue mate, that’s, the rules are there’s got to be five side lights on each trailer. Well 
if one’s out there’s still four you know. It’s not as if they’re all out. (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
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Company B even said “I’ve got no problem, it’s like security cameras, people complain but if 
you’re doing the right thing you’ve got nothing to worry about”.  
 
Returning to the aforementioned cultural traits of ‘safety’ and ‘experiential and 
narrative learning’, the increased acceptance of rules and regulations within Company B 
appeared to be linked to the use of SORs and the perceived likelihood of an incident in the 
presence of unsafe behaviours. This explanation was also evident in a comment provided by 
one driver from Company B who argued that SORs make “you think ‘we’re lucky we follow 
the policies’”. 
 
When drivers are convinced that compliance with regulations reduces their chance of 
an incident, many are willing to comply with rules and regulations and view them positively. 
Conversely, when non-compliance is not seen to hold safety benefits, drivers disliked these 
rules and exhibited as decreased intrinsic motivation for compliance. In the event that rules 
are viewed negatively there were two identified resultant third order cultural traits, 
punishment avoidance and the ‘go!’ mentality. 
Serious occurrence reports makes you more aware, you are always leaning; you can learn 
from incidents whether they happen at the workplace or elsewhere. That’s why the toolbox 
meetings are good, you hear of things and you think we’re lucky we follow the policies. 
(Company B Driver Four) 
 
Yes they’re keeping people to the speed limit. Yes they can get you if you speed. If you’re a 
professional driver it’s your livelihood. A licence is a privilege not a right but people don’t 
treat it as such... You do the speed limits for a reason; the signs are on the road for a 
reason, they’re there for safety. You go through roadworks that are 40km/h and some go 
through at 80km/h. If you lose a tyre all sort of things can happen to someone working on 
the side of the road. (Company B Driver Four) 
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9.3.3.1.   Punishment avoidance 
As discussed above, when rules and regulations are seen to have little safety benefit 
they are disliked by drivers. However, as stated in section 9.2.5.4, drivers may be highly 
motivated by money and other gains. Thus, due to the manner in which breaches of safety 
regulations are punished, many drivers may disagree with regulations, yet want to avoid 
punishment. A driver may avoid punishment either through compliance or avoiding 
detection. 
Due to the significant motivation of money within the industry, drivers will go to great 
lengths to avoid punishments. It was commonly stated that increased fines and punishments 
have led to a significant shift in the way the broader industry operates. For example, a 
number of Company A drivers suggested that the introduction of drug swabs significantly 
reduced drug use in the industry. Similarly, the introduction of chain of responsibility was 
argued by one Company B manager to have removed ‘backyarders’ (potentially another word 
for owner-operator rogues) within the industry. 
 
Due to the effects of greater enforcement, some organisations are now also taking 
greater care to ensure compliance within their organisation.  
 
And like I said, force blokes to have required breaks. Once upon a time all companies 
never used to do stuff like that but we now dismiss people if they don't because it’s just too 
much of a risk if something goes wrong. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Oh just everybody realises what the repercussions could be. I think there’s a lot more of a 
chase of it in the court system and you know a lot of the smaller transports and the way 
they went, a lot of those have gone now because of that, you know.  There’s no where near 
as many, I don't know I suppose you’d call them backyarders in the game these days, you 
know. (Company B Branch Manager Three) 
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In addition to affecting the broader industry, many drivers indicated enforcement has a 
significant impact upon individual behaviour. One Company B driver indicated that, whilst 
he has never used drugs, “if you do take drugs, you’re going to get caught”. Additional 
examples of behaviour that were affected by enforcement were unlicensed driving, seatbelts 
and fatigue management. Additionally, one Company A driver suggested that whilst drivers 
used to modify or falsify their log books, it’s “not worth trying to cheat it anymore; you need 
to write down your Speedo now, so you need to follow the book these days”. 
 
Whilst the motivation caused by punishments is effective, a number of drivers take an 
alternative approach to avoiding punishment. Rather than comply with rules and regulations, 
they will seek to avoid detection of non-compliance. For example, one Company A driver 
stated that, as the company give non-conformance slips for failure to complete pre-trip 
vehicle inspections, “I just tick it all off, if you know the truck you know how it will run, they 
are just covering their arses, so you just tick it all off”. Similarly, drivers were indicated to 
wait before a point-to-point speed camera until they can legally pass, or willingly speed after 
experiencing delays. 
 
But you know everyone does it, it’s not a purposeful thing, it just happens you know. 
There’s blokes that have got stop watches in their truck that time themselves too, they’re 
not going to break those times. If they are they just pull up and wait before the camera and 
then drive – 
 
Mainly for the fines to be honest, if you get booked not wearing (a seatbelt) you can’t bitch. 
I don’t wear it for safety coz I don’t believe it will help you, in a head on you’re stuffed. 
You just leave it on till they see it if you get pulled over. Even the safest things you can 
have an argument about if they are safe; I just find it’s easier just to put the bastard on 
(Company B Driver Three) 
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This approach was also evident at an organisational level to a lesser degree. When 
receiving a point-to-point speed camera infringement notice at the office, one Company A 
manager stated that they advise their drivers to not run quicker than the camera times, rather 
than telling them to drive to the speed limit.  
 
Whilst no Company B driver indicated that they avoid detection without compliance, a 
number of drivers gave accounts of other drivers who attempt to avoid satellite monitoring. 
For example, one driver stated that that when satellite tracking was first introduced “drivers 
would disconnect it” and that now some drivers suggest you “just wrap it in foil” as this was 
believed to block the GPS signal. 
Anyway back to the story, if you get a non conformance here for safety camera 
infringement it will say this is what you’ve done, this is what you should do to not do it 
again, which is just keep a track of your time, don’t run quicker than the camera times. 
Whether that be like I said on the flat, through a village, running off hills whatever, just 
don’t do it. (Company A Manager One) 
 
– through it... Mate you go down the highway every night of the week and there’s plenty of 
trucks that are just really quick trucks and they’ll go blasting past you and you get to the 
next camera and they’re all pulled up. Because they’re too quick for the cameras so they 
wait, go through the camera, go blasting past you again and you find them another hour 
down the road just waiting. (Company A Manager One) 
 
[Point-to-point speed cameras] don’t stop you from speeding. There are hills between the 
cams so you lose speed up the hills and can go like hell down them... Out of Sydney you 
will get trucks that will pass you three to four times in the night... Fatigue is still managed 
well with the cams, but speed isn’t... Going through towns slows you down so you go like 
stink on the highway (Company A Driver Six) 
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9.3.3.2.   The “go!” mentality  
Whilst somewhat related to the desire for autonomy, drivers also have a tendency to 
want to drive rather than complete other work tasks. This can present a problem in that 
certain tasks which are designed for safety purposes, such as pre-trip vehicle inspections, may 
be avoided by drivers due to a desire to get on the road. Interestingly, however, this trait was 
primarily only evident in Company A. In the case of Company B, the payment of drivers on 
an hourly rate reduces the financial losses associated with tasks that delay driving. In 
Company C, the necessity of regularly stopping to check on the cattle may deter drivers who 
want to simply drive from seeking employment in livestock transport. 
The majority of Company A drivers who discussed this trait appeared uninfluenced by 
it. It was common for drivers to state that they didn’t understand why “a lot of people just 
want to go, go, go”.  
 
Despite typically assigning this trait to other drivers, some Company A drivers did 
appear to adhere with this trait. It was argued that some drivers want to keep going at the 
fastest possible speed for as long as possible. Despite the risks of such behaviour, one 
Company A driver actually suggested that safety was the motivation for such behaviour. It 
was suggested that unless the driver continues moving and driving hard they run a higher risk 
of nodding off from fatigue. 
 
You can’t relax and cruise... You have to keep it at the max, keeps you alert even just 
staying aware of the cops... When you relax it’s game over, may as well go to bed coz 
you’re going to go off the road. (Company A Driver Six) 
 
Others say: Why do this or that with all the policies? Just get it done... Some guys just want 
to drive and not fulfil their duties... In my old company they wouldn’t even throw a strap 
over a load unless they had to. (Company A Driver Five) 
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9.4. DISCUSSION 
Study Three identified a number of cultural traits within the studied organisations. On 
the basis of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, which is the guiding 
framework for the current research, cultural traits are viewed as shared beliefs, attitudes and 
values which influence safety. Whilst the cultural traits were explored in a ‘grounded’ 
manner, with no more guidance than the definitions of culture provided in Chapter 2, there 
was a significant degree of overlap between the identified traits and the dimensions presented 
by Schein (1990). As such, Schein’s dimensions were used to categorise many underlying 
cultural traits identified within Study Three, providing an internal structure to the cultural 
component of the synthesised conceptualisation. The dimensions which were drawn from 
Schein and were present within the current research were: (1) the industry and organisation’s 
relationship to its environment; (2) the nature of human activity; (3) the nature of truth and 
reality; (4) the nature of time; (5) the nature of human nature; and (6) the nature of human 
relationships. 
Regarding the industry and organisations relationship to its environment, members of 
each company perceived themself to be unique. Traits categorised under the nature of human 
activity centred on the work expectations of industry members. Within all studied 
organisations there was a high value placed on hard work and fairness. Whilst it was not 
evident in company C, members of both Company A and B placed a high expectation on 
drivers to ‘hold their line’. Lastly, it was evident within each company that drivers place a 
high value on safety. Traits related to ‘the nature of truth and reality’ were also evident within 
each of the studied organisations. Drivers are heavily influenced by experience and stories, 
and were more likely to believe the experience of others over reported facts. They also placed 
a significant emphasis on common sense. Regarding the nature of time, though all drivers 
valued time to some extent, drivers who were payed a distance-based rate were much more 
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likely to prioritise the value of time. Traits relating to the nature of human nature centred on a 
key themes that drivers were good yet made unintentional mistake. Additionally, intentional 
safety breaches were either seen as behaviour that other people would do under the same 
circumstance or attributed to the actions of a select few rogues within the industry. However, 
it was recognised that many drivers are motivated by a desire for monetary and other gains. 
Finally, with regard to the nature of human relationships, it was evident that members of each 
company place a high value on autonomy and members of Company A exhibited a desire to 
conform with the ‘trucking image’.  
In addition to these traits, there were a number of second and third order traits which 
were typically the result of multiple interacting cultural traits and the occasional contextual 
factor. These second and third order traits included perceptions regarding the likelihood of 
incidents, the limitations with which the industry can improve safety, the level of 
responsibility placed on drivers, the attitudes of drivers towards rules and regulations, 
punishment avoidance, and the ‘go!’ mentality.  
Given that the purpose of the selection of case studies was to identify cultural traits that 
may be relevant to the broader industry, it is important to note that there was a significantly 
high degree of overlap between the identified cultural traits in each organisation (presented in 
Table 9.1). Whilst there was a small selection of traits which were only evident within one or 
two of the studied organisations, the majority of traits were in common. It is, however, 
important to note that some of the identified traits evidenced a dimension-like property, in 
which whilst the theme was common, drivers from different companies fell at opposite ends 
of the spectrum (e.g. time highly valued or little valued). Due to the high congruence between 
cases, each of these traits present potential industry-wide cultural factors, that should be 
considered when exploring safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry (see Figure 9.1 for a 
graphical summary of the findings of this chapter). 
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Table 9.1: The extent to which cultural traits were shared between case studies 
Underlying Cultural Traits Organisation/s 
The Industry/Organisations Relationship to its Environment  
- Uniqueness of the Industry/Organisation All 
The Nature of Human Activity  
- Hard Work All 
- Fairness All 
- Hold Your Line A & B* 
- Safety All 
The Nature of Truth and Reality  
- Experiential and Narrative Learning All 
- Common Sense All 
The Nature of Time  
- The Nature of Time All** 
The Nature of Human Nature  
- Unintentional A & B 
- Just Like Everyone Else A Only 
- Rebels, Rogues and Cowboys All 
- Money and Other Gains All 
The Nature of Human Relationships  
- Autonomy All 
- Keeping Up the Trucking Image A Only* 
Second and Third Order Traits Organisation/s 
- Luck and the Likelihood of an Incident All** 
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- Limitations All** 
- Responsibility All 
- Rules and Regulations All** 
- Punishment Avoidance All* 
- The ‘Go!’ Mentality A Only* 
* The absence or presence of trait may reflect contextual variations that changed the extent to 
which the trait was relevant. 
** The strength, valency or effect of this trait differed within organisations, yet was present 
in some form within all organisations. 
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Figure 9.1: Cultural traits identified within the case studies 
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10.  
Chapter 10: Study Three Results Part IV – Safety-Related Behaviours  
 
 
 
 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
Study Three consisted of a series of three case studies with transport organisations. 
During these case studies, observations of drivers and interviews with organisational staff and 
drivers were conducted. The purpose of Study Three was specifically to examine how 
cultural and contextual factors influence safety-related behaviours. Within the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture, safety outcomes are seen as the result of behaviours 
which are influenced by cultural and contextual factors (see section 2.3.5). Thus, within this 
framework, the contextual and cultural factors identified within Study Three are only relevant 
to safety culture if they influence behaviour. Similarly, safety-related behaviours are only 
deemed relevant to safety culture if they are influenced by cultural and contextual factors. 
Chapters 7 to 9 outlined the specific context surrounding drivers and the culture held by 
drivers. The final step to take to address the purpose of Study Three is to explore how the 
factors identified within Chapters 7 to 9 interact to produce specific safety related behaviours 
and, therefore, outcomes. 
The current chapter presents each class of safety outcomes that were identified in Study 
Three (crash outcomes, non-driving injuries, and health outcomes), along with the factors 
which were found to influence the relevant behaviours within these outcomes. The broad 
classes of safety outcomes that were identified within Study Three were crash outcomes, non-
Chapter Focus 
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driving incidents and health outcomes. Whilst the decision to aggregate safety-related 
behaviours according to outcome types was somewhat arbitrary, in that each behaviour could 
have been discussed separately, this chapter uses the same categorisation of outcomes that 
were used within Study One and Two (Chapters 4 and 5). The chapter begins with the 
discussion of crash-related behaviours, non-driving-injury-related behaviours and health-
related behaviours. 
Prior to exploring these behaviours and the factors which influence them, it is important 
to make note again of the purpose of exploring safety culture within the current framework. 
As discussed in section 2.3.1, there is significant debate within the literature regarding the 
extent to which culture can be shaped. Thus it was argued that it is important to explore the 
culture of workers and the context surrounding them in order to understand the reasons 
behind behaviour. Through understanding these factors, it was suggested that practitioners 
and researchers could identify how the context surrounding workers could be shaped to 
influence behaviour in the desired manner so as to interact in a positive manner with the 
culture of workers (section 2.3.5). Thus, similarly to Chapter 9, whilst the beliefs and values 
to drivers may not be objectively accurate, critiquing the culture of drivers for the sake of 
identifying faulty beliefs is not beneficial to shaping behaviour. The current chapter seeks to 
understand safety-related behaviours from the perspective of drivers.  
10.2. CRASH OUTCOMES 
Both Study One (Chapter 4) and Study Two (Chapter 5) identified a number of 
behaviours relevant to crash outcomes, including driving whilst fatigued, substance use, 
speeding, seatbelt use, and general driving errors and violations. Whilst seatbelt use and 
general driving errors and violations were only identified in Company A and B, the 
remaining behaviours were identified within each case study organisation. In addition to 
these behaviours, a number of vehicle maintenance-related behaviours were identified within 
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each company, and load restraint behaviours uniquely within Company B. Each of these 
behaviours and the factors found to influence them will be discussed separately. First, 
however, a number of general points should be made with regards to factors that were 
associated with crashes but not related to specific truck driver behaviours. Following this 
discussion, the current section will focus on the role of cultural and contextual factors in 
influencing each of the behaviour categories listed above, namely: (1) driving whilst fatigued; 
(2) substance use; (3) speeding; (4) seatbelt use; (5) general driving errors and violations; (6) 
vehicle maintenance related behaviours; and (7) load restraint behaviours. 
10.2.1. General crash factors 
Throughout the case studies a number of contextual factors were identified as having a 
direct influence on crash likelihood and were separate from truck driver behaviour. As direct 
effects were already discussed to some extent within Chapter 8, only a brief summary is 
presented here. First, a number of the identified environmental and situational factors (section 
8.8) pose a direct risk for truck crashes. Road design and conditions factors can present 
hazardous scenarios for drivers who are otherwise driving safely. For example, as discussed 
in section 8.8.1.1, one Company B driver experienced a near miss caused by poor on-ramp 
design, despite driving at a safe speed and conducting no unsafe behaviour. Similarly, truck 
design and maintenance can pose a threat to safety; for instance, through brake failure or the 
lack of visibility in trucks. 
Additionally, as noted in section 8.4, other vehicles may cause incidents independent of 
truck driver behaviour. Many incidents and near misses were suggested to stem from a lack 
of understanding of the design and abilities of heavy vehicles. Despite some such crashes not 
being caused by truck driver behaviour, the cultural trait ‘hold your line’ (section 9.2.2.3) was 
shown to increase the likelihood of a crash resulting from unsafe other-vehicle behaviour, and 
the perceived likelihood of an incident (section 9.3.1) may influence the extent to which a 
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driver maintains awareness of other vehicles. Further, environmental conditions such as wet 
weather (section 8.8.3) may further increase the likelihood of such incidents. 
10.2.2. Fatigue  
Driving whilst fatigued received the most attention of all safety-related behaviours 
within both Study One (section 4.2) and Study Two (section 5.2.1.1). The general perception 
of fatigue as one of the largest concerns was also evident within Study Three. One Company 
A staff member stated that fatigue is “the cause of most crashes” and is “is the most 
important thing”. Similarly, one Company A manager listed fatigue as one of three most 
common reasons for crashes. Thus, at least within Company A, fatigue is seen as high 
priority, and recognised to be a genuine safety hazard. Further, work diaries were also given 
significant attention within the case studies. Discussions surrounding fatigue centred on the 
themes of: (1) the causes of fatigue; (2) attitudes towards log books; (3) the difference 
between log books and fatigue; (4) driving out of hours; and (5) driving whilst fatigued. As 
such, the remainder of this section will discuss each of these themes. 
10.2.2.1. The causes of fatigue 
In simplest terms, fatigue is the result of prolonged attention, physical work or 
wakefulness with insufficient rest. When exploring the effect of safety culture on fatigue 
there are a number of contextual factors which create additional cognitive or physical strain 
on the driver, or reduce the ability of the driver to attain sufficient rest. Whilst it was rare for 
any single factor to be identified as fatigue inducing, Study Three found that the key factors 
influencing fatigue were members of the general public (section 8.4), customers (8.5), and 
environmental factors (8.8). Further, a number of general lifestyle-related factors, which did 
not emerge as a key theme within the case studies but did appear in Study One (see section 
4.2.3), were seen to influence fatigue. 
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10.2.2.1.1. The general public and fatigue 
One Company A driver suggested that cars are “the biggest contributor to fatigue” due 
to their tendency to “jump in front of you and hit the brakes”. The additional awareness and 
attention required when driving around other vehicles is a cognitive drain leading to fatigue. 
Additionally, it was indicated by multiple drivers that speed limiters prevent truck drivers 
from overtaking slower vehicles, leading to fatigue from frustration. 
 
10.2.2.1.2. Customers and fatigue 
As discussed in section 8.5, customers can be a source of significant delays which 
contribute to fatigue. Though not evident within Company B and C, Company A drivers 
experienced regular long delays during the observations. Two specific examples are worth 
discussing. In the first, the researcher and driver arrived on time to a depot at which the driver 
assisted in unloading.  After unloading, the researcher and driver waited approximately two 
and a half hours before the truck begun to be loaded, resulting in a total waiting time of four 
hours before departure. It was suggested that heat, and the fact that the air conditioner within 
the truck was broken, prevented napping during such delays. Thus, when delays are 
combined with truck maintenance factors and environmental conditions, the driver is unable 
to use such time to sleep. The second incident (recorded from the researcher’s perspective 
over the page) occurred during one change-over journey, when the observed driver was 
Should increase speed limit especially with the roads these days. You run off to catch up 
lost time. Increasing it would probably remove a lot of cowboys from the industry. Nothing 
worse than trying to overtake and they speed up and you can’t get past. Guys sit below the 
speed limit and when you go to pass they speed up and don’t let you in. Having 110km/h at 
the pedal would help. Frustration builds up and you are constantly tired, stressed out, your 
mind is going 100mph; even 3km/h on a long drive makes a big difference. (Company A 
Driver Three) 
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required to sit on the side of the road for approximately four-and-a-half hours during the 
middle of the night, due to a combination of customer delays and a slower travel time. Whilst 
the driver used this opportunity to take a brief nap, the researcher was unable to do so and 
experienced significant fatigue as a result. 
It was common for driver and manager to suggest that customers should be held more 
accountable for delays. For example, one Company A driver shared his experience of being 
required to wait six-and-a-half hours to be loaded. When combined with a three-hour loading 
process, the driver was delayed 9.5 hours despite arriving early to the customer site and 
expecting an early finish. The driver stated that “some places just don’t care how long they 
hold you up”. Whilst customers can be punished under chain of responsibility legislation, 
general perception is that they remain unpunished.  
 
10.2.2.1.3. Environmental factors and fatigue 
A number of environment factors were found to influence fatigue. These primarily 
included the time of day, road design and condition, truck design, and type of load carried.   
Safety concerns in terms of breaks are definitely with clients, lots of holds up in queues and 
there are people who are known to do it more so than others. So that’s a really big issue in 
this industry. A lot of it’s been discussed when I was going to the National Heavy Regulator 
forums. Lots of discussion around you know you’re focusing on the operators, what about 
the other people in the chain. So we often have drivers who are held up for hours. So we 
tell them to go and rest but it’s really hard because they’re getting woken up again to move 
things and just move up the queue or whatever like crazy.  So that’s a big safety issue. 
(Company A Manager Two) 
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Observation Notes Excerpts: Researcher’s Experience of Delay-Related Fatigue 
Driving from Brisbane to halfway between Brisbane and Sydney, where we will swap 
trailers with a driver coming out of Sydney, then return to Brisbane.  
 
6:30pm – Left Brisbane 
 
9:30pm – The driver coming out of Sydney was delayed and has only just left 
 
12:15am – Arrived at Macksville (halfway between Brisbane and Sydney). We had a brief 
break for coffee on the way. Now just chatting to the driver about work and family etc. 
 
3am (approx.) – We had been chatting for a while but I’m getting pretty tired and am 
concerned the driver may need to sleep. I suggested multiple times that if he wanted to rest 
or sleep (whatever he would usually do) that he shouldn’t let me stop him. I walked down 
the road to get something to eat and drink from the servo, but it may make him choose to 
rest if he wants to. When I got back to the truck he was in the bunk, apparently the other 
driver was a fair way off still and was going to call just before he got there. So the driver I 
am with is taking a nap. I decided to wait outside the truck to avoid disturbing the driver by 
moving around etc. Sitting beside the wheel arch (not sure if it is the wheel still hot, or 
warm air from the drain, but it’s warmer here). Almost fell asleep sitting here. So tired. 
 
4:30am (approx.) – Finally got the call that the other driver is about 20 minutes away. I 
hope the nap helped my driver, coz I’m exhausted. 
 
Thoughts after – Got a coffee at Grafton, gave me about 30 minutes of being awake but I 
was falling asleep again after that. Tried sitting forward to not be comfortable, every time I 
leaned back I started to drift. He’s right, you can’t relax or you’re gone. I think I had 
multiple micro sleeps, he didn’t seem to realise because he would say something that I 
missed the start of without mentioning that I was falling asleep. I’m not sure if just the act 
of driving would help you stay awake. 
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The time of day is particularly relevant to fatigue due to the human circadian rhythm which 
dictates levels of alertness on a regular basis relative to the time. Regarding this rhythm, one 
Company A manager simply stated “the human body is not meant to function at night”. Due 
to the proportion of night journeys conducted, this factor is more relevant to Company A 
drivers who regularly highlighted the times at which fatigue is the most difficult. The effect 
of time was typically attributed to light conditions, which also influence the body clock. For 
example, one Company A driver stated that “fatigue is definitely harder an hour either side 
of sunrise and sunset”, additionally stating that he finds there is “also a lull at about 3 to 
5pm”.  
 
It was also suggested that road design and truck design factors can interact with this to 
further induce fatigue. For example, when discussing what time was the hardest to stay alert, 
one driver stated that it depends on the road, indicating that a lack of lights along the road 
The human body is not meant to operate of a night time, we’re not nocturnal.  One of the 
biggest problems I always found when I was working the night shift... It’s the change from 
daylight to dark or dark to daylight. Every single morning 4.30, 5 o’clock I'm getting crazy 
tired just because it’s beginning to be light. Or when the birds wake up because you know 
it’s about to change from dark to light. And if it was a full moon and birds are awake 
because it’s so light you’ll be tired most of the night because you’ve got your birds all the 
time and your body just thinks oh it’s morning... Most of the night when we’re running late 
if they’re pulling up for their half hour break well they probably go to sleep, wake them up 
so they don’t over sleep all that sort of stuff.  A lot of blokes pull up 4, 5, 6am at the change 
of dark to light because that’s just, I don’t know, it’s just something. Your brain goes fuck 
I'm tired now it’s getting light. Because you know when it’s dark it’s just night-time but 
when it becomes light fuck it’s the morning. (Company A Manager One) 
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make it more difficult to stay awake. Similarly, one driver stated that it can be hard to stay 
alert at 2am due to the lack of attention required to drive an automatic truck.  
Both road and truck design factors can also influence fatigue separate to the time of 
day. A number of drivers suggested that the inability to find adequate rest locations along the 
road, and a lack of clean rest facilities at truck stops prevents drivers from gaining sufficient 
rest. Thus, one Company A driver stated that the government should invest in more stopping 
bays. Additionally, one driver who had previously worked in another country stated that in 
Australia the roads are long and straight, leading to fatigue from monotony. Conversely, one 
organisational staff member from Company A suggested that drivers have too much to focus 
on, particularly related to speed, which further increase fatigue. 
 
A number of Company A drivers also suggested that the provided bunk coolers were 
insufficient for Australian heat, making it difficult to sleep on the side of the road. Similarly, 
the absence of bunks in many Company B trucks was suggested by drivers to prevent 
napping to reduce fatigue during a journey. For this reason, truck design factors, particularly 
related to technological safety choices made by organisations, can also influence fatigue 
levels. 
The last environmental factor which was identified as influencing fatigue was the type 
of load being carried (section 8.8). When transporting livestock it is necessary to regularly 
exit the vehicle to check the cattle. Whilst this is still a form of work, the brief break from 
driving may assist the driver to stay alert. Conversely, one Company B manager stated that 
We need to be thinking big picture. I don't think we are on our highways. And our drivers 
get huge log book fines and they’re getting huge infringement fines for going 70 through 
something that looks like an 80 but is actually 60. So they’re constantly looking at their 
speedo to make sure they keep their points. So all that adds to your driver fatigue right? 
(Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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carrying over-dimension loads results in a significant increase of time spent loading and 
unloading, which in itself may contribute to fatigue. 
 
10.2.2.2. Log books 
Significant attention was given to log books by members of the studied organisations. 
Log books are the primary means of fatigue management enforcement and monitoring. Due 
to the influence of a number of contextual and cultural factors, a number of attitudes towards 
log books emerged. Additionally, a number of general comments regarding the suitability of 
log books were made. First, it should be noted that every comment regarding log books was 
inherently influenced by government departments, due to the legislation governing their use. 
Members of the industry commonly noted the influence of road factors on log books. 
Delays caused by roadworks, and even traffic lights, can significantly reduce remaining work 
Yeah it can be.  You know like there’s no doubt they do have big days, they’re pretty 
much...when they do head out of town they pretty much do go right up on their hours. 
Heavy haulage is less physical driving than like a line-haul truck. Like you know if you’re 
doing a Brisbane to Melbourne then you work 14 hours chances are you’re driving 13 of 
those hours or whatever it might be you know. With heavy haulage there is a lot of time 
loading, unloading, on site all that kind of stuff. So technically speaking if a job is a 30-
hour job you know the driving component of that might be 15 or 18, something like that. So 
a guy might work a lot of hours it doesn’t necessarily mean he’s been driving that whole 
time. You know just, it’s still a fatigue issue and everything as well because they’re not 
standing around they’re usually you know doing physical labour as well. With chaining 
down and all that kind of stuff. But yeah definitely is like you know and it’s the same like 
with police. If you go out of town with the police leaving at midnight the police are in the 
same boat. You know they’ve got fatigue management they’ve got to abide by as well. 
(Company B Branch Manager One) 
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hours, thus reducing the distance a driver can travel. Whilst delays still contribute to fatigue, 
many drivers disliked log books as minor losses of time detract from the maximum trip 
distance. This was partly influenced by a combination of the value placed on time and 
money, and the inability to drive beyond the legal hours. Due to distance-based payment 
methods, log books limit the amount of money a driver can make in the presence of traffic 
delays.  
 
Many participants also expressed that log books are unfair in that they are only applied 
to the heavy vehicle industry (see section 9.2.2). Further, a general lack of education, and in 
some cases, intelligence, made log books difficult for some drivers to comply with. For 
example, one Company B driver was visibly distressed when completing his work diary. The 
driver immediately stated that log books “are bullshit”, due to the ease of falsification. 
However, he immediately went on to say that he hated the log books “coz I didn’t go to uni 
and I’m not too bright with all these”, indicating concern, as “they book you for it if you 
don’t get it all right”. The driver concluded by saying “fuck I don’t know, I’m not real good 
at this shit as I say”. The number of overlapping rules governing maximum consecutive work 
hours and maximum weekly hours can become rapidly confusing. This will be further 
discussed in the next section; however, it is important to note that many participants believed 
that log books were too complicated and difficult. 
 
They’re trying to make it flexible but it’s a bloody, you know, it’s not flexible at all, or it’s 
not flexible enough.  We’re talking about guys that, you know, probably don't even get past 
Grade 8, so we need to make things a bit easier for them out there. (Company A Health and 
Safety Officer) 
 
We’re paid by the kilometre. You can’t cut hours any further coz you need to do 5000km to 
earn a decent wage. (Company A Driver Three) 
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Finally, members of Company C believed that the livestock transport industry was 
unique when compared with other transport (section 9.2.1). Due to this uniqueness, one 
driver stated that “log books just don’t suit the industry”. The combination of regular use of 
dirt roads, and the associated inability to travel significant distances within regulated hours, 
alongside the requirement to regularly stop to check on the cattle, results in log books being 
seen as a hassle, rather than a benefit.  
10.2.2.2.1. Log books versus fatigue 
Ultimately, as discussed in section 9.2.2, behaviour is significantly more likely where 
members of the industry believe that it will improve safety. Thus, it is important to consider 
whether or not fatigue management regulations are perceived to improve safety. Participants 
expressed mixed views regarding the benefits of fatigue management through log books.  
Many participants did express a belief in the benefits of the log book system. As stated 
by one Company A driver, “fatigue is not too bad if you follow the guidelines as they are 
meant to be done”. Similarly, another Company A driver indicated that it was common for 
members of the broader industry to criticise drivers who are perceived to not comply with 
fatigue management, through radio comments such as “if you’re not sure about your log 
book get off the road!” Additionally, one Company B manager stated that drivers who 
incorrectly used the log book, may be making a ‘mistake’ which will one day “cost his life”. 
Some members of the industry clearly believe fatigue management compliance improves 
safety.  
A number of participants, however, appeared to believe that log books do not improve 
safety. These beliefs appeared to be based upon perceived individual differences, the 
difference between ‘resting’ and gaining actual rest, the differences between standard and 
‘basic’ fatigue management regulations, and the perception that log books force drivers to 
drive when fatigued.  
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Perceived individual differences were commonly cited as being overlooked within 
fatigue management legislation. Within Company C, a number of individuals indicated that 
the maximum legal work hours assume that every driver will be tired after a given amount of 
work. For this reason, the driver/manager of Company C stated that log books are “shit”. 
 
Participants placed significant value on individual responsibility and common sense 
(see sections 9.3.2 and 9.2.3.2). The lack of recognition of individual differences in the log 
book system was perceived by the driver/manager of Company C to have removed common 
sense out of fatigue management. Whilst the removal of individual responsibility and 
common sense is beneficial to safety, it is commonly disliked by industry members. 
 
It’s like saying that after driving for five hours you must stop. Like they’ve taken the 
common sense out of that and said that after five hours no matter who you are –  
 
No, no I said that. No, because the fatigue laws say you’ve got to drive for five hours and 
then you’ve got to have a break and then you’ve got to do something else and then you’ve 
got to have a break. Sometimes you don't want to go for five hours. Sometimes you might 
get weary after two hours. But the laws say you must, to get the amount of time in a day of 
driving you must break it up into those specific breaks. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
 
They really get peeved when they get them. ... It’s a good way of teaching, too right, 
especially the work diaries you know. If they haven’t had their regular breaks and even 
though we find that out later on he might continually be making that mistake which could 
cost his life later on... So we, you know, found out more, you know, you’re not taking your 
four breaks right, is that, you know, eventually you’ll be found out and you know most of 
them say I didn’t know I had to do it like that. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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Many members of the industry expressed similar concerns yet still considered the rules 
as valid. 
 
A second weakness identified in the log book system was the difference between what 
constitutes resting on a log book, and actual rest achieved. For example, one Company A 
driver suggested that the legal seven-hour break every day is actually insufficient when a 
driver is at their own home, due to the time taken to eat, shower and commute between work 
and home. Conversely, it was argued that on the side of the road drivers do not want longer 
than seven hours. Similarly, one Company B driver indicated that a thirty minute break does 
not leave time to actually rest as, between recording the break, going to the toilet and quickly 
eating something the driver is left with 10 to 20 minutes. Lastly, one Company A driver 
stated that even with longer breaks drivers must choose to rest and that many will waste time 
doing other tasks. In each of these cases, the respondents were indicating that compliance 
with the legal requirements of log books does not guarantee safety and thus the current log 
I think the regulation is great on the hours. There’s some people out there who can drive 
for 24 hours. I can drive my car for 24 hours, or I used to be able to.  I could probably do 
the same in a truck the difference is the amount of people it will kill if it runs into a primary 
school I guess. You know the car will only kill the lady on the crossing the truck will take 
the gardener out as well. Yeah I don't know how you’d regulate, maybe it’s just too big to 
regulate. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
 
– or what your background is or whether you’re a robot or whatever, after five hours 
you’re gonna be tired.  That’s where the common sense has gone. Whereas after four hours 
you might be tired but to get to where you’ve got to be in that 12-hour period you must 
drive for five. And then you must have a break. ... Realistically you could probably drive for 
10 and then have your break. But the laws say that you can’t go over five so... (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
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book system, designed to improve safety, is insufficient if a driver does not want to gain 
sufficient rest. 
 
The three levels of fatigue management – standard, basic and advanced fatigue 
management – require users to gain the associated NHVAS accreditation and gradually allow 
longer daily hours with typically longer required break times between shifts. Additionally, 
basic fatigue management (BFM) places restrictions on the number of night-time hours 
driven. The differences between these levels were the focus of much criticism. For example, 
one Company A driver stated it is possible to drive every night between Brisbane and Sydney 
on standard hours, yet that due to restricted night time hours, the same trips are not possible 
under BFM. This restriction was deemed illogical given the extra training the individual has 
received. Similarly, in regards to the additional daily hours permitted by BFM, one Company 
A driver suggested that it should not be allowed as it “only favours the company” and “no 
driver wants to do the extra hours”. Thus, it was perceived that BFM allows what is 
considered to be dangerous single shifts whilst preventing normal shifts that other drivers are 
allowed. 
The final issue raised with log book enforcement was the perception that log books 
force drivers to drive whilst fatigued. As stated by one Company A driver “you gotta do a 
minimum amount of time and keep going so you can get home legally the next day”. 
Similarly, one Company C driver suggested that despite wanting to take longer to conduct 
some journeys, log book restrictions mean that he has to drive hard. 
Have heard rumours that some people don’t sleep in their seven hours rest period; they go 
and do stuff instead. But it’s gotta be a two-way street. They can’t force you to drive when 
tired but you still need to do your part and get enough rest. You have to play by the rules 
but you can’t be stupid about it coz it will stuff your next run out.  (Company A Driver Six) 
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Whilst the claim that log books encourage driving whilst fatigued initially seemed 
unlikely, further investigation revealed that weaknesses in the log book system encourage 
drivers to treat the log book as a restrictive run-sheet, rather than to ensure sufficient rest and 
reduced fatigue. The reliance on 24-hour periods means that no single day can be treated in 
isolation. Deviations on a single day to reduce fatigue can have significant implications for 
the remainder of a driver’s week. Whilst safety should be given priority over productivity, 
drivers are also forced to rest earlier than required, but not when fatigued, in order to comply 
with legislation. During the observed TruckSafe audit, the auditor identified a fatigue 
management breach on a log book copy. A reproduction of this example is provided over the 
page to demonstrate the impact that fatigue-reducing choices made on one day have on the 
next day. Due to the effects that rests have on subsequent work, drivers feel pressured to 
drive to the maximum requirements of the work diary and follow it as a prescriptive roster, 
rather than a tool to ensure they receive sufficient rest. This was another perceived reason 
why the log book system does not align with perceptions of safety. 
On some occasions, however, members of the industry may have been misinformed 
regarding fatigue management legislation. The driver/manager of Company C discussed 
curfews regarding heavy vehicle access to certain roads, noting that these curfews result in 
trips finishing after midnight. He believed that drivers were only allowed to work a total of 
six calendar days per week and finishing after 12am meant the driver had worked on the 
subsequent day and would be required to have a separate day off. In actuality, the regulations 
only require a consecutive 24-hour break and the driver is permitted to resume work 24 hours 
after finishing. Thus, some frustrations may be the result of misinformation. 
The way the books are once you put a mark in the book you gotta go, it might look good on 
paper, but you gotta go hard, if I had 1000 km to go, if left to my own devices it might take 
me 15 hours but I’ve gotta cover it in 12. (Company C Driver Three) 
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In the illustrated case, a driver began his 
first day at 9am, working til 8pm with 
two half-hour breaks. On the second day 
the driver started at 7am and worked four 
hours straight, finishing at 11am. Neither 
day, in isolation, has breached fatigue 
management legislation. 
 
Regulations state that a driver may not 
work more than 12 hours in a 24-hour 
period. Measuring from 9am on day one, 
the driver has only worked 12 hours and 
is thus within the law.  
 
However, the law also states that this 24-
hour period can be measured from the 
end of any break. If measured from the 
end of his first break on day one, this 
driver breaches fatigue management 
legislation by 30 minutes.  
 
Due to taking a necessary rest too early 
on day one, he is over hours on day two. 
 
Drivers are permitted to work identical 12-hour shifts every day, yet unless they take breaks 
at the same time every day they will be in breach of policy. Thus, drivers indicated that they 
feel pressured to take breaks for compliance, but unable to rest when fatigued. 
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It was evident that many participants did not perceive log books to be an effective 
strategy for reducing fatigue. Driving over hours and driving whilst fatigued are two separate 
behaviours in the minds of many industry members, and different factors were found to 
influence each behaviour.  
10.2.2.3. Driving over hours 
There are a number of factors which determine whether or not drivers will comply with 
fatigue management legislation. The factors which were identified included a number of 
organisational practices, the role of the government, customer delays, pressures and 
standards, the role of accreditation schemes, and a number of cultural traits. 
10.2.2.3.1. The organisation and driving over hours 
The organisation plays a significant role in influencing drivers’ decisions regarding 
fatigue management compliance. Even the basic recruitment of drivers may influence 
compliance. As discussed in section 7.3.1.1, many recruitment agencies do not hold copies of 
driver work diary entries and the use of recruitment agency drivers by organisations may 
result in unintended breaches. Similarly, an organisation is unable to prove that a freshly-
recruited driver is not exceeding legislated hours. 
 
It is the responsibility of the organisation, especially if accredited for BFM, to 
adequately train their staff on how to manage fatigue and comply with legislated work hours. 
Anyway there’s been an incident in the past where I’ve phoned an agency to obtain work 
diary sheets because the driver didn’t hand any in to us and we didn’t pay the agency 
because we didn’t have all the paperwork. And the agency wasn’t collecting work diaries 
and they’re the employer... So how are they making sure in a chain of responsibility that the 
driver is doing the right thing and are they training them on how to fill them in? (Company 
A Manager Two) 
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After training, the organisation also must roster drivers to suit fatigue legislation. As stated by 
one Company B manager, he must “make sure (the driver is) within his driving hours for the 
day or week or whatever it might be”.   
 
Communication between organisations and drivers during a shift may also influence 
compliance. This is particularly important when a driver is absent from the depot for a 
prolonged period of time. The operational manager of Company B discussed this 
communication, indicating that the organisation must determine how many breaks the driver 
has taken and when they occurred to ensure that the driver does not exceed their maximum 
weekly hours. However, even on shorter trips, the organisation may contact drivers to ensure 
that they can legally complete their journey.  
 
Whilst communication is largely related to helping the driver, it is also a form of 
compliance monitoring, potentially resulting in organisational enforcement. However, the 
primary monitoring technique for fatigue compliance in each company was the checking of 
If they go somewhere and get held up and they’re only allowed to drive 12 hours or 
something like that and they’ve driven the 12 hours they have to stop. They call here, our 
night loader (name) organises a driver to go there and pick that truck up and drive home, 
we don’t let them driver over the designated hours that are allowed. (Company B Trainer 
One) 
 
Obviously in my work you’ve got to be aware of fatigue management. They can only work 
so many hours a day, they have to have their statutory 10-hour break between finishing one 
day and starting the next day. Then if they’re away for a considerable period of time you’ve 
also got to be aware of the fact that they work so many hours in a seven day period and so 
many hours in a 14-day period. So it all comes back to managing their fatigue. So 
obviously when there’s fatigue involved, it heightens the risk factor of something happening 
on the road. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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log book sheets. It was noted by one Company A manager that they regularly check a 
significant proportion of log book sheets to ensure compliance, providing non-conformance 
notices for breaches. 
 
Additionally, many organisations utilise satellite tracking to monitor compliance. As 
stated by one Company B driver, “we’re satellite tracked so you don’t go over your hours”. 
Similarly, another Company B driver indicated that the length of time between satellite 
tracking “snap shots” enables monitoring of even short breaks. However, satellite tracking of 
fatigue compliance is generally through confirming log book accuracy. 
 
10.2.2.3.2. Government departments and driving over hours 
Compliance with fatigue management legislation is primarily enforced by government 
officials. Due to the perception that fatigue management legislation is insufficient at reducing 
fatigue, members of the industry appeared to take a punishment avoidance approach towards 
We’ve had instances in the past where we’ve gone back through the Navman and checked 
on what drivers have put on their timesheet and their log book just to make sure that 
they’re not cheating the hours, make sure they’re taking their half-hour breaks when 
they’re due them. Because they can only work a maximum of six hours and they have to 
have a half-hour break, we can use that. If a guy has had his engine turned on for 10 hours 
straight and he’s driving well you know he hasn’t had his half-hour break. (Company B 
Operational Manager) 
 
Drivers on a 14-hour day which is all basic fatigue management they have to follow a log 
book every day. They have to hand one page of that log book in every day. So the company 
monitors, someone goes over that page every day and checks to make sure they’re not 
making mistakes, they’re not exceeding their driving hours and that’s all monitored and 
recorded through the office. (Company B Operational Manager) 
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log books. Thus, the primary motivation for compliance was drawn from a desire to avoid 
punishment. One Company A driver, who was observed completing a log book entry from a 
previous shift, stated that he was doing this “so I don’t get booked” as it was “a fine we don’t 
need and points we don’t need to give away”. The severity of punishment, combined with a 
belief that log books could not be ‘cheated’, appeared to motivate drivers to comply rather 
than seek to avoid detection. As stated by one Company A driver, “you used to be able to 
cheat log books, but now it is not possible, you are forced to do it legally, it’s just not worth 
it”. Due to the requirement of entering odometer readings on the work diary, one Company A 
driver stated that it was “not worth trying to cheat it anymore, you need to write down your 
speedo now, so you need to follow the book these days”. 
Conversely, some drivers still believe it is possible to falsify log book entries without 
detection. One Company C driver simply stated “I’m old school, we get the job done and 
don’t worry about log books, I’ll bodge it up later”. Other subtler forms of non-compliance 
were also evident. Journeys which do not exceed 200km from the originating depot do not 
require work diary use. In these cases, it was indicated that drivers may conduct multiple 
runs, totalling work times in excess of 15 hours. Additionally, one Company A driver stated 
that a previous employee sent him on a short distance trip, then required him to start a log 
book from a second depot, resulting in a 19-hour shift.  
10.2.2.3.3. Customers and driving over hours 
Customers may apply heavy standards upon drivers, thereby encouraging compliance. 
Whilst timeslots can be a major contributor to fatigue, it was noted by one Company B driver 
that the time slots used by one customer prevented a driver from entering the customer site 
before a designated time. In this case, there is less incentive to skip rest breaks or drive over 
hours as the driver will simply have to wait at the destination. Similarly, many customers 
require drivers to declare that they are legally capable of completing a job. 
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Conversely, customers may also place significant delays and pressures on drivers. For 
example, one Company A driver indicated that, despite warning a customer of limited 
remaining work hours upon arriving at a depot, the customer did not process his unloading in 
time and the driver was required to exit the depot and find a safe rest location whilst outside 
of hours. Similarly, as discussed in section 7.3.5.3, Company C is often pressured by agents 
to conduct loads which would require non-compliance with regulation. 
10.2.2.3.4. Accreditation and driving over hours 
As was detailed in section 8.6, the NHVAS fatigue management scheme governs 
whether companies may use BFM. Thus, the requirements they place on organisations to 
train, monitor and enforce fatigue management compliance with their drivers has an indirect 
effect, through the organisation, on this compliance. Similarly, however, for companies 
which do not use BFM, TruckSafe accreditation places significant similar requirements on 
organisations. As these were discussed previously no further detail will be provided here. 
10.2.2.3.5. Cultural traits and driving over hours 
A number of cultural traits, identified in Chapter 9, appeared to influence fatigue 
compliance. First, the value placed on money can contribute to a driver’s decision to exceed 
regulated hours if they are paid a distance-based rate. Conversely, when paid an hourly-rate, 
one Company B driver stated that drivers who choose to work during breaks “are idiots”, as 
“it’s just giving the company money, you don’t get paid for it”.  
 
So they get paid, if they work 14 hours, they get paid for 14 hours. Not like the guys who 
are on a trip rate where they get paid $350 to drive to Sydney so they try and drive it there 
as fast as they can so they can turn around and come home again. (Company B Operational 
Manager) 
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The cultural traits of autonomy and responsibility were also suggested to play a role in 
driving outside of hours. Drivers are deemed solely responsible for choosing when to take 
breaks. Additionally, it is the driver’s responsibility to take breaks when fatigued, and ensure 
they are not stranded in a location which they cannot rest resulting in non-compliance. 
 
The perceived likelihood of experiencing fatigue from breaching fatigue management 
legislation can shape drivers’ attitudes and behaviours regarding fatigue management 
legislation. Thus, cultural traits of experiential and narrative learning, and the associated 
perceived likelihood of an incident, affect compliance decisions. For example, one driver 
stated that “the moment the 14 hours is up I go home. It’s the end of my day coz I’ve found 
that that’s where a lot of truck accidents happen, at the end of a long day”.  
Within Company C the perceived likelihood of an incident resulting from driving over 
hours was low. Due to the constraints associated with holding cattle on a truck for extended 
time, and the potential for punishment under animal welfare legislations, it was suggested to 
be easier to justify driving hours breaches than animal welfare breaches. Whilst this is an 
interaction between two government legislations, it evidenced a belief that driving hours 
breaches would not result in a crash. Thus, it was believed that a driver could drive over 
There’s no clock guard in a truck, there’s no headmaster watching. If you start at six 
o’clock in the morning you can drive for five hours. No one says you have to have your 
break at five to one or ten past nine. You have it when best suits you I guess. You look at 
the job you’ve got to do, the places you’ve got to go you know and then take all that into 
consideration with how you feel. There’s no point going, oh I’ll have my break right at the 
end, and then you find you’re sitting in a frigging traffic jam and you can’t have it. So then 
you’re under pressure, you’ve just added that little bit of stress to your life, but now you’re 
worried I'm not going to get my break, the RTA is going to get me you know. Doesn’t have 
to have... people need to I guess manage their fatigue. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
 
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 370 
 
hours without incident if they did not perceive themself to be fatigued.  
 
10.2.2.4. Driving whilst fatigued 
There were a number of factors which influenced the likelihood of a driver choosing to 
drive whilst fatigued. These included organisational factors, the role of customers, the 
broader industry, environmental factors, and a number of cultural traits. 
There’s nothing more than we identify issues early in the piece and if things come up sort of 
later on we counsel them if that’s the right word. But basically that’s how it works. And 
they know it’s made really clear to them early in the piece what’s expected of them and 
what’s not. The first thing that’s expected of them, and we’ve had this discussion without 
the tape recorder going, is they’ve tired they sleep. I really don't care if your log book says 
you have sleep you sleep because you’re tired. Umm you don't drive, unless there’s animal 
welfare issues and I'm always honest and out there, if there’s animal welfare issues and you 
have to drive past your ...certainly not into an unsafe environment, but past your five hours 
or you know a little while into your daily allowance, as long as you talk to me first, and 
explain to me what the issues are, if they’re in range. I don't have a problem with that. I 
then mark it in my diary to say this is what’s happening today and then I schedule around 
making sure it doesn’t happen two days in a row or that sort of thing... Yeah we discuss it.   
And I think that’s a call I have to make. Myself or (Driver/Manager’s name) but usually it’s 
me. I have to make. I mean I think chain of responsibility for animal welfare and chain of 
responsibility for driving hours umm it’s easier for me to justify allowing them to go 
another half an hour or an hour. And I don't mean (researchers name), I don't mean 24 
hours a day, I just mean extra time to do what needs to be done. Easier for me to justify that 
from a driving hours point of view, than it will be if we have a disaster and we’ve got cattle 
down and dead. (Company C Manager) 
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10.2.2.4.1. The organisation and driving whilst fatigued 
The organisation also plays a pivotal role in influencing drivers’ decisions regarding 
driving whilst fatigued. Given the greater proportion of long distance trips, much of the 
following information was drawn from Company A. Many organisations appear to walk a 
fine line maximising safe productivity and encouraging dangerous behaviour. As stated of 
Company A by one driver, “they don’t send you off if you’re tired, they will push you to your 
legal limit but if they are tired they won’t force it”. Thus, organisations must have a number 
of procedures in place to ensure drivers work in a safe manner. Ultimately, the organisation is 
somewhat limited in its ability to influence driving whilst fatigued.  
 
It is both a legislative and accreditation requirement for organisations to adequately 
train their drivers to identify and manage fatigue. As organisations cannot identify fatigue in 
their drivers, this training is essential.  
It was commonly suggested that, in addition to compliance with fatigue management 
legislation, organisations will roster their drivers according to their perceived level of fatigue. 
Whilst a driver’s level of fatigue cannot be predicted at the creation of a roster, organisations 
typically anticipate flexibility in their rosters. Whilst a driver may be rostered to complete a 
journey, if they are fatigued they are not required, or even permitted in some cases, to take 
the load. Within Company A it was suggested that drivers will be given a different load if 
they appear fatigued upon arriving at the depot. 
Yeah so you know it’s a, it’s a hell of a thing in a lot of respects. Yeah. So all we can give 
them are tools alright, it’s up to them to tie up the nuts and bolts with those tools, that’s all 
we can do. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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Organisations also use a number of specific safety-management strategies to ensure that 
drivers do not drive whilst fatigued. Within Company A, drivers are required to regularly 
inform the organisation if they are going to sleep during a rest break, which lets the 
organisation know that the driver is fatigued and enables it to assist the driver to avoid sleep 
inertia by waking him up after an agreed time. 
We’ve got to teach them to know, to look for the signs or symptoms of tiredness and we got 
to teach them as we went through our inductions to pull over if tired, ring ops. And we don't 
prevent them from doing that. You know certainly our stuff is time sensitive right but we’re 
not preventing them you know. We expect them to be true night workers in other words 
sleep during the day and work through the night. But people need that, you know, that kip 
or you know… we’d rather the wheels on the ground than wheels up there. (Company A 
Health and Safety Officer) 
 
Well we try and roster them on properly like to make sure, like, they will have their proper 
rest breaks. If they come in late and I see that they’re not fit to go out or we haven’t got a 
load to suit them to go out they get put at the end of the list and they don’t go out. Or we 
put them on a very late one where they do have extra...like say for instance a drive comes in 
at two o’clock in the afternoon you know darn well he doesn’t want to go out again. But I 
might have something for him that is not urgent to get into the other state till the following 
day and he can leave at midnight and he’s still getting time to go home, do whatever he 
wants to do and still get six or seven hours sleep before he actually has to go out again.  So 
we take that type of procedure here and we try and ensure that all our drivers are properly 
fatigue managed before they go out. (Company A Operations Staff Member) 
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Additionally, the organisation can recheck on the driver after their nap to try to assess 
fitness for duty. Similarly, the organisation will contact drivers on regular occasion to assess 
their level of fatigue, especially after receiving external feedback. 
 
If a driver is too fatigued, the organisation may also take measures to permit additional 
rest. One Company A manager suggested that when a driver is too fatigued, the organisation 
will organise another driver to take the load to the destination. Further, however, it was 
indicated that on occasions simply talking over the phone helps drivers to stay alert and thus 
communication in itself may assist in reducing fatigued driving. 
10.2.2.4.2. The customer and driving whilst fatigued 
Customer pressures can pose a significant threat to driving whilst fatigued. Within 
Company A this is further amplified by the express nature of their major freight (see section 
8.5). Whilst discussed in detail section 8.5.2.5.1, it is worth repeating that timeslots which are 
designed to allow a driver additional time to rest before arrival may reduce such pressures. 
However, one driver noted that there may be repercussions if a driver is regularly late.  
 
Yeah well that’s all you can do right? You know say for argument’s sake somebody rings us 
up and says one of our semi-trailers is you know wavering all over the road. All we can do 
is phone them up talk to them and assess their speech – whether it’s slurred, whether it’s 
slow, whether it’s coherent. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
 
One of the main functions of the night crew is if someone is tired they ring up and say I'm 
going for bed whether it be for 15, 20, half hour for this their legal required break or they 
need longer than that. So we wake them up when they’re due to get up whether it be for the 
time constraint or because they say I want to be in bed for 40 minutes or whatever. 
(Company A Manager One) 
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10.2.2.4.3. The broader industry and driving whilst fatigued 
As indicated in section 8.7, the broader industry can affect safety-related behaviours in 
a number of ways. As was discussed, Company A has at times relied on drivers from other 
companies to exchange loads with a fatigued driver, allowing additional rest. Further, 
members of the general industry have on many occasions been reported to criticise drivers 
who appear to be driving whilst fatigued (see also 10.2.2.2.1). 
10.2.2.4.4. Environmental factors and driving whilst fatigued 
In addition to contributing to a driver’s level of fatigue, environmental factors may 
contribute to decisions to drive whilst fatigued. Specifically, it was indicated by a number of 
drivers that they may opt to continue driving in order to reach their final location whilst it is 
still dark, or cool, in order to be able to sleep more efficiently. Additionally, regarding load 
types, the requirement for cattle to be removed from the truck after a maximum of 36 hours 
may encourage drivers to continue driving even whilst fatigued. 
10.2.2.4.5. Cultural traits and driving whilst fatigued 
A number of cultural traits identified in Chapter 9 appeared to influence drivers’ 
decisions to drive whilst fatigued,  including the uniqueness of the industry, hard work, 
money and other gains, rebels, rogues and cowboys, autonomy, responsibility and the 
perceived likelihood of an incident. 
First, due to the perceived uniqueness of the industry, it was common for participants to 
suggest that you can drive a truck all day without experiencing fatigue, yet this is not possible 
for cars. It was also evident that the cultural trait of hard work may encourage drivers to 
continue whilst fatigued. A number of drivers, particularly within Company A, suggested that 
once you accept a job you have to complete it. Though this was sometimes linked to meeting 
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with another driver to exchange loads and customer demands, it was also suggested outright 
that if you accept a job you must complete it.  
 
A number of drivers also indicated that the value placed on money and other gains may 
lead to driving whilst fatigued. One Company A manager described a driver who had 
carefully worked out the maximum amount of kilometres, and therefore income, that can be 
legally achieved within a week of work. This driver then completes this maximum workload 
on a weekly basis. Further, it was also evident that many members of the industry perceived 
that driving whilst fatigued was common amongst those labelled as rogues. 
The desire and value of autonomy and the responsibility of drivers were also evident in 
driving whilst fatigued. Unlike other identified traits, these cultural traits were seen to largely 
play a role in reducing driving whilst fatigued. Many drivers suggested that they will not 
succumb to pressure to drive whilst fatigued. This further applied to resting regardless of 
current log book requirements. As phrased by the driver/manager of Company C, “I manage 
my own fatigue”, continuing to say “when I feel like I’m tired I pull up and have a sleep”.  
The last cultural trait which was seen to influence driving whilst fatigued was the 
perceived likelihood of an incident. This perceived likelihood is strongly related to a driver’s 
past experience of driving whilst fatigued. However, this was further extended to relate to 
choices regarding substance use to manage fatigue.  
10.2.2.5. Summary: Fatigue 
Fatigue is a complex safety issue with a number of involved behaviours. A number of 
factors were identified which influence drivers’ levels of fatigue and their decisions to 
continue driving whilst either outside of legislated hours or experiencing fatigue. Every 
But when you’ve started a job you have to finish. You’ve put your hand up for it so you’ve 
got to get it done. (Company A Driver One) 
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organisational factor discussed in Chapter 7 was seen to have some influence over fatigue. 
Additionally, with exception to the effect of national and global climate, every category of 
contextual factors identified in Chapter 8 was also seen to influence fatigue. When 
considering that the discussed driver shortage (section 8.2.2) may encourage organisations 
like Company A to rely on recruitment agencies, it can be argued that there is an effect of 
national climate on fatigue. Lastly, the only cultural traits, discussed in Chapter 9, which 
were not seen to be evident within discussions of fatigue were the beliefs that unsafe acts are 
unintentional (section 9.2.5.3) or ‘just like everyone else’ (section 9.2.5.4), the tendency for 
drivers to conform to the ‘trucking image’ (section 9.2.6.4) and the ‘go!’ mentality (section 
9.3.3.2).  
With the exception of a few cultural sub-traits, it can be seen that every contextual and 
cultural factor identified within Study Three was relevant to fatigue. Thus, fatigue is a 
complex issue which cannot be understood using traditional approaches to safety culture, 
which focus solely on either organisational or cultural factors. Table 10.1 displays each of the 
factors which were identified to influence aspects of fatigue within the above discussion, 
along with the valence of their effect. These factors were identified to influence either 
experienced fatigue, attitudes towards log books, driving over hours or driving whilst 
fatigued. They are categorised according to their source (contextual or cultural) and as either 
leading to improved or decreased safety (e.g. greater or lesser experienced fatigue, positive or 
negative attitudes towards log books, and more or less likely to drive whilst over hours or 
fatigued). 
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Table 10.1: Factors which influence fatigue-related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Experienced 
fatigue 
Contextual Factors: 
General public 
Customer delays 
Road design and condition 
Truck design and maintenance 
Environmental conditions 
Load type 
Contextual Factors: 
Government COR legislation 
 Cultural Factors: 
Hard work 
Cultural Factors: 
- 
Attitudes 
towards log 
books 
Contextual factors: 
General public 
Road design and condition 
Contextual factors: 
- 
 Cultural Factors: 
Uniqueness 
Time 
Common sense 
Fairness 
Low perceived likelihood 
Rules 
Cultural Factors: 
- 
Driving over 
hours 
Contextual Factors: 
Customer delays 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational management. 
Government monitoring and 
enforcement 
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Customer standards 
Accreditation requirements 
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood 
Punishment avoidance 
Money 
Time 
 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
Safety 
Experiential and narrative learning 
Autonomy 
Responsibility 
Driving whilst 
fatigued 
Contextual Factors: 
Customer pressures and delays 
Environmental conditions 
Load type 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational management 
Broader industry 
 
 Cultural Factors: 
Limitations 
Uniqueness 
Hard work 
Money 
Cultural Factors: 
Experiential and narrative learning 
Perceived likelihood 
Safety 
Autonomy 
Responsibility 
10.2.3. Substance use 
As discussed in section 4.2, there is a relatively small body of literature regarding illicit 
drug use within the heavy vehicle industry. It was also seen in Study Two (section 5.2.1), that 
members expressed differing views regarding the extent of drug use within the industry. For 
this reason, and given the sensitivity of substance use, relatively little information was gained 
from Study Three regarding drug use whilst driving.  
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One Company B driver stated regarding drugs that “a lot of people say stuff that they 
don’t know anything about”.  Thus, it was indicated that much of the information gained 
could be myths. Further, one Company A manager stated that “there are two types of people 
who use drugs; those who use it to stay awake, and those who are just drug users who 
happen to drive a truck”. Therefore, whilst there may be aspects of heavy vehicle driving 
which could encourage illicit substance use, drug use may simply be a continuation of use not 
related to the industry. Prior to sharing this information, however, the manager quietly 
signalled to stop recording the interview. Whilst a small amount of sensitive information was 
provided during the time that the recorder was turned off, it was evident that even simple 
comments regarding drug use were shared secretively. Thus, despite ensured confidentiality, 
there may have been barriers to sharing such information, and the data collected regarding 
substance use may be biased or incomplete. For this reason, more targeted investigation of 
drug use is required to draw accurate conclusions. 
Potentially due to the above issues, all the information gained regarding drug use in 
Study Three was provided by individuals who, though they may have used substance in the 
past, do not currently use drugs. The factors which were identified as relating to illicit 
substance use included those drawn from organisational systems, government enforcement, 
customer standards and a few cultural traits. 
10.2.3.1. The organisation and substance use 
The organisation may play a significant role in influencing illicit substance use. Even 
general organisational factors were seen to influence substance use. For example, one 
Company B driver stated that, whilst drugs are used by some drivers, it seems to be mostly 
related to interstate truck driving over longer distances. 
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There are a number of factors originating from the organisation which may be related to 
decisions to use illicit substances. First, high levels of organisational pressure may be linked 
with the decision to use substances to continue working.  
 
In addition to not applying extreme pressures on drivers, there are a number of 
organisational approaches to reduce substance use. Essentially, however, they all revolve 
around the use of drug tests. The owners of Company A have a strong objection to any drug 
use whatsoever. Thus, Company A managers indicated that the company conducts regular 
random drug tests, typically testing random drivers alongside an individual who is suspected 
of drug use. Further, in the event of an incident, Company A requires drivers to be tested for 
illicit substances. Random drug tests are also common within Company B.  
 
The policy in place, which is in that manual right, is if you get injured you’re going to go 
down to our people, you’re going to get drug and alcohol tested right and you’ll be put on 
light duties. (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
 
We’re taking you to our doctor and every time you go to the doctor you’re going to be drug 
tested... And it’s got a lot, it is linked in with our drug and alcohol testing too because we 
test based on suspicion as well... They need to stop and rest if they’re in the middle of a trip 
or whatever. If there is suspicion then we organise drug testing. (Company A Manager 
Two) 
 
We do random drug testing, drug and alcohol testing of a morning at a site. No one knows 
till they get to work and oh got a minute? Test.  (Company B Region Manager One) 
 
 
I know that for this company I don’t need to take the drugs, I don’t need to work long 
hours. I can pull over and sleep no matter what time of the day and they won’t call you up 
and harass you. I pulled up once for five minutes and woke up four hours later. I didn’t 
hear a word about it. (Company B Driver Three) 
 
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 381 
 
10.2.3.2. Government departments and substance use 
Police officers monitor and enforce illicit substance use in drivers along the road. The 
introduction of police drug tests was suggested to have significantly reduced drug use within 
the industry. The combination of the cultural traits related to money and other gains, as well 
as punishment avoidance, increase the deterrent effective of this enforcement on many 
drivers. For example, one Company B driver stated that “if you do take drugs, you’re going 
to get caught, you see blitzes on the highway and now they’ve got the drug swabs”. Similarly, 
one Company A driver stated that drugs were “not worth it anymore”, as “when your whole 
career depends on your licence you don’t want to jeopardise it”.  
 
 
10.2.3.3. Customers and substance use 
Similarly to fatigue, the customer can influence substance use through enforcing high 
standards on drivers. Whilst many customers will simply require drivers to make declarations 
regarding drug use, some larger customers will also conduct random drug tests. 
10.2.3.4. Cultural traits and substance use 
A number of cultural traits were identified as being relevant to substance use. Within 
the above discussion of contextual factors, it was evident that the traits regarding money and 
other gains and punishment avoidance may influence the effect of government enforcement 
on substance use. Additionally, autonomy and the responsibility of the driver were evident in 
discussion surrounding organisational pressures.  
Other than that drink 47 cans of Red Bull every night I suppose or take drugs and run the 
risk of getting the drug swab somewhere I suppose. Pay money, take your chances I guess. 
That’s just staying awake. (Comapny A Manager One) 
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The perceived likelihood of an incident was regularly cited as the reason for avoiding 
substance use. A number of drivers indicated that there was a significant safety risk 
associated with drug use. As stated by one Company C driver, “I don’t care who I’m working 
for, I’m not taking drugs to stay awake” because “it’s my life at risk not theirs”. Similarly, 
one Company A driver stated that whilst some drivers do take drugs it “will catch up on you 
anyway”. This driver stated that he doesn’t use drugs as he “wouldn’t want to be one of those 
drivers in the paper having killed someone”. 
However, it was clear that this perceived likelihood of an incident was linked to more 
than simply crash events and extended to health outcomes. For example, one Company A 
driver indicated that prolonged drug use leaves people with “no life in them”, and that after a 
while drivers experience a “meltdown”. 
 
10.2.3.5. Summary: substance use 
Despite limitations in the collection of data relating to substance use, a number of 
factors were identified as having a role in decisions regarding the use of drugs. With 
exception to organisational pressure, each of identified factors was seen to have a protective 
Back then I would run off three hours sleep for days. That’s why drivers would resort to 
drugs. It kills you in the long run, tears your body apart. Drug’s in the industry has really 
died off. Fifty to 75% of drivers are dead set against it. It only really happened in the last 
four to five years. They just think stuff it, it’s not worth it, it’s about me now and our safety. 
The roadside tests changed people’s minds. It kills the body, people have no life in them. 
Some guys take so much it no longer affects them. After a while on drugs you have a 
meltdown, your body just stops. Some of them realise it doesn’t help anymore and get off it. 
(Company A Driver Three) 
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effect on the likelihood of using substances. In the same manner as for fatigue, these factors 
are presented in Table 10.2, along with the direction of the effect they have on substance use. 
 
Table 10.2: Factors which influence substance use behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Substance use Contextual Factors: 
Organisational pressure 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational monitoring and enforcement 
Government monitoring and enforcement 
Customer standards 
 Cultural Factors: 
- 
Cultural Factors: 
Autonomy 
Responsibility 
Money 
Punishment avoidance 
Experiential and narrative learning 
High perceived likelihood 
 
10.2.4. Speeding 
As discussed when examining the results of Study Two (see section 5.2.1.3), dangerous 
behaviours relating to speeding include: (1) unsafe speed for the conditions; and (2) 
exceeding the posted speed limit. Heavy vehicles are legally required to be speed limited to 
prevent speeds exceeding 100km/h. As such, this limiting technology only reduces speeding 
on highways with a posted speed limit of 100km/h or greater. Thus, it was concerning that 
many participants tended to define speeding as exceeding 100km/h. When asked about 
speeding one Company B driver stated, due to the speed limiter, “I can’t speed”. Similarly, 
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the driver/manager of Company C said that their drivers “can’t speed because they’re 
limited”. Given that a driver could drive at 100km/h on a suburban road with a posted speed 
limit of 50km/h, this perception is incorrect. Throughout the case studies, the role of 
organisations, government departments, the general public, customers and truck design 
factors were identified as relevant to speeding. Additionally, a number of cultural traits were 
identified as relevant to decisions regarding speed selection. 
10.2.4.1. The organisation and speeding 
The organisation’s primary roles in speeding come from the method in which they pay 
drivers, and the approaches used to monitor and enforce speed adherence. Starting with the 
payment of drivers, hourly rates were again shown to result in safer behaviour. As stated by 
one Company B driver, payment by the hour means that “you’re not really rushed”. Another 
Company B driver discussed a passing truck stating “these guys get paid by the load” and 
that this is a “good incentive to driver fast hey!” 
 
Each company relied on two primary means to monitor speed compliance – satellite 
tracking and speeding infringement notices from government departments. The satellite 
tracking methods of each company were capable of detecting speeds in excess of a set limit. 
When set higher than the trucks’ speed limiters, this typically indicates that the driver has run 
off a hill. Company B staff discussed the use of daily printed speed reports from satellite 
Basically the drivers over at (previous employer location), they’re getting paid a kilometre 
rate. So it’s in their own interest to go like gun it all the time and they do gun it all the time. 
They’re doing Sydney for 10, 11 hours so you’re moving...  Over here they get paid on an 
hourly rate so they’re not actually achieving anything by speeding and obviously our trucks 
are regulated to down to 95km and theirs are still 105, 110km.  (Company B Branch 
Manager Two) 
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tracking, which provided the maximum speed vehicles were driving within six minute 
intervals. Similar approaches were utilised within both Company A and C. 
Enforcement of speeding in each company was largely through non-conformance 
notices. For first offences and minor breaches, non-conformances were typically used to 
inform the driver that they were detected and to remind them to comply with the upper speed 
limit. As stated by one Company B driver, “you won’t get the sack”. Within Company A, one 
driver suggested that individual offences go unpunished, and that driver will be reminded to 
slow down, yet repeated offences are followed by non-conformance notifications, and/or one 
week without work and payment. However, one Company A driver stated that he “had this 
truck up to 120m/h downhill but it was never followed up”.  
 
Satellite tracking is also a useful means of detecting if a driver has tampered with their 
speed limiter. Prolonged breaches of the upper speed limit, that would not be possible from 
just a brief run-off, are seen as a sign of tampering. When this is detected the truck is 
typically checked by the mechanical team resulting in punishment if the limiter has been 
tampered with. Due to the ease of detection through satellite tracking, one Company A driver 
stated that you will get caught for tampering. Tampering with the speed limiter is deemed a 
serious offence by each company and is always accompanied by immediate dismissal. 
Yeah like the...well all our trucks are limited to 100kms okay. If they roll them off a hill or 
something like that they may exceed up to a 105 or 108. Yeah we normally ring up the 
driver and say: Oh what’s the problem how come you put your foot down or what happened 
there? And we try and monitor that as well... Of course then we sort of have to say: Right, 
you know you’re going to get chastised for it. You know you’re not in deep shit just keep it 
down, keep your speed back like don’t run it off the hills. On the flats you know you’d be 
flat out doing a 100, 101 would probably be about the best because they’re all speed 
limited. (Company A Operations staff Member) 
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Whilst satellite tracking is primarily only used to monitor speeds exceeding the speed 
limiter, they can be used for breaches of posted speed limits. One Company B manager stated 
that the organisation can place different speed restrictions on certain locations. However, as 
this must be conducted manually, it was not common. Additionally, within Company C the 
managers of the company occasionally visually check whether a driver exceeds the posted 
speed limit. Finally, the provision of infringement notices to the organisation by the relevant 
government department provides additional monitoring. This typically occurs for speed 
camera enforcement. Speed camera detection typically results in similar penalties for the 
driver. 
None of these methods is capable of detecting safe speed for the conditions. Whilst 
members of Company B indicated that they will remind drivers to be careful during rain, only 
members of Company C indicated that they actually monitor speed relative to the conditions 
(see section 7.4.3.1.2).  
10.2.4.2. Government departments and speeding 
Government departments play a significant role in monitoring and enforcing speed 
limits. As monitoring methods were discussed in section 8.3.5.2, they will not be repeated 
here. Additionally, as discussed in section 10.2.4.1, heavy vehicles are required by law, 
unless incompatible as in some older trucks, to be fitted with speed limiting technology. 
However, it is possible to exceed this limiter by running off of hills, meaning the legislation 
only holds trucks to a maximum speed and only whilst on flat roads. 
Tampering with speed limiters is easy, you just put a wire or a box over it but you can’t do 
it without being caught. Satellite tracking shows vehicle over limited speed for an extended 
period of time and you know they have tampered. People are sacked immediately for it, has 
happened a few times. (Company A Driver Three) 
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10.2.4.3. The general public and speeding 
Interactions with members of the general public on the road also have an influence on 
heavy vehicle drivers’ speed selection. As was discussed in section 8.4.3, members of the 
general public often delay truck drivers, due to a trucks inability to overtake. The 
combination of speed limiters and car drivers who are unwilling to be overtaken can cause 
significant frustration for truck drivers and a dislike of speed limiters. Due to such delays and 
the cultural value placed on time, it is common for drivers to subsequently speed to catch up 
lost time. 
 
10.2.4.4. The customer and speeding 
Whilst customer pressures may encourage speeding, it was generally stated that 
customers seek to ensure driver speed compliance due to their COR (chain of responsibility) 
requirements. Thus, as indicated in section 8.5.2, customers ensure compliance through the 
use of company audits. 
So they get to an 80km/h zone or a 70 or a 60 and they just keep on going. They come into 
an 80km/h zone and say keep doing 100. And I'm sure you’re guilty of doing it... you know 
you go down the road and it drops back to 80 for a section or whatever and you just keep it 
at whatever was the cruise control was set at. And it’s the same as truck drivers that have 
been stuffed around for the last hour by someone so they just hold it flat through a village 
to make up that time. (Company A Manager One) 
 
The road speed is gutted at 100km/h. They will go faster than that off a hill because they’re 
not gear-bound at 100km/h but I think they’ll top out at just over 120 or something like 
that, 130. (Company A Manager One) 
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10.2.4.5. Environmental and situational factors and speeding 
Whilst driving too fast for the conditions received little attention within the case 
studies, inclement weather can significantly reduce the safe travelling speed. A number of 
past incidents within Company A and C were the result of unsafe speeds for the weather 
conditions. Additionally, the design and upkeep of trucks is relevant to speeding due to the 
legal requirement for speed limiters (see sections 10.2.4.1-2). 
10.2.4.6. Cultural traits and speeding 
A number of the cultural traits identified in Chapter 9 were linked with speeding 
behaviours. With exception to cultural traits categorised as the relationship between the 
industry or organisation and its environment, every category of cultural traits was seen to 
influence speeding. Traits from each of these categories will be discussed in order of 
appearance.  
The cultural value placed on fairness was evident within speeding. The sole 
requirement of trucks to be speed limited was often deemed unfair. It was not suggested that 
cars be speed limited to the same speeds as trucks. Rather, given the speed that trucks are 
We don’t really have a speed issue because all our trucks are set to the speed limit.  There’s 
plenty of other mobs that don’t adhere to that but we're closely monitored … there’s a lot of 
trucks here that are painted (colour with customer name) on the side. We do a lot of work 
for them. We’re very closely monitored and essentially they even do their own audit on us 
every... six or 12 months they audit us themselves. To make sure we’re not breaking the law 
because under chain of responsibility these days they’re in as much shit as we are because, 
as the customer, they’re seen to push us to do the job.  So you know they watch us just as 
closely as anyone else watching us. (Company A Manager One) 
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limited to, it was argued cars should not be designed to travel as fast as current designs 
permit. For this reason one Company B manager stated that truck drivers feel like ‘sitting 
ducks’. 
 
 
As referenced when discussing experiential learning and NOD (normalisation of 
deviance), one Company A manager stated that the organisation had experienced very few 
speed-related crashes, as they were mostly related to other causes. This was immediately 
preceded with discussions regarding truck drivers choosing to speed through towns. The lack 
of experienced incidents that were attributed to speed led to a false confidence in the safety of 
speeding. 
 
The same manager indicated that one driver from the company had previously spun a 
truck on a highway at high speeds, yet attributed this not to speed but to the stupidity of the 
A lot of the highway is 100 but through the towns and that it is somewhat of an issue 
because blokes like to make up time so of course they speed through towns. We have very, 
very few speed-related crashes. They’re normally road condition-related or stupidity-
related or fatigue-related. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Point-to-point cameras have been around for years you know. From the truck driver’s 
perspective I guess he feels like a bit of a sitting duck. you know. It is hard to control 
but...governed, trucks are governed to 90, cars can do 220. Why do they need to do 200? 
Why on earth do we have a car that does 220km/h and gets sold to a 17-year-old on his 
birthday? There’s nowhere in Australia you can do 220km/h, doesn’t need to go that fast. 
(Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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driver. This manager mirrored many drivers’ perspectives on speed and highlights how false 
causal attributions can shape beliefs regarding the dangers associated with speeding.  
The cultural value placed on time was also seen as significant to speeding, as driving 
faster reduces travel time. As with other behaviours, the issue of time is less relevant for 
drivers paid an hourly rate. However, non-financial motivations for saving time may 
influence speeding. One Company A driver stated that it is beneficial to reach a destination 
sooner in order to sleep before the sun rises. Point-to-point speed cameras, through the use of 
30-minute intervals between cameras, can reduce this effect, as speeding requires the driver 
to stop before each camera. Nonetheless, drivers may speed to catch up on lost time and these 
cameras are incapable of detecting speeding if a driver experiences delays. Thus, point-to-
point speed cameras only limit the maximum time between cameras and not speed. 
 
It was often suggested that speeding is unintentional. One Company A staff member 
stated that truck drivers may miss the posted speed limit and drive at the speed that ‘feels’ 
right for the road. Due to the potential for unintentional speeding, many drivers were 
suggested to time the trip between point-to-point speed cameras to avoid punishment. Whilst 
And because those safety cam times are worked out in a car with the speed limit set on 
cruise control, you know it’s pretty exact. So if you’re cranking it up through every town 
and then, like I said, the trucks are road speed limited to 100 but they’re gear-bound at 
more than that so of course they run it off a hill. You can’t stop anyone from doing that, 
although we frown upon it and that’s one of the reasons we have satellite tracking to try 
and keep control of it a bit better. When they run it down a hill they’re at 110 or 120. That 
makes up time. Where that car has been tested at cruise control, if you’re doing 10km/h  
quicker for 30 seconds you’re going to break that time.   (Company A Manager One) 
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this was indicated to be done to avoid unintentional speeding, one Company A manager 
suggested this was a deliberate punishment-avoidance strategy. 
 
 
The desire for money and other gains were also seen to be related to speeding. Some 
influences of gain were positive in nature, such as the desire not to shift a load by driving too 
fast around corners. However, within companies which pay a distance-based rate the desire 
for money is a significant motivation to speed. 
The truck driver’s desire to fit in with the ‘trucking image’ may also influence 
speeding. Whilst there were no instances of this occurring during the case studies, drivers 
indicated that companies which have lower set speed limiters were often disliked and 
criticised by members of the industry. Additionally, one Company B driver did indicate that 
many drivers complained when it was suggested that the company reduce their speed limit as 
“interstaters would be grief, they’d run us off the roads”. Thus, it is clear that a desire to fit 
in with other truck drivers did influence perceptions regarding the upper speed limit. 
There were a number of second and third order traits which also were evident in 
discussions surrounding speeding. First, drivers’ beliefs about luck and the likelihood of 
incidents were often expressed when discussing speeding. Participants appeared to generally 
But you know everyone does it, it’s not a purposeful thing, it just happens you know. 
There’s blokes that have got stop watches in their truck that time themselves so they’re not 
going to break those times. If they are they just pull up and wait before the camera and then 
drive through it. Mate you go down the highway every night of the week and there’s plenty 
of trucks that are just really quick trucks and they’ll go blasting past you and you get to the 
next camera and they’re all pulled up. Because they’re too quick for the cameras so they 
wait, go through the camera, go blasting past you again and you find them another hour 
down the road just waiting. (Company A Manager One)  
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believe that speeding was a hazardous behaviour. As stated by the driver/manager of 
Company C “it’s dangerous to speed, shit yeah”. Similarly one Company C driver stated that 
another driver involved in a crash “was lucky he wasn’t going faster”. More generally, one 
Company A driver said “these things (trucks) are too dangerous (to speed) as far as I’m 
concerned”. Conversely, a number of drivers did not hold these same views. For example, 
one Company A driver disregarded the effects of speed by suggesting that speed was 
irrelevant if someone cuts in front of you. As this driver believed that most incidents were 
caused by other vehicles, speeding was not considered dangerous. Similarly, one Company A 
driver stated that he was unlucky to have been caught for speeding, indicating that he 
anticipated being able to speed without detection. 
The issue of detection relates directly to beliefs regarding rules and regulations. Within 
the case studies there were mixed views regarding methods of speed monitoring and 
enforcement. As already stated, many drivers dislike speed limiters due to interactions with 
cars. It was also evident from one observed toolbox meeting that some drivers do not like 
satellite tracking (see section 8.6.1). Nonetheless, the combination of satellite tracking and 
speed limiters was seen as positive by some drivers. For example, one Company B driver 
stated that the required speed limit used within their company protected them from incidents 
and fines. 
Regarding government legislation and rules, a number of Company B drivers also 
suggested that speed limit compliance held significant safety benefits. One driver in 
particular stated that “you do the speed limits for a reason, the signs are on the road for a 
reason, they’re there for safety”. This belief in the dangers of speeding extended to many 
drivers’ attitudes towards monitoring and enforcement.  
Unfortunately, however, many drivers find ways to speed within point-to-point speed 
cameras without detection. It was often stated that drivers would speed when going down 
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hills thus catching up lost time between cameras. One Company A driver also suggested that 
timing trips between cameras could be difficult when driving less heavily loaded vehicles 
which lose less speed going up hills. The driver stated that he will often stop prior to speed 
camera locations if he suspects he may have caught up too much lost time. Such strategies 
clearly bypass the intentions of these cameras, as rather than comply with speed limits drivers 
may choose to speed and then take a brief break before the camera.  
The familiarity drivers have with the roads they travel may contribute to this problem. 
One Company A driver pointed at a series of upcoming speed cameras, describing in detail 
the coloured lights which were on them, even indicating that he was unsure what device was 
responsible for a specific colour. This case demonstrated that drivers know the location of 
most fixed enforcement. Thus drivers can avoid detection in these locations. 
 
10.2.4.7. Summary: Speeding 
A number of contextual and cultural factors interact to shape drivers’ attitudes towards 
speeding and speed regulations, and their behaviour. Speeding was only moderately 
influenced by the organisation, their customers and government departments. Both 
organisational and government monitoring and enforcement possessed a number of 
weaknesses, resulting in speeding being able to occur without detection. Thus, speeding is 
SAFE-T Cams don’t stop you from speeding. There are hills between the cams so you lose 
speed up the hills and can go like hell down them. Out of Sydney you will get trucks that 
will pass you three to four times in the night. Fatigue is still managed well with the cams, 
but speed isn’t. Going through towns slows you down so you go like stink on the highway 
and at daytime you hit traffic lights which can add five minutes to your time. If they were 
closer together it would help. It would be easier just to download the data from the trucks 
computers. Engine computers can’t lie. (Company A Driver Six) 
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predominantly a cultural issue. Whilst many cultural traits were seen to influence speeding, 
these traits appeared to be either activated or dormant depending on the driver’s view of the 
likelihood of an incident resulting from speeding. Increasing the perception that speeding is 
dangerous, particularly through the use of narratives, appears the most beneficial route to 
improving speed compliance. As with each of the previous behaviours, the factors identified 
throughout the case studies as being relevant to speeding are displayed in Table 10.3. 
Table 10.3: Factors which influence speed-related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce Safety Factors Which improve safety 
Speeding Contextual Factors: 
General public, 
Environmental conditions, 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational payment, monitoring and 
enforcement 
Government monitoring and 
enforcement 
Customer standards 
Truck design and maintenance 
 Cultural Factors: 
Normalisation of deviance 
Low perceived likelihood 
Unfair 
Time 
Unintentional 
Money 
Keeping up the trucking image 
Rules 
Punishment avoidance 
Cultural Factors: 
Experiential and narrative learning 
High perceived likelihood 
Safety 
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10.2.5. Seatbelt use 
Seatbelt use was a significant issue within the studied organisations. Drivers from 
Company A and C rarely wear seatbelts. However, a small selection of drivers did wear 
seatbelts the majority of the time (typically not on short trips), including two Company A 
drivers who specifically assisted the researcher to locate his seatbelt. Conversely, every 
observed Company B driver wore seatbelts. Whilst there was the potential for police fines, 
seatbelt use appeared to be a solely cultural behaviour.  
Beliefs regarding the safety benefit of seatbelts were most relevant to their use. A 
number of drivers stated that they solely used seatbelts for protection during an incident. One 
Company B driver stated that he had always worn seatbelts as they increase the likelihood of 
staying within the truck cab. Similarly, another Company B driver stated that he wore a 
seatbelt as he doesn’t “wanna die in a crash”. Some drivers however, held mixed views of 
the benefits of seatbelts, largely based on the expected outcomes of a roll-over or driving into 
a river or creek. One Company B driver said he was “not sure if seatbelts actually help, 
probably like a car, sometimes yes, sometimes no, if you go into a creek with one you’re 
stuffed”. 
 
I don’t always wear my seatbelt, sometimes I jump in and forget it on a short trip, but yeah 
you wear it for safety. You have your days when they just annoy you, but this day and age 
you never know when a car will come up behind you and tell you to pull over. Some days 
I’ll drive down the highway and put it on when I get to Brisbane. If you roll it doesn’t 
matter if you wear it or not but you could get thrown out. Sometimes they are a hindrance, 
sometimes they save your life. I’d rather be stuck here in the cab than thrown out the 
window and under the trailer. If you roll they say you can jump across but where are you 
gonna go. I had a friend who would have died if he wasn’t wearing it. I never hop in a car 
without one though, in a car without a seatbelt you just feel naked. (Company B Driver Six) 
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As discussed in section 9.2.3, drivers place significant trust in stories of other drivers. 
This was evident with seatbelt use, as every driver had stories of individuals who would have 
died if they were wearing a seatbelt. These stories are likely inaccurate, as there is no proof 
the driver would have died, yet these stories are typically trusted. As stated by one Company 
A driver, “I have had a few friends crash without a seatbelt and said that if they were 
wearing it they would be dead”. However, another Company A driver indicated that such 
incidents may differ depending on load being carried. It was stated that as grain transport 
carries a higher risk of roll-over, grain transporters should not wear seatbelts. Nonetheless, 
given the loads carried in Company A, seatbelt use was argued to be beneficial as “you can’t 
control the truck if you get thrown out of your seat”. 
A number of other cultural traits also appeared in discussions regarding seatbelt use. 
Monetary losses associated with fines were seen to convince some drivers, who believed 
seatbelts were dangerous, to wear them. Thus, to avoid punishment seatbelt use was deemed 
necessary, often due to past fines. One Company A driver referenced a previous fine received 
for not wearing a seatbelt, detected through light reflecting off the buckle alerting a police 
officer on the side of the road. Due to this experience, the driver stated that he now always 
wears a seatbelt until the police officer sees it. Additionally, other gains such as comfort were 
seen to be relevant to seatbelt use (see section 9.2.5.4). 
Whilst each company suggested that they expect their drivers to wear seatbelts, they 
appeared to have no method of monitoring their use. A lack of organisational emphasis on 
seatbelts was evident within Company A, partly due to the perceived autonomy of truck 
drivers. One Company A manager stated that “all trucks are fitted with seatbelts, doesn’t 
mean they’re going to wear them”, continuing to state that “it’s the same as me, you taking 
me to the shop it doesn’t mean that I put my seatbelt on just because it’s in the car and you 
can say put your fucking seat belt on doesn’t mean I'm going to do it”. Further, however, it 
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was suggested by the manager that as seatbelts were a common sense issue, there is no need 
to tell drivers to wear them. Though this statement was immediately followed by reference to 
the perceived danger of seatbelts. 
 
Unlike other behaviours, seatbelt use appeared to be almost exclusively influenced by 
story-based beliefs about the benefits of seatbelts and beliefs about the likelihood of being 
punished. However, from the statements of the Company A manager above, it was apparent 
that there may be other cultural traits which present a barrier to the implementation of better 
monitoring and enforcement strategies. 
10.2.6. General driving errors and violations 
As stated in section 4.2, driving errors and violations are a broad selection of 
behaviours relating to the driven path of vehicles and the manner in which this path is driven. 
Errors can be viewed as unsafe vehicle movements on the road, and violations as deviations 
from road rules which govern such movements. There are a number of contextual and 
cultural factors which were seen to influence the likelihood of errors and violations. These 
included the design of trucks, a number of cultural traits, and the role of the organisation and 
the government. 
 
 
I believe tailgating is in the induction stuff.  Seat belts, that’s a good question I mean I 
suppose, I could be wrong here, it may be in there, I don't recall it, but I suppose you 
probably wouldn’t have to, I mean you don't tell them to breathe when they get in the truck, 
why would you need to tell them to put a seat belt on although you know most blokes don't 
because they think it’s safer without it. And quite often it is, in a truck. (Company A 
Manager One) 
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10.2.6.1. Vehicle design and driving errors and violations 
The design of heavy vehicles can influence the likelihood of incidents in a variety of 
ways (see section 8.8.2). It is worth noting, that many modern designs of vehicles possess 
technology aimed to reduce the effect of errors and violations. For example, during the 
observation of one Company A driver, a warning sound indicated the presence of a car to the 
rear end of the vehicle. Such technologies can reduce the likelihood of errors and warn the 
driver to take additional precautions; however, these technologies were not common in the 
studied organisations. 
Given that errors and violations are typically inconsequential without the addition of 
another vehicle, members of the general public typically appeared in discussions of driver 
errors. As discussed in section 8.4.2, members of the general public were believed to lack 
sufficient understanding of truck design limitations and present a significant hazard to 
drivers. For example, one branch manager indicated that Company B has previously 
experienced incidents where trucks have backed into a vehicle they were unable to see. 
 
And obviously we're dealing, we have a lot more with the public or the public are in that 
area around them. As you know, the public, they don’t think that the driver won't be able to 
see them backing out, we have Pantech body (word lost) it's totally blacked out. If they’re 
not in the view of the mirrors then the driver can’t see them. Obviously we’ve had one or 
two instances where they’ve backed into a car that’s been passing because he didn’t know 
the driver was going to keep on coming out you know, pretty straight forward things to 
anybody like ourselves. It’s a straight forward thing, how can the driver see you? So we 
have had a few of those instances, that’s one area about that. (Company B Branch 
Manager Two) 
 
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 399 
 
It is worth noting that other truck drivers typically assist one another in overcoming the 
limitations of trucks (see section 8.7.4). Truck drivers will often flash their lights or provide 
radio calls to indicate if it is safe to merge or overtake.  
10.2.6.2. Cultural traits and driving errors and violations 
Many of the cultural traits identified in Chapter 9 have a significant role in errors and 
violations. Of particular note are those which relate to the nature of truth and reality. As noted 
when discussing NOD (section 9.2.3.1.1) behaviours are commonly regarded as acceptable 
when incidents are attributed to other causes. It appeared that many error or violation-related 
incidents were attributed to individual stupidity, thus implicating the cultural trait of common 
sense. Additionally, the tendency to label errors and violations as ‘driver error’ may relate to 
the perceived responsibility of drivers.  
In addition to these direct relationships, perceptions relating to the likelihood of 
incidents influenced the caution taken by truck drivers to avoid such errors. For example a 
number of drivers indicated a perception that incidents were likely and, thus, took additional 
precautions such as slowing down when other vehicles were close. 
10.2.6.3. The organisation and driving errors and violations  
The organisation can play a role in limiting errors and violations through recruitment 
(see section 7.3.1), training (see section 7.3.3 and 7.3.4) and load choices. As these processes 
have already been discussed in detail only brief discussion is provided here. Members of each 
company indicated that organisations have a role in determining which drivers receive 
employment, potentially reducing drivers who are more predisposed to errors or likely to 
commit violations. Additionally, it was indicated that training, particularly regarding load 
types, can influence error rates. Lastly, the type of load being carried is typically determined 
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by the organisation when accepting jobs. Given that load type may influence the limitations 
of the vehicle, exposure to these risks are filtered by the organisation. 
 
10.2.6.4. The government and driving errors and violations  
Government departments and enforcement officers can also influence driving errors 
and violations. Though receiving little attention within the case studies, this influence is 
evident in punishment of road rule violations. Additionally, a significant degree of attention 
was given to licensing (see section 8.3.5.1), which it was indicated determines the level of 
experience and knowledge held by drivers, thus influencing the chance of an error. 
10.2.6.5. Errors and violations summary.  
There are a number of factors which influence driving errors and violations, including 
the design of vehicles, cultural traits, organisations and government departments. 
Additionally, interactions between these factors with members of the general public were also 
seen to influence these behaviours. See Table 10.4 for a list of the factors found to be 
associated with driving errors and violations, and the direction with which they influence 
safety. 
 
 
But when you get into the over-dimensional freight where it’s wider than what the trailer is, 
or if it’s super high load, you’ve got to take into consideration of are you going to hit 
anything through the course of the journey. And the same for the width, you’ve got to be 
considerate of who you put on there, it’s got to be a person that’s experienced in that sort 
of work that knows the hazards to look for and knows that driving around corners, you’ve 
got to take a wider sweep to get around corners and that sort of thing. (Company B 
Operational Manager) 
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Table 10.4: Factors which influence general driving errors and violations 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Driving errors 
and violations 
Contextual Factors: 
General public 
Government licensing 
 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational recruitment and training 
Truck design 
Load type 
Broader industry 
 Cultural Factors: 
- 
Cultural Factors: 
Experiential and narrative learning 
High perceived likelihood  
Common sense 
 
10.2.7. Vehicle maintenance 
As discussed in section 4.2.1.3.5, there is significant research demonstrating the effect 
of vehicle maintenance on crash outcomes. A number of participants highlighted the 
importance of maintenance, with one Company A driver even stating that “accidents are 
often operator error, or simple errors or broken equipment”. As vehicle maintenance is 
conducted by mechanical staff, maintenance cannot be the target of the identified cultural 
traits which are present in drivers. In fact, vehicle maintenance was considered a contextual 
factor in Study One. However, throughout the case studies, it became evident that vehicle 
maintenance requires the input of drivers in conducting vehicle inspections and reporting 
problems, and that there were a number of organisational, governmental and cultural factors 
which influenced the accurate completion of such inspections. 
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10.2.7.1. The organisation and vehicle maintenance 
The organisation can influence maintenance through purchasing quality trucks, 
conducting maintenance on their own vehicles and requiring drivers to complete vehicle 
inspections. Whilst the purchasing of trucks and conducting of maintenance is clearly 
important to driver safety, the current discussion focuses on vehicle inspections. As was 
discussed in section 8.6, the organisation can only conduct their own complete maintenance if 
they have the associated NHVAS accreditation. Both this accreditation and TruckSafe 
accreditation require organisations to complete regular vehicle inspections. In order to ensure 
that mechanical staff maintain vehicles sufficiently, it is necessary for drivers to conduct 
regular inspections and report any identified problems. 
 
That’s certainly very important for the driver’s safety. Pre-start, go round and check your 
vehicle, make sure you’ve got no, you know, nothing that’s visually you can see that 
loosening if I go down the road, the wheel nuts might fall off or you know there’s a serious 
oil leak or something that can affect the vehicle’s operation which could result in them 
having a motor vehicle accident.  And that’s why we push them fairly constantly for...that’s 
just, that’s part of their job. As important as it is to drive the truck and certainly some 
vehicle pre-start is an important part as well to ensure when you leave you know your truck 
is to your; because they’re not all mechanics. But like you and I look at our car you’re not 
going to drive down the road if you’ve got a flat tyre or something. Or nearly flat. So it’s 
just as important to the guys as that. Especially if they’re pulling a trailer, they might walk 
around and someone else has loaded the trailer the day before and might have had an 
oversight or it mightn’t be tied down as well as it should be, so that’s why certainly it’s 
critical that their pre-start is done. So they do a visual check of the vehicle to make sure 
that before they’re on the roads it’s safe to do so.  (Company B Region Manager One) 
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Each of the studied organisations required drivers to conduct a pre-trip vehicle 
inspection, covering a range of factors including tyres, oil, water, lights, and trailer 
connections. It was noted by one Company A driver that the inspection forms also leave 
space to note if any problems are identified during the trip and each vehicle has a 
maintenance request book for any major concerns.  
Within each of the organisations, failure to complete these forms was met with a non-
conformance notification. As stated by one Company A driver, you receive a non-
conformance “if you don’t fill out your paper work perfect and don’t tick every box”. This is 
typically monitored and enforced through regular paperwork audits. 
 
10.2.7.2. Government departments and vehicle maintenance 
Sufficient vehicle maintenance is a legal requirement. There is also a strong partnership 
between government departments and accreditation bodies, due to the fact that regular 
But yeah in terms of our non-conformance system every week I go through 15% of work 
diaries, 100% of pre-trip inspections and I go through mass as well and record all the 
mass. So if a driver from my perspective hasn’t been filling in work diaries correctly, hasn’t 
been taking the legislated breaks, if they’ve just missed one box on their pre-trip check form 
or again haven’t been filling it out correctly, then they’ll get a non-conformance from me. I 
try and do the majority of them on a weekly basis but I do leave filling out the forms 
incorrectly for a month. (Company A Manager Two) 
 
When the drivers fill in their audit checklist, we’ve got (trainer name) down the front there. 
He’ll actually go through and make sure all the numbers are checked, the dates are correct, 
the driving hours correct. Breaks have been taken, is the fitness for duty checked? So 
there’s a process in place that we do the following morning. So whatever happens today all 
happens yeah tomorrow. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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government inspections have been replaced with organisational accreditation for conducting 
maintenance. 
 
 
You went for your yearly machinery inspection... (accreditation) it’s fairly easy for us in the 
respect or whatever was that I think we’d been doing machineries for probably 10 or 15 
years and never had a recall. So when the maintenance management scheme come in we 
got it fairly easy because we had a good record. Like I was paranoid about machinery 
inspections, absolutely paranoid that I would fail. To the state that I would change the 
brakes if they’d quarter worn out the day before the machinery so that everything was 
right, and I did no, that’s a lie, I got failed once for a number plate light… That’s their job 
mate....Each year they had a special thing that they would look for, that’s what I think. Like 
some years they were on something, some years they were on something else. If there’d 
have been a fatal somewhere where you know it had been found that something had been 
broken on the truck well that would be their, they would go straight to that yeah. But no 
machinery inspectors as machinery inspectors they were pretty good. They were really 
good.... No it’s better for us because, like I said, back in the machinery inspection days you 
would change things leading up to an inspection that didn’t need doing. You know what I 
mean? Whereas now you do them as they need doing.  Like I say we run them over the pit 
every time they come home from a trip, bingo. Reasonably long trip, not as if they just go to 
town and back again. You know up to 400km trips and things like that which is an 800km 
by the time you go and come back. We’ll say 1000km, round figures. Right? Every truck 
goes over the pit, it’s greased, it’s looked at and if there’s brakes or something dodgy or 
getting down to the point of jumping a cam or something like that, it gets changed. 
(Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Maintenance can be enforced by on-road transport inspectors. One common example of 
this enforcement was infringement notices for faulty speed limiters which are issued to 
drivers detected exceeding 100km/h. However, it is typically the accreditation bodies that 
monitor and enforce maintenance. During the observed TruckSafe audit, the auditor indicated 
that the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads require organisations to 
provide objective evidence of maintenance. It was stated that one method of providing such 
evidence was to examine department records of infringement notices. Additionally, however, 
the organisation is required to keep up-to-date records of both identified mechanical problems 
and the maintenance conducted. This was seen as frustrating by the driver/manager of 
Company C, due to the lack of past mechanical problems. 
 
Additionally, as noted within section 8.3.5.1, the lack of mechanical understanding 
necessary to receive a truck licence was criticised. This was seen as illogical due to a 
requirement of mechanical knowledge for forklift ‘tickets’. 
We’ve been doing it for years anyway except it’s just not written down and it becomes a 
pain in the arse because there’s things on that that are silly things. Yeah ... Not irrelevant, 
they’re silly little things. Like you’ve got brakes and you’ve got tyres and you’ve got your 
steering and your king pins and your ring feeder are the main things. Like things one side 
light out or that that’s not a safety issue. A kangaroo could have run into it going down the 
road do you know what I mean? You know like safety issues you know they can pin you for 
having a side light out and that’s not a safety issue mate, that’s...the rules are there’s got to 
be five side lights on each trailer. Well if one’s out there’s still four you know. It’s not as if 
they’re all out. And then the other thing, since LED lights like you’ll probably ask this 
question what’s the best thing that’s happened? Well I’ll tell you. It was tubeless tyres and 
LED lights. You were always changing bulbs and tube tyres were a pain in the arse. LED 
lights and tubeless tyres I reckon. Yeah. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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10.2.7.3. Cultural traits and vehicle maintenance 
A number of cultural traits identified in Chapter 9 were seen to influence vehicle 
inspections. The traits most connected with this behaviour were related to the value placed on 
safety and the perceived likelihood of an incident resulting from failure to complete vehicle 
inspections. As discussed in section 9.2.2.4, drivers will go to great lengths to ensure safety. 
Pre-trip inspections were deemed significantly important due to the perceived likelihood of 
an incident occurring. For example, one Company C driver stated that “you’ve gotta have an 
ounce to check the truck properly” as even a small tyre leak “could be a fucked seal or a 
bearing; you could get down the road and the wheel could come off and hit a car”. Similarly, 
one Company A driver stated that he always checks the trailer pins as, if they are not 
correctly in place, the trailer could detach from the truck and “it could be fatal and you’ll get 
a fine and it ruins your night”. 
 
Aside from the perceived likelihood of an incident, it was also noted by a number of 
drivers that breakdowns are a significant inconvenience warranting adequate inspections. 
Thus, drivers were motivated by an unwillingness to lose time on the side of the road waiting. 
Conversely, despite valuing maintenance, many drivers viewed the requirement to complete 
an inspection form and certain aspects of pre-trip inspections as unimportant. A number of 
Oh your steering and your tyres mostly, steering, tyres, lights. Yeah steering is probably 
your, like your steering components taking steer tyres, ball joints all that sort of thing. 
Brakes are a big issue, but brakes in our business is just a normal every day, because of 
where we go. Every time the truck goes over the pit for a grease its brakes are checked. 
There’s only one thing between you and a post is your steer tyres and your brakes.  And 
drivers are happy with that, you know drivers are, because they have daily checks and all 
that they’re responsible for their own safety to make sure that it’s within spec. (Company C 
Driver/Manager) 
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drivers perceived that their personal knowledge of the vehicle they were driving reduced the 
need for a thorough inspection. Thus, cultural traits such as time and punishment avoidance 
were more important to these drivers. For example, one Company A driver stated that due to 
the time requirement of a full inspection “you just tick it off”. This appeared common within 
Company A, also relating to the fact that enforcement was based purely on the completeness 
of forms, rather than a subsequent inspection. Thus, another Company A driver stated that “if 
you don’t tick it off you get in shit, so I just tick it all off, if you know the truck you know how 
it will run, they are just covering their arses, you just tick it all off”. 
10.2.7.4. Summary: Vehicle maintenance 
Though vehicle maintenance is conducted by the organisation, drivers are required to 
complete regular vehicle inspections. Organisations, government departments and 
accreditation schemes influence the requirement of drivers to complete such inspections. The 
perceived likelihood of an incident or breakdown from poor maintenance appeared to be 
strongly linked with completion of inspections, as did the perception that punishment could 
be avoided without compliance. See Table 10.5 for a list of each of the factors seen to 
influence vehicle maintenance inspections. 
10.2.1. Load restraint (Company B only) 
Within Company B a significant amount of attention was granted to adequate load 
restraint. Whilst one Company A driver briefly stated that he could be held accountable for 
insufficiently restraining a load, there was no other detail provided. This does not mean that 
correct load restraint was unimportant within Company A, simply that members of the 
company did not provide sufficient information. Conversely, as Company C transports 
livestock they are not required to restrain their loads. Prior to exploring the factors which 
contribute to load restraint within Company B, it is worth noting that this section will only  
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Table 10.5: Factors which influence vehicle maintenance-related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Vehicle 
maintenance 
inspections 
Contextual Factors: 
Government licensing 
 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational material safety 
Organisational monitoring and 
enforcement 
Government monitoring and 
enforcement 
Accreditation requirements 
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood 
Punishment avoidance 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
Safety 
Other gains 
  
detail adequate restraint related to road incidents, and not injuries sustained during restraint 
which are discussed in section 10.3. 
Adequate load restraint requires a number of behaviours, including correct loading, 
sufficient restraint and ongoing examination of the load. Adequate restraint is the 
responsibility of all COR members. Thus, the organisation and customer play a role in load 
restraint. Additionally, government enforcement can deter incorrect restraint. Additionally 
both environmental factors and a number of cultural traits may influence restraint. 
 
Whatever you’re carrying, you have to stop at points throughout the drive to check your 
load restraints, check they haven’t come loose. If you’re carrying a large piece of mining 
equipment, that tension can come loose with the vibration of the road, vibration of the 
vehicle so you’d have to pull over every few hours to check them. (Company B Director) 
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10.2.1.1. The organisation and load restraint 
Company B ensures adequate load restraint through a number of means. First, they 
regularly train their drivers on proper load restraint. Many drivers from Company B had a 
high level of knowledge regarding load restraint. Drivers often discussed estimates of the 
weight of items and the amount of restraint provided, both through direct (strap contact) and 
indirect (contact with a strapped item) means. Additionally, however, many drivers discussed 
the most effective means of restraint with one another and, at times, their relevant manager. 
 
Company B also monitors load restraint through feedback between the organisation and 
the customer, and load audits. The organisation was indicated to have a strong, open, 
relationship with their steel products customer. This is particularly relevant to ensuring 
correct loading, as it is the customer that conducts loading. 
 
Safety is safety, so it depends on what we’re aiming for. Like if we go through the drivers 
themselves we’ve got procedures and policies in place to make as I said the drivers’ hours 
are correct, their fitness for duties, we do load audits. So if we’re not happy with the loads 
that are loaded by (steel customer) we have load audits in place and risk assessments can 
be completed. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
 
We’ll undertake training, load restraint training with them and various other training 
modules. I think we’ve been able to develop a culture in a couple of those sites where the 
guys actually now think all the time about safety because we’ve been able to show them 
what happens if they don't through our customer sends us anything that they get nationally, 
any significant safety occurrences. We’ll then feed it back to our guys, look what happened 
in Victoria, look what happened in NSW, beware of this when you’re doing it. (Company B 
Region Manager One) 
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10.2.1.2. The customer and load restraint 
Due to COR requirements, customers must also ensure adequate load restraint. In every 
Company B observation, the customer loaded the goods prior to allowing the driver to 
restrain the load.  
As it is predominantly the driver’s responsibility to then restrain the load, the driver is 
often also required to complete a declaration form indicating that he has inspected and 
restrained the load properly. In addition to these measures, one manager noted that their 
customer provides extensive guidelines regarding restraint of various items. 
 
10.2.1.3. Government departments and load restraint 
Aside from COR legislation, transport inspectors also have a significant involvement in 
monitoring and enforcing safe load restraint. This is largely enforced at weighbridges located 
along the highways. Due to the potential for detection one Company B driver stated that it 
A lot of our customer's customer’s site probably half of our vehicles are loaded of a night 
when our driver is not there. So he comes in the morning when all the movement and all the 
loading has happened, he comes in the morning, restrains it and then goes. So it takes him 
out of that process, but there’s you know someone is here while they’re trying to load the 
vehicle as well, we try and split that up.  Loading of an evening, delivery during the day. 
(Company B Region Manager One) 
 
Yeah well (Steel Customer) guidelines ...there’s a whole book on (Steel Customer) 
guidelines it’s as thick as you can get, it’s that book there... That’s guidelines and that’s 
what you’ve got to go to. If we’re auditing a load and we’re not sure, I go to any section, 
any product we carry. Australian guidelines for miscellaneous equipment like pipes and all 
that. So it has all these guidelines and you can refer back to whatever you want, but it’s the 
whole board there. (Company B Trainer One) 
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was important to restrain the load correctly as if even a “strap is twisted it reduces the load 
rating of the strap and you’ll get a $130 fine”. Many members of Company B felt that these 
requirements were acceptable and important, and it was indicated by one manager that the 
organisation chooses to exceed the legal requirements.  
 
10.2.1.4. Environmental factors and load restraint 
Both truck design and load type, discussed in section 8.8, can play a significant role in 
load restraint. Many taught-liner trailers require metal gates to prevent the load from piercing 
the canvas side. Conversely, it was noted by one driver that the trailer he was driving used 
Kevlar reinforcements within the canvas, reducing the requirement for these gates and the 
number of straps required to restrain the load. A number of other trailer design factors were 
discussed, including the use of ‘bearers’ on steel-carrying trucks, which lift the load to ensure 
it can be ‘belly wrapped’. Thus it was evident that the trailer’s design can play a significant 
role in assisting the driver to adequately restrain the load and reducing the level of driver 
input in restraint. 
In regards to load type, the majority of information gleaned from Company B related to 
transporting steel. It was, however, noted by one driver that you cannot be complacent when 
loading as it is “different for every load”. Thus, regardless of the type of goods carried, each 
individual load must be restrained uniquely. As discussed in section 8.8.4.3, there are a 
But that’s the only aspect towards the government side I think (Company B) here and 
(Steel Customer) we, I think the law is 80% restrain your load, but we do it 100% here. You 
know we go, we got 20 tonne on, it’s five four-tonne chains, simple as that. Whereas 
elsewhere the law says you’ve only got to restrain 80% so you can put four chains on. 
(Company B Trainer One) 
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number of specific factors related to steel which influence load restraint requirements. These 
requirements will not be further discussed. 
10.2.1.5. Cultural traits and load restraint 
There were two primary cultural traits which appeared to be relevant to load restraint 
within Company B. These were the value placed on safety, and the perceived likelihood of an 
incident. As discussed in section 9.3.1, the reliance on SORs within Company B increases the 
perceived likelihood of an incident, due to the value placed on stories and experience within 
the industry. Many drivers viewed incidents as likely to occur without sufficient load 
restraint. Additionally, it was noted that poor load restraint is not only a threat to the driver, 
but also a threat to members of the general public. 
 
10.2.1.6. Summary: Load restraint 
The factors which were seen to be related to adequate load restraint, and the direction 
with which they influence safety, are depicted in Table 10.6. It was seen that every member 
of the chain of responsibility – drivers, organisations and customers – play a significant role 
in ensuring the safe restraint of loads. Additionally, whilst government enforcement was 
evident, it was clear that for Company B and their drivers the risks associated with incidents 
were sufficient to warrant going beyond legal requirements and ensuring safety. 
 
 
How would you be if you lost a load on a family? Fuck dying yourself, that would be worse. 
I might sound like a do-gooder. I’m fucking not I tell you, but I just don’t want to get in 
strife. I wanna drag this life out as long as I can. You need to know the right stuff when it 
comes to loading so you have to ask the right questions. I’ve got a few questions I need to 
ask (trainer name) when he gets back. (Company B Driver Three) 
 
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 413 
 
10.2.2. Crash outcomes summary 
From the above discussion of crash outcome-related behaviours, a number of general points 
can be made. Crash-related behaviours are often the product of various contextual and 
cultural factors. Many of these factors influence behaviour through interactions with other 
factors. This aligns with the definition of safety culture provided in Chapter 2, which argued 
that cultural beliefs and values interact with contextual factors to produce visible patterns of 
behaviour which influence safety. Whilst seatbelt use was suggested to be ‘almost 
exclusively’ influenced by cultural factors, even within this behaviour it was evident that past 
experience of government enforcement shaped driver behaviour. 
 
Table 10.6: Factors which influence load restraint-related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Load Restraint Contextual Factors: 
- 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational training, monitoring and 
enforcement 
Government monitoring and 
enforcement 
Customer standards 
Truck design 
Load yype 
 Cultural Factors: 
- 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
Safety 
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Chapter 2 argued that much of the previous research on safety culture emphasised the 
role of the organisational factors on safety behaviours. Whilst the case studies did highlight 
the importance of organisational factors, no behaviour was seen to be solely influenced by the 
organisation. Thus these traditional approaches to safety culture are vastly insufficient to 
explain road safety within the heavy vehicle industry. Conversely, due to the high number of 
contextual factors which influenced behaviours, the interpretive approach to safety culture 
(which emphasises cultural beliefs and values) is also insufficient to explain road safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry. Thus the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture (see section 
2.3.5), which was the guiding framework for the current research, appears uniquely suitable 
for road safety behaviour within the heavy vehicle industry.  
Whilst quantitative investigation is required to statistically demonstrate the relative 
impact of each factor, and thus the most beneficial routes to improving safety, it appears 
likely that this model could provide significant improvements to safety. First, within each of 
the discussed behaviours it was evident that a high perceived likelihood of negative outcomes 
was associated with safe behaviour. The finding that perceived likelihood was heavily 
influenced by experience and stories within the industry suggests that the use of narrative 
education methods could significantly improve safety. This was further supported by the 
higher level of compliance seen within Company B, who utilised SORs in training sessions. 
Additionally, however, careful examination of each of the contextual factors which 
influenced behaviour, and the way in which these interacted with cultural traits, may provide 
useful approaches to reduce negative contextual influences. 
10.3. NON-DRIVING INJURIES 
As discussed in section 4.2.2, a significant proportion of injuries sustained by truck 
drivers occur under non-crash circumstances. These non-driving injuries come in a variety of 
forms and typically occur during loading and unloading, or checking a load during transit. 
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Given the varied forms of injuries and behaviours that can lead to these injuries it is difficult 
to separate these injuries into behavioural categories. Shibuya et al. (2010) analysed text 
descriptions of incidents from a Danish trucking firm. Amongst other variables, Shibuya et al. 
used mechanisms of injury to categorise incidents including: (1) slips, trips and falls; (2) 
overexertion; and (3) being struck by, or pinned between, objects. These three mechanisms 
overlap with the data collected in Study Three. Due to the lack of sufficient information for 
many specific behaviours, the categorising of data into mechanisms of injury is more 
beneficial in identifying how contextual and cultural factors interact to contribute to injuries. 
The following section starts by examining general factors which either relate to multiple 
mechanisms of injury, or the mechanism of injury was not specified. The remainder of the 
section provides specific analysis of the factors related to: (1) being struck by an object; (2) 
slips, trips and falls; and (3) muscular strains and overexertion.  
10.3.1. General points regarding non-driving injuries 
There were a number of factors which were generally linked with non-driving injuries, 
though not specifically indicated to operate through a single mechanism of injury, including 
organisational, government departments, customer and load-type factors and a number of 
cultural traits.  
10.3.1.1. The organisation and non-driving safety 
The organisation plays a significant role in non-driving incidents, through training and 
PPE (personal protective equipment) policies. As PPE was discussed in section 7.4.2, this 
will not be discussed in depth here. Both Company A and B placed some requirement on 
drivers to utilise PPE. PPE generally serves to reduce the impact of incidents or to reduce the 
likelihood of an incident. Thus the requirement to wear PPE can be seen to influence 
outcomes associated with both being struck by an object and slips, trips and falls. 
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Training provides drivers with the necessary skills and knowledge to work safely and 
increases awareness and motivation for safety. Each company provided some form of initial 
training to their drivers, however, only Company B utilised significant ongoing training, 
much of which centred on non-driving injuries (see section 7.3.4).  
10.3.1.2. Government departments and non-driving injuries 
In section 8.3.4, it was noted that workplace health and safety departments and 
WorkCover play a significant role in monitoring and enforcing workplace safety. Non-
driving injuries are given significant attention by these departments. As this has been 
discussed in detail, little further discussion is warranted. Nonetheless, perceived increases in 
levels of enforcement have had a significant impact on non-driving safety. 
The only time they can wear thongs is out where the bedrooms are just outside the office 
we’re sitting in here. They can walk out of there to have a smoke, there’s a designated 
smoking area round there. It’s okay to wear the thongs around there you know they’re out 
of harm’s way, there’s no machinery, there’s  no nothing, it’s just seats and trees so they’re 
allowed to wear thongs out there. (Company A Manager One) 
 
You’ve probably seen the old, well there’s still a few round, stubbies and a singlet. Thongs 
maybe that was the unofficial truck drivers uniform, you don't see that, you see long pants, 
high viz protective long-sleeved shirts, gloves, helmets, glasses, hearing protection. It’s all 
there and that’s part of (Company B). (Company B) used to issue shorts, short-sleeved 
shirts, they don't anymore. They, I think they, I think there might be a site where they issue  
shorts, but they issue overalls as well. So when you go to the next site, say you come to 
(building materials customer) protective equipment’s required, you put your gear on before 
you enter the site. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
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10.3.1.3. Customers and non-driving injuries 
Given that loading and unloading typically occur at customer sites, customers play a 
significant role in non-driving injuries. As discussed in section 8.5.2, customers enforce a 
variety of standards on drivers and transport companies. The customer primarily influences 
safety through auditing and communicating with organisations, enforcing onsite policies and, 
occasionally, pressuring drivers and their organisations. Each of these factors may influence 
non-driving injuries. 
Oh just everybody realises what the repercussions could be. I think there’s a lot more of a 
chase of it in the court system and you know a lot of the smaller transports and the way 
they went a lot of those have gone now because of that you know.  There’s nowhere near as 
many, I don't know I suppose you’d call them backyarders in the game these days you 
know. You know there was one guy that was an owner driver that did a lot of the little bits 
and pieces. The beer around (this location) for years... he would have been in business 15 
years. He was the strangest guy. You know he’d go to the brewery and they’d make him 
wear boots which we all had to wear boots, metal tipped boots. And he’d just take his 
thongs off, pull his boots on with no socks on and just walk around the brewery with no 
socks on, yeah ridiculous nonsense like that. You know getting around working with kegs 
and this sort of thing and you’ve got no, the rest of the time he’s got thongs on his feet.  And 
that guy was in business for many, many years and finally it all caught up with him and he 
ended up having to get out of it totally... actually about a year ago he was probably one of 
about three that went out that same year... Just you know I suppose the repercussions are 
now that there is jail time too I suppose, whereas everybody got a slap on the wrist for it 
many years ago. I suppose now there’s a bit more of a repercussion to it. (Company B 
Branch Manager Three) 
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Well, all the stuff here on site we do quite well, we control a lot of the getting on and off the 
trucks. What we get most complaints about the drivers, not so much about the drivers but 
the drivers complain about, stuff that happens off site. So it’s all the stuff that we call the 
ma and pa little customers that haven’t had the same safety standards. Here we obviously 
have exclusion zones, you know high viz vests, hard hat and all that. You go to other 
customers out the back of Toowoomba, up to Caloundra, don't have the same safety 
standards. So what we do is we run into an issue of when we’re there is that they interact 
into a world where they’re probably not as familiar. Because we push safety so heavily, 
where you don't have the exclusion zones, you’re back up on top of a truck. We have like a 
wasp system here so when you’re on the back of the truck you’re actually harnessed in.  
When you’re out on site you don't have that available to you. Not all sites don't have them 
but there is just a few. I think there’s only one site that really does the harnessing. So that’s 
the real risk. So our biggest complaint is how we can influence behaviours off site. Now 
whether that’s through customers, forklift unloaders, even just being out on the road, that’s 
our biggest concerns. So the more interaction with our customers and the ones that don't 
have the safety sense that we said. So as I said to you the exclusion zones, the getting up on 
the truck, the more the task out on site is probably the biggest concern for drivers because 
they come back with some pretty serious stories about you know near misses and so forth. 
So it’s pretty serious mate. But that’s the one thing we try to do here and we try to influence 
the behaviours of the customers.  So...umm you know with the drivers, do everything as far 
as like the driving hours and all that all by the law, by the book and we audit that. So 
there’s no issues there and we’re a basically a six till six business so there’s really no need 
for us, because we’re delivering to customers, they shut by five o’clock usually anyway. So 
the driving sides of things. But the real big push is more stuff that happens on customer 
sites when we’re unloading. (Company B Branch Manager Five) 
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Throughout the case studies a number of different customer sites were visited. At each 
site, the level of involvement of the driver in these processes varied. Many customers conduct 
all of the loading and unloading without driver assistance. During a number of observations 
the researcher and driver were required to either remain within the cab or stand in a 
designated location until loading was completed. Conversely, however, at some customer 
sites the driver conducted significant amounts of loading and unloading. For example, one 
Company B driver was observed unloading palletised goods. Similarly, many Company B 
drivers stood on the trailer to connect goods to customer operated cranes, and one Company 
A driver operated a forklift. Due to the variety of loading procedures, the driver’s level of 
hazard exposure significant changes between sites. 
 
 
10.3.1.4. Load type and non-driving injuries 
But once he’s really on site he’ll un-restrain the load and then virtually it’s then up to the 
customer, and some of the, some of the customers will need his assistance and that’s always 
been the, that’s always been the case in the transport industry. The driver will assist the 
customer to unload. You know it would be all well and good we can all say sorry we’re not, 
our driver doesn’t. He only delivers he doesn’t assist. If we took that philosophy well we 
probably wouldn’t have a business because the other 200 companies out there, their people 
will assist. So there’s also a commercial understanding that we need to also understand at 
that point. And because we’re delivering our customer’s site to their customers we’ve got to 
be careful because if their customer doesn’t you know if we adopt some particular 
procedure which impacts our customer’s customer, our customer’s customer doesn’t buy 
the product so there isn’t need for us to transport it. But certainly the end of the day if it’s 
unsafe we’re not going to do it, don't care who the customer is, how big they are we’re not 
going to do it. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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A number of hazards related to the type of load being carried were identified in section 
8.8.4. Whilst the slipperiness of steel and the risk of livestock kicking will be discussed under 
specific mechanisms of injury, it is important to note that sharp goods also pose a cutting 
hazard. The low level of information regarding cutting injuries prevented a more detailed 
discussion. However, as stated in section 8.8.4.2, sharp goods pose a natural hazard to drivers 
during any handling. This risk is typically managed through protective clothing. 
 
10.3.1.5. Cultural traits and non-driving injuries 
A number of cultural traits identified within Chapter 9 were indicated to play a general 
role in non-driving injuries. These are discussed in order of appearance within the relevant 
chapter. Non-driving safety is typically viewed as being a matter of common sense. One 
Company A manager simply stated that “most injuries are just stupidity, blokes doing the 
wrong thing”.  This was extended by drivers to customer and organisational inductions. The 
perception that inductions are common sense, led one Company A driver to state that he 
doesn’t “remember much of the inductions, a lot of companies are all the same”. One 
Company B driver similarly stated that most inductions are “common sense, ‘use the 
walkways’, ‘follow instructions’, ‘wear the correct PPE’”. 
 
Had stupid things like common sense things... Kicked in the head with a gate and that’s 
normal in the livestock industry that’s normal. Like I said every beast is different. You can 
go and close the gate behind 300 and the 301st bastard will kick the gate.... That’s across 
the board. Yeah that’s across, that’s so much as being in the truck but yeah...falling off –  
 
So that alone is probably one of the biggest hazards, other than driving on the road. Product 
wise I think 1.5mm is the thickest product here. Everything is like a razor… Yeah basically 
any manual handling is an issue, not an issue but a hazard. (Company B Branch Manager 
Four) 
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The value placed on time may result in significant risks in order to speed up unloading 
and loading and other non-driving tasks. One Company A driver was so concerned about 
saving time that he breached organisational policy regarding involvement in loading and 
unloading. It is worth noting, however, that one Company B manager suggested that ‘cutting 
corners’, which could be viewed as time saving, was simply laziness coupled with an ability 
to breach policies without detection. 
 
The general belief that drivers are good natured, but make errors, or are behaving 
similarly to anyone else, along with the belief that drivers are heavily motivated by money 
and other gains, were seen to be related to non-driving injuries by members of the studied 
organisations. It was often suggested that drivers make simple unintentional errors or that 
unsafe acts equate with the behaviour of everyone else outside the industry. When viewing 
– crates and things like that, we’ve never had anyone fall off... Had a bloke fall in.... That’s 
the nature of it, the human nature it’s the fact that there’s a risk factor in every job and if 
you take the risk you’re going to get hurt... like getting on a motor bike and riding down the 
road mate...It’s like getting in the car and driving down the road, there’s a risk factor in 
everything you do. Some get hurt some don't. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
 
I think you’ve got a core group of guys that probably are lazy, they’re always going to be, 
they’ll always be looking for the shortcut. And I suppose a truck driver because they’re not 
here like in a factory you don't ...unless something happens you don't see what they’re 
doing out there. So ...the ones that probably do have an incident, it probably isn’t the first 
time they’ve done it a particular way, just unfortunately this time it’s gone wrong. So if it’s 
only a small component you just put it down to laziness. Rarely is it ignorance because it’s 
really fairly a basic task that they do it, that they’ve been doing, that they haven’t done it 
correctly. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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these incidents as simple errors or common behaviour, strict enforcement or punishment was 
deemed unreasonable. Unfortunately, this then allows unsafe behaviour to continue. 
 
It was also evident that many safety procedures and policies may be neglected for gain. 
PPE was often rejected on the basis of comfort. For example, despite one manager's claim 
that drivers wear boots all day long; it was evident during the observations that some drivers 
wear thongs throughout their shift until entering a strict depot. Drivers may be strongly 
motivated to take shortcuts to increase income, as was discussed in section 8.3.4. Drivers may 
also exaggerate or falsify injuries to receive significant payouts from WorkCover. 
The desire to conform to a specific ‘trucking image’ may also pose barriers to non-
driving safety. Though no direct link to outcomes was observed, it was noted that drivers may 
be somewhat hesitant to offer advice or instruction to one another. Though argued to be part 
of the cultural of ‘Australian blokes’, it may also be the result of the autonomous ‘look out 
for yourself’ truck driver image and the general view that safety is ‘uncool’. 
You know trying to drill into blokes’ heads to wear not necessarily steel cap work boots but 
just covered footwear. You know we can walk out here now and find half a dozen blokes 
wearing thongs. And that’s not to say they wear thongs all night it’s just, they’ve just sat in 
the truck for 10 to 12 hours. You know I'm sure when you get home from work the first 
thing you do is kick your shoes off. If these blokes are wearing work boots of course they 
want to kick their boots off and the problem with that is that they’re still in an industrial, on 
an industrial work site. And they want to walk upstairs to the shower or walk in to get a 
drink or walk upstairs to the kitchen, but them blokes are walking through a workshop area 
to get to those areas and it’s a hazard. (Company A Manager One)  
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The perceived likelihood of incidents and the attitudes held towards rules and 
regulations were also seen to relate to non-driving injuries. A number of drivers indicated that 
non-driving injuries were very likely. As stated by one Company C driver, “even changing a 
tyre can kill you or maim you quick”. Thus, many drivers viewed the rules and regulations set 
out by organisations and customers as being useful in improving safety.  
 
Despite many drivers viewing loading and unloading policies and procedures as 
relevant to safety, other drivers do not share these views. Where individual policies were 
viewed as pointless, punishment avoidance strategies were evident. For instance, as stated 
above, many drivers opted to only wear PPE at depots where enforcement was likely. 
Similarly, managers at Company B indicated that some drivers will only adhere to certain 
policies when under direct supervision. 
If you follow the policies and procedures put in place by (construction supply customer) 
you won’t come unstuck. It doesn’t mean things won’t happen, it just means they are trying 
to prevent anything. (Company B Driver Four) 
 
We try and instil on our men when they’re out working if they see their mate doing 
something that they think is ..to pull him up, don't let him keep going. That’s a hard culture 
to get across because men and Australian men always think: Oh we’re tough, we’re 
invincible and we don't realise some of the things we do. We’re not as tough as we think we 
are. And that’s the problem and I mean some blokes can get upset if you tell them they 
shouldn’t be climbing up like that but it’s in the approach, the way you tell them. And I 
really, firmly believe that it doesn’t happen, their mates telling them is a lot better than 
someone like me racing down. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
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10.3.2. Being struck by an object 
Within the industry there is a significant risk of injury associated with being struck by 
an object during unloading and loading and other activities around a truck. Within Study 
Three the major hazards related to items failing off of a trailer or being struck by a restraint as 
tension is released. Many of the general non-driving injury factors discussed in the previous 
section also apply to this mechanism of injury. A number of specific factors were also 
I think another hazard is the mentality of people, of the drivers, when they’re out of the 
depot is they revert back to old ways. So they’ll take off all their high vis, they’ll walk 
around in thongs, they’ll put on their stubbies, they’ll smoke, they’ll eat and drive, do all of 
those things where we’ve got very clear procedures, but how do you monitor that? Really 
hard to monitor because you’re not sitting out the back of woop woop watching them. So 
some of the ways that we reduce those risks is a lot in the culture. So a new focus is a 
cultural behavioural shift is people just behaving in a way that is safety-related so that it 
becomes a behaviour, that it will be done regardless of whether you’re being seen or not 
being seen. (Company B Director) 
 
So we’re not ...we’re nowhere near perfect, we’re striving but no it’s not as rosy as we have 
things...we have drivers climbing up on trailers and won’t put their helmet on. They know 
they’ve got to have it on and you’ll see them, they’ll see you walk around the corner and 
straight off and into the truck and grab their helmet. ... Same thing we expect if you’re in 
our yard you must have a helmet on if you’re above the ground. Same thing I walk down 
the back and our yard blokes are there with me and you’ll see, he’ll say here he comes get 
your helmet. But you know what I'm trying to get through to him, don't let it get to that, tell 
him straight away put your helmet on, in our yard you must have your helmet on. But it will 
always happen. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
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identified including organisational policies and material safety, customer standards and 
policies, load type and truck design, and a number of cultural traits.  
10.3.2.1. The organisation and being struck by an object 
In regards to organisational policies and training, the principal behaviour targeted was 
standing too close to the vehicle during loading and unloading. This was managed through 
exclusion zones, which identify the safe location for drivers to be situated during unloading 
and loading. Whilst heavily dictated by customer policies, within Company B significant 
attention was given to exclusion zones. Managers and drivers alike demonstrated a high level 
of awareness of exclusion policies. Company B utilises an approach based on three colour-
coded zones (similar to the example in Figure 10.1), which served as a guideline for instances 
where customers used no policies. In a side loading example, drivers should stand at either 
end of the vehicle or, if necessary and granted permission, the corners of the trailer. However, 
drivers are prohibited to stand either directly beside the loaders or on the opposite side of the 
vehicle.  
With respect to material safety, only Company B appeared to have specific precautions 
limiting the potential for injuries from being struck by an object. First, many company 
branches required staff to wear hard hats, offering significant protection for drivers in the 
case of an object striking the head. Additionally, significant attention was given by managers 
to the form of restraints used. As discussed in section 7.4.2, Company B has banned the use 
of ‘lever dogs’ to restrain equipment. Due to tension arising from lever-dog restraint, they 
have a tendency to ‘flick’ when loosened, potentially striking the driver.  
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Figure 10.1: Example of a three coloured exclusion zone similar to that used by Company B 
(Image Source:Australian Steel Institute, 2011) 
 
10.3.2.2. Customers and being struck by an object 
As loading and unloading occurs at customer sites, customer policies and procedures 
significantly influence the risk of striking injuries. As discussed in section 10.3.1.3, 
customers may require different levels of driver involvement in unloading and loading. When 
drivers are not permitted to be involved in these tasks and are required to wait in an exclusion 
zone, they are completely protected from falling objects. However, some customers will 
allow the driver to stand in dangerous locations and the driver must choose to adhere to 
organisational exclusion zone policies. 
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 427 
 
 
10.3.2.3. Load type and truck design and being struck by an object 
The type of load and the design of the truck and trailer can significantly influence the 
risk of striking injuries. Within Study Three, specific attention was given to the risks 
associated with cattle and steel. With regards to steel, pipes were noted to be highly risky due 
to their propensity to roll. As stated by one Company B manager, “if you don’t have the right 
pipe racks on the trailer, as they lift one pipe up some can roll off the other side of the 
trailer” and, therefore, drivers “have to be aware that they shouldn’t be on the opposite side 
of the trailer when people are unloading”. Conversely, cattle can pose a significant striking 
risk when they kick directly at the driver or kick a gate which strikes the driver. 
 
Carrying cattle you gotta make sure you don’t get injured by a beast. Where you put your 
arms and where you stand, you can quite easily get hurt by getting kicked by the cattle. 
(Company C Driver Three) 
 
You have to be careful wandering around the crate that you don’t get kicked or hit with the 
gate. They can kick you out the side of the crate... Reading the animals, you learn to read 
them and can see in their eye if they are crazy and will try to eat you. You can’t always tell 
but I’m pretty good at it. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
You don't do stupid things, you don't run in behind them and kicked in the guts do you? And 
the same going back too, every load is different. I mean some cattle kick, some don’t, some 
chase you, some won’t. You pick that, you know that. You know that the minute you, you 
know. It’s all common sense. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
 
Some have nothing, you gotta use your common sense, they’ll let you stand right next to a 
forklift, but if you don’t want to die. (Company B Driver Two) 
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A number of factors associated with trailer design, such as racks which prevent loads 
from shifting, have an impact on reducing risks. Within Company C, the importance of crate 
design was highlighted as reducing the risk of being struck. Through the use of gates which 
lock upon closure, drivers are less likely to be struck by a kicked gate before it can be locked 
in place. Similarly, crates are designed with spaces between the gate and wall, enabling 
drivers to stand in safety where they cannot be kicked. 
 
10.3.2.4. Culture and being struck by an object 
Many of the traits discussed in section 10.3.1.5 equally apply to being struck by an 
object. Additionally, common sense and the perceived likelihood of incidents were 
particularly relevant to striking injuries. Safety related to being struck was largely viewed as 
common sense. Thus it is unlikely for these companies to take additional precautions (see 
section 9.2.3.2). For example, when discussing drivers standing too close to a forklift one 
Like....there’s a law in the bush never stand behind a gate. But in a crate how do you shut 
the gate if you’re not standing behind it? So there is a rule don't stand behind the gate, 
because if they hit it they’re going to squash you. The crates are designed, the gate can’t 
come right back. It’s a space in between the gate and the side like, so they can’t really get 
at you. They can get at you but they can’t hurt you. But that’s why the crates are made and 
that’s where manufacturing and industry and itself, like most, most crates are designed out 
of people like us or whatever who come up with these little ideas. And then the 
manufacturer takes them on board and they refine them and it’s all come from industry. It 
hasn’t come from manufacturers... Oh L pens and just chains around gates, they all got 
slam shuts now so you just slam the gate and it shuts. Like before you had to go and push 
the gate and put your chain around it. Yeah. And anyone that’s been carting cows for 30 
odd years will have some sort of a mark on his face or his teeth or somewhere where he’s 
been kicked in the head with a gate. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Company B driver simply asked “what did you think would happen if you stand that close?” 
Similarly one Company A staff member stated that “you shouldn’t have to tell anybody, 
they’d been near a forklift”. 
 
A number of drivers suggested that incidents involving items falling from a trailer were 
bad luck. One Company A driver discussed a friend who was standing on the opposite side of 
the trailer when it was unloaded and was pinned beneath an item. The driver attributed this to 
luck, as the driver was simply “in the wrong place at the wrong time”. Conversely, many 
other drivers, particularly in Company B, did expect that injuries could occur from falling 
objects and discussed the importance of standing clear. 
10.3.3. Slips, trips and falls 
Slips, trips and falls (STF) are another major hazard faced by truck drivers. Whenever a 
truck driver works from a trailer or back of the prime mover, or when entering and exiting the 
truck, there is a risk of falling from heights. Specific factors which were identified as relating 
to this type of injury included organisational policies and procedures, government 
enforcement, customer procedures, load type and truck design factors, and a number of 
specific cultural traits. 
See most of the stuff’s done elsewhere. All the loading is done elsewhere. You know most of 
the types of injuries you get is somebody yakking to somebody. Like the forklift driver. Last 
injury had the guy that was standing beside his truck and the forklift driver was operating 
and talking. Right and they didn’t see the box on top of something else and it fell off and hit 
him on the back... Yeah you shouldn’t have to tell anybody. They’d been near a forklift. You 
shouldn’t have to tell somebody to drive forklifts at a reasonable pace. You shouldn’t have 
to tell somebody not to drive around the area at 10km/h but you’re continually doing it you 
know... what do you have to put in place? (Company A Health and Safety Officer) 
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10.3.3.1. The organisation and slips, trips and falls 
The organisation plays a role in STF injuries through training, policy enforcement and 
material safety. Training regarding working at heights, and using three points of contact when 
climbing, was given by both Company A and B. However, one Company B driver noted that, 
due to the company desiring drivers not to climb onto a trailer, Company B provides little 
training regarding safe work on trailers.  
 
Both Company A and B have policies regarding working at heights, where STFs are 
more likely to lead to severe injuries. Within Company B the policy is generally that drivers 
are not allowed to climb onto a trailer, however, in some cases this is not possible. Within 
Company A the major policy regarding working at heights is that drivers must always use a 
forklift cage. When breached, typical enforcement strategies are invoked (see section 
7.4.3.4). 
 
Yeah if they’re seen to be doing it I will give them a warning... So all that stuff is covered 
off in our inductions and that now, so people are aware that we won’t accept just climbing 
up, being on the forklift that’s not in a secure cage and that’s attached to the forklift. 
(Company A Manager One) 
 
At height, yeah you know, we go through all the training, all the shit to be in a cage on the 
forklift. There’s no passing or anything. It’s just in a cage on a forklift or don't do it. That 
would be round the, you know, the workshop blokes fixing roof lights or, you know, the tops 
of air cleaners or pipes and that. They’d be in the fork..on the fork. The wash boys have 
occasional forklift up there. The only other height stuff is the odd rare occasion when 
they’ve got to climb up in the back of a trailer, you know high end of the trailer for some 
shit but that’s a once-in-a-blue moon thing. (Company A Manager One) 
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Lastly, regarding material safety that influences STF injuries, members of Company B 
indicated that the company utilises harnessed platforms for loading within onsite depots, 
ceased using tarped trailers (reducing time above a load), and have attached additional steps 
to a number of trailers (enabling drivers to safely examine a load from a higher position). In 
addition, the director of Company B indicated that they are currently investigating 
transportable steps enabling drivers to climb safely. 
 
They have loading platforms. So I guess it’s not so much that you can’t get on there, you 
can’t fall off. Because there’s something you’re attached to on the site. So you can fall off 
the truck all you like, you just land on this bloody platform whereas out in the 
street...(director name) has often said she doesn’t want anyone on the back of a truck. 
Ultimately she doesn’t want anyone on the back of a truck and people go well that’s not 
freaking possible, that’s ridiculous. Got to dream. You’ve got to pursue something and 
that’s what she’s in pursuit of, nobody gets on the back of a truck. We can’t drive around 
with the platforms and so on and so forth but they made up stools, ladders, things that 
can...rather than get on the back of the truck give you that little bit of extra height to reach 
to the top of the truck you know. So they’re always looking for ways to improve:  One, how 
we get on and off if we have to; and two, reduce the amount of times that we have to get on 
and off. Ultimately you can’t not get someone...when...I shouldn’t say that. But it’s pretty 
hard to imagine a day when no one has to get on the back of the truck. But if you don't try 
and imagine it you’re not going to get as far as you can are you? So... I mean there’s a way 
around every single issue but once you put three issues on the same truck it then becomes 
hard. I mean you can get the poles out the centre of the truck without getting up there if you 
want to. But once you add some sheeting or you add a little bit of rust you know, add more 
friction, it reduces your ability to do things from a distance. (Company B Branch Manager 
Four) 
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10.3.3.2. Government departments and slips, trips and falls 
There is significant legislation covering the requirements of organisations and 
customers to provide workplaces that are safe from STFs. Due to effect of punishments, one 
Company A manager stated that the company must ensure drivers do not dangerously climb 
on trucks and trailers. The manager stated that previously he would climb “all over the thing, 
but you just can’t do that now”. Whilst the risks associated with this behaviour had not 
changed, the punishments were deemed more severe. Whilst it is clear that government 
enforcement has had some impact upon STFs, members of Company C argued that 
government officials were unable to identify safer work methods for livestock crates and thus 
have not influenced STFs in the livestock industry.  
 
 
Yeah in the actual industry I think Work Health and Safety has been pretty good. They don't 
really, like we’ve had them look at putting handrails on crates and safety harnesses and all 
this and it just don't work in this industry. They look at it, and they see what we do and they 
come away with it, you know they put issues on there. They put stipulations on that we’ve 
done anyway. But they had to be in writing, another little chapter that you can’t climb up 
the side of the crate, you must use the ladders, you must do this… which is common sense. 
But they had to put their little bit in there, make it look like they were doing something... 
Like you can climb on the top of the crate; even though it’s four-and-a-half metres off the 
ground when you’re on the catwalk you can only fall one-and-a-half metres into the crate. 
Because you’re not walking along the little bar on the side, four-and-a-half metres above 
the ground, you’re walking along a catwalk. And if you fall in there you’re going to get 
hurt. Because there’s 40 other things in there with four legs. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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10.3.3.3. Customers and slips, trips and falls 
As unloading and loading is conducted at customers’ sites, customers play a role in STF 
safety. Many customers differed in their approach to STF safety. Whilst at some sites drivers 
were seen to climb up the side of trailers to identify items to unload, clear an obstruction, or 
direct a forklift driver, other sites had strict policies requiring use of ladders and platforms. 
Additionally, it was noted that even site cleanliness was important for trips. Building sites 
visited by Company B drivers were indicated to have significant trip hazards from building 
materials and rubbish which are left on the ground. 
10.3.3.4. Load type and truck design and slips, trips and falls 
Regarding the influence of load type and truck design on STF injuries, many factors 
discussed in section 10.3.1.4 were also relevant to STFs. Some loads, such as those unloaded 
by crane, require the driver to climb the trailer, thus increasing the risk of falls. Similarly, 
many steel products are slippery, posing risks to drivers on the trailer. Additionally, when 
transporting livestock, there is also a requirement to climb the crate. Conversely, with 
palletised goods there is a lower requirement for driver to work from heights. As stated by 
one Company B driver, “unless a pallet gets stuck you don’t need to get on the back”.  
 
Truck design factors can also play a significant role in STF safety. Whilst much of the 
current discussion has centred on climbing trailers, entering and exiting vehicles also poses a 
And then they’ve got mesh on the trucks or reo-bar which is reinforcing bar so you put 
down extensions. So to get up on the truck they’ve got to put the straps around it or the 
lifting chains around it. So they can lift it off and actually lift it off themselves with the 
crane, which obviously causes a new problem, getting it on and off the truck, obviously 
chaining it down and having to move it because you haven’t quite got it centred or 
whatever, and obviously using the crane. (Company B Branch Manager Two) 
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risk for STFs. It is easy to slip when entering the vehicle, particularly during wet weather (as 
discovered by the researcher). Without using the provided handrails, drivers may fall and 
suffer injury. This is contributed to by the fact that steps and ladders into trucks are often 
made of steel. Whilst members of the industry gave little focus to this hazard, one Company 
A driver described one truck as a “prick of a thing to get out of, you gotta bloody crawl out 
backwards”. Thus, the design of trucks can play a significant role in STFs. 
10.3.3.5. Culture and slips, trips and falls 
The perceived likelihood of an incident, the responsibility of drivers and the effect of 
experiential learning on attitudes towards rules were all identified as being relevant to STFs. 
Many STF injuries were attributed to luck by members of Company A and C. One Company 
A driver discussed a number of STF incidents, each resulting in medical attention. Despite 
the fact that the driver could have avoided each incident he simply stated that it was “just 
unlucky”. Similarly, when describing a driver who had slipped on ladder rails of a livestock 
crate, the driver/manager of Company C said “it was just one of those things”.  
 
There was another one, a bloke, but this was at the sale yard on a very dewy wet morning, 
a cover up job. He went to climb the ladder to go up to the top ramp, it had no handrails on 
the ladder, just a ladder, just a ladder. He put his foot on the ladder and grabbed the 
ladder because there was no rails and he’d been doing it for 50 years, the same old ladder 
had been there, but it was just one of those things. You could say it was an accident going 
somewhere to happen but it hadn’t happened. And when he grabbed the rail the ..the 
runners of the ladder it was slippery from the dew, his hand slipped, his foot went through 
the rungs and he fell back and broke his leg off there. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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As with any incident, when the cause is attributed to luck there is a reduced perceived 
need to act more safely or identify design and procedural issues. For this reason, it is 
important to note that many drivers did highlight the risks associated with climbing and the 
need to use caution. One Company B driver discussed the occasional need to climb a trailer, 
citing an example injury, stating that “it’s deadly, you just need one foot in the wrong place 
and you’ll go off the side”. 
The emphasis placed on experience and stories was again seen to relate to the perceived 
likelihood of an incident. Drivers were commonly stated to jump from trailers and trucks and, 
when warned of the risks this poses, state that they have done it for years without injury. 
Thus, a lack of experienced STFs may promote ongoing risks through NOD.  
Whilst it is commonly held that drivers are responsible for resisting customer pressure, 
it was evident that there is significant pressure to help some customers in loading situations 
which breach company policies. Whilst it could be argued that this is more a result of the 
influence of customers, as discussed in section 9.3.2, the expectation that drivers will resist 
pressure may lead customers and organisations to push the driver until they refuse to comply. 
The responsibility drivers feel towards the load they carry, and the organisation’s equipment, 
can also influence drivers decisions to breach policies. During one observation, a Company B 
a driver stated that he chose to break rules regarding climbing the trailer in order to prevent 
the unloader ‘stuffing up’ and “so I’m not a bastard telling them you’re not going to help”. 
10.3.4. Muscular strain and overexertion 
Muscular strains and overexertion are a common form of injury within many 
workplaces. There was significant attention granted to these forms of injuries within Study 
One’s literature (section 4.2.2), however, within Study Two these injuries received little 
attention (section 5.2.1.2). Throughout Study Three, once again relatively little information 
on these forms of injuries was provided. The majority of information regarding these injuries 
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came from Company B. As Company B conducts a higher proportion of short distance 
transport than the other two companies, this trend supports the hypothesis that the absence of 
such information in Study Two was from an over-representation of line-haul drivers. The 
specific factors which were linked with these form of injuries included organisational training 
and material safety, customer policies, truck design and load type factors, and a selection of 
cultural traits. 
10.3.4.1. The organisation and muscular strains and overexertion 
Whilst Company A has a detailed manual handling policy within their driver’s manual, 
neither Company A nor C indicated that they conduct manual handling training. Given that 
Company C drivers are not required to conduct manual handling of goods and Company A 
drivers are generally not permitted to load and unload their trailer, it is to be expected that 
there would be less focus on these injuries. Company B, however, dedicates significant 
attention to reducing strain and overexertion injuries. Recently prior to the case study, 
Company B had completed a manual handling training program for all its staff. Additionally, 
however, Company B conducts regular ‘refresher training’ and has worked with its customers 
to develop safety procedures. 
 
Probably because I work with the managers in each site we develop training programs. 
Some of our sites are obviously manual handling intensive so consequently we’ve 
developed over the years where we’ll have a manual handling, a refresher program, being 
provided where we bring an occupational therapist in who we use who understands the 
industry. He knows trucks, what the handling is and then he’ll provide a specific training 
package for that business. We work with our customers in developing safe operating 
procedure  that’s to do with driving, load restraints, fatigue, particular equipment that we 
use. (Company B Region Manager One) 
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Company B also utilises a number of devices to reduce manual handling. No Company 
B driver was observed manually carrying any goods and the most intensive action witnessed 
was the use of an electric pallet jack. Regarding these jacks, one Company B driver stated 
that manual pallet jacks result in “sore necks and backs and shoulders”. In addition to 
providing electric pallet jacks, one Company B branch purchased a forklift mounted clamp to 
significantly reduce the amount of lifting conducted by staff. 
 
10.3.4.2. Customers and muscular strains and overexertion 
Customer policies regarding loading and unloading also have a strong impact on 
reducing muscular strains and overexertion. As previously indicated, many drivers are not 
permitted to assist loading and unloading, removing the main manual handling task. It was 
however noted by one Company B driver that, in some cases, customers may have lower 
We’ve found a crowd that actually made a hydraulic clamp that attaches to the forklift so 
you can build layers of the pallets. So if certain customers, one might want 30 cartons of 
Gold stubbies which is three layers, and it’s got the four hydraulic pads, you just slide it 
over the top of the pallet and it just grabs in and it lets you pluck those 30 cartons off and 
you just lift it up and take it over and put it on another cart... where we would have done 
that manually, if we wanted 30 cartons there would have been somebody there picking 30 
cartons one by one. And of course so the less of the injury we normally *words lost on 
recording*.  And I think it’s done a marvellous job really. But it’s done, it was only a, cost 
$30,000 outlay which is really at the end of it all we ended up doing it with one person less 
than what we would so it basically paid for itself in less than 12 months. So basically they 
have a life of about five to 10 years so it’s well and truly get your dollar’s worth out of it as 
well as the lack of, you know, the less impact of injury. (Company B Branch Manager 
Three) 
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standards regarding manual handling. It was noted that some customers have previously 
loaded “extra items into the same pack and put a second sticker on it”. Thus, a single 
package recorded on an order may contain additional items. The driver continued to say that 
“according to the sheet it only weighs 20 kilograms but it might weigh 36”. 
10.3.4.3. Truck design and load type and muscular strains and overexertion 
The type of load carried determines the level of manual handling. Palletised goods are 
moved via forklifts and pallet jacks and larger items may be unloaded via a crane. However, 
smaller loose items require manual handling. Additionally, truck design factors can also 
influence strains and overexertion. The metal gates used within taught liners are required to 
be lifted into place and can weigh a significant amount. Within one Company A observation, 
a truck was fitted with ‘runners’ for the gates. These runners limit the lifting task required to 
dislodge a gate to approximately 10cm, at which point it can be dragged from side to side on 
its runners. Unfortunately, in this instance, the runners were only present on one side of the 
trailer and, thus, the driver was required to lift the gates on the opposite side. 
 
Whilst the above discussion has focussed on manual handling, strains can also occur as 
a result of non-lifting tasks. For example, drivers can suffer strains from throwing straps over 
loads, climbing into the cab, or even from jolts incurred by jumping from the trailer. In terms 
of truck design factors, a number of drivers indicated that air cushioned seats have reduced 
Our gates are on skates so they don’t have to lift them up and down to the ground all the 
time. There’s new lightweight materials being used for the gates, you know things are done 
by fork lift, mechanical means, all those kinds of things and I think that’s evolved over a 
long period of time and, you know, we’ve got strict rules. (Company A Health and Safety 
Officer) 
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the long term strain placed on drivers’ backs. Additionally, one Company A driver noted that 
he commonly experiences pain in his knee due to the angle at which his leg is positioned. 
10.3.4.4. Culture and muscular strains and overexertion 
The tendency of drivers to value experience and stories over communicated facts, and 
the associated NOD, along with the value placed on money were seen to influence strains and 
overexertion. With regards to the motivation of money, the argument that injuries may be 
exaggerated was common (see section 8.3.4). As this has already been discussed, it is 
sufficient to note that strains which occur outside of work were suggested to be claimed as a 
work injury. Additionally, it was evident that one Company A manager perceived muscular 
strains to often be minor injuries that are exaggerated. Further, it was also indicated that 
repetitive strain injuries are effectively blamed upon the organisation which employs the 
individual at the time that the injury becomes evident. 
 
All that dude has ever done since he’s worked here, he gets in his truck goes to (customer 
name), hooks up his trailers goes to Sydney unhooks them and goes to bed. Does that every 
night of the week, five nights a week.  All of a sudden, you know, we’ve caused his hernia. 
Turns out, we sent him to our doctor yesterday. He doesn’t have a hernia he’s got a 
strained stomach muscle. That could happen from taking a crap mate, you know? How does 
he put that down to being a work injury? The hardest thing he does is climb in his truck, 
which is probably no taller than his front steps at home anyway. Unfortunately everyone 
knows now that you can get lots for a work injury. We had a bloke working here for a few 
months, he only had one arm, he was diagnosed with carpel tunnel and had to have an 
operation. So that goes on our Work Cover. You know that’s a life time of using one arm to 
do everything, but he was working here when it happened and it cost us tens of thousands 
of dollars. But then when Work Cover offered him a thirty thou, or twenty three thousand 
dollar payout he said no and now he’s personally suing the company for three quarters of –  
Chapter 10: Study Three Results – Safety-Related Behaviours 440 
 
 
It was often indicated that drivers may conduct incorrect lifting techniques, climb using 
their upper body rather than legs or jump from parts of the truck regularly without 
experiencing injuries. Thus, through NOD drivers are resistant to being warned about injuries 
resulting from such activities. This was particularly highlighted when discussing strains, 
which can be cumulative injuries, as drivers may have sustained unrecognised damage. 
Therefore, the emphasis given by drivers to experiential learning may prevent drivers from 
recognising the risks of behaviour until injury has been sustained. 
 
10.3.5. Summary: Non-driving injuries 
Unlike crash outcomes, there was insufficient detailed provided in Study Three to 
warrant specific behaviour-focussed analysis. By focussing on the mechanisms of injury it 
was possible to identify a broad range of factors which influence injury. Generally, non-
– a million dollars. Because he thinks he deserves that because he got carpel...he was 
diagnosed with carpel tunnel when he was working here. That’s something that happens 
over a lifetime of repetitive strain. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Other things that cause injuries that I'm finding is a lot of, just the repetition of the work. 
Always lots of strains and sprains. Climbing in and out of a truck even. We train on three 
points of contact and to use your legs to get in the truck, but everyone will revert. Well not 
everyone. A lot of people revert back to just pulling themselves up into a truck, that they 
jump out of a truck. They don’t climb down, just like a trailer. They will jump from the 
trailer rather than climb down the points... So they think they’re young, they’ve done this 
100 times before, it’s not that far, the calculated risk they’ll take. But the amount of times 
they’ve done that, there’s just going to be one time they jump and then they go, my knee 
hurts from that one jump. No it’s not from the one jump, it’s from the 200 jumps you’ve 
done prior because you’ve just taken it as, ‘this is okay’. (Company B Director) 
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driving safety is contributed to by a number of organisational, government, customer and 
environmental factors. Additionally, cultural traits relating to the nature of truth and reality, 
the nature of time, the nature of human nature and the nature of human relationships, along 
with the second order traits of luck and the likelihood of incidents, responsibility and rules 
and regulations were evident within non-driving injuries. As no single non-driving injury 
mechanism was attributed solely to a single source, or exclusively to contextual or cultural 
factors, the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, again, appear suited to 
understanding non-driving injuries within the industry. 
Similarly to crash outcomes, further study is required to quantify the effects of each 
factor and determine the level of interaction between factors. Nonetheless, the current 
approach to safety culture appears to hold significant potential to reduce non-driving injuries. 
Once again, the perceived likelihood of incidents, based strongly upon the value given to 
experience and stories, was evident within each mechanism of injury. Thus, increasing the 
perceived likelihood of an incident could reduce incidents. Additionally, the belief that safety 
is largely a matter of common sense appeared to hinder efforts to improve safety. The belief 
that drivers should be responsible for their own safety also appeared to expose drivers to 
pressures. These two traits may be useful targets for intervention. The factors identified as 
relevant to non-driving injuries, generally and through each of the injury mechanisms 
discussed, along with the direction with which they influence safety, are presented in Table 
10.7. 
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Table 10.7: Factors which influence non-driving injuries and related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
General non-
driving injuries 
Contextual Factors: 
Customer pressures 
Load factors 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational training 
Organisational material safety 
Government enforcement 
Customer standards, policies and 
enforcement 
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood/luck 
Rules are bad 
Common sense 
Time 
Unintentional 
Money and other gains 
Keeping up the trucking image 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
Rules are good 
Being struck by 
an object 
Contextual Factors: 
Load type factors 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational policies and training  
Organisational material safety 
Customer standards, policies and 
enforcement 
Positive truck design  
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood 
Common sense 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
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Slips, trips and 
falls 
Contextual Factors: 
Load type factors  
Poor truck design 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational policies and training  
Organisational material safety 
Government enforcement 
Customer standards, policies and 
enforcement 
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood/luck 
Experiential and narrative 
Learning/NOD 
Drivers are responsible 
Cultural Factors: 
High perceived likelihood 
 
Muscular strain 
and 
Overexertion 
Contextual Factors: 
Low customer standards 
Load type factors 
Poor truck design 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational policies and training  
Organisational material safety 
Customer standards, policies and 
enforcement 
Load type factors 
 Cultural Factors: 
Low perceived likelihood/luck 
Experiential and narrative 
Learning/NOD 
Money and other gains 
Cultural Factors: 
- 
 
10.4. HEALTH OUTCOMES 
Whilst heavy vehicle drivers are subject to a number of health concerns, participants 
gave little attention to these outcomes. Throughout Study Three a small amount of discussion 
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was given to eating and lifestyle-related diseases and psychosocial concerns. There was 
insufficient detail provided to comprehensively understand these health outcomes and the 
factors which contribute to them. However, a number of points emerged which may inform 
future research. Prior to exploring these two health outcomes, a general point on health and 
medical examinations should be made. 
Many accreditation schemes require heavy vehicle drivers to undergo medical 
examinations. As such, each company enforces their drivers to provide up to date medical 
information. One Company A manager stated that the company regularly uses one doctor for 
these examinations, which the company pays for. In the event that a driver’s medical 
examination reveals medical concerns, the organisation will ‘stand down’ the driver until the 
problem is resolved. Additionally, one Company B driver noted that some customers will 
also require a separate examination in order to offer a contract. 
 
10.4.1. Eating and lifestyle health 
Eating and lifestyle-related diseases are a major concern for truck drivers. Obesity and 
smoking are common within the industry. Regarding healthy eating, it was noted by one 
Company A manager that many drivers predominantly eat fast food. Even if a driver wants to 
eat healthily along the road, it was indicated that it can be difficult to find a place to park a 
truck to purchase food. Thus, many drivers are required to visit fast food venues at truck 
Other than that just, just the training, the induction stuff, the bare bones stuff. You know 
medicals, we make blokes get out of the truck if there’s something wrong with their 
medical or stand them down until the health issue is fixed or whatever… we like to be a 
little bit health conscious with our staff here because ultimately they’re the money earners 
here not us.  So if there’s a health problem we work closely with them to try and rectify it 
as quick as possible so they’re not out of their job. (Company A Manager One) 
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stops which typically offer little healthy food. Only one observed driver discussed choosing 
to eat healthily. This choice was influenced by past experience of a heart attack. The driver 
stated that, due to requiring heart surgery, he now needs to watch what he eats.  
Due to the significant amount of time spent waiting at customer sites, a number of 
drivers smoke to pass time. Additionally, it was noted that night-time driving contributes to 
levels of smoking. As stated by one Company A driver, “I smoke more coz I’m going solid 
sitting there all night”. Smoking was seen to reduce the symptoms of fatigue. Additionally, 
many drivers will also turn to other substances, or high levels of caffeine, to manage fatigue. 
 
So I guess the only way to combat it is healthy eating. Yeah. It’s all energy drinks and shit, 
whether they work for you or not. Some people love them, some people don’t. I heard a 
rumour that some people take drugs to stay awake but I don’t know how real that story is. 
But I guess it’s down to the individual ... When I was working nights I bought some No Doz 
from Woollies. No Doz was about as good as Tic Tacs. Man, I don’t think it’s that good. 
Some blokes, you know, some blokes think it’s great. There’s a lot of stuff you can get now 
off the internet or from health stores that are claimed to be a pseudo-ephedrine to keep like 
energising everything but man there’s one particular thing. I don’t know the name of it. 
You know people joke around ‘it’s Japanese Duromine’. You know, back in the day truck 
drivers used to use Duromine and it’s a diet pill that blokes take because it’s got pseudo in 
it and it fucks with blokes’ head man. With prolonged use just sends blokes fucking 
bonkers, paranoia you know. I know of a bloke that was using that stuff and when he got 
out of the truck he went to a nut house for 10 days. It really fucks with your head. It’s easy 
to get. It’s cheap to get off the net, they ship it straight to you, it works great. It’s a great 
product to keep awake but prolonged use it destroys blokes and I’ve seen it happen to a few 
people and it’s not nice stuff. You know there’s some stuff you can get from health shops –   
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10.4.2. Psychosocial concerns 
Psychosocial concerns received little attention within the case studies, only identified 
by members of Company A and typically in a negative manner. The major concern 
highlighted within Study Three was psychological trauma resulting from crashes. As was 
previously indicated (section 8.4.4), one Company A driver, when discussing a past no-fault 
crash, was visibly distressed and still trying to process the fact that he may have ‘killed’ 
someone. Similarly, when discussing a recent high profile truck crash, one Company A driver 
stated that “that driver who went through the house in Urunga, the ute driver was drunk, but 
how would you live with that? He killed a boy”.  
There was some degree of stigma surrounding the issue of psychological trauma. 
Within Company A it was evident that, due to crashes being blamed upon stupidity, there was 
little sympathy for individuals suffering psychological distress unless they were not at fault. 
For example, when discussing an incident, one Company A manager stated that the driver 
was “claiming post-traumatic stress because he’s a fucking idiot that just had a lose in the 
wet”. Thus, regardless of whether the stress was considered real, the fact that the individual 
was at fault invalidated this stress. Unfortunately, in many cases it was evident that post-
traumatic stress was viewed as fake or exaggerated. When discussing one driver, who had not 
– and that that’s pretty good, it works alright.  How good it is after prolonged periods of 
time after long periods of time I don’t know. It’s yet to be seen I suppose because I’ve only 
seen some blokes using it in recent times. Other than that drink 47 cans of Red Bull every 
night I suppose or take drugs and run the risk of getting the drug swab somewhere I 
suppose. Pay money, take your chances I guess. That’s just staying awake. (Company A 
Manager One)  
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worked in seven years due to fear resulting from a crash, the manager asked whether the 
claim sounded real then answered: “I’m thinking not champ”. 
 
10.4.3. Health outcomes summary 
Due to insufficient attention granted to health outcomes, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions regarding the effect of culture on health outcomes. Further, it is difficult to 
determine the suitability of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in 
understanding health outcomes. Future research should investigate these health outcomes in 
isolation. The factors identified as relevant to health outcomes, and the direction of their 
effect, are presented in Table 10.8. 
Table 10.8: Factors which influence health outcomes and related behaviours 
Outcome Factors which reduce safety Factors which improve safety 
Health outcomes Contextual Factors: 
Road design (truck stops) 
Environmental factors (time) 
Contextual Factors: 
Organisational enforcement 
Accreditation requirements 
Customer policies 
 Cultural Factors: 
Common sense 
Money 
Cultural Factors: 
- 
Shit happens. People break their ankles but, you know, as for psychological damage for 
crashing a truck seven years ago and you’re too scared to do anything. Like this bloke 
hasn’t worked for seven years because he’s too scared. Do you really think that sounds 
real? I'm not calling him a liar but I think he might be just tricking us just a little bit you 
know. I can understand if he was maybe too scared to run down that highway or drive a 
cab over truck but to do anything ever? I'm thinking not champ (Company A Manager One) 
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10.5. Summary: Safety-related behaviours and outcomes 
The current chapter examined specific behaviours relating to crash outcomes, 
mechanisms of non-driving injuries and a small selection of health outcomes. The purpose of 
this chapter was to identify how contextual and cultural factors, identified in Chapters 7 to 9, 
influence these outcomes. Whilst the discussion of these findings in relevance to the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture and improving safety within the heavy vehicle 
industry is discussed in Chapter 11, a few points should be made. Throughout this chapter 
every factor which was identified in Chapters 7 to 9 was seen to impact safety in a number of 
ways. Whilst not every factor was evident in a given behaviour, no single outcome was 
governed exclusively by contextual or cultural factors. Given that previous safety culture 
approaches have focussed solely on either contextual or cultural factors, the findings of this 
chapter highlight the benefit of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture in 
understanding behaviour. In the absence of quantitative investigation, it is not possible to 
directly demonstrate that each of the identified factors has a genuine, rather than industry-
perceived, impact upon safety. Nonetheless, it appears that many of the identified factors 
have potential to be used to reduce the number or severity of incidents within the industry. 
10.6. STUDY THREE CONCLUSION 
The purpose of Study Three was to examine the impact of cultural and contextual 
factors on safety and the manner in which they influence behaviours within specific 
organisations. The choice to use a case study methodology was based upon the findings of 
Study Two. Study Two revealed that there were significant differences in safety between 
organisations, based primarily upon the size and location of the organisation, and the type of 
trucks, type of cargo and distance the cargo is transported. Thus, a collective case study 
methodology was chosen, in which cases were selected not out of intrinsic interest, but to 
inform a broader issue. Whilst there were major contextual differences between the 
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organisations, it was apparent that many of the cultural traits were common between 
organisations. Despite some variance in the valence of traits, and the strength at which they 
are present, it appears likely that the identified cultural traits are somewhat common within 
the broader heavy vehicle industry.  
The case studies provided significant detail regarding the contextual and cultural factors 
which are relevant to safety within each company. The findings of Chapters 7 to 10 are 
presented within Figure 10.2. This figure is an adapted form of the model proposed in 
Chapter 2 (context, culture, behaviour and outcomes), updated with the major headings 
discussed in Chapters 7 to 9. Thus the figure provides a detailed overview of the findings of 
Study Three relative to the culture and context of the three studied organisations, and the 
behaviours and outcomes that they influence.  
As was the aim of the current chapter, the manner in which these factors interact to 
produce behaviour was examined. Whilst further research is necessary to quantify the impact 
of these factors and interactions, the case studies have provided significant theoretical depth 
to the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry. The 
next chapter discusses how the findings of each of the three studies have contributed to the 
existing knowledge of safety culture, via the synthesised conceptualisation proposed in 
Chapter 2, and the knowledge of safety within the heavy vehicle industry. Further, discussion 
surrounding the limitations of the current research and directions for future research is 
provided. 
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Figure 10.2: Synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture within the studied organisations 
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11.  
 
Chapter 11: Discussion, Conclusions and Moving Forward  
 
 
 
 
11.1. THE PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
The purpose of the current thesis was twofold. As discussed in Chapter 1, the heavy 
vehicle (or road freight transport) industry is a crucial component of the Australian economy, 
yet has a number of health and safety concerns which must be addressed. Due to the nature of 
the heavy vehicle industry, health and safety is a combination of both workplace health and 
safety issues faced within many industries, and road safety. It was noted, however, that the 
heavy vehicle industry has been resistant to standardised intervention strategies, and safety 
culture was identified as a potential focus of exploration for health and safety within the 
industry. Thus, the first purpose of the current research was to explore the influence of 
culture on safety within the heavy vehicle industry. 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of previous research which has explored safety culture in 
similar industries around the world, there is a lack of tested approaches to applying the safety 
culture concept to this industry. Further, research within the field of safety culture is divided 
over even the most basic definitions and methods of investigation to be utilised. For this 
reason, it was noted that previous researchers had described safety culture as a concept in 
chaos. Despite a lack of general consensus within the field of safety culture, researchers tend 
towards either a functionalist or interpretive approach. The first emphasises organisational 
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structures and systems and the latter emphasises shared beliefs, attitudes and values. Due to 
the extreme levels of autonomy held by members of the industry, taking a solely 
organisational approach to safety culture was seen to be too restrictive. Further, the number 
of external influences on a driver’s behaviour, such as government regulations and 
organisational and customer policies and procedures, meant that sole focus upon shared 
beliefs, attitudes and values was similarly too narrow for this industry. Thus, the second aim 
of the current research, which was necessary to address the first purpose, was to return to the 
theoretical roots of safety culture to provide a theoretically grounded conceptualisation and 
framework of safety culture. 
11.2. The synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture 
Chapter 2 was comprised of a literature review which sought to provide a theoretical 
grounded framework of safety culture. Within the field of safety culture there are many 
different definitions and conceptualisations of safety culture, in part influenced by the 
different academic or professional background of researchers and practitioners. Due to the 
lack of consensus within the field regarding the basic definitions and key components of 
safety culture, it was argued that there was a need to develop a stronger theoretical 
understanding of safety culture to advance the field beyond a loose collection of 
organisational safety research. Whilst the behaviours which comprise safety differ between 
organisational settings, it is the use of the word ‘culture’ in safety culture that provides the 
primary connection within this field. Thus, by better understanding the meaning of ‘culture’ 
in safety culture it is possible to provide a theoretically grounded framework of safety 
culture. 
As many safety culture researchers have recognised safety culture to be a component or 
effect of organisational culture, organisational culture was seen to be a valid first point of 
examination for understanding culture. However, just as safety culture has been linked with 
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organisational culture, organisational culture has been conceptualised in terms of more 
traditional anthropological and cultural psychological conceptualisations of culture. Thus, to 
truly provide a theoretically grounded framework of safety culture, it is necessary to 
understand how these fields view culture. Brinkmann (2007) reviewed three 
conceptualisations of culture which appear within the literature – the normative, 
anthropological and pragmatic conceptualisations. These three conceptualisations were used 
to examine the existing literature on safety culture.  
The normative conceptualisation of culture is typically viewed in an individual-focused 
manner, and holds that culture is the knowledge of the best that has been said and thought. 
Thus, the conceptualisation argued that every individual can and should be ‘cultured’, by 
gaining this knowledge. Whilst safety culture has not been viewed as an individual construct, 
the treatment of safety culture as a predetermined ‘best’ standard has been common since the 
term was first introduced. As it is believed that this best standard can and ought to be 
possessed by organisations, this has led to an emphasis on creating or shaping a culture. 
Inevitably, this has resulted in safety culture being considered a type of best safety practices 
model in which organisations are judged on their policies and procedures resulting in changes 
being made where necessary. 
The anthropological conceptualisation of culture, however, views culture as a set of 
shared beliefs, attitudes and values. Whilst many definitions of safety culture match with this 
conceptualisation, there has been relatively little research which uses this conceptualisation. 
The lack of research is arguably contributed to by the difficult and time consuming nature of 
ethnographic and qualitative research. 
The third and final conceptualisation of culture, the pragmatic conceptualisation, holds 
that culture is essentially about practices or behaviours. Whilst safety culture is not often 
defined or viewed in such terms, a behavioural focus on safety culture is evident within much 
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of the practice-oriented literature. However, this literature differs from the pragmatic 
conceptualisation in that the latter requires that practices be driven by underlying beliefs, 
attitudes and values, whereas much of the related safety culture literature has relied upon 
other social and organisational psychology theories to explain behaviours. 
Each of these conceptualisations has seen some use within the field of safety culture 
and possesses a number of strengths and weaknesses, outlined in Chapter 2. Due to the 
unique strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualisation, it was argued that, by combining 
the focus of each conceptualisation in order to harness their relative strengths whilst 
minimising or eliminating their weaknesses, safety culture could be more amenable to a wide 
variety of industries and safety issues. Thus, the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture was proposed in which safety culture was defined as the assembly of underlying 
assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an organisation, which 
interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader contextual setting to 
result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety. In simplest terms, 
culture (shared beliefs, attitudes and values) interacts with contextual factors (environmental 
factors, many of which are readily amenable to change) to produce behaviour. This 
distinction between cultural and contextual factors that interact to influence behaviour is the 
key distinctive of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture. This conceptualisation 
formed the basis of each study throughout this thesis. 
11.3. THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
Chapter 3 set out the aims and methods to be used in the current research. Following on 
from the two purposes of the current research highlighted in section 12.1, Chapter 3 proposed 
two primary research objectives. The first objective was to enhance the current understanding 
of safety culture by providing an approach to safety culture which can be applied across a 
variety of industries and settings, including the heavy vehicle industry. In order to address 
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this objective it was necessary to both develop the framework presented above and examine 
its efficacy in explaining safety-related behaviours. The second objective was to utilise the 
developed framework to explore the effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Whilst Chapter 2 provided the framework to be used, the remainder of the current 
research was required to examine the framework’s efficacy and utilise it within the heavy 
vehicle industry. Thus, the following aims were employed for the research: 
a. Examine the suitability of the key components of the synthesised conceptualisation of 
safety culture (culture, context and behaviour) to the heavy vehicle industry 
b. Identify factors previously identified within heavy vehicle industries, which comprise 
the key components of the framework 
c. Identify major factors within the heavy vehicle industry which have eluded previous 
research 
d. Identify the best methodological approach to investigating the effect of culture on 
safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
e. Examine how cultural and contextual factors affect safety-related behaviours in the 
heavy vehicle industry 
In order to address these aims a three-part research project was developed which relied 
heavily upon a combined ethnographic and grounded theory methodology (see section 3.2.2). 
The first study, which sought to address aims A and B, was comprised of a systematic 
literature review of previous heavy vehicle health and safety research. The second study, 
which addressed aims C and D, was comprised of a series of key stakeholder interviews with 
members of the industry. Lastly, based on the findings of Study Two, and in relation to aim 
D, Study Three sought to address aim E by utilising case studies of individual transport 
organisations. A discussion of the findings of each of these studies is presented below, with 
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particular emphasis on how the studies addressed their respective aims, and what limitations 
are inherent in the studies.  
11.3.1. Study One 
As stated above, Study One sought to address aims A and B by conducting a 
preliminary assessment of whether the key components of the synthesised conceptualisation 
of safety culture were suitable for use within the heavy vehicle industry. It also addressed 
these aims by identifying the factors shown in previous research which comprise the key 
components of the theoretical framework. A systematic literature review of previous heavy 
vehicle health and safety research was conducted and those studies which identified 
contextual or potential cultural factors relevant to safe and unsafe behaviours were selected 
for review. A total of 132 peer-reviewed journal articles were selected, which were found to 
provide results which aligned with the key components of the theoretical framework. Whilst 
the vast majority of these papers related to crash outcomes and behaviours, a number of 
papers were identified which examined factors related to non-driving injury outcomes and 
health outcomes. Additionally a small selection of papers were included which examined 
factors which did not directly align with the above outcome categories, yet appeared to hold 
information relevant to the framework and safety within the industry. 
The results of this review, presented in Chapter 4, included the identification of: (1) a 
number of behaviours which were linked with safety outcomes; (2) a number of contextual 
factors which were seen to either have a direct relationship with safety outcomes or with 
behaviours linked to outcomes; and (3) a number of potential cultural beliefs, attitudes and 
values. The lack of previous research examining cultural beliefs, attitudes and values means 
that, within the current research, any cultural factors drawn from previous research can only 
be referred to as ‘potential’. In addition to these findings, it was found that there were a 
number of individual factors which related to these behaviours and outcomes. A number of 
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individual factors were also identified, however as individual factors are not theoretically 
relevant to the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture (which emphasises shared, 
rather than individual, beliefs, attitudes and values, and the context surrounding the 
workforce), these factors are discussed in Appendix A.  
In relation to the stated aims of this study, a number of key points can be made. Firstly, 
the large number of identified factors strongly supports the idea that the synthesised 
conceptualisation of safety culture is suitable for use within the heavy vehicle industry. 
Whilst a number of papers were excluded from the review, due to a primary focus on issues 
such as pedestrian safety, road wear and the effects of air pollution of the health of the 
general public, there was evidence for both cultural and contextual influences on safety 
within the industry. The sheer number of factors identified in each of these categories 
highlights the importance of not solely examining shared beliefs, attitudes and values, or 
organisational structures and systems. When compared with existing approaches to safety 
culture, the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture appears much more suited to the 
heavy vehicle industry and thus, in response to aim A, it can be stated that the synthesised 
conceptualisation is well suited to the industry.  
In relation to aim B, whilst a full recap of the identified factors would be neither 
necessary nor required, a number of general categories of factors should be noted. Firstly, as 
it is a requirement of the synthesised conceptualisation for identified factors to be relevant to 
behaviours, a number of safe and unsafe behaviours and behavioural scenarios were 
identified, including driving whilst fatigued, drug and alcohol driving, speeding, seatbelt use, 
driving errors and violation, behaviours during loading and unloading and entering and 
exiting the vehicle, receiving health care, and eating and exercise. These behaviours were 
linked with crash rate and severity, injuries and fatalities, locomotor disorders, cancer, 
respiratory diseases, obesity and related diseases, and common illnesses. 
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In terms of contextual factors which influence these behaviours and outcomes, it was 
seen that government departments, the organisation, customers and the workers union all 
have a role in shaping the context which influences heavy vehicle driver safety. Further, it 
was seen that a number of road environment and work environment factors also influence 
safety. With regards to cultural factors identified within previous research, the fact that 
previous research was not explicitly aiming to identify cultural beliefs, attitudes and values 
limits the ability to draw significant conclusions. Whilst it could be argued that previous 
research has not identified any cultural factors, a number of studies have identified trends in 
attitudes, beliefs and values which influenced safety-related decisions. For this reason, a 
number of potential cultural traits were identified within the existing literature.  
In terms of the general limitations of Study One, the number of papers identified could 
be argued to appear relatively low. Whilst there was a significant amount of grey literature, 
such as government reports and government-funded research, there was less peer-reviewed 
literature to examine. Further, many of the databases originally searched were ill designed to 
adequately limit search results and were not practical for use within the study. For example, 
Google Scholar returned thousands of results and, though some of the results on the first 
couple of pages appeared to be unique to Google Scholar, an inability to apply any relevant 
filters on the results prevented this database from being practically useful. Thus there were 
some limitations in the number of papers identified and potentially significant past research 
may have been left out of the current review. However, as the second two studies examined 
these factors within the industry, the potential for missed research in the first study does not 
significantly reduce the validity of these findings for the current research. In terms of the first 
aim of the current study, further information would only serve to strengthen the suitability of 
the current framework to the heavy vehicle industry by identifying further factors. Study One, 
however, may have been limited in its ability to comprehensively address aim B. 
Chapter 11: Discussion, Conclusions and Moving Forward 459 
 
11.3.2. Study Two 
Study Two consisted of a series of 30 interviews with key industry stakeholders, 
including government personnel, managers, drivers, and representatives from industry 
associated groups such as the Australian Trucking Association. The purpose of these 
interviews was to identify major contextual and cultural factors which had eluded previous 
research and to identify the best approach to exploring the effect of culture on safety within 
the heavy vehicle industry. 
Throughout the interviews a number of additional factors were identified which did not 
appear within the systematic review (see Chapter 5). Thus, in regards to aim C of the current 
research, Study Two identified a number of factors previously not identified in the literature, 
each of which may serve as a vital focus of research regarding the effect of culture on safety. 
In terms of behaviours and outcomes, there was a significant degree of overlap between 
Studies One and Two, and the only new factors that were identified were the extension of 
speeding to include inappropriate speeds below the posted speed limit, and the additional 
identification of anxiety and stress as an outcome. Additional contextual factors included a 
number of industrial groups and affiliations, which also encompassed the previously 
identified workers union, the contracting organisation which serves as an additional customer 
to subcontractors, and the notion of a temporal context comprised of the past state of the 
industry. Further, whilst other vehicles had been identified by Study One as being a 
component of the road environment, it was deemed necessary to disaggregate other vehicles 
into a separate factor, entitled the general public, due to the additional influences of electoral 
power and public perception of the industry.  
Regarding cultural factors, again it can only be stated that the identified factors were 
‘potential’ due to the relatively lower representation of drivers within the interview sample. 
Whilst managers and industrial affiliates may have a great understanding of heavy vehicle 
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drivers, it is questionable whether their opinions on the shared beliefs, attitudes and values 
can be truly considered representative of the culture of drivers. Additionally, due to the wide 
scope of the interviews with participants sampled from across the industry, it is difficult to 
know whether factors identified were unique to subsections of the industry or could be 
applied broadly. Nonetheless, when combining the potential cultural factors identified within 
Study Two with those identified within Study One, it was possible to broadly categorise the 
potential factors. The cultural factors identified throughout the first two studies could be 
categorised as beliefs about the general public, beliefs and attitudes towards enforcement and 
regulations, the notion of an ‘old school’ subculture, the value of autonomy and the lifestyle 
of trucking, beliefs and attitudes towards money, attitudes toward work, attitudes toward 
safety and risk, attitudes towards family and friends, and beliefs and attitudes regarding the 
organisation. 
In regards to aim D of the current research, Chapter 5, section 5.3, explored a number 
of findings from Study Two which were used to determine the best approach to exploring the 
influence of culture on safety within the heavy vehicle industry. It was found throughout the 
interviews that there was significant heterogeneity within the industry. Despite previous 
suggestions that drivers may identify themself with a broader road culture rather than with 
their individual organisations, many of the differences within the industry were linked with 
organisational factors such as the size of the organisation and the location of the depot, load-
related factors such as the distance and type of goods are carried, and the size of the truck. 
Given that the size of trucks used and many of the load-related factors are determined by the 
organisation for which the driver works, it appeared evident that organisations could serve as 
a vital focal point for Study Three. Thus, these results suggested that the use of case studies, 
aimed as sampling subsections of the industry by examining individual organisations, was the 
best approach to address the final aim of the current research. 
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Prior to moving forward to the results of Study Three a number of general limitations 
should be mentioned with regards to Study Two. First, as this study was comprised 
completely of interviews many limitations common to qualitative research apply to Study 
Two. The results of these interviews are largely based on the opinion of interviewees. Though 
well informed due to their status as stakeholders within the industry, the information may be 
incomplete or biased. This is particularly the case due to the inability of interviews to directly 
measure the relationship between the factors identified and behaviours or outcomes. Further, 
the relatively low representation of drivers within the sample population may further bias the 
results, as the factors which managers and government personnel see as relevant to driver 
behaviour may not align with the factors that would be identified by drivers. Conversely, the 
high number of managers present within the sample may have a biasing effect, as managers 
may be less likely to recognise their own involvement in the unsafe actions performed by 
their drivers. Lastly, the biases of the researcher can play a significant role in qualitative 
research, as the researcher is required to identify meaning within the words of participants. 
A brief note should also be made regarding the potential for censorship of negative 
information to provide socially acceptable responses which may not align with reality. Due to 
the number of government regulations governing safety, and that the project was funded by 
government departments, participants may have opted not to share negative information 
which they felt could have led to punishment. This issue was not overly problematic within 
Study Two, however, as much of the information retrieved was presented in a third person 
perspective and negative information was typically provided about ‘others’. Some of this 
information may have been actually relevant to the study participants, and not simply other 
members of the industry, but as it was typically presented in a very negative manner it did not 
appear to have been censored to appear more positive. Conversely, however, data gained 
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which genuinely related to a third party may have been, in part, conjecture and thus should be 
interpreted with caution.  
In order to reduce the effect of these limitations two key approaches were used. Firstly, 
the use of grounded theory analysis techniques, in which themes are identified from multiple 
sources, reduced the effect of individual biases. Additionally, the use of two researchers for 
the analysis of interview transcripts reduced the possibility of researcher bias, as alternative 
interpretations could be considered and discussed. In order to reduce censorship of 
information participants were informed of rigorous confidentiality, in which all the collected 
data was de-identified prior to analysis and any presentation of results. Given that the purpose 
of Study Two was to identify major factors that were missed in previous research and to 
identify the best approach for Study Three, ensuring the highest validity within this study was 
not necessary. The distinction of ‘major’ for the factors which eluded previous research 
highlights that the key importance was to identify potential gaps in past research which 
should be examined within Study Three. Whilst some of the factors highlighted by Study 
Two may have been the result of biased information, they still served to identify factors 
worth investigating. Further, the sheer degree of overlap between Studies One and Two 
provides confidence in the reliability of the findings. 
With regards to aim D, whilst it was important to identify the best approach to Study 
Three, the findings regarding the heterogeneity of the industry served primarily as a warning 
to ensure that Study Three was not confounded by a lack of homogeneity. Thus, even if this 
level of heterogeneity was incorrect or exaggerated, the choice to allow the perceived 
heterogeneity to guide the sample selection of Study Three will not limit the findings of this 
study. If Study Three was to find no differences within different subsections of the industry, 
it could be argued that there may be a broad industry-wide culture. Conversely, if major 
differences were present, the choice of case studies will enable the results of Study Three to 
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be interpreted with due caution. Thus, whilst there were a number of limitations to Study 
Two which may have led to biased results, these limitations do not pose a significant problem 
for the interpretation of results.  
11.3.3. Study Three 
The final aim of the current research was to examine how interactions between cultural 
and contextual factors affect safety in the heavy vehicle industry. Following on from the 
results of Study Two, it was determined that the best approach to investigating these 
interactions was to conduct case studies with organisations chosen to sample the perceived 
heterogeneity of the industry. This approach forms a collective case study, in which multiple 
cases are examined not out of intrinsic interest, but rather to sample a broader whole. In this 
instance, the three chosen organisations were selected due to a combination of convenience 
(that is, the need for organisations that are willing to participate) and due to the differences 
between each organisation that aligned with the key sources of variation identified within 
Study Two. A detailed summary of the selected organisations can be found in Chapter 3 
(section 3.2.3.4.3) along with a table demonstrating the differences between each 
organisation. As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.3.4.2) the primary methods of data 
collection within the case studies were based upon the ethnographic method, primarily 
consisting of interviews and participant observations.  
Whilst document analysis is a common method employed within ethnography, the 
sheer degree of data and the extent of consensus between sources within each organisation 
rendered document analysis unnecessary. Whilst driver’s manuals were provided by each 
organisation, they were primarily used simply as an additional source to clarify what was 
meant by participants who referred to specific policies and practices and to confirm the 
method of employment used within each company. Further information that could be drawn 
from the provided documents was solely of a policy or procedural nature. This information 
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was unnecessary as managers described the relevant policies in detail. It was also potentially 
irrelevant, as the actual practices associated with policy enforcement within an organisation 
may not directly align with the written procedures and the perception of procedures may be 
more relevant to driver behaviour than official procedure statements. 
The data that was collected was analysed using a grounded theory analysis approach 
(see section 3.2.2), consisting of open coding in which data is coded into major categories or 
factors, axial coding in which subcategories are identified and the relationships between these 
categories is explored, and selective coding in which the relationships between categories and 
a key theme are identified. It could be argued that the current research is not ‘true’ grounded 
theory, in that a framework of safety culture was developed prior to commencing the 
research. However, this was a necessary step to ensure that the findings of this research were 
truly valid to the first purpose of the current research, namely to identify the effect of culture 
on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. Thus the grounded component of the current research 
was not to form a theory of safety culture, but to identify what specific factors formed the 
broader components of the framework (context, culture, behaviour and outcomes) within the 
target industry. In this sense, the current research is inductive in approach.  
Due to the need to adhere to an existing framework of safety culture, the interviews and 
observations were in part guided by the findings of Studies One and Two. Thus information 
which was relevant to the factors identified in the previous studies was given particular 
attention and sought out where possible. However, as much of the data obtained naturally 
aligned with the findings of Studies One and Two, the researcher was able to focus on 
ensuring that any further information was sought. This largely was achieved by approaching 
the interviews and observations in an open manner, allowing participants to share information 
that they believed was relevant to safety, rather than guiding the participant towards existing 
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preconceptions. Nonetheless, when passing reference was made to apparently relevant 
factors, the researcher encouraged the participants to further expand upon these comments.  
The data analysis for the case studies was conducted using the software program 
NVivo. During the open coding aspect of the data analysis, collected data was coded as either 
sources of contextual influence (e.g. government departments, the organisation), culture 
(broadly at this stage), or driver factors (for individual factors, see Appendix A). Due to the 
requirement for factors to be linked with behaviours and outcomes, the transcripts were 
simultaneously coded according to the relevant behavioural or outcome category (e.g. crash, 
fatigue, loading, musculoskeletal injuries). The results of this coding led to the main sections 
found within Chapters 7 to10. Following this initial open coding, each of the existing coded 
factors was further analysed for subcategory themes. Each of these subcategories was 
discussed in detail within the relevant chapters. For example, within the organisation 
(Chapter 7) data was coded into a number of subcategories including safety management 
(7.4) and general employee management (7.3). Within each of these subcategories a number 
of further subcategories could be identified (e.g. within general employee management there 
were initial training and inductions (7.3.3), ongoing training (7.3.4), and payment (7.3.6) 
etc.). Lastly, Chapter 10 was the result of selective coding, identifying the manner in which 
each of the identified factors was related to specific safety outcomes. 
Whilst the key focus of Study Three was to examine the interactions between factors 
and the effect they have on safety, it was necessary to first detail the factors identified in 
order to discuss these interactions. Thus, there was a significant degree of attention devoted 
to explaining the identified factors through Chapters 7 to 9. However, the key findings of 
Study Three, that is, how Study Three has addressed aim E, can be primarily found in 
Chapter 10 where the effect of interactions between contextual, cultural and individual 
factors on specific behaviours was discussed. 
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11.3.3.1. Overview of Study Three findings 
It would not be possible to provide a complete overview of the findings of Study Three 
within the current chapter, however, a number of key findings should be noted. The results of 
Study Three were presented over Chapters 7 to 10. Chapter 7 examined the role of the 
organisation in influencing safety within the studied organisations. Studies One and Two had 
identified that general organisation characteristics, employee management practices and 
specific safety management practices had an influence on safety behaviours and outcomes. 
Within the case studies, general organisational characteristics were already outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 6 and formed the basis of selection for Study Three. Thus, whilst the 
influence of these factors was evident throughout the study, they did not receive specific 
attention. Employee management practices and specific safety management practices were 
again identified as having an affect on safety, though where Study One and Two emphasised 
the differences between good and bad practices, Study Three simply sought to examine the 
practices that were occurring in the studied organisations and the influence that these had on 
safety. 
Chapter 8 focussed on the remaining identified contextual factors. An additional level 
of influence was discovered, referred to as the influence of national and global climate. It was 
found that economic conditions, employee availability and even national cultural traits 
influenced safety through applying financial pressure, limiting the ability of organisations to 
choose suitable employees and shaping individual behaviour respectively. Regarding 
government departments, the essential mechanisms through which government departments 
influence safety were found to match with the results of Studies One and Two, but a number 
of specific departments and policies were identified which influenced safety in the studied 
organisations. Regarding the general public, the research did not find any direct affect of 
public perception and their electoral power over governments on safety. However, a number 
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of issues were identified with members of the general public in terms of the manner in which 
they drive, particularly around trucks. Though the effect of cars on the road could be 
considered a road environment factor, as it was in Study One, the degree of information 
obtained, especially regarding the lack of education about truck limitations, warranted 
specific attention and thus the general public remained as a specific level of influence. 
Similarly to the influence of government departments, the mechanisms of influence did not 
differ much from the earlier studies, though a number of specific policies and enforcement 
techniques and demands and delays were identified.  
The previous two studies identified a number of organisations, labelled as industrial 
groups and affiliations, which influenced safety. These organisations included the transport 
workers union, a number of accreditation bodies, and organisations that provided external 
safety guidelines. Within the studied organisations, however, the workers union and external 
guidelines, though mentioned, were not found to have a direct influence on safety. 
Conversely, accreditation schemes received significant attention and were seen to have large 
impacts on safety, so only accreditation schemes remained in the model for the studied 
organisations. Another additional level was also discovered, termed the broader heavy 
vehicle industry, where members of other transport companies were found to influence 
safety. It was found that industry-wide cultural values, assistance offered between 
organisations, competition and direct driver-driver interactions all had an influence on safety. 
This was either directly on driver behaviour or through altering the level of risk via the 
organisation for which the driver works. 
Lastly, regarding environmental and situational factors, the previous studies had 
identified the road and work environment as separate influences. With exception to 
passengers and health care access, each of these factors was identified within the case studies, 
though in further detail. Generally it was found that road design and condition, truck design 
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and limitations, environmental conditions, and factors related to the type of load being carried 
influenced safety. The absence of passengers being identified as a relevant is to be expected 
given each of the organisations studies had policies dictating passengers. For that matter, 
during all of the observations the researcher was the passenger and it was difficult to 
determine what effect the researcher’s presence may or may not have had. Further, due to the 
requirements of certain accreditation schemes which each organisation was a part of, drivers 
receive regular medical examinations. Thus, the current sample of organisations was not able 
to identify whether many other drivers find health care access a difficulty. 
It can be generally stated, with regards to contextual influences on safety, that Study 
Three provided significant depth and detail regarding the context surrounding drivers within 
the studied organisations. There were some differences between the findings of Study Three 
and Studies One and Two. However, the purpose of Study Three was to explore how 
contextual and cultural influences interact to influence behaviour in the three chosen 
organisations, rather than to provide an industry-wide model. Thus, these differences are 
simply a reflection of what was important within the studied organisations. Further, studies 
One and Two were somewhat hypothetical in nature, examining more general possibilities of 
factors to consider, whereas Study Three examined factors which were shown to be important 
for safety in the studied organisations. 
With regards to cultural traits, the traits outlined in Chapter 9 were identified through 
an inductive approach. Though previous research had identified attitudes, beliefs and values 
which influenced safety, and there were a number of similar factors identified within the 
stakeholder interviews, these findings were of a ‘potential’ nature due to a lack of previous 
approaches specifically targeting the identification of cultural factors. Within Study Three 
themes were identified through grounded method analysis techniques, with open coding 
consisting of identifying data as relevant to culture, axial coding consisting of identifying 
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specific cultural traits, and selective coding consisting of identifying the relationships 
between these traits and with behaviours and outcomes. After the axial coding phase was 
completed 20 cultural traits were identified. For ease of access and understanding, and due to 
the apparent similarity, these traits were presented using headings taken from Schein’s 
(Schein, 1990) ‘underlying dimensions of culture’. Whilst the relationship between the 
findings of Study Three and Schein’s dimensions was unintended, it serves to validate the 
focal topics of the identified traits. Further, Schein’s dimensions provide a useful organising 
structure with which to group thematically related cultural traits. Thus the majority of 
identified traits could be categorised as relating to the industry and organisation’s relationship 
to its environment, the nature of human activity, the nature of reality and truth, the nature of 
time, the nature of human nature, or the nature of human relationships. Additionally, 
however, a small selection of cultural traits appeared to be largely based and dependent upon 
other traits. These traits were identified separately as second or third order traits. For 
example, the second order trait of ‘luck and the perceived likelihood of an incident’, appeared 
to be comprised of a combination of the value placed on safety and on experiential and 
narrative learning.  
The final component of the case studies, presented in Chapter 10, explored the 
relationship of each of the previously discussed factors with specific behaviours and 
outcomes. Generally, it can be seen from the analysis of specific behaviours that safety is a 
complex issue, with a large number of factors contributing to many behaviours. The first 
behavioural category discussed, fatigue, was influenced by almost every one of the identified 
factors, except a small selection of cultural traits. Conversely, some behaviours were only 
influenced by a small number of factors. For example, seatbelt use appeared to be determined 
solely by the perceived likelihood of injury or punishment resulting from lack of use, which 
was drawn from the experience of drivers and the stories they have heard from others. This 
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final component of the case studies therefore addressed aim E by identifying the complex 
interactions of multiple contextual and cultural factors which influence safety. 
11.3.3.2. Limitations to the findings of Study Three 
As with Study Two, the third study was comprised completely of qualitative data and 
thus the same limitations that were present in Study Two also apply to Study Three. 
Additionally, due to the reliance on qualitative data, the relationships drawn between the 
identified factors must be interpreted with caution. In the absence of quantitative validation, it 
cannot be stated that the relationships between factors and behaviour have been demonstrated 
in a positivistic sense. Thus the relationships which were identified represent those which 
were either perceived by participants, or interpreted by the researcher from the interview and 
observation data.  
The results of Study Three were based primarily on the expressed opinions of 
participants and data gained from direct observation, which is subject to researcher bias. 
Conversely to Study Two, however, as the case studies sought to examine the influences that 
were present solely within the investigated organisations, the opinion of members of the 
studied organisations is extremely valuable. Whilst it is important to recognise that the views 
of participants may have been biased by a desire to convey specific aspects of safety, where 
the participants shared their own positive and negative behaviour, and the contextual 
influences which shaped it, there is likely to be a high level of validity. It is worth noting, 
however, that there may have been a significant degree of negative information which 
participants opted not to share, either out of a desire to appear in a given way or out of fear of 
potential repercussions. 
The potential for the censoring of information in this way was partly countered through 
rigorous confidentiality that was ensured to participants. Participants were consistently 
informed of the degree of confidentiality that they would receive. This confidentiality 
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included the guarantee that the research team and transcriber alone would have access to the 
recordings and transcripts of interviews, as well as the researcher’s observation notes. 
Additionally, participants were ensured that at no point during the presentation or 
dissemination of results would the data be presented in such a way that any government or 
organisational member could identify the organisation or individuals in question. Despite 
this, it was evident that some participants were hesitant to discuss certain matters, particularly 
when discussing substance use, as noted by the manager who requested that the recording be 
ceased.  
Due to the highly implicit nature of culture, in that the underlying shared beliefs, 
assumptions and values may not be directly expressed, there is a significant need for the 
researcher to interpret the information that is gained. Thus, whilst the data regarding 
contextual influences will have a high degree of validity, the identified cultural traits could be 
argued to be somewhat subjective due to the researcher posing a significant limitation to the 
identification of cultural traits. Both this limitation and the general limitation of biased 
individual responses were managed through the requirement of responses from multiple 
participants to form a theme, and through the assistance of additional members of the 
research team in interpreting results. Further, it is important to recognise that ethnography, 
through the use of participant observation and interviews, is the fundamental approach to 
investigating the culture of a population of people and, thus, whilst there are certain 
weaknesses inherent to this form of data, it is the most trusted technique to the initial 
exploration of a culture. However, future research is necessary to further validate the findings 
of Study Three with regards to the culture of the industry and organisations in question. 
A final limitation to Study Three can be found in the selection of cases. Whilst every 
effort was made to sample organisations that represented different subsection of the industry, 
there were difficulties associated with gaining participation from organisations. For this 
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reason the organisations which were selected were in part selected out of convenience, or 
simply the fact that they were willing to participate, along with meeting the requirements set 
out by the findings of Study Two. As outlined in Table 2, section 6.1, the organisations 
selected were either small (less than 10 trucks) or medium (approximately 50 trucks) and 
based in either a capital city or regional centre. Further, each organisation carried different 
cargo, typically over different distances, and though each organisation used semi-trailers and 
B Doubles, Company C also used road trains, whilst Company B also used a number of rigid 
trucks. The weaknesses in the sample include the absence of larger transport organisations, 
the absence of organisations based in truly rural regions, and an absence of certain goods 
types, such as dangerous goods or liquids. Further, whilst each organisation was unique in 
some way (Company A was the only general goods company and had the longest regular 
transport routes; Company B was the only company to carry metal and over-dimension 
products and the only organisation which used rigid trucks; and Company C was the only 
small, regional or livestock-carrying organisation) there was significant overlap between 
many of the characteristics with at least one of the other two organisations. Thus, the ability 
to draw conclusions regarding the broader application of the findings may be somewhat 
limited.  
11.3.3.3. Study Three conclusions 
Despite the limitations inherent within Study Three, a number of conclusions can still 
be drawn. Firstly, as is the purpose of ethnography, Study Three provided a detailed 
description, using the industry’s own language (phrases and descriptions, as opposed to the 
English language), of the culture, context and behaviours that relate to safety within three 
heavy vehicle industry organisations. Through the use of grounded theory data analysis 
techniques, the culture and context were able to be categorised into a series of specific 
factors, which were seen to be linked by members of the industry with safety-related 
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behaviour and outcomes. Whilst there were contextual differences between each organisation, 
and differences in the prevalence and valency of cultural traits, many were common between 
the organisations. Thus, the findings and figures presented throughout Chapters 7 to 10 
represent a synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture within the studied organisations. 
This partially addressed the aim of Study Three to examine how interactions between cultural 
and contextual factors affect safety in the heavy vehicle industry. However, the use of three 
specific organisations may limit the ability of these findings to apply more broadly within the 
industry, and the absence of quantitative data limits the extent to which these factors can be 
claimed to actually have an effect upon safety. 
11.4. RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS 
The aims of the current research were to: (1) explore the influence of culture on safety 
within the heavy vehicle industry; and (2) return to the theoretical roots of safety culture to 
provide a theoretically grounded conceptualisation and framework of safety culture. Thus, the 
current research has implications to both safety within the heavy vehicle industry and to the 
field of safety culture. These implications are discussed below. 
11.4.1. Implications for safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
The current research represents the first major study which has explored safety culture 
within the heavy vehicle industry. Whilst the first two studies were of high methodological 
importance, it is the findings of Study Three which have the greatest implications to safety 
within the heavy vehicle industry. Each of the identified factors has implications for safety 
within the heavy vehicle industry, though only a few key factors will be discussed here. First, 
however, a number of general implications are important to consider. Though Study Three 
only examined three organisations, and the findings therein may be somewhat limited to the 
studied organisations, there was a significant degree of overlap. General organisational 
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factors such as the type of goods carried and the location of the depot appeared to have 
broader effects on safety within the organisations. Of particular note, there were differences 
in the number and type of government regulations associated with the load being carried. For 
example, as Company C carried livestock they were subject to animal welfare regulations. 
Again focussing on company C, being based in a regional area and conducting significant 
proportions of their travel on private roads leading into and out of grazier properties, meant 
that hat there was less interaction with policing and members of the general public on the 
road. Further, each organisation and customer appeared to have significant differences in 
policies, requirements and even employment methods. Whilst the interactions with members 
of the general public is beyond the control of either government departments (save for 
designing roads such that heavy vehicles are separated from other vehicles), customers or the 
organisation, many of the other differences are easily amenable to change. The policies and 
procedures set out by these groups can be changed relatively easily, if the groups in question 
should choose to do so, though of course government regulations are time consuming to 
change and may have broader implications to consider. 
Conversely, as was discussed within Chapter 2, culture can be very difficult to change. 
However, there was evidence of a high level of similarities between the organisations. The 
relevance of the specific cultural traits will be discussed further below, yet it is important to 
note that many cultural traits were common to each organisation. Given the deliberate 
selection of organisations which sampled the heterogeneity of the industry, it seems likely 
that, to some extent, the shared cultural traits may be common throughout the industry. Thus 
there is some evidence for an industry wide culture that is comprised of these traits.  
There is uncertainty regarding the extent to which cultural traits can be deliberately 
changed. However, as many of the identified contextual factors can be changed, a number of 
potential avenues for intervention can be identified within the findings of this research. 
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Firstly, it may be beneficial to determine a number of ‘best practices’ within the industry 
which are suited to the existing culture. Secondly, contextual factors and practices of 
customers and organisations which reduce safety should be targeted for change. Finally, 
future interventions should be design to suit the culture of the industry to ensure the greatest 
impact on safety and minimise resistance.  
11.4.1.1. Best practices 
Whilst further research will be required to truly identify, and quantitatively validate, 
best practices within the industry, the current research highlighted the following 
organisational and customer practices as potential ‘best practices’. Starting with the 
organisation, many of the practices employed by Company B appear to have the greatest 
safety impact. Organisations aiming to minimise incidents should conduct thorough 
interviews, screening and reference checks. Further, new employees should be required to 
undergo a probationary period during which both trainers and other drivers accompany the 
new employee to conduct on-the-job training and assessment of skills, attitudes and 
knowledge. There is a requirement for thorough inductions, and initial and ongoing training. 
Training should be conducted on a regular basis and should incorporate serious incident 
reports and stories of incidents that have resulted from failed compliance. Drivers should be 
rostered both according to legal and individual requirements, and the rosters should be 
flexible and subject to daily fitness for duty examinations. Further, drivers should be paid an 
hourly rate, rather than paid by the day, trip or distance travelled.  
Regarding specific safety management practices, there is a need for ongoing regular 
communication with drivers. Additionally, technology should be designed and implemented 
which reduces the risk of injury or incidents, by removing potential hazards. Organisations 
should also seek regular feedback from customers regarding their driver performance, and 
conduct regular audits of paperwork completed by drivers with accompanied objective 
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examination of the accuracy of these forms. Satellite tracking should be utilised by 
organisations to monitor fatigue management compliance, speeding and driving to the 
conditions. This would require satellite tracking with the relevant posted speed limits in-built. 
Lastly, though a complete listing of policies and enforcement cannot be presented here, there 
is a need for stringent monitoring of policies and fair but serious punishment. 
Regarding best customer practices, the following can be identified from the results of 
Study Three. Customers should require prospective transport companies to be accredited by 
both TruckSafe and NHVAS fatigue management at a minimum. Customers should conduct 
their own audits of transport companies and provide safety guidelines to the organisation. 
Customers should require all heavy vehicle drivers to undergo inductions, and enforce strict 
safety procedures and policies. Customers should process heavy vehicle loading and 
unloading in a speedy manner to reduce delays. If delays are inevitable, customers should 
provide adequate rest facilities for the driver to use and should provide information regarding 
the delays to the organisation whilst simultaneously keeping a record of delays which have 
occurred. Lastly, though timeslots are beneficial to planning the loading and unloading of 
multiple vehicles, these time slots should provide significant additional time to prevent any 
pressure on the driver to drive unsafely to arrive. 
11.4.1.2. Unsafe contextual factors 
Regarding unsafe contextual factors and customer and organisation practices which 
should be the target of change, relatively few were identified. Starting with government 
departments, there was a significant need for greater enforcement. This is difficult due to the 
resources associated with enforcement, however, it was evident that many regulations are too 
easily broken without sufficient monitoring and enforcement to punish breaches. Specific 
examples include the weaknesses associated with point-to-point speed cameras which are too 
distantly spaced to prevent drivers from speeding to make up for delays, insufficient 
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enforcement of COR legislation, and insufficient monitoring of seatbelt use. Additionally, as 
identified by the manager of company C, it is important to prioritise the stringency of 
legislation. It was argued by the manager of Company C that it was easier to justify breaches 
in fatigue management than breaches in animal welfare. In crudest terms, this effectively 
means that cattle are valued more highly than truck drivers. Undoubtedly this is an issue 
which was never intended to occur but must be addressed. Finally, there was also evidence 
that the current licensing requirements for heavy vehicle drivers are insufficient and drivers 
with no relevant experience are permitted to drive many vehicles.  
Whilst best addressed through government departments, there is also a need to improve 
the manner in which cars drive around trucks. Members of the general public were commonly 
viewed as the single biggest danger to members of the studied organisations. It was believed 
that this stemmed from a lack of understanding of the design and limitations of heavy 
vehicles. Whilst this is unavoidable to some extent, in that without having driven a truck it is 
difficult to understand these limitations, government regulations should target the manner in 
which cars drive around trucks. For example, similarly to the manner in which tailgating is 
punishable, ‘jumping in front of’ a truck should be given a similar status as it is equally 
dangerous. Further, education campaigns should be directed at the general public concerning 
how to safely drive around heavy vehicles. At the customer and organisational levels, it is 
difficult to identify specific problems as it was typically a lack of sufficient action that 
appeared problematic. Adherence to the suggested best practices could remove many 
problems, but two specific points should be made. First, there is a need to reduce the pressure 
placed on drivers through rostering, timeslots, and direct demands. Second, payment methods 
which remunerate drivers based on a daily, trip, or distance rate should also be removed. 
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11.4.1.3. Designing interventions which suit the culture of the industry 
Regarding the identified cultural traits, quantitative validation of the extent to which 
they are truly shared throughout the industry is required. However, if the traits which were 
identified within the studied organisations are found to be in common, interventions should 
be designed with these traits in mind. The following discussion outlines the shared traits 
which were identified and how interventions can be shaped to work with the cultural traits. 
Though the source of uniqueness differed between organisations, members of each 
company tended to view themselves and their co-workers as unique in some respect. This had 
the potential to reduce the perceived legitimacy of external information and interventions. 
Whilst it is true that there were a number of reasons why the organisations or industry 
subsection did differ from other organisations or industries, many safety related issues were 
found to be common. Thus, future interventions must be designed with an awareness of the 
relevant differences between subsections of the industry. Additionally, interventions should 
be presented in such a manner as to support this perceived uniqueness. For example, whilst 
fatigue is common for all heavy vehicle drivers, members of Company C felt that the use of 
private roads and transitioning to sealed public road reduced the impact of fatigue. In this 
case, rather than simply educate livestock carriers in the same manner as other transport 
companies, an emphasis could be placed on the degree of physical stress from driving on 
rough surfaces and the need to be alert due to increased traffic on public roads. Simply 
providing separate guideline statements for differing subsets of the industry, potentially with 
quotes and examples from the relevant group, may increase the perception that the 
uniqueness of these groups has been considered and accounted for in the creation of 
interventions. 
Regarding the collection of traits categorised under the nature of human activity, a 
number of suggestions can be made. Education which emphasises the fact that safe work 
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results in higher long-term productivity (for example, that a well rested driver is able to work 
harder) could reduce the negative impact of the value placed on hard work. The value placed 
on fairness, and the resultant decreased commitment to organisations and regulations which 
are deemed unfair, suggest a need to consider whether government regulations should be 
more equally applied to other members of the general public. Whilst it is difficult, time 
consuming, and potentially much higher in cost, every effort should be made to reduce the 
implication that the heavy vehicle industry is viewed more negatively or even criminally. 
Whilst the exact means of specific enforcements could differ, members of the industry may 
value from having similar regulations in other industries explained. For example, many 
organisations are required to ensure that workers who have worked over hours have 
alternative means of transport. Thus, whilst fatigue regulations are viewed as unfair, 
explaining the manner in which similar precautions are taken for others may reduce the 
feeling that transport drivers have been treated unfairly. The trait entitled ‘hold you line’ was 
absent from company C, due to a lower interaction with other vehicles. Further, as this trait 
primarily applied to avoiding no-fault crashes, there is little that can be done to manage this 
aspect of the culture. Further, it could be argued that the decision to not risk one’s life in 
order to avoid a crash that is caused by someone else is actually an ethically sound decision. 
This, along with the manner in which members of the general public drive around trucks, 
highlights a major need to better educate the public regarding safety around trucks. Given 
that the vast majority of car driver and passenger fatalities resulting from crashes with trucks 
are the fault of the car driver (Driscoll, 2013), it is simply a truth that truck drivers don’t kill 
members of the general public, car drivers do. Thus, there is a need for general-public-
centred truck safety initiatives. Lastly, the fact that truck drivers will go to great lengths to 
improve safety highlights the fact that effective communication of the safety benefits and 
risks associated with specific behaviours is essential. Throughout each of the specifically 
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discussed behavioural categories, this value consistently influenced safe outcomes. In many 
ways it could be argued that this is the single most important finding of the current research; 
however, to adequately use this trait, effective communication is required. 
The need for effective communication highlights the importance of the first cultural 
trait categorised under the nature of truth and reality. Drivers from all companies appeared to 
hold the assumption that knowledge gained from personal experience and heard stories was 
more accurate and reliable than ‘cold’ information. Though it would appear intuitive to 
suggest that government departments and organisations should, therefore, utilise true 
accounts of the consequences of behaviour (which appeared effective within company B), 
there is a need to further investigate this technique. It is important to identify the type of 
stories which have the most impact on truck drivers, the most effective means of 
communicating those stories, and any factors relating to the source of this information which 
affect the perceived legitimacy of the stories. It may be the case that the same accounts 
presented by government personnel, managers and other drivers may be differentially 
accepted. Further, drivers may need to have already formed a trusting relationship with the 
individual who shares the account. Nonetheless, the use of true stories, which represent what 
incident statistics have shown to be true, appears to be a promising manner in which to 
increase the perceived likelihood of an incident and, thus, due to the value placed on safety, 
lead to safer behaviours. Regarding the emphasis placed on common sense, however, it is 
important to identify where common sense may be counter-productive to safety. The 
increasing requirement of government and accreditation bodies for safety to be common 
knowledge rather than common sense, as noted by members of company C, is disliked by 
members of the industry. However, this appears a valid means of reducing a reliance on 
common sense which may or may not be reliable within individuals. 
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The value placed on time by members of the industry can be counter-productive for 
safety in that drivers may take shortcuts to save time. Interventions should be designed which 
require the least amount of time taken for compliance with maximum effect. However, this 
may be more difficult than it sounds, and thus identifying safety interventions which require 
other organisational members to take some of the time burdens away from drivers may be 
beneficial. For example, pre-trip vehicle inspections were commonly not completed due to 
the amount of time taken to accurately inspect the vehicle. Thus removing the requirement 
for drivers who are not ‘on-the-road’ to inspect vehicles, by instead requiring maintenance 
personnel to conduct inspections, would result in no additional ‘required cost’ for 
organisations (assuming the mechanical team take the same amount of time to complete an 
inspection as a driver would if they were to complete it correctly) but would ensure that 
inspections are correctly conducted. Additionally, it is important to note that the manner in 
which drivers are paid influenced the extent to which time was valued. Put simply, no 
organisation should be permitted to pay drivers by the kilometre travelled or a total trip wage. 
Payment by the kilometre translates directly to a need to minimise trip time by speeding, 
taking shortcuts during inspections and completion of required forms, and resting solely as 
legally required rather than when fatigued. Whilst regulations banning payment by the 
kilometre may be disliked by members of the industry, and could result in difficulties 
associated with price quoting as delays would need to be accounted for when factoring driver 
wages, this is an important step to consider to improve safety. 
Beliefs regarding the nature of human nature may be significantly more difficult to 
account for in the development and implementation of interventions. Though absent from 
company C, members of companies A and B commonly attributed unsafe acts to 
unintentional errors. If these attributions are true, then the implementation of driver feedback 
measures may reduce errors, but such measures may be impossible to implement for non-
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driving tasks. Further, trucks and machinery could be developed in such a way as to require 
certain tasks to be adequately completed, though such measures would likely be overcome 
through non-compliance means if the requirement was not believed to influence safety. For 
example, regulation could require all new trucks to be designed in such a manner as to 
require an engaged seatbelt to operate, however, perhaps in such a situation the seatbelt could 
be fastened underneath the driver to enable the truck to operate without compliance. 
However, the use of such measures would remove the potential for unsafe acts to be blamed 
on unintentional errors in cases where the driver has deliberately failed to comply. Similarly, 
the tendency to blame negative safety events within the industry on the ‘rogue element’ may 
be difficult to counter through education, and thus members of the industry may continue to 
view safety issues as ‘someone else’s’ fault. Finally, the value placed on money and other 
gains has been somewhat discussed when examining the value of time. Further, however, 
many regulations already have associated financial punishments and thus the only way to 
strengthen these regulations would be through more stringent enforcement. Where other 
gains, such as those related to comfort, are involved there may be little that can be done to 
remove these gains and costs. However, it appeared evident that in many situations these 
other gains were a motivation to not comply with rules that were already viewed negatively, 
and thus these other gains may be less relevant than education regarding safety. 
With regards to the nature of human relationships, only the value placed on autonomy 
was clearly shared between organisations. Generally truck drivers appear resistant to any 
management strategies that reduce autonomy. This poses a threat to safety in that drivers can 
be difficult to adequately monitor. Thus interventions aimed at improving safety must be 
designed in a way to provide control over unsafe acts without reducing autonomy beyond that 
which is required. Approaches which encourage driver autonomy to continue in a safe 
manner should be explored. 
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With exception of the ‘go!’ mentality, each of the second and third order traits was 
evident throughout each organisation, though the valence of these traits differed between 
organisations. The perceived likelihood of an incident was one of the most direct influences 
on safety due to the value placed on safety. As previously discussed, it is important to find 
effective means by which to communicate the risks associated with unsafe acts. Further, there 
is a need for education efforts to reduce the perception that incidents are simply bad luck. 
Regarding the belief that many incidents are inevitable and that, therefore, the organisation 
and drivers are limited in their ability to improve safety, there is again a need to better 
educate the industry regarding how to reduce incidents to counter this belief. Due to the 
assumed accuracy of experience and stories, rules and regulations are often viewed as 
irrelevant to safety and thus disliked. When rules are viewed as irrelevant, the typical result is 
that drivers will either comply to avoid punishment, or avoid detection without compliance. 
There is a need to increase the certainty of punishment within the industry, but this however, 
as this would require significant resources to increase monitoring and enforcement, efforts to 
improve compliance through an increased belief in the validity of regulations may be more 
efficient. Lastly, though presented out of order, the belief that drivers hold the key 
responsibility for safety appears to stem from the long-standing autonomy that has existed 
within the industry. With the introduction of chain of responsibility legislation there has been 
an increased onus placed on organisations and customers, thereby removing some of the 
responsibility from drivers. However, as it appears that COR legislation is yet to have been 
sufficiently enforced, there is a risk that drivers are taking less responsibility without an 
increase in responsibility being taken by organisations or customers. Thus, interventions must 
aim to ensure that drivers are still held accountable, yet that organisations and customers do 
not ‘push’ drivers until they refuse to comply. Put simply, due to the manner in which the 
industry has operated in past years, there is a tendency to pressure drivers to work hard under 
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the assumption that the driver will refuse to comply if it is unsafe. Unfortunately, despite 
COR legislation being implemented this behaviour has continued. Thus there is a need to 
target organisations and customers, in a proactive manner, rather than just to prosecute after 
an incident has occurred. 
11.4.1.4. Summary: Implications for safety in the heavy vehicle industry 
From the above discussion it can be seen that the results of the current research have 
major implications regarding safety within the heavy vehicle industry. Through the 
examination of the influence of cultural and contextual factors on safety, a number of 
potential avenues for intervention have been identified. These include the identification of 
potential best practices for organisations and customers, contextual factors which currently 
reduce safety, and means by which future interventions can be designed to be suited to the 
culture of the industry. Regarding the latter, whilst many of the cultural factors had associated 
means by which safety could be improved, the most consistent need was for effective 
communication of the risks associated with unsafe behaviour and the benefits of compliance. 
11.4.2. Implication for the field of safety culture  
The current research has also contributed to the field of safety culture through the 
development and application of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture. As was 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, despite significant attention within the literature in recent 
years, there is significant debate regarding definitions and conceptualisations of safety 
culture. Naevestad (2009) identified two dominant approaches to safety culture within the 
literature, referred to as the interpretive and functionalist approach. The interpretive approach 
to safety culture views safety culture as a series of shared beliefs and values, whereas the 
functionalist approach views it in terms of organisational structures and systems. By 
examining the links between safety culture, organisational culture and traditional views of 
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culture found in the cultural psychology and anthropology literature, it was found that 
traditional conceptualisations of culture could be used to explain the different approaches to 
safety culture. Further, due to the unique strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualisation, 
it was argued that combining these approaches into a single conceptualisation of safety 
culture could allow for a better understanding of safety culture.  
It was argued in section 2.3.5 that this synthesised conceptualisation would enable 
researchers to understand the interactions between both contextual and cultural factors and, 
therefore, understand the complex manner in which safety culture influences safety 
outcomes. Further, it was argued that this synthesised conceptualisation would allow the 
myriad of published research from each of the pre-existing conceptualisations of safety 
culture to be brought together under a single framework, permitting a greater understanding 
of the research and knowledge that has already been gained in this field. Thus, the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture was presented, which represents the first 
major contribution of this research to the field of safety culture. 
Chapter 2 consisted of the theoretical development of this framework, which was then 
applied to the heavy vehicle industry throughout the current research. In addition to verifying 
that the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture was suitable for the heavy vehicle 
industry, Study One further demonstrated the utility of this conceptualisation. Despite an 
absence of previous safety culture research within the heavy vehicle industry, by conducting 
a systematic literature review of health and safety in this industry, a preliminary framework 
of safety culture was developed (see section 4.3). Whilst a number of additional findings 
were made throughout Studies Two and Three which further developed this framework, there 
was a significant degree of overlap between the initial preliminary framework and the 
frameworks developed from the stakeholder interviews and case studies. Whilst Chapter 2 
argued that existing safety culture research could be positioned within the synthesised 
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conceptualisation of safety culture, the findings of Study One, and the congruence this had 
with the findings of Studies Two and Three, demonstrated that the provided conceptualisation 
could be used to provide an approximated model of safety culture from safety research which 
did not seek to explore the effect of culture. This ability to develop a framework from theory 
and literature, rather than investigation, is the second key contribution of the current research 
to the field of safety culture. 
Throughout the case studies a number of key findings were made which have been 
discussed in relation to their implications for safety in the heavy vehicle industry. However, 
when examined in relation to their contribution to the field of safety culture a number of 
further points can be made. As stated in Chapter 10, with the potential exception of seatbelt 
use, every safety behaviour or behavioural category was seen to be influenced by a 
combination of both contextual and cultural factors. Returning to the arguments of Chapters 1 
and 2, previous research within the field of safety culture has tended to emphasise either 
contextual or cultural factors in isolation. The key purpose or argument behind the 
presentation of the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture was that this isolated focus 
was neither necessary nor beneficial, in that culture interacts with the contextual environment 
to produce behaviour. Whilst there is a need for quantitative validation of the findings of 
Study Three, at this stage the evidence supports the need to examine both of these factors and 
the interactions between them. Despite finding effects of both contextual and cultural factors, 
no single behaviour appeared to be entirely explainable solely through contextual or cultural 
factors. Thus it can be argued, assuming quantitative validation verified the current findings, 
that previous conceptualisations of safety culture provide less predictive validity toward 
safety within the heavy vehicle industry than the synthesised conceptualisation. Further, as 
per the implications for safety in the heavy vehicle industry, the synthesised 
conceptualisation appears to provide further avenues to improve safety than either the 
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dominant functionalist or interpretive approaches, which would, respectively, only provide 
either best practices and negative practices to target, or the ability to design interventions to 
match the existing culture (though with less understanding of how contextual factors interact 
with the existing culture). This may further apply to a number of other industries. 
All the previously discussed limitations of the current research can be noted to apply to 
the findings of Studies One, Two and Three with relevance to the field of safety culture. As 
these have been discussed in detail, it is sufficient to restate a couple of key points. Firstly, 
the current research relied heavily upon qualitative data and thus could be biased or 
incomplete. The findings were, however, somewhat validated by the systematic literature 
review which demonstrated that many of the key identified factors had also been identified 
within previous safety research. Whilst a number of approaches were taken to reduce these 
limitations there is still a need for quantitative validation to confirm that each of the identified 
factors does indeed influence safety in the manners discussed.  
Additionally, however, it is worth noting a final limitation unique to the relevance of 
the current research to the field of safety culture. One criticism levelled at traditional views of 
culture found in the anthropology and cultural psychology literature is that many definitions 
of culture are so broad as to lose all predictive validity. Whilst the synthesised 
conceptualisation is not as broad as some of the definitions referred to by critics, it is 
questionable whether the scope of this conceptualisation is ‘all-encompassing’. The inclusion 
of both cultural and contextual factors could be seen to indicate that safety culture includes 
everything except individually held psychological factors. Whilst this is true to some extent, 
the requirement of factors to be linked with safety outcomes reduces the scope of this 
conceptualisation to only those aspects relevant to safety. Further, whilst contextual factors 
were included within the conceptualisations, the true focus of this conceptualisation is on 
cultural traits, and contextual factors are primarily included to explain the mechanisms by 
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which culture influences behaviour. Thus despite the conceptualisation’s apparent all-
inclusiveness, there is a significant level of specificity. Nonetheless, future researchers who 
utilise the synthesised conceptualisation must take seriously the requirement of cultural and 
contextual factors to be relevant to safety, and contextual factors to be relevant to the means 
by which culture influences safety.  
In summary, the current research presents a number of contributions to the field of 
safety culture. First, the research presents a new conceptualisation of safety culture which 
encompasses previous approaches, allowing for a greater understanding of safety culture 
whilst reducing the limitations of existing approaches. Second, this conceptualisation can be 
used to interpret existing research to identify key factors relevant to safety culture within a 
target industry. Third, though there is a need for further research, the current research 
demonstrates that the synthesised conceptualisation appears to provide a greater 
understanding and predictive validity of safety within the heavy vehicle industry (and 
potentially other industries). 
11.5. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Whilst the current research has significant implications for both safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry and for the broader field of safety culture, there is a need for further research 
to expand upon the current contribution. In order for the findings of Study Three to be 
demonstrated to hold predictive validity for safety within the studied organisations, there is a 
need for quantitative validation. This requires the development of quantitative tools to 
measure the identified factors. Once such tools have been designed and assessed for 
reliability and validity, they could be used to statistically verify the relationships between 
these factors and safety outcomes and behaviours. Additionally, however, such tools should 
be developed with an awareness of the importance of individual factors (see Appendix A) as 
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a failure to control for differences between individuals may limit the predictive utility of any 
tool. 
Further, after the validation of findings there is also a need to then apply such tools to a 
larger sample within the industry to confirm that the shared cultural traits within the studied 
organisations are also more broadly shared across the industry. This would confirm whether 
or not there is a common culture within the heavy vehicle industry, thus identifying if the 
suggested means to improve safety within the industry would be beneficial outside of the 
studied organisations. Additionally, should the identified factors and relationships be shown 
to hold under statistical analysis, it will be possible to provide a validated list of best practices 
and negative practices to target for intervention. Interventions which are suited to the culture 
of the industry and organisations should be designed and piloted to examine the efficacy of 
this approach. 
In addition to validating the findings that relate to safety within the heavy vehicle 
industry, statistical validation would benefit the field of safety culture by providing evidence 
for the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture. Further research could also examine 
the difference in predictive validity between the synthesised conceptualisation and the 
interpretive approach to safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry, by examining the 
level of prediction accomplished through cultural traits in isolation within contextual factors. 
Similarly, by comparing prediction between the complete measure and organisational 
contextual factors in isolation, it would be possible to compare the validity of the synthesised 
conceptualisation and the functionalist approach to safety culture in the heavy vehicle 
industry. 
Finally, research should also seek to apply the synthesised conceptualisation of safety 
culture to other industries or target populations. This may require further qualitative research 
to identify the relevant contextual and cultural factors within the target population. Further, 
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due to the general nature of many of the identified cultural traits and their alignment with 
previous organisational culture research, research should examine whether these similar traits 
are found across different industries. It may be the case that many of the identified factors 
represent common dimensions which could be used to compare industries and organisations. 
Separate to future research in safety culture. The results of the case studies can also be 
seen to relate to the social construction of gender and, specifically, masculinity. Hegemonic 
masculinity has been a key area of research within sociology for many years and has been 
historically defined as a “pattern of practices (i.e. things done, not just a set of role 
expectations or an identity) that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue” (p.832; 
Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) indicate that the core 
component of hegemonic masculinity is not specifically the dominance of men over women, 
but the existence of multiple ideals or forms of masculinity which may compete against one 
another for dominance. The Australian heavy vehicle industry has typically been a male 
industry (referring here to the ratio of men to women and not the perceived roles or 
stereotypes of each). When examined with respect to this view of hegemonic masculinity, it 
can be seen that many comments made by study participants were also rich with notions of 
what makes a ‘good bloke’ versus one who is lazy, a stupid man, or even one who complains 
about minor injuries. Barrett (1996) argued that masculinity was most shown to have 
meaning when placed in opposition to an outside group, typically females, and thus the 
‘other’ group is attributed with the opposite characteristics of what makes a good man. In the 
absence of comparisons to female truck drivers it is unclear whether the differing descriptions 
of individuals could be viewed as multiple competing masculinities, or simply as competing 
images of a truck driver. Whilst findings with regards to this direction of study have little 
bearing on the current presence of the identified cultural traits, or their relationship to safety, 
if the industry was to increase its recruitment of females, masculinity-related traits may 
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become less shared and there may be a shift in dominant beliefs, attitudes and values. Future 
research should, therefore, examine the extent to which the cultural traits identified within 
this thesis are more closely tied to industry conceptions of masculinity or what it is to be a 
truck driver. 
11.6. CONCLUSION: SAFETY CULTURE AND THE AUSTRALIAN HEAVY 
VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
 The current research sought to provide a theoretically grounded definition and 
conceptualisation of safety culture and use it to examine the effect of culture on safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry. After examining the literature on safety culture, giving key attention 
to its relationship to organisational culture and thus traditional views of culture, the 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture was presented. Safety culture was defined as 
the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of 
an organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader 
contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety. 
The current research then examined whether this conceptualisation was suited to the heavy 
vehicle industry by conducting a systematic review of health and safety within heavy vehicle 
industries. It was found that a significant number of the factors identified as influencing 
safety in the existing literature could be positioned within the synthesised conceptualisation 
of safety culture. Thus the current research used key stakeholder interviews to confirm the 
findings of past research and identify the best approach to exploring how the interactions 
between cultural and contextual factors influence safety within the Australian heavy vehicle 
industry. Due to the heterogeneity of the industry, it was found that the best approach to 
examining the interactions between culture and context within this industry was to conduct 
case studies of individual organisations. After conducting three such case studies a number of 
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contextual factors and cultural traits were identified, many of which were shared between 
organisations. 
The current research has identified a number of potential ‘best practices’ within the 
industry, along with negative practices which should be reduced. Additionally, based on the 
apparent shared nature of many of the identified cultural traits, a number of guidelines for 
future interventions were provided. External to the heavy vehicle industry, the current 
research has provided a new approach to safety culture which is beneficial in understanding 
existing safety and safety culture research. The current research demonstrated that this 
synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture appears to hold greater explanatory validity 
than previously existing approaches to safety culture. Whilst there is a need for further 
research, the findings of the current research will serve to improve safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry and provide future researchers in the field of safety culture a more adaptable 
conceptualisation of safety culture. 
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A.1  APPENDIX A INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the current research, a number of individual factors were identified which 
were seen to have an influence on safety within the heavy vehicle industry. Whilst these 
individual factors do not align with typical views of safety culture, it is necessary to be aware 
of such factors as they may interact with cultural and contextual factors, thus changing 
behavioural outcomes. Without having an awareness of the relevant individual factors it may 
not be possible for future research to accurately identify the links between culture and its 
consequences. Whilst these findings were excluded from the main body of the current 
research, future research which seeks to quantify the relationships between contextual and 
cultural factors, and behaviours and outcomes, should be conducted with an awareness of 
these factors.  
A.2  INDIVIDUAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED WITHIN STUDY ONE 
Throughout the Study One literature review, a number of individual factors were 
identified which had been previously demonstrated to influence safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry. The following section examines each of these findings with relevance to 
crash outcomes, non-driving injuries and health outcomes within heavy vehicle industries.  
A.2.1 Individual factors and crash outcomes within previous literature 
A number of individual factors were identified in the literature as being related to crash 
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outcomes. Whilst culture is typically considered to be comprised of shared factors, and 
contextual influences typically affect a number of people, it is important to be aware of 
individual differences that may affect crash outcomes. As these factors fall outside of the 
presented model of safety culture they will only be briefly discussed but are nonetheless 
important to safety. The individual factors identified in the literature which were seen to 
influence crash outcomes included general health, lifestyle-related health, demographic 
variables and driver history. 
A.2.1.1. General health 
Brodie et al’s (2010) exploration of coroners’ recommendations from fatal crashes 
found that the requirement of truck drivers to report health issues was one of a number of key 
recommendations. Poor physical health has been seen to be correlated with poor sleep and 
sleepiness whilst working (Braeckman et al., 2011). Further, medication use has been seen to 
predict falling asleep at the wheel (Heaton et al., 2008). Additionally, however, poor mental 
health, in the form of depression, has been seen to increase the chance of crashes and near 
misses by between four and five times (Hilton, Staddon, Sheridan, & Whiteford, 2009). 
Lifestyle-related health issues form a specific subcomponent of health issues which can 
significantly influence crash outcomes. Lifestyle-related health factors found to influence 
crash outcomes included obesity, and sleeping patterns and problems. 
Obesity. Anderson et al. (2012) conducted a longitudinal study of 744 truck drivers 
recruited by a single firm and found a strong correlation between obesity and crash rates. 
Similarly, Cantor et al. (2010) examined driver-related factors and crashes and also found a 
link between obesity and crashes. The manner in which obesity is linked to crashes is not 
clear, however, research has shown that obesity is linked to fatigue (Cui et al., 2009; Lemos 
et al., 2009; Wiegand, Hanowski, & McDonald, 2009). Similarly, it has been seen that diet 
and exercise, two major components related to obesity, are linked with fatigue and crashes, 
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with drivers finding it hard to include exercise and healthy eating due to the confines of long 
hours and life on the road (Moreno, Louzada, Teixeira, Borges, & Lorenzi‐Filho, 2006; 
Snyder, 2012). 
Sleep patterns and problems. Fatigue has already been identified as a major safety 
concern in heavy vehicle drivers. Canani et al. (2005) assessed sleepiness in 438 Brazilian 
truck drivers. A number of sleep complaints were identified including insomnia (26.6%), 
loud snoring (45%) and witnessed apnoea (7.6%). Twenty-two per cent of drivers reported 
falling asleep while driving and 2.8% of subjects indicated falling asleep daily or almost 
daily. Such sleep problems have also been found by a number of other authors. Sleep apnoea 
is one of the most common sleep disorders that has been shown to affect fatigue and fatigue-
related incidents (Braeckman et al., 2011; Lemos et al., 2009). Additionally, non-specified 
sleep disordered breathing (Cui et al., 2009; Sakurai, Cui, Tanigawa, Yamagishi, & Iso, 
2007) and snoring has also been seen to be common in truck drivers and linked with fatigue 
outcomes (de Pinho et al., 2006; Moreno et al., 2006). Another common sleep-related factor 
associated with fatigue is sleep duration. A number of studies indicated that low sleep 
duration and quality were associated with fatigue-related outcomes (P. H. Gander et al., 2006; 
Heaton et al., 2008; Maldonado et al., 2002; McCartt et al., 2008; McCartt et al., 2000; 
Morrow & Crum, 2004; Sabbagh-Ehrlich et al., 2005). 
A.2.1.2. Demographics 
A number of demographic variables were also seen to influence crash outcomes. These 
included age, marital status, ethnicity and gender. The age of drivers has regularly been 
shown to influence crash rates and severity (Cantor et al., 2010; F. Chen & Chen, 2011; 
Duke, Guest, & Boggess, 2010; Stein & Jones, 1988). Typically, it has been shown that both 
the youngest and oldest of drivers have the highest rates of crashes, with many indicating that 
decreased cognitive ability at older ages and both a lack of experience and higher risk taking 
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at younger ages are responsible for the pattern. In addition to the direct effect of age on crash 
outcomes, age has also been seen to be related to fatigue, though the direction of this 
relationship has been seen to differ between studies (Baas et al., 2000; Braeckman et al., 
2011; de Pinho et al., 2006; McCartt et al., 2000). Lastly, da Silva et al. (2009) found that age 
was protective against drug use in Brazilian truck drivers. 
Whilst only one study was found which highlighted both ethnicity and marital status as 
relevant to crash outcomes, it is still worth briefly mentioning these factors. Mir et al. (2012) 
compared drug and alcohol use in 857 commercial drivers in Pakistan. As was indicated 
when discussing drugs and alcohol as a risky behaviour, truck drivers were found to use more 
alcohol and cannabis whilst driving than other drivers. In this study it was found that certain 
ethnicities were more likely to use these substances. Additionally, whilst unmarried and 
married drivers showed similar substance use patterns, divorced and widower drivers were 
seen to have significantly higher substance uses. It is thus clear that background factors 
related to a driver’s heritage and family can also play a role in determining crash-related 
outcomes. 
The gender of drivers was also seen to play a role in crash outcomes. This is interesting 
as, at least within Australia, female truck drivers are much rarer than male truck drivers. It 
has been seen that male truck drivers pose a higher risk for crashes (Cantor et al., 2010), 
which is consistent with road safety research which commonly shows males are a higher risk 
for crashes. Interestingly, despite the greater tendency towards crashes for males, Chen and 
Chen (2011) found that female truck drivers experienced more severe injuries than male truck 
drivers. It is thus clear that the gender of drivers is differentially involved in both crash 
occurrence and severity. 
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A.2.1.3. Driver History 
Lastly, the past experiences of drivers can play a significant role in crash outcomes. As 
previously indicated, a lack of driving experience in younger drivers has been indicated to be 
responsible for their increased levels of crashes (Duke et al., 2010). Similarly, however, a 
lack of driving experience may account for a number of critical incidents regardless of age 
(Hanowski et al., 2007). A lack of driving experience has also been shown to be related to 
increased poorer sleep and increased sleepiness (Baas et al., 2000; Braeckman et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, however, McCartt et al. (2000) found that older and more experienced drivers 
were more likely to fall asleep at the wheel. The contradiction in these findings is difficult to 
explain, however, it is clear that driving experience is important to consider when exploring 
safety in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Drug use has also been seen to be influenced by past experiences. Lower education 
levels were seen to be related to drug use in Brazilian truck drivers (da Silva et al., 2009), 
whilst in Australia it was shown that past drug use history was also strongly predictive of 
current drug use (Davey et al., 2007). 
A.2.1.4. Summary: Individual factors and crashes 
Whilst individual factors were not originally suggested as a target of investigation in 
the synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture, a number of individual factors were 
shown to be relevant to crash outcomes in the literature. Whilst it is difficult to argue that 
these are truly relevant to safety culture, it is important to be aware of these factors as they 
may prove relevant to organisations in determining who to hire, as well as serve as a quasi-
contextual influence which affects individual drivers. The individual factors which were 
shown to be relevant to crash outcomes were the driver’s general health (including 
medication use, mental health and lifestyle-related health problems), demographics 
(including age, ethnicity, marital status and gender), and driver history (including level of 
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experience and past drug use history). Together, these factors were seen to directly relate to 
crash occurrence and severity as well as fatigue and drug and alcohol use. 
A.2.2 Individual factors associated with non-driving injuries in previous literature 
Only one paper was identified which again revealed links between individual factors 
and injuries in non-driving situations. This paper was again Williamson et al’s (2009) survey 
of truck drivers in the greater Sydney region, which highlighted that job satisfaction and 
years of driving experience were correlated with worsening injuries, illnesses and injury 
claims. Similarly, personal commitment to the driver’s organisation was correlated with 
worsening injuries. In regards to job satisfaction and organisational commitment, it is unusual 
that these are correlated with worse health and safety outcomes when they are typically seen 
as positive traits leading to better adherence to policies. Nonetheless it may be possible that 
drivers with higher satisfaction and commitment may push themselves harder than other 
employees. Years of experience, however, may be associated with worsening physical 
condition, leaving the driver prone to injury and illness, and must be interpreted with caution. 
Regardless of the mechanism by which these factors influence injury, it again reveals the 
importance of considering individual factors when exploring otherwise corporate factors. 
A.2.3 Individual factors associated with health outcomes in previous literature 
Section 4.2.3 reviewed literature which explored health outcomes within the heavy 
vehicle industry. Within this section Buxton et al’s (2009) survey of 542 truck drivers in the 
USA was discussed. Whilst the main focus of this section was on exploring how contextual 
and cultural factors influenced health outcomes, this paper also revealed a number of 
individual factors which were seen to be relevant to health outcomes. Buxton et al. aimed to 
assess relationships between work environment, sleep adequacy and diet. It was found that 
fruit and vegetable consumption was correlated with non-Caucasian ethnicity, bringing food 
from home, and getting adequate sleep. Similarly, consumption of sugary drinks and snacks 
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were correlated with lower education, younger age and inadequate sleep. Due to the 
relationship of adequate sleep to more sugary diets, poor sleep adequacy was also explored 
revealing correlation with working more hours, Caucasian ethnicity and job strain, whilst 
good sleep adequacy was associated with supervisor support, lower job strain and job 
satisfaction. From these findings it can be seen that age, ethnicity, education, individual sleep 
patterns and even job satisfaction were predictive of diet choices. 
A.2.4 Summary: Individual factors and Study One 
Throughout the systematic literature review a number of individual factors were found 
to have an influence upon safety. Crash outcomes were seen to be influenced by general 
health, demographics and driver history. A number of individual factors including job 
satisfaction, commitment to the organisation and level of experience were also identified as 
being relevant to non-driving injuries. Lastly, health outcomes, in the form of eating and 
exercise-related diseases, were seen to be influenced by ethnicity, age, education, sleeping 
patterns and job satisfaction. The individual factors identified within Study One can be seen 
in Figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1: Individual factors identified in Study One 
 
 
Appendix A: Individual Factors  500 
 
A.3  INDIVIDUAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN STUDY TWO 
In addition to the contextual and cultural factors identified within Study Two, a number 
of individual factors were highlighted by interview participants as being relevant to safety. As 
was discussed in Chapter 4, individual factors were not recognised as part of safety culture 
when formulating the synthesised conceptualisation. The literature regarding heavy vehicle 
safety has, however, revealed a number of individual factors which impact upon safety and 
should be considered when examining the effect of culture on safety in order to ensure that an 
accurate reflection of the cultural effect is established. Similarly, throughout the Study Two 
interview process a number of factors relating to individuals were identified. As stated by one 
interviewee: “It takes a select person to be a truck driver” (Transport Department 
Representative Two). 
Whilst much of the following information provided regarding heavy vehicle drivers is 
shown in a negative light, it is important to note that many managers suggested that most 
drivers are generally good. As safety is often described in a negative light (i.e. crashes and 
incidents, risk factors rather than positive lead indicators) there is a natural bias in the 
following data regarding heavy vehicle drivers. This is simply because negative occurrences 
are perceived to be more noteworthy. Despite this negative bias, the majority of interviewees 
stressed that most heavy vehicle drivers are “honest men” who “work hard”, are “trying to 
do the right thing” and “love what they do”. Most drivers are also reported to be conscious of 
not wanting to unintentionally harm someone. 
 
They’re the same as anyone else. They’re doing a job. They finish their job, they get paid 
and go home, probably the same as any of us do.  (General Goods Transport Company 
Manager Four) 
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Despite this general positive perception of heavy vehicle drivers, a number of issues 
were raised regarding health and safety. The following discussion explores the interpersonal 
relationships of drivers and their demographic characteristics. 
A.3.1 Interpersonal relationships 
The interpersonal relationships of heavy vehicle drivers can have a significant impact 
on safety. A number of industry members referred to the relationships between heavy vehicle 
drivers and the associated occurrence of peer pressure. Whilst peer pressure has previously 
been seen to be associated with drug use in the heavy vehicle industry, through pressure to fit 
in with a cultural stereotype (Davey et al., 2007), the indication that peer pressure is involved 
in the formation of other behaviours was new. In addition to relationships between drivers, 
the relationships between heavy vehicle drivers and their families can provide support or 
alternatively added pressure. 
Relationships between drivers. It was reported that in past years there was a high level 
of mateship within the industry. This mateship was evidenced in the practice of heavy vehicle 
drivers warning each other over the radio of upcoming obstacles or law enforcement. 
Additionally one manager claimed that in the past if you had a tyre blowout or a breakdown 
you could expect other heavy vehicle drivers to stop and help. However, it was argued that 
this culture of mateship is beginning to pass, in part due to the increasing pressure to meet 
deadlines and continue driving until a rostered rest location is reached.  
A number of managers suggested that peer pressure is a significant issue in the 
industry. For example, one manager highlighted that some individuals maybe wouldn’t feel 
the need to use drugs but they may choose to “because their mates use them”. This peer 
pressure is also seen in an increased desire for heavy vehicle drivers (who are predominantly 
male) to protect their own masculinity. The desire to prove masculinity can also be seen 
through the reported culture of bullying that can occur in the industry. Whilst this may start 
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as harmless nicknames, some drivers are unable to handle it which can result in physical 
fights. It was suggested that there was a natural difference between the older and younger 
drivers, in that many of the older guys are “genuinely tough” whilst the younger guys are 
“softer”. Many of the older guys will tell the younger guys to “suck it up”, “harden up” and 
“get over it”, and make reference to “back in my day...”. The idea that drivers need to 
‘harden up’ can be perceived as an attack against their masculinity, and it is therefore 
significant that drivers may attempt to hide psychological trauma rather than show signs of 
weakness. In addition to these aspects of bullying and peer pressure, many drivers may also 
feel the desire to push themselves in order to not let each other down. The following quotes 
were provided by managers within the industry: 
“Maybe if one of the drivers is feeling a bit tired he may push himself a little bit 
harder to make that next changeover point so he’s not letting someone else down, I 
suppose, instead of running an hour late and having an extra hour’s sleep. I suppose 
it’s that sort of culture in the industry that we have to try and change... Still a hesitation 
for drivers to admit they’re tired and, as I said, that’s just a cultural thing that we just 
keep putting in front of the drivers that it’s ok to be tired and it’s ok to stop if you are.” 
(General Goods Transport Company Manager Four) 
Finally, it was suggested that there is a great deal of urban legends and mythology in 
the industry. Whilst it was believed that some of these myths may originate from driver-
focussed magazines, it was suggested that a number of drivers have a propensity for story-
telling. As stated by one manager “drivers talk a lot of shit, but some of it is true”. Whilst 
this tendency to tell stories may appear insignificant, it may be the case that the content of 
these stories may influence drivers.  
The driver’s family. The family of heavy vehicle drivers can play a significant role in 
safety. Though marital status was seen to have an association with safety in the literature, the 
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way in which a driver’s family may influence safety-related behaviours was not clear. 
Throughout the interview process a number of participants highlighted the role that the 
driver’s family has on safety. One of the ways in which family can influence safety is through 
providing direct support. For example, one interviewee who was also the wife of a driver 
claimed that many drivers rely on phone calls from their wives between 12am and 5am in 
order to stay awake when they don’t have time to stop. Conversely, family members can also 
apply significant additional pressures to heavy vehicle drivers, such as the pressure to return 
home earlier. In addition to this a number of drivers may desire to make it home and drive 
outside of driving hours regulations, despite a lack of overt pressure from home. It was also 
suggested by a number of managers that general family life can lead to ongoing fatigue 
during working hours: 
“Most of our accidents occur after a driver has had a weekend off or come back 
from holidays. A driver has to be prepared for when he goes back to work after days 
off. And that’s where a lot of our data shows that we have accidents and incidents is 
from people coming back from leave and weekends off... May not have slept, may be 
fatigue issues or inattention... Probably the biggest issue I think. 
 “We try to do a fair bit of work with our fleet drivers to try to get that message 
across to those drivers to make sure they are prepared for work. I would assume that if 
you take a driver that has small kids or something like that, if he’s got to take a sleep 
during the day or something he probably finds it very difficult to do. His partner might 
be asking him to mow the lawn or whatever before he goes. The guy’s life at home prior 
to him going back to work could impact on his next day’s work. He may have to work 
for 12 to14 hours.” (General Goods Transport Company Manager Four) 
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A.3.2 Heavy vehicle driver demographics  
The demographic characteristics of individual drivers were also shown in the literature 
to have a significant impact on safety, including ethnicity, age and gender. Characteristics 
which emerged as themes in the interview process were the age of drivers and their level of 
intelligence. Whilst many more characteristics may play a significant role in determining 
safety outcomes, only these were discussed in significant detail to warrant inclusion. 
Age. Whilst some of the differences between older and younger drivers have seen 
significant attention within the literature, there were a number of differences between older 
and younger drivers reported by interview participants. Many younger drivers were reported 
to have different expectations of work. Whilst the ‘older guys’ saw work as a long-term 
commitment to a company, the ‘younger guys’ may desire a wide range of experiences. It 
was suggested that many of these younger drivers will “rush into the industry wanting to be a 
long-distance driver”, but don’t understand that many companies want to build trust with a 
driver before releasing them on longer drives. Furthermore, it was suggested that whilst the 
older guys look after the vehicles and understand how to handle them safely, younger less 
experienced drivers reportedly try to drive heavy vehicles like a car, only want work within 
office hours, and “drive with loud music and the air-con turned up”. Whilst this description 
paints older drivers in a positive light, it is also important to note that some managers related 
older drivers to the older, more entrenched culture of driving “fast, hard and heavy”, 
breaking every rule and holding injuries as a badge of honour. 
 
Remember that a lot of these people, it’s an older workforce and some old habits are very 
difficult to change even though we try very hard to make sure those people don’t do the 
wrong thing. (Steel Transport Company Manager) 
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Intelligence. The stereotype surrounding heavy vehicle drivers is one of individuals 
with a lower intelligence level who are often illiterate. As it was phrased by one manager 
“lots of drivers didn’t go to uni, they don’t have a big brain”. It was suggested that some of 
these drivers need help to fill in their log books properly and, rather than admitting that they 
don’t know how or are illiterate, will use excuses like they forgot, are tired, or simply that it 
is too hard.  
A.3.3   Summary: Individual factors identified within Study Two 
Whilst less individual characteristics were revealed by the interviews, perhaps even 
more so than what was seen in the literature, it is evident that the factors identified are 
relevant for consideration when exploring safety culture in the industry. In particular, the 
interpersonal relationships of drivers are important to consider as they represent specific 
contextual variables which are unique to each driver. Additionally, whilst the age of drivers 
was identified in the literature, the findings of Study Two have begun to develop a better 
understanding of how age plays a role in safety. Specifically, rather than old age being solely 
linked to deteriorating cognitive ability, it was recognised that old habits may be present 
which are unsafe. Additionally, rather than just seeing younger drivers as irresponsible and 
inexperienced, it is evident that they can approach the industry with different desires and 
expectations than their older counterparts. Lastly, the recognition of lower intelligence levels 
is important to be aware of when considering potential safety interventions. These factors 
have been added to those identified in the literature and can be seen in Figure A.2. 
 
 
On average 50-53 years old... they are often stuck in their ways and don’t want to change 
things that have worked for them for years. (General Goods Transport Company Manager 
Seven) 
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Figure A.2: Individual factors associated with safety in the heavy vehicle industry – updated 
with results form Study Two 
 
A.4  INDIVIDUAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED WITHIN STUDY THREE 
Similarly to the previous two studies, Study Three identified a number of individual 
factors which were seen to be relevant to safety within the heavy vehicle industry. In addition 
to contextual and cultural influences on behaviour, each individual driver possesses 
characteristics and may have had various past experiences which will influence his or her 
behaviour. Despite the fact that cultural elements are shared, drivers may have many 
individual differences which present a challenge to predicting behaviour. These factors can 
be broadly broken into driver history, knowledge and skills, individual differences, their 
transient state of mind, and their family. In Company C however, only the driver’s history, 
knowledge and skills, and individual differences were noted. Whilst there were slight 
differences in emphasis between participants from each company, the general content of 
factors relating to the heavy vehicle driver appeared fairly consistent between companies and 
there appears to be no reason why factors which received little attention in some companies 
should not equally apply. It is important to note that, due to the manner in which this 
information is obtained (relying strongly on first person accounts and descriptions of others), 
the case studies did not identify many of the individual factors that have appeared in previous 
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literature through associating specific factors with crash and injury rates or through targeted 
use of specific questionnaires. The following section presents the results pertaining to 
individual factors which were seen to influence safety within the case studies.  
A.4.1 Driver history  
Drivers may come to a transport company with a wide range of past experiences within 
the industry. In fact, the vast majority of the drivers at the studied companies had been 
employed within the industry prior to entering the service of the companies which were 
studied. It was indicated by the manager of Company C that “there are some people I would 
never employ”, particularly due to the manner in which they drive a truck, arguing that “a lot 
of that depends on who they drove for before”. Whilst the examples provided by the manager 
centred upon negative past experiences, one driver from Company C also indicated that past 
experiences can provide significant benefits to a driver by equipping them to safely drive a 
truck in a number of situations. The driver stated that due to previous experience in logging, 
he was required to learn to avoid crashes as in the event of a crash with a logging truck the 
driver is at a higher risk of death or injury. 
 
During drivers’ past years within the industry they may have received differing levels 
of training through other transport companies.  For example one manager from Company A 
indicated that drivers may have previously received training in fatigue management. 
 
They drive to standard hours yeah. We get some who come through saying that they’ve got 
BFM but legally they can’t do BFM for us until they’ve sat our BFM course. (Company A 
Manager Two) 
 
Used to do logging, it’s an education in driving, with logs you don’t get a second chance... 
if you have an accident they slide forward into the cab... the thing to look at is stopping 
yourself from being in a crash. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
Appendix A: Individual Factors  508 
 
Additionally, drivers may have a varied history of education from sources outside of 
the industry. It was noted within Company B that it is important to look beyond simply years 
of experience and licences. It was argued that due to weaknesses in the licensing system a 
driver may be licensed for a vehicle for which they have no related experience. Further, 
whilst a driver may have many years’ experience driving trucks, differences between truck 
and load types can mean that a driver does not possess the required set of skills for a given 
job. It was therefore indicated that it is necessary to understand the experience of a given 
driver in order to ensure the driver is capable of a given task. 
 
I have a lot of problems with people coming down with B-double licences and all this and 
they can’t drive a single trailer with steel. You know 25 tonne of steel on is a little bit 
different to handle on a trailer than 22 tonne of Weetabix, do you know what I mean? It’s a 
whole different aspect you know. Especially when they’re about 20m and all that, because 
they’re long and they get trailers out 20m and they’re 3.2 wide, sometimes 3.3.... Whole 
different ball game. Like we’ve had a lot of drivers come here with B-double licences and 
couldn’t drive a body truck you know. I believe that goes back to the government. You can 
hold a HR licence in Queensland, go and pay $3000 to “Major” or whoever does “B-
double national”, or whoever does that, of a weekend, and come out a B-double driver. 
And yet you’ve never driven a trailer, why’s that? So I believe if you’re going to become a 
B-double driver in Queensland, I know I used to it in NSW and I got my artic licence, you 
had to drive for years, as a 21-year-old, say I think it was three years before you could 
actually step up and go for your thing like that. And I believe you should have to drive a 
single trailer before you can sit for your B-double.  Say two years, let’s say that. If you 
were going around in a HR pushing 12 to 14 tonne around to pushing 86. Friday afternoon 
you stop the truck and you’re pushing 12 tonne of steel. Monday morning you’re in a –  
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In addition to previous driving and training experience, drivers’ experiences working 
for other companies may influence their behaviour and expectations within a new company. 
A number of drivers mentioned the negative experiences they had in previous companies. 
One Company A driver stated that when he raised certain safety concerns with a past 
employer he was victimised and eventually had to leave the company. In this case, the driver 
was pleased with the requirements placed on him by Company A and was happy to comply. 
Conversely, other drivers’ experiences may have jaded them in their approach to working for 
Company A. For instance, one Company A driver indicated that a past employer had made 
unsafe demands on him and fired him for refusing to comply. This driver then suggested that 
you “have gotta cover your arse in this job”. The driver even stated that he had previously 
made multiple unfair dismissal claims against companies. In this case, these past experiences 
appeared to lead the driver to take a very individualistic approach to work, rather than feeling 
part of the company he works for at a given time. 
The final component of a driver’s history which was identified in the case study was his 
or her past experience of near misses and incidents. Whilst this is clearly related to the 
tendency for experiential learning within the industry, this is comprised of the actual 
experiences that an individual driver has had. Examples of these experiences and their 
influence include not driving under the influence of alcohol after a drunk driver crashed with 
their truck, leaving additional space in traffic due to previously witnessed erratic car drivers 
and being more aware of fatigue after having near misses. 
A.4.2 Knowledge and skills 
Due to drivers’ past experience within the industry and other industries, and the training 
they have received, they may have a vastly different skill set and knowledge base. Despite 
– truck pushing 86 tonne of steel. Where’s the go, where’s the experience and that’s where, 
I think, where the government falls down badly in Queensland. (Company B Trainer One) 
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extensive experience attained over years of service, it was noted by one Company A driver 
that “so many guys want to get out of the industry but it’s all they know”. The common 
pathways where drivers gain skills and knowledge are organised training courses (such as 
fatigue management and licensing courses) and driving and work experience.  
Whilst the history of each driver is unique, it was noted within each company that many 
drivers have similarities in terms of their skills and knowledge base. For instance it was 
argued that many drivers either have a lower academic intellect or simply a lack of formal 
education. This was not to indicate that drivers are unintelligent, but rather that much of their 
skills and knowledge come from years of practical experience within the workforce. In 
Company C it was particularly noted that many drivers are illiterate but have compensated for 
this by developing their memory to a high enough level that they can remember the locations 
of graziers and agents without relying on maps or directions. 
 
The primary issue with this informal mode of education is that drivers may have habits 
and ideas which may be out-dated or dangerous. It is for this reason that a director of 
Company B indicated training is necessary to bring drivers up to current practices. 
 
I think education. We try to educate. I think the level of people that come into the industry 
aren’t the smartest. Not all the time, there are some very smart people, but most of the time 
these are people who haven’t been successful at school, who have just floated through life 
and have just wound up going well I can drive a truck because I can drive a car or I like 
driving, I like being away from people, I like being my own person and just doing my –  
And I'm like that. Like I’ll say you know it’s 10k down this road and turn after that like that. 
I could go there and take you straight to it, but I probably couldn’t tell you how to find it. I 
mean I wouldn’t be able to say you go seven grids and turn left. Because I’ve never counted 
the bloody grids. I mean I know where to go. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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Despite low levels of formal education, drivers often develop skills specifically needed 
in the industry. It was evident throughout the case study of Company B that drivers require a 
number of specific skills and knowledge. As put by one driver from company B, “truck 
drivers are not just truck drivers, they have to be multi-skilled”. There are many skills needed 
by drivers, ranging from those related to driving ability, such as being able to safely control 
the vehicle and accurately judge stopping distances, to those specific to certain loads, such as 
the ability to operate a crane. A number of drivers from each company discussed these skills 
which they suggested indicated that it’s not possible to be ‘a dumb truck driver’. 
 
– stuff, no one tells me what to do. It’s a little bit of that thought process, they’re generally 
older generation. Most of the older generation are very smart men but they haven’t finished 
high school and they say, I haven’t got a high school degree. So we try and do some 
education stuff just to get them back into what is current practices or what are different 
ways. And what I say to them is they know their job, they have done it for so many years, 
they don't need to be the smartest man on the earth to do it very well because they’ve 
refined it. (Company B Director) 
 
All the public thinks is that they are dumb truck drivers... You can’t be a dumb truck 
driver... there are none...  Some jobs you need to guess the weight of goods to make the 
weight even across the axels... You’ve got to read the minds of other drivers... Always 
trying to work out who the next idiot is... Without a buffer zone you can wipe out cars ... 
Your awareness needs to be spot on... Check left and right and decide in a split second... 
Going down hills if you select the right gear and use compression braking you shouldn’t 
speed up... On certain hills if you use a foot break you will get fined... You’ll burn out your 
brakes too quick. (Company A Driver Three) 
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Whilst differences in such capabilities will be briefly discussed when examining 
individual differences, it is important to note that many drivers have developed a significant 
set of skills and knowledge which enables them to understand the job they do. One manager 
from Company B even indicated that due to his own lack of experience driving a truck he 
often relies on his drivers to inform him of the requirements of certain jobs. 
 
In regards to general skills required by all drivers, it was noted by one driver from 
Company C that a driver must be able to understand the basic mechanics of a truck in order to 
accurately conduct mechanical checks on the truck. 
 
In Company C, however, the majority of noted skills related to livestock-specific 
factors. As put by one Company C driver, “you’ve gotta understand cattle and understand 
moving freight”. Similarly, another driver stated that when transporting livestock it is 
important to understand the different sizes and weights of each animal in order to safely load 
You’ve gotta have an ounce to check the truck properly. Some blokes just check the oil and 
water and go... some would see a tyre leak and think nothing of it... but it could be a fucked 
seal or a bearing... you could get down the road and the wheel could come off and hit a 
car. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
But I mean heavy haulage is a bit different, you pretty much discuss a lot of the jobs. Like I 
certainly use a bit of an open forum sort of policy I suppose with my guys. I might invite 
them into my office and I use a whiteboard to display the jobs and I give those guys as 
much warning as I can about what they’re going to do and I discuss that with them, even 
when they’re coming up, like these guys. I don’t have a truck licence, I’ve never driven a 
truck, these guys do. So I utilise their knowledge and expertise even when I'm quoting jobs. 
If I’ve got questions about: how do you think about this? So I get those guys in there and 
actually step through a lot of things. (Company B Branch Manager One) 
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the crate. This is important for both the driver and the animals’ safety, as an incorrectly 
loaded crate can increase the risk of a rollover and if a crate is overloaded cattle may be 
injured or die. Similarly, it was noted that it is important to assess the health of each animal to 
ensure you can safely transport it. 
 
A.4.3 Individual differences 
There are a number of individual differences between drivers. These differences range 
from individual capabilities to their personal values. It was due to the combination of these 
individual differences that an operations staff member from Company A indicated that 
‘safety’ is not the same for each driver. When asked what a driver needs to do to be 
considered safe the staff member responded: Well what would you determine as being safe? 
Like you know you can probably get 10,000 different answers as what is being safe... It’s 
what the individual himself is classified as being safe (Company A Operations Staff 
Member). 
In terms of the capabilities of drivers, within Company B it was noted that different 
capabilities are required for different loads. For example, it was noted that within heavy 
haulage drivers need a certain level of common sense and intellect to be able to accurately 
determine the capabilities of the load being carried. For this reason it was indicated that not 
all drivers are capable of conducting this form of work. 
 
If he shows that he’s got it doing the line haul and he’s interested in doing that heavy 
haulage, if you think that you know we can try and train him up to it, well it’s like anything, 
you know, you like to try and train your own guys up to sort of make that level. But in all –  
You need to be able to estimate the weights of the cattle to load the trailer, and the size; if 
you overload a pen some will fall and get trampled... You’ve gotta inspect the health of the 
animals to see if they are healthy enough to travel. (Company C Driver Two) 
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Similarly, with craned loads it was indicated that drivers must be able to carefully 
operate the crane to avoid potential damage to the truck. It was stated that despite offering 
significant training to drivers, some drivers are simply incapable of safely operating a crane. 
 
Fatigue was one of the key areas that organisational staff members in Company A 
referenced as susceptible to the differences between drivers. It was often suggested that 
different drivers have different requirements for rest and sleep and that, due to this, it is not 
possible to simply apply a predetermined framework for fatigue on drivers. This is not to 
suggest that the company felt that driving hours legislation didn’t apply to it, but rather that 
even when adhering to these restrictions drivers are not always capable of working. 
– honesty it’s probably one in 10 that I see that I think have actually got the nous to go and 
do it. (Company B Branch Manager One) 
 
I have some really good drivers, some really good crane operators there. They know how to 
use a valve that lets so much oil go through at certain times. So the more the valves is open, 
the quicker the movement will be so my guys are really smooth on that control so they can 
really operate the cranes really good. I’ve seen some really shonky drivers that are very 
jerky and snatchy and things swinging around and crashing into the side of their truck. I 
would never operate like that, it’s too risky. A lot of the times you’re working in very small 
spaces with a lot of people around you so you’ve got to be a really smooth operator and 
also you’ve got to be very aware what’s going on around you... we had a driver over at 
(customer name 1) that actually worked for (main depot), he actually worked with 
(customer name 2) when I was up there but he had a few issues over there so they moved 
him down here. He was actually one of my relief drivers. He went over to our (customer 
name 1). He had probably been over there for eight, nine or 10 days with two drivers. I 
swapped the drivers around. He was going to try and send one of the drivers, one of the 
more experienced drivers but I thought there might have been a personality clash there so I 
actually moved him to another driver and he couldn’t operate the crane. He just wasn’t 
safe operating a crane. I spoke to both drivers about him and they said (participant name) 
you could send him over here for the next 10 months, he’s still going to be swinging steel 
around in the air like it’s going out of fashion. So we had to pull him out of there and we 
said sorry, you’re not going to be suitable to go over there, you’re not going to learn, so 
I've given you two weeks but unfortunately you can’t go over there. So we moved him back 
into (customer name 1). So that’s kind of how we do things. (Company B Branch Manager 
Two) 
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In addition to the differences between the capabilities of drivers, there were a number 
of psychological characteristics of drivers which were discussed by members of the studied 
companies. This included differences in drivers’ propensity for rule breaking and risk taking. 
Whilst some drivers work in a safe and controlled manner, others were suggested to take 
significant risks and refuse to comply with rules. As stated by one Company A driver during 
an observation, “there are some who insist on breaking the rules, they know what to do but 
do it wrong anyway”. One Company C driver stated of himself that he left the steel industry 
when they became safety focussed. Whilst the driver primarily focussed this discussion on his 
own perceived attitudes towards work boots, claiming to be safer without boots, it is clear 
that drivers may hold unique attitudes which may not be shared with other members of the 
industry. 
 
Similarly, drivers appear to have different levels of desire for money. It was often 
suggested that, as Company A does not pay above the reward rate, drivers leave Company A 
I’m not really one for safety, I always wear thongs, never my boots... I’ve got them with me 
but I never wear them... I even used to work in steel but got out of that when they got all 
safety focussed... I’m less safe in boots, I have worked with thongs for years and never 
crushed a toe but when I wear boots I trip on everything coz I’m not used to the extra 
depth. (Company C Driver Two) 
 
Obviously fatigue is an issue and that needs to be controlled by everyone not just the 
person you know that you’re talking about but your senior staff members and schedulers 
and all that sort of crap. Need to take into account what time that bloke got in, when he can 
go out. Not only legally but what he’s capable of. You know some blokes are capable of 
doing better things than other blokes or different things than other blokes. (Company A 
Manager One) 
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in order to receive more money elsewhere, whilst other drivers are happy to receive lower 
pay in exchange for a better working environment. This was also suggested to apply to 
drivers’ attitudes towards workers compensation for injuries. It was indicated by members of 
both Company A and B that whilst some drivers want to return to work quickly, others 
exaggerated their injuries to receive further compensation. As stated by one Company A 
manager, “it all depends on the individual, depends how many dollar signs they can see”. 
This was also related to differences in work ethic between drivers.  It was suggested that 
whilst some drivers were happy to receive money for resting an injury, others simply wanted 
to return to work. 
 
Yes sure if you need a day or two take it you know but...and then you get other blokes here 
that you know you could chop their arm off and it’s like ‘oh fuck I’ve got to go to work, but 
fuck, my arm, you know ....it’s not even there but it’s still sore’. (Company A Manager One) 
 
Depends on the person. You can generally pick them. I had one person who fell off the 
truck, the trailer and fractured his hip. Fifty percent overall permanent impairment, can’t 
drive a truck today, has never gone common law. Could have gone to state claim and 
common law no worries. Never gone common law because he felt supported through the 
process. He has a job that he still works around the heavy vehicle injury but he just said, 
“I'm not that type of person. I don’t believe in that sort of system. I’ve got a payout that has 
been sufficient for me to do what I need to do for ongoing surgery”. Because he needed a 
hip replacement in the end and that came out of a stat payment. He did all that, he’s happy. 
I’ve got somebody who has a small tear that was based on a pre-existing tear but they did 
it, the straw that broke the camel’s back was here. It’ll be in common law, no worries. 
They’ve already got their lawyers involved... I’ve got some people that use the system 
because they know they’ve got money and they’re not really going to need it going –  
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A.4.4 State of mind 
Whilst the other driver factors that have been discussed relate to the long term 
accumulation of knowledge, skills, experience and values, a number of transient states of 
mind were discussed within companies A and B which were described as having an influence 
on safety. These included maintaining awareness, a good attitude, and patience. 
One of the most important states of mind for a driver to maintain is a high level of 
awareness. When discussing the requirements of operating a crane, a manager from Company 
B stated that “you’ve got to be very aware what’s going on around you”. This is particularly 
critical when driving. Driving a truck safely requires a significant level of awareness of the 
surroundings. This was stated to be particularly important due to the behaviour of cars on the 
road. As stated by one Company A driver about cars, “you never know what they are going to 
do... You always have to be aware of what they will do”. This was further emphasised by 
another Company A driver who stated that when driving a truck, “you’ve got to read the 
minds of other drivers, always trying to work out who the next idiot is... Without a buffer zone 
you can wipe out cars, your awareness needs to be spot on”.  
Due to the size and weight of trucks and the load they are carrying, they have long and 
variable breaking distances. For this reason it was stated by one Company A driver that when 
driving a truck the driver needs to “keep an eye way up in front not just right in front” in 
order to ensure that a collision is avoided. A number of members of Company B similarly 
noted the importance of awareness of hazards ahead which could increase the risk of an 
– forward but they know they can get it. Got other people who don’t believe that they 
should milk the system like that. Then we have other injuries where people haven’t even, 
they don’t even think about it. They just focus on, I'm going to get back to work and it’s a 
small part and its then back on the job. They’ve focussed on the job rather than the injury. 
(Company B Director) 
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incident. For example, one Company B driver stated that “taking your eyes off the road for a 
moment is where you come unstuck”, continuing to say that “you look well ahead because at 
least at that distance you have enough time to make a reaction”. In terms of the specific 
hazards that could arise, Company B drivers listed cars braking suddenly, cars overtaking the 
truck dangerously and doors of parked vehicles suddenly opening when travelling in the city. 
For these reasons another Company B driver stated that “you gotta keep an eye up ahead, 
always looking ahead”, and that “if you look ahead, nine times out of 10 you can see it 
coming, but if you don’t look you can’t see it”. 
Drivers also suggested that keeping a good attitude and mindset is crucial for safety. 
One Company A driver even stated that “if you can get a good mindset and get your body 
clock right you can get right to Sydney no problem”. Similarly it was suggested that a good 
attitude with enforcement agencies is necessary to avoid additional fines. Whilst it is part of 
maintaining a good attitude and mindset, a number of drivers also discussed the importance 
of patience when driving a truck. It was often suggested that when driving for significant 
periods of time it is easy for frustration to build up, leading to poor decisions. It was even 
suggested by one Company A driver that most accidents are caused by impatience.  
A.4.5 Family 
The final driver specific factor which can influence safety within the industry is the 
driver’s family. A number of drivers from companies A and B indicated that their family 
plays a supportive role in safety, however a number of organisational staff members also 
raised concerns about the demands that family may place upon the driver. Similarly to the 
pilot study, the majority of information pertaining to the influence of the driver’s family on 
safety in Company A centred around fatigue. Whilst this information will be covered when 
discussing fatigue, drivers indicated that they rely on phone calls from their wives to stay 
awake and that their families help them to plan their weekends in order to gain sufficient rest 
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and sleep. Conversely, the driver’s family can play a significant role in determining whether 
or not the driver is able to gain sufficient rest when with their family. For example, one driver 
from Company B indicated that his partner doesn’t understand how tiring heavy vehicle 
driving is and expects him to be able to be able to do significant work around the house or 
partake in a number of activities for which he is too tired. The driver stated that his partner 
“thinks I sit on my arse all day” indicating that when he is asked to conduct certain activities 
by his partner his response is “Fuck! I’m tired”. 
Additionally, however, many indicated that a driver’s family can provide significant 
motivation and support for safe behaviour. Separately to fatigue, one driver from Company B 
described the manner in which his partner supports and encourages him to live a healthy 
lifestyle. The driver argued that due to the nature of work on the road he previously would eat 
unhealthily and smoke. However, after suffering a heart attack, the driver indicated that he 
had been required to make significant lifestyle changes to improve his health. The driver 
stated that his wife was a significant encourager of these lifestyle changes. 
Further, it was often indicated by drivers from Companies A and B that their family 
provides a strong motivation for remaining safe. A number of drivers indicated that they 
avoid certain unsafe practices and behave in a careful manner in order to prevent their family 
from the loss of a grandfather, father, husband or son. In this way the family appear to give 
additional motivation to drivers to value their own safety.  
 
Better to get there late than not at all... Have run off road a few times from being too tired 
and hit the little white poles... Scares the shit out of you, it’s a feeling you’ll never forget... 
At the end of the day its only freight, it can get there late it doesn’t matter... Coppers don’t 
have to call your family and say you’re dead. (Driver)  
 
I’ve got grandkids now. I don’t want to die on the road, I want to go home and see them. 
(Company B Driver Three) 
 
I try to keep a safe distance. If another vehicle pulls in front of me I slow down a bit... once 
again it’s about safety. I want to go home to my family. (Company B Driver Four) 
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A.4.6 Individual factors and specific safety behaviours and outcomes 
The following section details how these factors were found to influence the behaviours 
and outcomes identified within the case studies. As such, this section is divided into specific 
crash outcome related behaviours, non-driving injuries and health outcomes. 
A.4.6.1. Individual factors and crash outcomes 
The crash outcome-related behavioural categories identified within the case studies 
included (1) driving whilst fatigued; (2) substance use; (3) speeding; (4) seatbelt use; (5) 
general driving errors and violations; (6) vehicle maintenance related behaviours; and (7) 
load restraint behaviours. The role of individual factors in each of these is discussed below. 
A.4.6.1.1. Individual factors and fatigue 
Chapter 10 identified a number of key themes relating to fatigue within the studied 
organisations. These included factors which were related to: (1) the causes of fatigue; (2) 
attitudes towards log books; (3) the difference between log books and fatigue; (4) driving out 
of hours; and (5) driving whilst fatigued.  
A.4.6.1.1.1. The causes of fatigue 
Regarding the causes of fatigue in drivers, the contributors were individual differences, 
the driver’s state of mind and lifestyle related factors (which emerged within Study One but 
not as a key theme within the case studies). The role of these factors is discussed below. 
 
 
I’ve got grandkids now. I don’t want to die on the road, I want to go home and see them. 
(Company B Driver Three) 
 
I try to keep a safe distance. If another vehicle pulls in front of me I slow down a bit... once 
again it’s about safety. I want to go home to my family. (Company B Driver Four) 
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A.4.6.1.1.1.1. Individual differences between drivers 
Individual differences were described in section A.4.3, and one of the major differences 
noted was the different tolerances for certain activities before feeling fatigue. It was for this 
reason that one organisational staff member form Company A suggested that ‘safety’ is 
different with each individual and comes down to what “the individual himself is classified as 
being safe”. 
 
Similarly, however, it was noted by a number of drivers that every driver is different, 
and that even on a given day there can be differences in how far a driver can go before 
needing to rest. One Company A driver stated that “sometimes you need a nap after 1.5 
hours, sometimes you can go straight to Sydney with only the regulated breaks”. It was due 
to both general individual differences, and day-to-day differences, that it was commonly 
You know some blokes do this job standing on their head, it’s not a problem. Run down the 
road every night just like you go to your job every day and I come and sit at my computer 
every day, doesn’t affect them you know. They can do six thousand ks a week and sweet, do 
it standing on their head.  But then there’s other blokes that just shouldn’t be truck drivers 
because they’re a danger to themselves and everyone around them because they’re just not 
meant to be awake all night doing 100kmh everywhere. I mean it’s the same as any job. 
Some people are made for it, some people can kind of get away with it and some people just 
can’t do it. And driving trucks is no different, especially being awake at night time is no 
different you know. I don’t have a problem staying awake for stupid amounts of hours or all 
night and all day and all night again or whatever, doesn’t affect me at all. Some people 
would shake their head because they can’t get past one day or something. That’s just how 
your body works. I suppose it’s just what you’re used to, it’s just what you’re capable of 
doing. (Company A Manager One) 
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suggested that rostering of drivers needs to be flexible and take into account these 
differences. 
 
A.4.6.1.1.1.2. The driver’s state of mind 
The driver’s state of mind may be one of the factors which contribute to daily 
differences in fatigue tolerance. Whilst the driver’s state of mind was typically more 
connected to awareness in avoiding incidents, it was stated by one driver from Company A 
that “if you can get a good mindset and get your body clock right you can get right to Sydney 
no problem”. Whilst there was little other reference to the driver’s state of mind influencing 
fatigue levels it is still worth noting this potential connection. Additionally, however, it can 
be noted that this appears to highlight a notion of what is considered to be the best or most 
correct way of behaving. It could be suggested that this hints that due to the value placed on 
hard work, drivers may feel that they have been unsuccessful in properly adjusting their body 
clock, and thus have not worked hard enough. This may lead drivers to push themselves to 
drive longer than they should, as ‘if they had gotten their state of mind correct’ they should 
be able to do the trip without concern.  
A.4.6.1.1.1.3. The driver’s family 
As was covered in section A.4.5, the driver’s family and home life can have a 
significant effect on their experienced fatigue whilst working. Essentially it was argued by 
members of the studied organisations that family issues, and activities conducted for the 
Obviously fatigue is an issue and that needs to be controlled by everyone not just the 
person you know that you’re talking about but your senior staff members and schedulers 
and all that sort of crap need to take into account what time that bloke got in, when he can 
go out. Not only legally but what he’s capable of. You know some blokes are capable of 
doing better things than other blokes or different things than other blokes. (Company A 
Manager One) 
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family at home, can interfere with a driver’s ability to receive sufficient rest to prepare for 
driving. 
 
 
One Company A driver indicated that gaining sufficient rest at home on weekends can 
be a significant struggle. The driver argued that because of this, Monday nights are the 
hardest for fatigue, as on Sunday he is up all day with his family and, particularly in summer, 
it is difficult to sleep in on a Monday due to the heat of the day. Thus, when he works 
But I have a great concern about some of the drivers. Like when they’re at home, are they 
getting proper rest? Are their wives taking them out to hang onto and do the shopping and 
so forth and so forth. We don’t know what they do at home. I can control it if they’re here, 
like I can always, if I see them standing around outside I can always hunt them off to bed 
and you know shoo them off type thing but whilst they’re at home. Same as in Sydney I 
can’t basically pat them on the arse and put them into bed. And that is one of my main 
issues, I don’t know what they do at home. (Company A Operations Staff Member)  
 
Umm...in relation to safety?...got to ensure that even before they start they have a fitness 
for duty to acknowledge. So if they come to work and they’ve had a bad night, they’re 
fatigued because they haven’t slept because they’ve had the flu, because they’re taking a 
medication that may affect their driving, their responsiveness, they have an undertaking to 
put their hand up and say: I'm just not coming to work , I'm not well. We’ve had instances 
where we’ve had drivers come in and they’ve had some family issues at home, they’ve been 
visibly upset. We’ve said: no, no not in a truck today mate, you call it quits and head off 
home, get on top of things and then come back. We’ve done that for guys that are sick for a 
day, we’ve done it for one or two, we’ve sent them off and given them extended leave for a 
couple of weeks because they’ve had issues, so that’s even before they start at work. 
(Company B Region Manager One) 
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Monday evenings he is often tired. Ultimately, the belief that drivers should be responsible 
for their own safety was again evident here, as drivers indicated that it is the driver’s 
responsibility to gain sufficient rest when at home. For example, one company driver who 
regularly carries loads early in the morning suggested that managing fatigue is “about making 
sure you get home at a decent hour” as he needs to go to sleep 8pm to be sufficiently 
refreshed when he wakes at 2am. 
A.4.6.1.1.1.4. General lifestyle-related factors 
The last set of factors which were identified as causing fatigue were lifestyle-related 
choices, which whilst they were not discussed elsewhere in the case studies, were the subject 
of research discussed in Study One (section 4.2.3). It was stated by one manager of Company 
A that he had investigated the relationship between food intake and fatigue, and that he had 
been informed that bananas were one of the best foods to consume. Similarly, one Company 
B driver stated that whilst he previously did not believe it to be true, it has been his 
experience that “food affects how you feel”. Whilst there can be positive benefits of healthy 
eating in reducing fatigue, it was also indicated by a number of drivers that they rely on 
cigarettes and coffee to maintain alertness. For example, one Company A driver, when asked 
how he managed fatigue, stated simply “coffee and smokes”. Another driver from Company 
A however, stated that sleep was the most important method of reducing fatigue and that “a 
lot of guys don’t sleep enough” as they just “sit around drinking coffee instead”. Whilst it 
could be argued that illicit substances may also be relevant to this section of the discussion it 
is worth noting that this will be discussed later as it appears that illicit substances are not so 
much a means to maintain alertness as to drastically ‘remove’ fatigue which is present. 
Coffee and cigarettes, on the other hand, have a less significant immediate impact and are 
consumed regularly to maintain a ‘normal’ level of alertness. 
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A.4.6.1.1.2. Log books and log books vs fatigue 
Section 10.2.1.2 and 10.2.1.2.1 discussed the general views held by members of the 
studied organisations about log books and whether or not log books are an effective tool for 
managing fatigue. Though these views are separate to individual factors, it is worth noting 
that perceptions of individual differences were cited as one reason why the log book system 
was not effective. It was due to the perception of the ineffectiveness of log books in 
managing fatigue that driving over hours and driving whilst fatigued were considered as two 
separate topics. The following is a direct excerpt from section 10.2.1.2.1:  
Individual differences were commonly cited as being overlooked within fatigue 
management legislation. This was particularly the case in Company C where a number of 
individuals indicated that the maximum legal driving time assumes that every driver will be 
tired after a given amount of work. For example, one driver stated that he did not like log 
books due to the fact that “they say that when you’ve worked 12 hours you’ve gotta be tired” 
and this was not necessarily the case in his opinion. It was for this reason that the 
driver/manager of Company C stated that log books are “shit”. 
 
A.4.6.1.1.3. Driving over hours 
When exploring driving over hours it was evident that the individual driver’s history 
may play a role in deciding to continue driving. Above, it was argued that the individual 
driver’s personal history may influence behaviour. It was noted that drivers may come to a 
company with a range of different employment, driving and training experiences, which may 
No, no I said that. No because the fatigue laws say you’ve got to drive for five hours and 
then you’ve got to have a break and then you’ve got to do something else and then you’ve 
got to have a break. Sometimes you don't want to go for five hours. Sometimes you might 
get weary after two hours.  But the laws say you must, to get the amount of time in a day of 
driving, you must break it up into those specific breaks. (Company C Driver/Manager) 
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influence their behaviour in a variety of ways. When discussing fatigue and driving over 
hours a number of drivers discussed past experiences and the impact they have on current 
behaviours. The driver who was discussed, when examining the role of government on 
driving over hours, as having been made to work a 19-hour shift openly shared how this 
experience helped him to understand the importance of driving within regulated hours. The 
driver indicated that he felt ‘like a robot’ by the end of the shift, and thus will not conduct 
such an activity again. Similarly, a number of other drivers said that, due to the experience 
they had gained when driving over hours for past companies, they felt that it was important to 
adhere to driving hours’ regulations.  
A.4.6.1.1.4. Driving whilst fatigued 
Similarly to drivers’ decisions to drive outside of hours, a driver’s past experience can 
be relevant to decisions regarding driving whilst fatigued. This experience is also particularly 
relevant to the individual differences in levels of fatigue and tolerance for fatigue-inducing 
stimuli. As stated by one Company A driver, “you get to know yourself, and your own signs 
of fatigue” and that because of this “you know when you need to stop”.  
Essentially, this experience affects the perceived likelihood of an incident when 
fatigued. Another Company A driver stated that from his own experience, “if you don’t get to 
sleep you feel like shit and are wandering all over the road”.  One Company C driver, 
however, suggested that his past experiences mean he knows he can drive fairly safely whilst 
fatigued. But due to the additional traffic on the road in recent times, he no longer believes it 
is safe to drive fatigued due to the reduced reaction times and likelihood of crashing into a 
car. Whilst this is more a case of a perceived likelihood due to other vehicles, it was evident 
that the driver’s past experience of fatigue was sufficient to know that his reactions would be 
too slow around other vehicles.  
Appendix A: Individual Factors  527 
 
 
Finally, as previously discussed in section 9.6, the driver’s family can also serve as a 
significant motivation for safe behaviour. Thus when combined with a driver’s past 
experience of fatigue increasing the perceived likelihood of an incident, the motivation to 
behave safe can significantly shape behaviour. 
 
A.4.6.1.1.5. Summary: Individual factors and fatigue 
From the above discussion it can be seen that individual factors were significant to both 
the causes of fatigue and decisions to continue to drive either when fatigued or already 
outside of legislated working hours. In fact, with exception to a driver’s individual 
knowledge and skills, every individual factor previously identified was seen to influence 
fatigue outcomes in some way. 
 
Better to get there late than not at all. Have run off road a few times from being too tired 
and hit the little white poles. Scares the shit out of you, it’s a feeling you’ll never forget. At 
the end of the day its only freight, it can get there late it doesn’t matter. Coppers don’t have 
to call your family and say you’re dead. (Company A Driver Three) 
 
Used to work for a company in Bathurst where we wouldn’t sleep for days. Just would lie 
down on the wheel while they loaded us then keep going. I’ve got grandkids now. I don’t 
want to die on the road, I want to go home and see them. (Company B Driver Three) 
 
I have had a few near misses when tired; never a fatal though. A fair bit of that is luck, it’s 
not that I’m a better driver than others, just lucky to pull out of the near miss... then you 
think: Fuck I gotta sleep. Those experiences help you judge your fatigue. For me it is speed. 
If I start slowing down and can’t keep it at 100km that’s my first sign. You have to keep the 
pace up, you can’t be a Sunday driver. If you relax it’s game over. Well, that’s me anyway. 
Chatting on the phone doesn’t help. (Company A Driver Six) 
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A.4.6.1.2. Substance use and individual factors 
Though there were limitations in the amount of information obtained about substance 
use within the case studies, the studies identified the effects of a driver’s history and family 
on substance use. Section 8.4.4 recounted the story of one driver who was involved in a crash 
with another vehicle whose driver was intoxicated. The driver shared this story and then 
stated that even though he had previously driven whilst intoxicated he never would again 
after seeing the results of that incident. This is a clear example of how a driver’s experience 
can shape their perceptions regarding the consequence of behaviour and thus alter their 
behaviour. Whilst some similar cases will be discussed in the next section when discussing 
the perceived likelihood of an incident, it was generally noted that drivers’ previous 
experiences and witnessed events shaped their behaviour choices. However, it was also clear 
that when drivers had experienced drug use in the past without consequence, they appeared to 
have a different attitude towards drugs. During one observation of a Company B driver, 
another member of the company was met at a customer site. This driver appeared to almost 
boast about past experiences with drugs. The driver claimed that when he worked for a 
previous company, the organisation itself provided him with “half a bag of speed” and told 
him that they needed him to “go like stick and not stop”. Whilst the driver suggested that this 
was a negative event, his smile and tone of voice suggested that he was proud of this story to 
some extent. It is important to note, however, that the driver who was being observed on that 
day subtly indicated that the story may be untrue afterwards, in which case, sharing such 
stories may be more related to the cultural trait of keeping up appearances. 
Lastly, as has been previously discussed, see section 4.2.1.4 and 9.2.5.6, a driver’s 
family may also be linked with decisions regarding substance use. It was evident that a 
driver’s family can be linked with increased pressure to make money and thus drive longer 
hours; however, it was also evident that family provides an incentive to be safe. 
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A.4.6.1.3. Speeding, seatbelt use and individual factors 
Unlike the previously discussed behaviours, none of the individual factors which have 
been identified were directly linked to speeding or seatbelt use behaviours within the case 
studies. However, it is worth noting that due to the cultural assumption of the accuracy of 
personal experience and stories it is clear that a driver’s history will to some extent influence 
these behaviours. This may particularly be the case due to the importance of the perceived 
likelihood of incidents in determining behaviours related to speed selection and seatbelt use. 
A.4.6.1.4. General driving errors and violations and individual factors 
As many errors are lapses in concentration or attention, it is not surprising that 
members of the studied organisations suggested that the driver’s state of mind was also 
relevant to such behaviours. In particular, however, it was noted by one Company B driver 
that the design of the vehicle cab can have a direct influence on this state of mind. It was 
argued that “if you are not comfortable you are not able to concentrate” thereby increasing 
the risk of errors. For this reason, the driver indicated that the quality of seats within truck 
cabs is important and that, whilst the seats within the vehicle he was driving at the time were 
good, the seats of other vehicles within the Company B fleet “are starting to fall apart”. 
A.4.6.1.5. Vehicle maintenance and load restraint and individual factors 
Similarly to both seatbelt use and speeding, individual factors were also not identified 
as relevant to vehicle maintenance and load restraint behaviours within the case studies. 
However, it is worth noting that again the individual driver’s history may influence their 
perceptions regarding the likelihood of an incident and thus indirectly influence these 
behaviours. 
A.4.6.2. Individual factors and non-driving injuries 
Non-driving injuries were seen to typically result from either: (1) being struck by an 
object; (2) slips, trips and falls; or (3) muscular strains and overexertion. No individual 
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factors were found to be directly linked with these forms of injuries, however, as has been 
noted above, the significance of the perceived likelihood of an incident, coupled with the 
cultural assumption regarding experience and stories, highlights that the driver’s history may 
be relevant to these injuries. 
A.4.6.3. Individual factors and health outcomes 
Though little information was obtained regarding health outcomes in the case studies, it 
can be seen that individual factors may be relevant to health outcomes. The two forms of 
health-related outcomes which were identified within Study Three were eating and lifestyle-
related health and psychosocial concerns. Though psychosocial concerns were often seen to 
result from crashes, in this case crashes are the causal stimulus and thus a driver’s past 
history of crashes is not necessarily related to psychosocial concerns. Eating and lifestyle-
related health however, did appear linked to individual factors, in that the driver’s history of 
previous illnesses was seen to influence current health decisions. 
A.4.7 Summary: Individual factors identified within Study Three 
The purpose of this section was to outline the specific forms of individual heavy 
vehicle driver characteristics which may interact with the contextual and cultural influences 
on safety. Due to the shared nature of culture it is uncommon for safety culture to focus on 
such individual characteristics. As was discussed in Studies One and Two however, it is 
apparent that there are a number of individual factors which may interact with the context and 
culture of the industry to further influence behaviour. Whilst these factors may not be 
important to consider in all industries, nor form an important focus for future safety culture 
research, it is important to consider these factors in this research in order to understand 
factors which may confound the relationship between culture, context and behaviour. This is 
particularly the case for future quantitative research, as it may be difficult to accurately 
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examine the statistical relationships between both contextual and cultural factors and 
behaviours and outcomes, without first controlling for individual factors.  
As can be seen from the discussion of these factors, there are a number of individual 
variables which can influence safety. These primarily included drivers’ past experiences, 
skills and knowledge, along with differences in individual capabilities, attitudes and values. 
These past experiences, skills and knowledge lay the foundation for the driver’s employment 
within the industry and may significant shape driver behaviour if not controlled for by the 
organisation through adequate testing and training. Additionally, however, it was noted that 
the state of mind of a driver can have important influences on driver safety. As this factor is 
very transient in nature, it is potentially better viewed as a requirement of safety and or a 
hazard or risk factor. Lastly, however, of a more contextual nature, is the driver’s family. 
Whilst the driver’s family could have been included as a contextual variable, the very fact 
that every driver has a unique family precludes their family from serving as a shared 
influence on safety and thus can be treated as a social extension of the driver. 
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